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ABSTRACT 
Are some of the world's smallest state regions, like the Caribbean, able to punch above their weight 
in international affairs, thus overcoming limitations of acutely small size? This is the first of two 
questions that the dissertation addresses, by investigating how and under what conditions the 
Caribbean Region-an extremely small, marginal (ostensibly island) world region, on a global 
·comparative scale-routinely dons and deploys an international image qua posture in the pursuit of 
strategic international policy. Through empirical cases the dissertation demonstrates that this strategy 
is principally geared at and mediated by technocratic norm generation and political projection in the 
international system, with a view to expanding very small states' scope for recourse to statecraft and 
agency. Explanations of this kind have, generally, not been offered. The first of two principal 
findings of the dissertation is that a constellation of 'norm entrepreneurs' or epistemic communities-
what is referred to as an elite technocracy-influence, champion and marshal how the Caribbean 
state is socialized inter- and intra-regionally, per moral imperatives. This study determines that this 
dual 'socializing' engagement is profoundly informed by elite technocrats operating in regional and 
national bureaucracies who draw attention to and seek accommodation as regards the treatment of 
clusters of states, in the light of the relative mismatch of size and associated material disparities. The 
dissertation showcases how collective norms and common regional identity or like-mindedness 
(expressed through regionness) are reified in Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism (as relates to the 
negotiation and implementation of trade agreements, specifically), whilst they are seemingly 
disrupted in aspects of Caribbean regional integration. The fact is, systematic scholarly study of 
small state Global South regions' constitutive role in norm generation and, importantly, in the use of 
norms to 'level the playing field' has been elusive. The dissertation contributes to filling this gap, 
building not on standard neorealist accounts-which fall flat-but rather on social constructivism, 
Social Identity Theory (SIT), the discourse-theoretic approach of poststructuralism and, to some 
extent, Habermas' social theory. Taken together, these theoretical referents are compelling in 
analyzing the priority accorded regional identity in very small states' diplomacy. 
The Caribbean has been pivoted as an 'ideational' actor at a time when many larger 
states/regions-often with competing geopolitical interests-have seemingly placed considerable 
stock in soft power, with a view to maneuvering to claim increased space and thus boost their 
standing in global politics as normative powers. In this context, focusing in on the European Union 
(EU), the second dimension of the two-tiered puzzle the dissertation unravels is whether through the 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the Caribbean, the EU seeks to promote its vision of 
the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 'official' Caribbean region-building project. The 
dissertation argues that the EU has seen fit to advance a particular notion of the identity-based 
boundedness of the Caribbean as a regional configuration, inclusive of the Dominican Republic. In 
the process the study also examines how the EU leverages its normative power, gauging how this 
reinforces the EU as a global actor and elucidating policy implications therein for the Caribbean 
Region as delimited for the purpose of the EPA. 
The dissertation determines that theorizing small, marginal world regions like the Caribbean 
as 'social constructs' provides conceptual purchase, and serves as an analytical device that more 
accurately captures and contributes to an understanding of the soup<;on of negotiating savvy in 
regionalist engagements in which such states are involved than do materialist, rationalist approaches 
and attendant parsimonious explanations. It is shown that the Caribbean has a growing, purposeful 
reliance on (inter)regionalism-cum-norms in the exercise of strategic international policy-Le. 
regional interactions and representations, with a view to extracting gains. For its part, as an emergent 
normative power the EU is increasingly relying on the norm-based exercise of actorness to achieve 
its own ends, which are deemed to be not altogether unproblematic. 
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If there is one undeniable truth derivingfrom the total West Indian historical 
experience, it is that, whatever the task, we do it better if we do it together. 
DME FOR ACTION, Report of the West Indian Commission (1992, 90) 
Introduction 
Toward an Explanation of the 'Puzzle' and a New Research Agenda for the Study of 
Caribbean Regionalism 
I. Purpose and Importance of the Study 
Established rationalist, materialist explanations in International Relations (IR)1 have tended to 
ignore the world's smallest state regions. When the latter are given passing mention by realist 
and other conventional IR perspectives, they are thought to be poorly placed to 
independently/meaningfully achieve foreign policy ends. Indeed any possible dint of a winning 
negotiating strategy with respect to so-called 'under-dog' states, especially when they are up 
against larger states, tends to be written off. 
In addition to paying scant attention to these kinds of states, structural realism is 'hard-
wired' to overemphasize materialist explanations of the foreign policy behaviour of states. 
Stemming from this default position, the international system is showcased as the 'independent 
variable' with respect to state-derived foreign policy outcomes. More profoundly, the ideational 
backdrop of or, crudely put, the role of ideas and the intersubjectivity of identity with respect to 
international interactions involving the world's smallest state regions is not taken into account by 
realist-oriented explanations of that ilk. Yet, the foreign policy behaviour of states cannot be 
properly or accurately understood apart from ideas-driven behavior. 
Owing to the fact that neo-realism continues to be extraordinarily influential and the 
paradigm of choice-in the mainstream current, no less-of (North American) IR scholarship, 
the strategic (ideas-driven) behavior of some of the world's smallest states is generally hidden 
from view. Where systematic scholarly attention in this vein is absent, hyperbolic depictions of 
the foreign policy behaviour of small states tend to run rife in mainstream explanations, which 
1The abbreviation 'IR' denotes the academic discipline. 
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present an unflattering vision of these states' lot in global politics. 
Simply put, in the overall scheme of things, these groupings of states are deemed as 
'inconsequential' in the so-called hierarchical international system by perspectives that miss the 
mark. In fairness, such theories are not well equipped to analyze these types of world regions in 
the first place. 
What such approaches lack in explanatory value with respect to especially small world 
regions, like the Caribbean, some of recent vintage more than make up for. Socialization 
perspectives, which have mushroomed since the early 1990s and stand in sharp contrast to 
materialist perspectives, suggest small states should not be underestimated. 2 Instructively, the 
ascension of social constructivism3 in IR has opened new pathways for the study of interstate 
relations. Of note, it has profoundly impacted: (i) how international politics is understood and 
explained; and, (ii) the study of certain kinds of actors in the international system, otherwise 
marginalized in mainstream international studies. In point of fact, constructivism has expanded 
the horizons for theoretically guided inquiry of small states in the international system. 
That small state studies in IR has been reprised over the last two or so decades owes 
much, then, to the fact that constructivism's footprint has grown ever larger in the discipline 
(Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 14-15). Structural realism's explanatory appeal, on the other hand, 
has been abraded in that period. Put plainly constructivist approaches have had a strong bearing 
and salutary effect on the advance of small state-related IR scholarship (which came into its own 
in the 1960s ), albeit taken up largely with sets of countries of the Global North (see Ingebritsen 
2 In taking identity, ideas and international norms seriously, social constructivism holds open the possibility that 
small states can be theorized as also being able to bring influence to bear in international affairs (Neumann and 
Gstohl 2006, 14). In point of fact, if it is that "not only relative power and/or international institutions matter, but 
also ideational factors, small states may gain new room to maneuver in their foreign policy" (Ibid., 14). 
3 Hereinafter, social constructivism will be referred to as constructivism. 
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et al 2006). 
Constructivist-informed empirical research on the Global South and by academics from 
that part of the world has historically placed a distant second in comparison, and even then there 
is geographical bias. For instance, Southeast Asia has attracted a disproportionate amount of 
scholarly attention (see, for instance, the work of Acharya (2001)). Smaller Global South 
regions, like the Caribbean, have not attracted research attention with respect to international 
affairs themed issues along these lines, even though the theory and policy-relevant 'fruits' of such 
a focus stand to be bountiful. 
A notable exception is Lana Wylie's recent volume Perceptions of Cuba: Canadian and 
American Policies in Comparative Perspective (2010), which adopts a constructivist approach to 
analyze the markedly different state and non-state 'perceptions' that Canada and the United States 
have of a country in the 'Wider Caribbean', Cuba, following the 1959 Cuban revolution. She 
traces these different perceptions to divergent national identities, and in this vein argues that the 
Canadian approach to Cuba has been to constructively engage the island, while the United States 
has historically adopted the opposite approach, to "other" Cuba. 
Instead, research on the Caribbean has over the last decade tended to utilize 
postcolonial/reflectivist perspectives to understand the political economy of the Region's 
development and international interactions (see Barrow-Giles and Marshall 2003). This comes 
on the heels of a period from the 1960s when dependency theory-related accounts of the 
Caribbean in the international system cast a long shadow over how the Region came to be 
theorized, in contradistinction to conventional, long-dominant Modernization theory-inspired 
accounts that have also commanded the research spotlight. The dissertation departs from such 
accounts, with a view to contributing to filling the gap in scholarship with respect to studying 
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Caribbean regionalism from the vantage point of constructivism. 
Very little is known about Caribbean diplomacy set against a constructivist scholarly 
backdrop. Even less is known, in this regard, as relates to the social typification of the Caribbean 
along interregionalist lines. Yet it has been acknowledged that "foreign policy is constructed by 
our perceptions which in tum have their origins in our identities" (Wylie 2010, 19). 
Instructively, the Caribbean is pursuing foreign policy ends as an 'ideational' actor at a 
time when many larger states/regions-often with competing geopolitical interests-have set 
upon to enhance their normative power. They wish to claim increased space and thus boost their 
standing in global politics as normative powers. The European Union (EU) is seemingly at the 
forefront of this effort, and it is a region to which the dissertation turns attention, analyzing its 
intent in this regard by undertaking an ideational and normative reading of the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) interregional engagement that interlocks the EU and the 
Caribbean. 
The seminal 2002 article by Ian Manners in the Journal of Common Market Studies laid 
the ground for important work on Normative Power Europe (NPE) over the last decade, though 
that work has had rather limited geographic and conceptual reach. Of note, the EU's interregional 
engagement with the Caribbean has not been framed in these terms, and for that matter the EPA 
has not systematically come under scrutiny in NPE terms. The dissertation makes inroads into 
plugging these gaps. 
In sum, this study utilizes a constructivist framework to understand the role of Caribbean 
regional bureaucratic actors (with a view to challenging myths and misconceptions about small 
state regions as passive, reactive actors) and extra-regional actors (with a view to bringing to 
light certain global governance agendas) with respect to the construction of 'a' Caribbean 
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Region. The study is primarily concerned with systematically analyzing and explaining 
ideational diplomatic postures adopted by the Caribbean Region set against recent EPA 
negotiations and the interrelated flexing of 'normative muscle' by the EU in the context of those 
negotiations, and the implications thereto. The· argument is developed drawing on constructivist 
insights and using empirical evidence, sourced mainly from interviews, to provide a more 
compelling, first of its kind account of Caribbean regionalism/interregionalism. The study breaks 
new ground regarding a constructivist research program, in this regard, providing a theoretical 
and empirical focus which, on the one hand, recasts the limits of the possible for Caribbean 
agency and, on the other, uncovers new insight into European Commission external actions in 
the Caribbean leveraging the normative strength of the EU. 
The dissertation is a contribution to IR, but admittedly it does not neatly fit there. It is at 
the intersection of interregionalism, regionalism and island studies, traversing the boundaries of 
critical geopolitics and NPE, too. Thus the study's contribution is not limited to IR, or the small 
states literature therein. Its contribution can be framed against the following backdrop: 
The work of the Commonwealth Secretariat and some other authors have gone a long 
way in opening up scholarly focus on very small developing states in the global system, 
albeit not strictly from the lens of IR, rather island studies (broadly conceived). 
Interregionalism, critical geopolitics and NPE literature have all fallen short in engaging 
with these types of states seriously, though the track record of regionalism studies fares 
better. This dissertation contributes to patching these gaps, from an IR vantage point. 
II. Quo Vadis, Caribbean Integration?: A Brief Account 
A. 'Bureaucratic-driven Integration': The Promethean Construct and its Set-pieces 
Before proceeding any further, we need to turn our attention first and foremost to the region 
which my doctoral research investigates-the Caribbean. The region, as understood in the 
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present work, is comprised of the independent states of the Commonwealth Caribbean that are 
full members of the Caribbean Community (CARI COM), inclusive of Haiti and Suriname. The 
Dominican Republic is also associated with the study's notion of the Caribbean, albeit in a 
limited maimer-to be described shortly. These are, for the most part, littoral states. They will be 
enumerated in short order. 
As a regional movement CARICOM is something of a novelty in the Global South, 
establishing "itself as a beacon of cooperation among small states" (Stuart 2012, 16-17). A high 
level of institutionalization characterizes Caribbean integration, evidence of which is the range of 
formalistic institutions and associated bureaucratization in cooperation procedures and practices. 
In point of fact, regional organizations form the cornerstone of cooperation in CARICOM, 
spanning a variety of subject areas. These organizations abound. There are close to thirty 
regional organizations falling into four relational categories with respect to the Guyana-based 
CARICOM Secretariat4-the administrative arm of the Community-and the Organs of the 
Community. 5 Taken together these organizations make up the mainstay of the regional 
4 The present Secretary-General of CARI COM is Ambassador Irwin LaRocque, a national of the Commonwealth of 
Dominica. Ambassador LaRocque is also Secretary-General of CARIFORUM, and Regional Authorizing Officer 
(RAO) in the context of CARIFORUM for the European Development Fund (EDF) pertaining to the CARIFORUM 
Regional Indicative Programme (CRIP). The EDF is the primary instrument utilized in the provision of EU aid for 
development cooperation regarding the ACP States. The Fund is also used in connection with Overseas Countries 
and Territories, which depend constitutionally on four EU Member States: Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom. 
5 Category 1 of Regional Organizations ('Institutions within the Community'): Caribbean Agricultural Health and 
Food Safety Agency (CAHFSA), Caribbean Aviation Safety and Securing Oversight System (CASSOS), Caribbean 
Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC), Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), Caribbean Examinations Council 
(CXC), CARICOM Competition Commission (CCC), CARICOM Development Fund (CDF), CARICOM 
Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), Caribbean Food Corporation (CFC), Caribbean 
Knowledge Leaming Network (CKLN) Agency, Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) (it is the most 
recently established of the regional organizations (now a legally established entity, with the signing of the Inter-
Governmental Agreement in July 2012), and is expected to commence formal operations in January 2013. It is a 
consolidation of five regional health institutions-Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC), Caribbean Health 
Research Council (CHRC), Caribbean Environmental Health Institute (CEHI), Caribbean Regional Drug Testing 
Laboratory (CRDTL) and Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute (CFNI)-into one agency), Caribbean 
Organisation of Tax Administrators (COTA), Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM), Caribbean 
Regional Information and Translation Institute (CRITI), CARICOM Regional Organisation for Standards and 
Quality (CROSQ), Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU) and Council of Legal Education (CLE); Category 
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bureaucracy, the staffing complement of which numbers in the hundreds. In the case of the 
CARICOM Secretariat, the Caribbean's foremost regional organization, there is a total staffing 
complement of some 320, of which around 140 are professional staff.6 These numbers also 
account for staff of the Secretariat's Barbados-based CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
(CSME) Unit and Jamaica-based Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN), which has a sub-office in 
Barbados, too. 
As outlined m the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean 
Community including the CARI COM Single Market and Economy, 7 there are two Principal 
Organs in the CARICOM construct: the Conference of Heads of Government (and its Bureau) 
and the Community Council of Ministers (The Community Council). 8 Assistance is provided to 
the Principal Organs by four subsidiary Organs (which meet at Ministerial level), three 'bodies', 
as well as the CARICOM Secretariat. The Organs are: the Council for Finance and Planning 
(COFAP), the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the Council for Foreign 
and Community Relations (COFCOR), the Council for Human and Social Development 
2 of Regional Organizations (established by or under the auspices of the Community, and hence dubbed 'Institutions 
of the Community'): Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP) (the Assembly is now defunct), 
Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI), Caribbean Centre for Development 
Administration (CARICAD), Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and the Caribbean 
Institute for Metrology and Hydrology (CIMH); Category 3 of Regional Organizations ('Associate Institutions'): the 
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), Caribbean Law Institute/Caribbean Law Institute Centre (CLI/CLIC), 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), University of Guyana (UG) and University of the West Indies 
(UWI); Category 4 of Regional Organizations ('Limited Association'): Caribbean Export Development Agency 
(Caribbean Export) and Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO), which periodically request observer status to 
certain Community Organs. The Association of Caribbean States (ACS) can also be placed in this category. The 
organizational categorization enumerated above (does not necessarily find expression in the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas establishing CARJCOM including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy and) is drawn, in part, 
from: http://www.caricom.org(jsp/community/institutions.jsp?menu=community Regional organizations within the 
Community enjoy a closer relationship with relevant Organs of the Community than do those organizations that are 
of the Community, in so far as it is not stipulated that the latter should necessarily report to any of the Organs. 
6 Calculation, by author, drawing on internal Secretariat staff database: 5 September 2012. 
7 Expressed as the Revised Treaty, in shorthand. 
8 The Community Council comprises Ministers responsible for Community Affairs, and acting on policy directions 
set out by the Conference it focuses to a great extent on what Article 13 of the Revised Treaty describes as "the 
development of Community strategic planning and co-ordination in the areas of economic integration, functional co-
operation and external relations." 
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(COHSOD) and the Council of Ministers responsible for National Security and Law 
Enforcement (CONSLE). The bodies are: the Legal Affairs Committee (LAC), the Budget 
Committee and the Committee of Central Bank Governors. 
For illustrative purposes (and I deploy this comparative referent advisedly) the 
aforementioned Organs and bodies can be compared to the Council of the European Union, but 
only in so far as the respective Council configurations provide platforms for Member State 
ministers to engage one another on a cross-section of policy areas and help steer the respective 
bloc's positioning in this regard. The resemblance between the CARJCOM Organs/bodies and the 
Council of the European Union does not extend beyond this superficial comparison, not least 
because the legislative body-styled Council of the European Union has considerable ability to 
make EU laws working in concert with the European Parliament. The Council system within 
CARICOM has no such authority, nor is it formulated to work in such a manner. 
These CARICOM Organs and bodies comprise the institutional structure of the 
Community, and they find expression in the Revised Treaty. In essence, along with regional 
organizations and national bureaucracies in Member States these Organs and bodies are the 
constitutive parts of what can be termed 'bureaucratic-driven integration' in the Region. 
Importantly the Organs and bodies are at the forefront of the architecture of 'bureaucratic-driven 
integration', in that they provide mandates that set the direction of institutional work 
plans/programmes nationally and regionally in the service of regional integration and 
development. These mandates are guided by strategic visioning for regional integration and 
development emanating from CARICOM Heads of Government (HoG) that routinely finds 
expression through a variety of leadership fora, principally the Conference of HoG. 9 In this 
9 As previously alluded to, provision has also been made for the Bureau of the Conference ofHoG of CARI COM, or 
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regard, there is an established arrangement where a Chairperson of the 'Conference of Heads of 
Government of CARICOM'-the Conference being the "supreme" Organ of the Community-is 
in place, the turnaround for which is six months. 10 The Chairperson is him/herself an HoG, and 
the convention is that during the given HoG's tenure the annual HoG summit (typically held in 
early July, starting from around 4 July, the anniversary date of the signing of the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas which established CARICOM) is convened in his/her country, and it ·typically 
comes to a close on 6 July. A mid-term summit dubbed the Intersessional Meeting of regional 
leaders is also held, either in February or March of each year. It is less formal than the Regular 
summit Meeting in July, and shorter in duration. 
The Conference of HoG is, then, at the helm of 'bureaucratic-driven integration'; the full 
extent of this leadership role captured in Article 12 of the Revised Treaty: "The Conference shall 
determine and provide policy direction for the Community". Instructively, the HoG is directly 
inserted into the integration milieu by virtue of a Quasi-cabinet of the CARI COM Conference of 
HoG, wherein individual HoG are responsible for regional portfolios. These portfolios consist of 
sectors that have been deemed critical to the Region's contemporary integration and 
development, and as such HoG with assigned portfolio responsibilities serve essentially as 
'champions' for integration in the sectors concerned and, by extension, initiatives intended to 
catalyze the sector's advancement in the context of integration and development. Presently, the 
CAR/COM Bureau in shorthand. This is a platform that comprises the current Chairman of CARICOM and the 
immediately outgoing and incoming Chairmen of the Conference, as well as the CARICOM Secretary General, 
respectively. Meetings of the Bureau generally take place twice a year, to coincide with the assumption of the new 
Chairperson of the Conference, or, at the very least, be convened during the term of the sitting Chairperson. 
Meetings of the Bureau also take place against the backdrop of certain emergencies, and so the convening of this 
body is, essentially, on an as needs basis above and beyond the twice yearly convening. Please note, reference to the 
Bureau here should not be confused with another 'Bureau: the Bureau of COFCOR. The Bureau in the latter case 
advances issues germane to COFCOR, in between regular meetings of this Ministerial Council. Jn the years 
following the establishment of the Bureau of the Conference of HoG, regional Foreign Ministers determined that 
they needed a Bureau pertaining to COFCOR. 
IO For the rotation schedule for the Chairmanship for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2014, refer to 
http://caricom.org/jsp/community/chairmanship rotation schedule.jsp 
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regional portfolios are: Agriculture, Agricultural Diversification and Food Security (including the 
Regional Transformation Programme and Bananas); Community Development and Cultural 
Cooperation (including Culture, Gender, Youth and Sport); Energy; External Trade Negotiations; 
Human Resource Development, Health and HIV/AIDS; Justice and Governance; Labour 
(Including intra-Community Movement of Skills); Security (Drugs and Illicit Arms); Services; 
Science and Technology (including Information and Communications); Single Market and 
Economy (including Monetary Union); Sustainable Development (including Environment and 
Disaster Management and Water); Tourism (including Land, Cruise, African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP)/EU Partnership Agreement provisions etc); and Transport 
(Maritime and Aviation). 
The Quasi-cabinet is not altogether unique. Although there are important differences, for 
illustrative reasons it can be likened to the European Council in so far as both are constituted of 
Heads of State or Government of Member States of the respective blocs. What is more, as far as 
function is concerned like the European Council, the Quasi-cabinet sets out the general political 
direction and priorities for the bloc. Any comparisons b~yond this are not practical, not least 
because the European Council is an institution (further to the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon on 1 December 2009) at the helm of a supranational project that is the EU. The European 
Council is headed by a President, presently Mr Herman Van Rompuy. Also within the fold of the 
European Council is the President of the Commission, presently Mr Jose Manuel Barroso. The 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also inserted into the 
European Council. Indeed, the Quasi-cabinet has more in common with the pre-Lisbon European 
Council that took form in the years following the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), wherein the 
European Council assumed a more robust and defined role with respect to setting down the 
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political direction and priorities for the bloc. The Quasi-cabinet plays a central role in handing 
down political directives and setting down related priorities for, importantly, the flagship policy 
area of the bloc-the CSME. 
The signing by regional HoG, over a decade ago, of the Revised Treaty laid the ground 
for the regional bloc's policy agenda in its present form. That agenda hinges, for the most part, on 
advancement of the CSME-effectively, the notion of a Common Market has given way to the 
CSME. Notwithstanding, the contemporary CARICOM bloc is taken up, too, with integration 
and functional cooperation imperatives in a cross-section of policy areas, namely trade 
integration and the promotion of economic development, the advancement of human and social 
development, as well as the coordination of foreign policy. The Secretariat Directorates of Trade 
and Economic Integration (TEI), the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
(CARIFORUM), Human and Social Development (HSD) and Foreign and Community Relations 
(FCR), respectively, are indicative of the institutional focus lent to the aforementioned thematic 
areas. 
With respect to the CSME, the main objectives are: "full use of labour (full employment) 
and full exploitation of the other factors of production (natural resources and capital); 
competitive production leading to greater variety and quantity of products and services to trade 
with other countries. It is expected that these objectives will in tum provide improved standards 
of living and work and sustained economic development". 11 Therefore, the CSME encapsulates 
the steps and process for base building with respect to the contemporary regional bloc. 
In decoupling the SM from the SE in the CSME, the following facets can be flagged: (i) 
with respect to the "Caribbean Single Market, [it] rest[s] on five pillars: .... the free movement of 
11 Refer to http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single _market/single_ market_index.jsp?menu=csme 
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goods, free movement of services, free movement of capital, free movement of skilled labour 
and the free movement of enterprises"; 12 (ii) the Single Economy dimension is much more 
ambitious (delving, for instance, into harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies) and is 
farther off, with respect to being given effect in the agenda of the integration movement: 
Concrete and positive steps toward the consolidation of the regional integration project-
though far from achieving the ambitions of some-have been taken. At a Special Retreat of the 
Region's political directorate on the priorities for the Community held in Guyana on 21-22 May 
2011, HoG "affirmed the importance of the CSME in advancing the development of the 
Region ..... and [t]hey reiterated the importance of ensuring a fully effective and efficient Single 
Market which is critical to making the Region more competitive and better equipped to compete 
in the global market place" (CARICOM 201 la). 
In assessing the status of implementation of the CSME at the Thirty-Third Regular 
Meeting of the Conference of HoG in July 2012, HoG underscored the following elements, 
among others, for "strategic focus" regarding an effective CSME: 
• The expansion of the categories of skilled Commlinity nationals, including ·the 
introduction of additional categories; 
•Adherence by all Member States to the decisions that make CARICOM nationals 
welcome in other Member States. The decisions include the automatic grant of a 
period of six months upon entering a Member State, subject to security exceptions; 
• Creating the environment for competitive production; 
• Making key institutions more effective; 
• Acceptance of the principle that Member States able to proceed with integration at a 
faster rate should be allowed to do so, provided that the door is always left open for 
other Member States to join when they are able. 
(CARICOM 2012) 
12 Refer to http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single _market/single_ market_index.jsp?menu=csme 
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However, the regionalism project has pushed up against some challenges in recent years with 
respect to the pace and depth of integration. Of note, concerted action with respect to integration 
has, at times, been in short supply. In a Summit Communique issued in July 2011 HoG also 
signaled "their intention to review the schedule ·towards full implementation of the Single 
Economy, putting a pause on specific elements, such as the creation of a Single Currency" 
(CARICOM 2011a, 2). In fairness, HoG "highlighted the critical importance of advancing 
implementation of those elements of the Single Economy which would create an environment 
more conducive to investment and job creation" (Ibid., 2). 
B. "Crucial Moments" on the Path Toward Integration and Milestones in the History of 
Integration: A Snapshot 
The contemporary Caribbean integration movement owes a debt to the early visionaries of 
Caribbean regional integration in the first half of the twentieth century, among them Dr Eric 
Williams-the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. In 1942, he proposed "an economic 
federation of all the Caribbean areas"-understood as the insular (or ethno-historic) Caribbean 
(Moore and Wilmot 1998, cited in Gaztambide-Geigel 2004, 140). As a matter of fact, today's 
independent Caribbean States have had longstanding expenence with integration 
initiatives/arrangements of one form or another that predate the present one. The West Indies 
Federation is one of the more high profile ones. 
The idea of a West Indies Federation can be traced back to the 1940s. Indeed, the 
initiative took root on the heels of the end of World War II. British policy in respect of the future 
of what were then its West Indian colonies was to link their independence with their integration 
into a federal political system (Will 1991, 5-10). The British Caribbean Federation Act of 1956 
put in place the groundwork for the Federation which was comprised of Antigua and Barbuda, 
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Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, the then St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint 
Lucia, St Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago. 
The Federation was short-lived, lasting from 1958 to 1962. Its failure and the 
circumstances that heralded the beginning of the end of the Federation loom large with respect to 
its notoriety, and in a nutshell reflect a resistance on the part of respective territories at the time 
to cede policy making authority in key areas to the Federal Government, an administrative 
structure established at the behest of Britain. That the West Indies Federation project came to 
such an unceremonious end not only affected the prospects for integration in the immediate 
aftermath, but dealt a severe blow to hopes for and attempts at far-reaching, decisive steps 
toward integration in the decades since, in so far as the Federation's 'curtain call' and the 
disagreements that led up to same have served to temper overly ambitious attempts at 
integration. 
Following the demise of the Federation (precipitated by the exit of two of its largest 
members, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and its dissolution not too long thereafter) the 
Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was founded in 1965, with the signing of the 
Dickenson Bay Agreement. Effectively, regional integration was re-envisioned. For one regional 
states sought to exert 'home-grown' notions of and control over integration, thus determining the 
limits of the possible regarding integration peregrinations. Arguably, the vision for integration 
was scaled back when regional states took ownership of the integration movement. The bloc, 
however, did evolve-guided in its formative years by a cohort of scholar-politicians who 
strongly associated their political legacies with achievements just as much in the national space 
as the regional space. 
CARIFTA would almost a decade later become CARICOM, with t4e signing of the 
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original Treaty of Chaguaramas by founding members 13 Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago on 4 July 1973. At this time some of the states had already secured 
independence, while many others were on the verge of doing so. The effect of the signing of the 
original Treaty of Chaguaramas was the establishment of CARICOM, including the Common 
Market. CARICOM came into effect on 1 August 1973, and has since formed the basis upon 
which modem Caribbean integration has unfolded in the years since. Instructively, the decision 
.taken by regional leaders in Grande Anse, Grenada in 1989 to establish the CSME was the 
trigger for the modem regional integration movement to be further deepened (Stuart 2012, 23). 
Over a decade later, another seminal event took place. In 2001, the original Treaty establishing 
CARICOM was revised. In effect over a half-dozen protocols were combined, forming the 
'Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas'. 
This Revised Treaty is the constituent document for CARICOM. With the advent of the 
Revised Treaty, there is an agreed plan for the modem-day integration movement. As to the 
future, there is a bourgeoning debate on the need to revisit the Revised Treaty in light of 
emergent opportunities and challenges. The change management process currently underway 
under the aegis of the CARICOM Secretariat and geared at the transformation of CARICOM 
will no doubt also spur this debate, given that the process (expected to span two-plus years) is 
intended to advance the vision of a renewed CARICOM and, by extension, identify ways in 
which the Secretariat will have to adjust. It is instructive, in this regard, that the agenda for 
change has two primary expected outcomes: i) A five-year strategic plan for the Community; and 
ii) A transformed Secretariat with clear goals and purpose, as well as the capacity and will to play 
a lead role in implementing the Community Strategic Plan. 
13 These states are the so-called 'Big Four' that, as such, are often looked up to by the other states to provide 
leadership to the integration movement. 
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Owing to its historical backdrop, which has been traced above, CARICOM is widely 
regarded as "the longest surviving integration movement among developing countries and is only 
surpassed by the European Union in longevity" (Housty 2005, 137). Like the experience of 
European integration, Caribbean integration has deep roots that go even further back among 
some countries-predating the twentieth century. Consider that as far back as the seventeenth 
century, confederation was attempted on Caribbean colonies (across both the Greater and Lesser 
Antilles, including Guyana and what was then known as British Honduras) by the English 
(Taglioni 2000, 213). Indeed, a string of political union-inspired integration efforts were pursued 
that involved territories in the Caribbean, through the course of the 1700s and 1800s (Ibid., 213). 
Dating to "the nineteenth century there were many proposals for federation of the British West 
Indies" (Braithwaite 1957, 133). Some saw the light of day. For example, "[i]n 1871 the 
federation of the Leeward Islands was actually achieved," though it was subsequently "de-
federated" (Ibid., 133-135). Similarly, there were calls in the nineteenth century for an Antillean 
Federation, to comprise the Spanish-speaking Caribbean States of Cuba, the Dominican Republic 
and Puerto Rico; a Greater Antilles Federation was also contemplated, to which Haiti and 
Jamaica would be added-in the late 1800s, the inclusion of the British West Indies was also in 
the cards (Garcia 2008, 58). The US's 'gunboat diplomacy' and more assertive imperial designs in 
the Greater Antilles in the late 1800s and early 1900s would, ultimately, weigh heavily in 
scuttling efforts to get the Antillean Federation off the ground (Ibid., 59). 
All told, with respect to the Caribbean 'regionalism story' it is one that surely is marked 
by actors oscillating between revival and retreat in respect of regional integration and leveraging 
it to create strategic advantage, especially when confronted by the 'guava season' (a term used in 
.the Caribbean to denote hard economic times). 
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C. Integration Peregrinations: Common Purpose, if not Common Strategic Approach 
What is perhaps most apparent in integration efforts which pre-date CARIFTA is the 'hand of 
Empire'. It comes as no surprise, then, that Caribbean peoples have been unapologetic in their 
quest to have command over their own destiny and seek to leave their imprint on integration 
initiatives. This latter narrative continues to find expression today, in so far as policy makers and 
ordinary citizens alike are seized of the existential threats facing their relatively tiny countries 
'going it alone', so to speak, in the international system as opposed to banding together and thus 
seeking strength in numbers. West Indians are quick to invoke the adage "We must Integrate or 
Perish", which was made famous by the late Forbes Burnham (former President of Guyana) 
forty-five years ago. In a much-cited speech, the title of which the aforementioned adage stems 
from, Burnham underscored: 
[T]he Caribbean can no longer, like the proverbial ostrich, hide its head in our 
beautiful sandy beaches and ignore the trends and impelling forces of change in 
the world economic order. Either we weld ourselves into a regional grouping 
serving primarily Caribbean needs, or lacking a common positive policy, have our 
various territories and nations drawn hither and thither into, and by, other large 
groupings where the peculiar problems of' the Caribbean are lost and where we 
become the objects of neo-colonialist exploitation, and achieve the pitiable status 
of international mendicants. 
(Burnham 1967, 1-2) 
European integration (the most mature form of integration, as compared to any other regional 
bloc) and Caribbean integration have a common narrative of sorts, then, in so far as integration 
has been pursued in the light of existential threats-albeit very different ones. For Europe, the 
experience with back-to-back world wars in the first half of the last century cast a long shadow 
over policymaking that set the course toward and provided impetus for integration and the 
associated 'ideational story' of a rule of law-based Europe, as envisioned by 'big thinkers' like 
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Schuman and Monnet. For the Caribbean, economic imperatives have loomed large with respect 
to the steps and process for base building, in so far as what compelled integration was an interest 
in coming together to better guard against and surmount the vagaries of an unforgiving global 
system. Caribbean States generally are committed to staying the course in their integration 
peregrinations and embracing the promise of a shared future. 
The parallels between European and Caribbean integration, however, end here. The 
respective blocs each took radically different paths, with respect to how 'high the bar was set' for 
integration. From the very outset, the architects of the European integration project had their 
sights set on supranationalism. For the most part the trajectory of modern Caribbean integration 
has been considerably less ambitious, 14 in recent years seemingly stuck in mid-gear as the 
grouping's states try to see a way forward in respect of weaning themselves from the 
'gravitational pull' of state sovereignty. 
D. The Tale of Woe or the Tower of Babel: Sovereignty and the Elusive Promised Land of 
Supranationalism 
As two scholars astutely point out in a recent work, "[t]he esteem in which Caribbean states and 
their leaders seem to hold their sovereignty cannot be underestimated" (Bishop and Payne 2010, 
4). This foregrounding of state sovereignty has had a zero-sum effect, of sorts, on regional 
integration. H. E. Ralph Gonsalves, the Prime Minister of St Vincent & the Grenadines, is on 
14 There are some exceptions in respect of the level of integration ambition amongst sub-groupings of CARI COM 
countries, notably among the Windward Islands in the late 1980s when political union was under serious 
consideration. More recently, in the early part of the last decade, Trinidad and Tobago and a sub-grouping of Eastern 
Caribbean islands pursued an initiative for regional integration among themselves. That initiative has been absent 
from the spotlight since the former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and one of the initiatives' leading 
architects, Patrick Manning, was voted out of office. In point of fact, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS)-which has an architecture all its own that is steering sub-regional 'bureaucratic-driven integration'-has 
embarked on a level of integration that has long outpaced the CARI COM bloc at large. The operationalization of the 
OECS Economic Union in 2011 has served to provide a fillip to the sub-regional grouping's integration 
peregrinations. 
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record as saying "[t]he course we have taken to view CARI COM as a community of independent 
sovereign states, that is, if we proceed without a supranational authority to which some measure 
of sovereignty is transferred to direct the operation we can still succeed but it will take much 
longer and there will be greater pain and frustration. We have chosen to proceed in the most 
difficult way to a single market and economy" (Stoneman, Pollard and Inniss 2012, 10-11 ). 
At issue are setbacks over the last two-plus decades in the advancement of regional 
governance. The nub of the issue is, to use a term deployed by a regional statesman, an 
"authoritative machinery"15 (what has been termed as the Caribbean Commission) to implement 
the decisions of HoG with respect to facets of the integration project-such that the overarching 
project may unfold relatively seamlessly-has proven elusive. Regional policy makers at the 
very highest levels remain supine on such an executive body, critics charge. Implementation has, 
as a consequence, fallen behind. The fact is in as much as action regionally across a range of 
policy areas is contingent on decisive implementation, the lack thereof is the Region's Achilles 
heel. 
For some the pace of integration has slowed considerably, as a result of the impasse on 
the establishment of the Caribbean Commission. Hence, some integration watchers contend 
"CARICOM has yet to live up to its economic integration goals" (Bravo 2005/2006, 148). Others 
are more critical. Bishop and Payne call into question the emphasis placed by individual 
Caribbean States on sovereignty, considering that they have to contend with an unforgiving 
"global political order" (2010, 5). Such a stubborn allegiance to sovereignty is doing more harm 
than good with respect to the regional integration project, they note. 
15 Edward Seaga, an elder regional statesmen and the former Jamaican Prime Minister, has said "[a]t the present 
level, CARICOM functions in pieces and patches without any overriding authoritative machinery" (Seaga 2006). 
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In point of fact the West Indian Commission's landmark report-entitled Time for 
Action, 16 published in 1992-"[ a ]cknowledging .... that CARI COM had lost much of the 
dynamism displayed at the time of its launch as a regional movement in the early 1970s and had 
by common consent retreated into little more than ritual by the early 1990s, .... proposed a radical 
step to reinvigorate the whole integration process, namely, the establishment _of a permanent 
Caribbean Commission of three former political leaders designed to drive forward the 
development of the region" (Payne and Sutton 2007, 2). 
In effect this Caribbean Commission would put the bloc on track to an integration 
arrangement transcending simple intergovernmentalism. At its core, though, CARICOM remains 
"a Community of sovereign states. "17 Hence the proposal for such an executive agency has 
proven contentious, given that sovereignty would increasingly have to give way to a 
supranational regional agenda. The proposal for a Caribbean Commission was, therefore, 
rejected by HoG who met shortly following the West Indian Commission issuing its Final Report 
(Time for Action) to consider that Report. Since that time, the Caribbean Commission has failed 
to take root as there has not been a paradigm shift at the very highest levels of the Community 
wherein supranationalism would be the preferred developmental path over sovereignty. 
All the while integration has suffered from the so-called 'implementation deficit', given 
that the implementation of decisions taken with respect to the integration project has in key 
16 The Report has been described as "essentially [laying] out a comprehensive programme of economic and social 
development for the region and then specify[ing] the institutional and other machinery required to deliver it" 
(Stoneman, Pollard and Inniss 2012, 26). 
17 The deep-seated attachment in the Region to sovereignty of states is reflected in a much-cited Declaration 
issued in 2003, the so-called Rose Hall Declaration on Regional Governance and Integrated Development. While it 
spoke to "-improving governance," with a view to "deepening the integration process," there was a reaffirmation of 
CARI COM as a "Community of Sovereign States, and of Territories" (CARI COM 2003, 2). The Declaration made 
clear "that the deepening of regional integration will proceed in this political and juridical context" (Ibid, 2). 
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instances not come about because the Secretariat has no enforcement powers, due to its status as 
an intergovernmental body. 18 That decisions are effected at all depends on whether HoG are 
seized of the need to do so and that they are willing to expend the necessary political capital to 
do so. It is often the case that the allegiance of the political directorate is to sovereignty (driven 
by domestic considerations) over supranationalism (driven by regional considerations), such that 
in the realm of reality there is often a gap at the very highest levels of the architecture of 
'bureaucratic-driven integration' between the stated desire to advance on the integration project 
and the actual steps being taken to that end. 
Ironically, HoG themselves have repeatedly expressed frustration in this regard. Recently, 
at the Opening of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the Conference of HoG in July 2011 the Prime 
Minister of St Vincent and the Grenadines, H.E. Ralph Gonsalves said that the Region "had to 
appreciate the combined and uneven development of the integration movement, which could be 
attributed to domestic considerations taking priority over optimal regional activity, and stressed 
the importance ofleadership by the four [founding] Member States" (CARICOM 201 lb). 
It is fair to say that the experience of the West Indies Federation, more precisely the 
factors that led to its demise, has had a lasting effect on the collective psyche of the political 
directorate, in particular its outlook on integration in the direction of supranationalism. 
Instructively, Time for Action concluded that political integration was a goal "out of reach." What 
is more, it rejected the notion of a "return to federalism." Rather, the Report called attention to 
"instrumental integration," where integration would be pursued at "practical levels affecting 
everyday lives" (West Indian Commission 1992, 22-25). That approach to integration proved less 
18 The CARICOM Secretariat is no substitute for the much vaunted Caribbean Commission. It is an 
intergovernmental organization, and as such has limited authority in respect of driving integration. 
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bothersome for HoG, as the 'red line' for them was going the route of the Caribbean Commission. 
They favoured the creation of a CARI COM Bureau, instead. 
The Bureau was operationalized shortly following the issuance of the Time for Action 
Report, i.e. in December 1992. The Bureau's functions are set out in Article 12 of the Revised 
Treaty, and they encapsulate the following: (i) initiating proposals, for advancement typically in 
the context of the Ministerial Councils; (ii) updating consensus of Member States, usually on 
issues that are ·to be determined at the level of the Conference; (iii) in an "expeditious" and 
''informed" manner, work to facilitate implementation of Community decisions; and (iv) provide 
the Secretariat with guidance on policy issues. 
The decision by regional leaders to put the Bureau in place was taken at a Special 
Meeting of CARICOM HoG in October 1992, and that decision heralded a mechanism 
ostensibly charged with a crucial remit that in theory should have smoothed out an otherwise 
uneven record of implementation in respect of any number of areas of import to the Community. 
However because the Bureau was created as a compromise mechanism that lacks the powers that 
the Time for Action Report envisioned for the mooted Caribbean Commission, whether it has in 
fact provided the necessary impetus for implementation two decades since its establishment is an 
open question. 
Recognizing that a lot more had to be done to build confidence with respect to efforts to 
facilitate an enabling environment in the Community that could plug the 'implementation deficit', 
HoG proposed the establishment of the Permanent Committee of CARICOM Ambassadors 
(PCCA). The Committee would complement the Bureau mechanism; in effect, reinforcing it by 
facilitating in streamlining follow-through at the level of state institutions. The PCCA proposal 
received a tepid response in the Region, and was eventually unable to take flight. That the PCCA 
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initiative was essentially stillborn did not do much to assuage concerns that not enough was 
meaningfully being done to close the gap between initiative-setting and implementation of same. 
At its very highest levels, 'bureaucratic-driven integration' in the Region is in the midst of 
feeling a way forward to secure a 'stop-gap', at the very least, to patch the divide between 
competing narratives of integration that at one extreme pivot on the perceptual and at the other 
seek to forthrightly put into practice what is preached. 
III. Definitions, Concepts and Analytical Scope 
A. The Basics 
Having examined key dynamics and features of the Caribbean Region, I now turn attention to 
other concepts and analytical underpinnings of the study. Some terminology is first explored. 
Constructivism19 and the so-called Wittgensteinian constructivists20 can provide great 
explanatory power for the study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism.21 Constructivism's attempt to 
distill "how .... states know what they want [and show, in this regard, that they turn to structures] 
.... 
not of power, but of meaning and social value" (Finnemore 1996, 2) is especially instructive for 
our purposes. So too is drawing on insights from Social Identity Theory (SIT), the discourse-
theoretic approach of poststructuralism and Habermas' social theory, all of which are used in 
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conjunction with and in order to support the study's constructivist approach. 
19 This is taken up with the study of the effect of norms on actors' identities, but also interests and behaviour 
(Christiansen et al l 999b, 535). 
20 They understand speech acts to ascribe meaning (Ibid, 535). Christiansen et al say of Wittgensteinian 
' constructivists that they are seized of the need to understand the ways in which the world is constructed. Hence the 
importance of speech acts, from which social meaning is derived. This type of constructivist is contrasted with what 
Christiansen et al refer to as the other side of the dichotomy, sociological constructivists. They are described as 
being more seized of the importance of positivist-styled empiricism as a means of exploring the effect of no norms 
on actors, though they acknowledge the 'social constructedness' of reality. 
21 I use (inter)regionalism in this study to refer, in shorthand, to interregional ism and regionalism. 
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Before we engage with these themes any further, some definitions and concepts need to 
be established from the outset. They are enumerated below: 
Caribbean Region: The Caribbean Region is often loosely defined, so for purposes of this 
study unless otherwise specified, the Caribbean is understood as comprising the independent 
states of the Commonwealth Caribbean that are full members of CARICOM, inclusive of 
Haiti and Suriname. They are enumerated here, as follows: Antigua and Barbuda, The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St 
Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. The 
Caribbean is, ostensibly, an island region (with the exception of Belize, Guyana and 
Suriname, which are continental states). While a West Indian regional space has been 
outlined here, the intention is not to exaggerate its geographic terms. Rather, I am interested 
in the social processes, as relates to shared state identities and interests, sloshing around 
notions of the Caribbean that help to 'construct' it as a region and assign it meaning. (As an 
informational note, when the independent CARICOM states are paired with the Dominican 
Republic-typically in the context of the EPA and Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)-
the regional entity is referred to as CARIFORUM. This regional configuration will also be , 
exan1ined in the study). 
Regional Identity (Formation): This term refers to economic (namely developmental), 
social, political and cultural idiosyncratic referents that together are used by agents to 
(re)produce, anchor and project the historical and contemporary ideational and experiential 
collective meanings of elements/institutions of a transnational space and its peoples, in time. 
That spatial consciousness takes form by binary relations being emphasized by one region, 
such that the distinctive meaning ascribed to that regional place emanates just as much from 
perceived discontinuity narratives applied in establishing another and in determining what is 
expected of that other region in relation to itself. 
Norm: A norm is defined as "a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given 
identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891 ). Norms can have a "regulative" effect (i.e. 
setting out expectations or standards of proper actor behaviour, according to a given identity 
narrative) and a "constitutive" effect (i.e. norms that act not unlike rules that actually define 
an actor's identity; and that actor's actions are specified in such a way that a given identity is 
recognizable to others) (Katzenstein 1996, 5). As an intersubjective belief, a norm is 
animated through social practice. 
Regionness: This is a term attributed to Hettne et al, and refers to "the degree to which a 
particular region in various respects constitutes a coherent unit" (1999, xv). It has also been 
noted that regionness effectively transforms a geographical area; formerly a "passive object" 
it becomes an "active subject" voicing transnational interests (Hettne and Soderbaum 2002, 
38). While I am seized of both of these characterizations of regionness, the second one is 
especially pertinent to this study and how it invokes the Caribbean. Regionness is applied in 
this study exclusively in relation to the Caribbean. 
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Actorness: This term is defined by Soderbaum and Stalgren "as conscious efforts to shape 
the external world in accordance with the values, interests, and identity of the actor" (2010, 
1 ). The EU is deemed to exhibit actorness, and the te1m is applied in this study exclusively in 
relation to the EU. 
Normative Power Europe (NPE): Normative power is understood in the present study not in 
terms of neorealist notions of material power, but rather as the wherewithal (which is 
understood to rest with and is framed in the context of the EU) to project onto others, with 
authority and impact, ideas of a foundational and normative nature. Instructively, those on the 
receiving end are often compelled to institutionally embed projected values. 
The EU: For our purposes, the EU is not a political community, per se. In deploying the 
term, I am interested in ontologically conceptualizing and representing the EU as the · 
'bureaucratic' actor of note, set against the governance milieu in that regional space; and so, I 
am most interested in its institutionalized form, the European Commission. The Commission 
is seen in this study as being emblematic of the EU, perceived as an administrative and a 
normative (and not so much a geographic) space/construct. The 'ideas' of this space/construct 
are projected by the Commission, and solidified by norms. I wish, at this juncture, to further 
nuance why the study is taken up with the Commission in the way that it is. The study 
focuses on bureaucratic elite actors, and on the EU side the bureaucratic actors that the 
Caribbean side was most regularly in contact with as counterparts during EPA negotiations 
were those from the Commission. This remains the case, to a large extent, in the 
implementation period. It is against this backdrop that the European Commission has the 
prominence that it does in the study, and that focus should not be taken to mean that the 
jigsaw puzzle' of institutions like the European Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice are somehow not also institutions of consequence which make up 
the broader composition of the EU (which includes states) and the range of European 
identity(ies). One final caveat: The EU which is the subject of analysis in the present work is 
also temporally specified-i.e. the EU of the post-Maastricht period (1993 onwards). 
B. Strands of 'Actors', in Light of the Levels of Analysis as an Analytical Device: 'Choosing 
between the Trees or the Forest' 
With the aforementioned terms/explanations in mind, I want now to make an initial foray into 
pairing them with key analytical referents of the study. The work of David Singer ( 1960) is 
pivotal in setting the stage. 
His review of Kenneth Waltz's seminal work Man, the State, and War let loose an 
instructive quip that drew attention to the significance of "the level of social organization" 
deployed as a "point of entry into any study of the subject" (Ibid., 453). Singer would later 
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publish an influential article on the levels of analysis pertinent to the study of IR (1961 ), which 
was inspired by and owes an intellectual debt to Waltz's analysis of the causes of war framed 
against three 'images', i.e. the first image (the individual); the second image (the state) and the 
third image (the international system). Indeed, Singer's concept of 'levels of analysis' and Waltz's 
'images' concept are, in many respects, synonymous. 
The opening salvo in Singer's 1961 piece is especially instructive. He notes, "[i]n any 
area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study 
may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systemic analysis" (Singer 1961, 77). Singer's use of 
metaphor, in this vein, aids significantly in making his point; of note, he alludes to the 
investigator "choos[ing] between .... the trees or the forest" (Ibid., 77). 
It is useful to pause here to acknowledge one of the terms in the title of Singer's 1961 
work: 'Problem'. He, no doubt, was alluding to several things in referencing this term, not the 
least of which is a "propensity" for students of IR "for vertical drift" spanning a plane of micro 
to macro levels, and vice versa, in the conduct of analysis. Of this, I am no less guilty. I will be 
oscillating between the 'trees' or the 'forest', so to speak, at various points in the study. For this, I 
make no apologies. The complexity of the international transactions under investigation has 
necessitated such an approach; it would be quite arbitrary to come down solely on and deploy 
one level of analysis at the expense of the other. 
Indeed Singer, no less, stopped short of favouring one level of analysis over another. 
Perhaps this was also part of the 'Problem' to which he alluded: depending on the level of 
abstraction, one level of analysis may be more fitting to deploy (in an explanatory sense) relative 
to another, at anyone given point. That the level of abstraction in any comprehensive analysis is 
fluid means that the "resting place" (to use Singer's terminology) in terms of the level of analysis 
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cannot be static. 
It should also be kept in mind that for Singer the level of analysis problem is intimately 
tied to the examination and/or explanation of state behavior, namely how it is to be done. For our 
purposes, this notion can be extended/applied to the Region. Namely, the level of analysis 
approach can be used to study Caribbean regionalism. 
In borrowing from Singer's insights, I want to nuance the levels of analysis concept once 
more to suit my purpose. With the aforementioned in mind, for purpose of analysis of Caribbean 
regionalism we can tum to the lens of 'Individual' Level of Analysis, i.e. ILA (seized of 
individual protagonists, elite technocrats as I call them in the Caribbean context, otherwise 
referred to as 'norm entrepreneurs' or epistemic communities). European Commission 
functionaries (namely, Commissioners arid technocrats of the Directorate Generals Trade and 
Development, as well as officials from the Delegation offices of the EU spread across the 
Caribbean, namely Delegation offices to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, the Dominican 
Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, respectively) also fall in this category. 
There is also the 'State' Level of Analysis, to which I tack on 'Transnational' Intergovernmental 
Organization Interactions, i.e. S/TIOILA (seized of unit-styled perceptions of respective 
protagonists, i.e. states or intergovernmental organizations as having characteristics/identities). 
Finally, there is the 'International System' Level of Analysis, i.e. ISLA (seized of certain global 
agendas, which play out at the behest of certain global players, e.g. the EU). As the study 
unfolds, I oscillate between all three to convey insight with respect to in-group/out-group 
socialization practices and the end result in respect of same, which I elaborate on in empirical 
chapters of this study. 
ILA is the point of reference for analysis at the level of the 'trees'. At this level of 
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analysis, the study takes its cue from Peter Haas' ( 1992) rendering of epistemic communities, 
though it expressly draws on constructivist insights. In this regard, the study is most interested in 
setting its gaze on elite technocrats operating in the Caribbean 'bureaucratic' space by way of 
intergovernmental institutions (informed by regional policy frameworks) and public institutions· 
(informed by national policy frameworks), and determining how they influence, champion and 
marshal the Caribbean state's socialization (i.e. the dynamics and practices) in relation to certain 
inter- and intra-regional engagements, respectively. The themes of regional identity (formation) 
and norms are interrogated, against the backdrop of regionness, with a view to addressing some 
basic questions: Who are those agents? Do some, such as top-tier policy makers and high-level 
technical experts/officials in regional and national bureaucracies, play a more prominent role 
than other actors in devising and normalizing in-group/out-group regionalism-based socialization 
practices, in the service of negotiating ends/policy outcomes, such as norms and accords that 
help 'level the playing field' for Caribbean States? If this is the case, can they be ranked in order 
of influence and embeddedness (or insertion) in the so-called Caribbean Regional Platform, a 
term that is a catchall for a universe of actors involved in interregional and/or intra-regional 
policy engagements with respect to the Caribbean? How can such a framing help to better 
understand the praxis of regionalism and, stemming from this, the construction of the Caribbean 
Region at the hands of administrative structures of that region, or, for that matter, an extra-
regional administrative and normative space? 
My analytical gaze also shifts up the 'totem pole of abstraction', if you will, referring not 
just to states in the first person but ascribing agency to regions. In. terms of this S/TIOILA 
approach, I engage in a level of abstraction that envisions blocs of states as the protagonists. In 
looking at the experience with the CARIFORUM-EU EPA-the study's analytical referent when 
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it comes to interregionalism-the Caribbean Region is said to have a regionness, and along the 
lines of the sociological/constructivist tum in IR theory is assigned an identity; a set of 
characteristics that influence its foreign policy behaviour. In references to the 'Caribbean 
Region', more often than not I seek to frame that region ·as 'actor'. It is not an actor in the 
semantic abstract, though. Rather, it was institutionally anchored by way of the then Caribbean 
Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM). By the same token, in references to the EU it is also 
implied that it has an institutional form upon which its agency is anchored, i.e. the European 
Commission. In turning to an analysis of the CARICOM Development Fund (CDF)-the 
impetus for understanding intra-regional Caribbean state relations in this study-the notion of a 
cohesive regional identity in respect of the Caribbean is destabilized/problematized and the 
prominence of groups of states brought to light as the protagonists rather than the 'region' and an 
institution (i.e. the CRNM), per se. Thus the strands of 'actors' identified with respect to 
S/TIOILA are: the Caribbean Region a la CARICOM, CARIFORUM, clusters of states within 
the Caribbean (such as the OECS) and the EU. 
In these parts of the study, I move more concertedly to cloak and infuse my. analysis in 
constructivist terms in a bid to decipher, showcase and instantiate socialization dynamics and 
practices as relates to instances of Caribbean interregional and intra-regional engagements dealt 
with in the relevant empirical chapter of this study, Chapter 5. Some terms that I use in these 
parts of the analysis are small state-brokered social learning, normative persuasion, and norms. I 
invoke the duality of socializers and socializees, for instance framing the Caribbean as socializer 
during EPA negotiations while the EU is understood as coming to occupy the role of socializee. 
The study's levels of analysis gaze shifts higher still, aiming for the 'forest over the trees', 
when the focus moves to global agendas, namely the EU's global governance agenda. Leaning 
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analytically on the ISLA approach, this agenda is described in very specific terms: NPE. Indeed 
the EU is framed as a normative power in Chapter 6, with a view to drawing attention to a 
particular view of the Union's role in the world.22 NPE is found to loom large in respect of the 
concept of actomess. The primary protagonist, in respect ofNPE agenda-setting, is understood to 
be the European Commission, in so far as the exercise of EU actomess occurs at the hands of its 
functionaries, it is argued. Rather than viewing the Commission as a 'black box', as set out in the 
Treaty of the European Union it can be conceived of as having two tiers. One constitutes a 
political arm, namely the over two-dozen commissioners. The second is a bureaucratic arm, 
which is comprised of technocrats. The two work in concert in effecting the EU's actorness. They 
represent an epistemic community all their own. During the negotiation of the EPA, 
CARIFORUM came in contact most with the bureaucracy at political and technical levels from 
the Directorate Generals Trade and Development, respectively. 
In terms of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, the forthcoming analysis focuses to a significant 
degree on how that interregionalist engagement is implicated in NPE and the connection thereto 
in respect of the EU promoting its vision of the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 
'official' Caribbean region-building project. Deciphering the regional integration challenges for 
CARIFORUM that stem from this delimitation is also of particular interest. The EU's 
interregional engagement with the Caribbean has not been framed in NPE terms, and for that 
matter the EPA has not systematically come under scrutiny in NPE terms; ·and so I determine 
whether there is a link to be made in both these cases, and establishing that there is I explore the 
implications, by way of an ideational and normative reading of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
Against this backdrop, simply put the constructivist approach applied to Caribbean 
regionalism in this study frames the Caribbean at once as the product of ideational frameworks 
22 The work oflan Manners is especially instructive in this regard. 
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and, not un-controversially, as the target for the transposition of global governance imperatives. 
As a 'product', the Caribbean Region takes form through discourse and negotiated understandings 
(or norms) of ideas around a 'sense of community', and out of this springs regionness. The 
influence of identity-based institutional preferences looms large, in this regard. As a 'target' for 
norm-based transposition, the Caribbean Region can be subjected to norm projection from third 
countries via interregional relationships. The study examines the EU in this regard, pointing to its 
actorness through the European Commission in deploying the EPA to achieve NPE ends. 
In sum, rather than being monolithic, there are a number of indispensable, yet different 
ways that the contemporary practice of the socialization of Caribbean regionalism can be 
conceptualized/understand and will find expression in this study. These conceptions are 
illustrated below. 
Table 1 
Conceptions of the Contemporary Practice of the Socialization of Caribbean Regionalism 
ILA S/TIOILA ISLA 
Regionness Caribbean elite technocrats Caribbean NIA 
(namely, top-tier policy makers 
- As region: 
and high-level technical CARI COM, 
experts/officials) CARIFORUM 
grouping of 
states 
- As institution: 
CRNM 
Actorness European Commission EU, as a region and in NPE 
functionaries (namely, its institutionalized 
Commissioners and form, the European 
Technocrats of the Directorate Commission 
Generals Trade and 
Development), as well as 
officials of Delegation offices of 
the EU spread across the 
Caribbean 
Source: Author. 
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C. Analytical Scope 
The present study should be seen as providing a basis for analytically unshackling small states, 
all too often portrayed by the theoretical orthodoxy in IR as incapable of exhibiting agency. A 
discourse analytic reading of representational issues around the construction of a community of 
Caribbean States could advance this type of analysis. How so? Consider that reality, as it is 
understood in the material sense, is derived from the speech act-language has a performative 
effect. For instance, elements of the material world (e.g. sovereignty) have no meaning apart 
from the "framework of shared meaning" that animates and validates them; on the basis of 
"collective intentionality" (Ruggie. 1998, 870). Indeed, many constructivists have noted that the 
'structure' of shared knowledge gives the material world meaning for social agents. 
Discourse analysis, then, can be a valuable tool for providing insight into the diplomatic 
and policy tack narrative of the Caribbean Region. Consider that, like other world regions, the 
Caribbean has had a dominant, organizing representation built on enduring narrative themes, 
which policy-making elites23 have a hand in weaving together and an influential say in 
projecting. A constructivist framework can shed light on the ends sought and strategies/practices 
deployed in this regard, with respect to foreign policy hanging so deliberately on sketched social 
realities (as will be showcased, overwhelmingly labeled as adversity-driven ones) by way of 
official texts and rhetoric. 
For the Caribbean, in the first instance, this representational self-image reflects a certain 
socially constructed reality, a commonality (but also divergence) of experience. In perpetuating 
23 There are many actors who contribute to the social construction of the Caribbean. I am, however, interested-as I 
have already alluded-in a particular set of actors: so-called 'norm entrepreneurs'; their characterization is slightly 
different elsewhere (see Ingebritsen 2002). As administrative elites and functionaries, they, in fact, form epistemic 
communities (Haas 1992). They are part of an institutional fabric that has a central role in framing the regional 
narrative. 
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an anthropomorphist narrative, as a result, the Region would consciously/purposively be 
normalizing a subjectivized discourse that informs diplomatic and policy tacks. In this vein, 
extreme smallness and vulnerability looms large as the currency of difference. The fact is, this 
community of Caribbean States is politically, financially, economically and developmentally 
heavily invested in an adversity-driven narrative, and continues to ply that narrative as it affords 
them and is an important precondition for: 
(i) Vital access to the largesse of and differentiated treatment by the international 
community, in such policy areas as trade and development. We need look no further 
than the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the role of regional institution-based norm 
entrepreneurs; and 
(ii) Norm entrepreneurs (primarily state actor-based) to play a dominant role in devising 
the norms that shape and/or define state identities and interests underpinning regional 
integration (e.g. under the CSME). The case of the recently established CDF 1s 
especially instructive, in this regard. 
The sort of treatment that obtains for Caribbean States through inter-regional and intra-regional 
relations, respectively, is secured by the establishment of norms, which are principally identity 
and interest-centered. The constructivist approach could avail deep insight into the Caribbean 
region's constitutive role in the generation of norms and, importantly, in the negotiation/use of 
norms as influence-bearing instruments of statecraft. Chapter 4 sets down a conceptual 
framework that is pivotal to undergirding the constructivist analysis of Caribbean regionalism 
which unfolds in later chapters. 
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The fact is guidelines and frameworks for treatment in respect of norms-which have 
"practical implications" (Simon and Martini 2004-05, 132)-are established in treaties like the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA and that governing the CDF; principal amongst them differentiated 
treatment. This differentiation in treatment stems from ideas of smallness and vulnerability, and 
thereby disadvantaged status, articulated by Caribbean States which resonated with others, su~h 
that the structure for the interaction between the respective sides is comprised of shared ideas.24 
The literature on role theory/analysis, as applied to foreign policy analysis, provides a useful 
theoretical framework and cognitive construct (Aggestam 2006), in this regard (see Holsti 1970). 
So, too, does social psychology and identification theory. 
Building on constructivism, therefore, rather than viewing Caribbean States as norm-
takers, they (as will be shown) can be thought of as norm-makers. 25 A strength of the 
constructivist approach is that it provides the conceptual 'tool-kit' to frame social learning and 
normative persuasion, which underpin regionalist-informed statecraft in this vein. 
In going forward with this sort of analysis, then, we must take a cue from critical 
geopolitics; which is also pivotal in bridging strands of constructivist insight with the present 
study as a whole. In this vein, if we are to think of the Caribbean as a place, we must distill what 
makes it a place in its own right. 
Massey's approach to 'place' is a useful one (1993, 66). For her, it is socially-constructed. 
As Brenner argues, "spatial scales can no longer be conceived as pregiven or natural areas of 
social interaction, but are increasingly viewed as historical products - at once socially 
constructed and politically contested" (1998, 460). In terms of the framing for the present study 
24 This is in keeping with Wendt's assertion that "the central thesis is that the meaning of power and the content of 
interest are largely a function of ideas" (1999, 96). 
25 These themes will be taken up in detail in Chapters 4; 5 and 6. 
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we can understand this to mean that, the Caribbean Region and/or regionalism is a social reality 
constructed by (often non-neutral) discourse that is typically bent on relational distinction, and is 
ultimately identity-driven. Identity, in this sense, is constituted of ideational-cum-normative 
factors, such as shared historical narratives and contemporary circumstances, values and culture. 
This is not unlike Deutsch's articulation of 'we-feelings'26 and common 'role-identity' 
(Deutsch 195 7, 5-7), with respect to gemeinschaft. It is also fair to say that the construction of an 
identity for identities' sake (or some sort of altruism) is not what obtains in the Caribbean, or any 
other world region for that matter. Ultimately, Caribbean regionalism serves a strategic purpose; 
that is: the production of regional awareness/consciousness in identitive terms and through 
social-communicative practices/processes, so as to establish the Region as a relational 
act/device.27 Its strategic purpose is to preserve and reinforce-as it will be argued-the 
adversity-driven narrative, in the service of continued access for this community of states to the 
largesse of and differentiated treatment by others. 
However, what a constructivist framework can also reveal is that this identity affinity is 
destabilized at the level of the intra-regional ideational structure, which is more deeply tangled 
up in state-mediated and anchored interests. As with interregional interactions, Caribbean States 
26 In invoking Deutsch, it is perhaps fitting to recall that he devised concepts like 'we-feelings' in the context of 
security communities. Deutsch and his collaborators defined a security community as "a group of people" that are 
bound up by a "sense of community," i.e. "a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to 
agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 
'peaceful change"' (Deutsch et al, 1957, 5). Against this backdrop, peaceful change is seen as "the resolution of 
social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force" (Ibid., 5). 
Two types of security communities were distinguished: the amalgamated security variation (which is uncommon, 
e.g. the United States) refers to states that have banded together and forfeit their full sovereignty in favour of a union 
(a design which makes for the most institutionalized structure of cooperation). This is distinct from more widespread 
pluralistic security communities, wherein state sovereignty is retained but common institutions are advanced as is a 
sense of "we-ness" and "we-feeling". The pluralistic security community variant when applied to the real world 
should, practically, be seen as subject to varying degrees of cooperation/integration, the EU being the most tightly-
knit of them all. Following a five decade-long dry spell in research on that subject matter, Emanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett (1998) would reprise the security communities concept, but with a constructivist twist. 
27 In that, not unlike self-other depictions, states in a regional grouping may also define their commonality, their 'we-
feelings' in juxtaposition to an external 'other' (Hurrell 1995, 335). 
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also leverage difference amongst themselves to extract gains (I previously intimated as much). 
Where Caribbean States do so collectively with third parties, among themselves, the notion of· 
'speaking with one voice' is not always workable. In treaty-making, therefore, at the Community 
level it is not uncommon for states to be pitted against states, or sub-region (namely, the OECS) 
against a state or states. 
A constructivist approach, then, can serve as a springboard for framing how different 
states strategically position themselves in an integrative milieu (e.g. through cooperative 
bargaining), with a view to seeking concessions in treatment and access to resources. 
With respect to the assertion that areas of the Global North, like the EU, have placed 
considerable stock in soft power (loosely conceived) with a view to maneuvering to claim 
increased space and thus boost their standing in global politics, invoking the NPE thesis is 
especially fitting. Manners has characterized NPE as the "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' 
in international relations" (2002, 239). This study will seek to examine this very important 
insight, and relate it back to the EU's EPA-centered interaction with CARIFORUM. The fact is, 
while the seminal article by Ian Manners in the Journal of Common Market Studies a decade ago 
laid the ground for important work on NPE since then, the relevant scholarship has had rather 
limited geographic and conceptual reach. 
The fact is, the manner in which the EU has utilized its policies to project norms has 
featured prominently in the scholarly agenda of the fields of European and international studies, 
which-instructively-has also advanced insight with respect to the emergence of the EU as a 
global actor. However, relatively little is known about NPE and/in the Caribbean. Thus there is 
scope for an empirical study of how the EU has sought to leverage the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, 
against the backdrop of NPE. This approach is a significant departure from run-of-the-mill 
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accounts of the EPA that are more often than not taken up with tariff and non-tariff issues (see, 
for instance, Stevens et al 2009). 
IV. The Context for a Constructivist Research Program on Caribbean Regionalism: 
Toward a 'We-ness' in States' Self-understandings and Socialization Practices 
A. Background 
The foregoing has set the stage for the analysis in the balance of the study. However, as part of 
its first steps, this study must establish substantially more context-political, ethnographic-cum-
linguistic, economic, geographic and historical-vis-a-vis Caribbean identity. Such a review is 
useful, considering that the Caribbean is often seen as a former site of colonialism, and thus 
comprised of heterogenous socio-political, cultural, racial, linguistic and geo-economic/political 
backgrounds (Hillman and D'Agostino 2003). 
A. (i) Caribbean Political Identity 
I have already indicated the 'boundedness' of the Caribbean, for purposes of this study. It is 
comprised of some of the smallest states in the world, and the smallest in the Western 
hemisphere. With the exception of Haiti, Suriname and the Dominican Republic (with French, 
Dutch and Spanish governance systems, respectively), the Caribbean States that are the subject 
of this study have relatively stable Westminster-styled democratic parliamentary systems of 
government inherited from their former British colonial master. For the most part, in the states 
that once came under British rule the British Monarch is the Head of State, represented in-
country by an appointed Governor General. Similarly, they have common jurisprudential/legal 
traditions, including shared understandings of the rule of law and human rights. 
The relative political stability of the Commonwealth Caribbean has,. in identity terms, 
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been showcased as a significant achievement, indicative of political and societal maturity. That 
experience is held up for others to take notice, against the backdrop of experiences of most other 
developing countries in respect of their move toward and embrace of democracy which has 
generally been fraught with. difficulties. The gains that regional states have achieved with respect 
to sovereignty tend to be juxtaposed, by political and civic leaders, on the 'long march' to 
independence and the associated struggle. The 'sacred cows' of British imperialism are also taken 
to task in that narrative. 
A. (ii) Caribbean Ethnographic, Linguistic and Cultural Identity 
The Caribbean has historically been a cultural crossroads, and as such is a product of its unique 
history. Several different racial groups have coalesced in this part of the world, dating back to its 
insertion into the global economy some 500 years ago. As the Atlantic slave trade took root, the 
Caribbean became one of several focal points on the Atlantic shores of the Americas for the 
transfer of African slaves. As such, ethnographically the peoples of the Caribbean are for the 
most part descendants of slaves; in some instances, descendants of European slave masters. 
There is considerable racial mixing dating back several hundred years, and the Region's 
indigenous peoples-whilst they form distinctive groups-have also mixed, to some extent, with 
other races. The arrival in the 1800s of indentured labourers from the Indian sub-continent, to 
some territories, and in the 1900s of other ethnic groups, for example from the Middle and Far 
East, have also added to the rich, diverse ethnic composition and, typically, led to even more 
racial mixing. Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, in particular, have traditionally been 
settlement countries for persons from the Far East. In more recent times, economic migrants 
from Asia/the Far East have settled in their numbers in these two countries and Guyana, and to a 
lesser extent some of the other territories. 
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As Lloyd Best put it, in reference to the Caribbean, "the people come from many 
different places at many different times (2001, 6). This is not µnproblematic for Best, neither has 
it been for some very influential West Indian scholars writing in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Indeed Best recalls the writings of C.L.R. James, in this regard, noting that he "wrote 
that we were brought from Africa and thrown into modern industry and organization, and we 
either had to adapt or die" (Ibid., 6). 
Suffice to say, the contemporary Caribbean is home to some of the most diverse racial 
groups in the world and, as such, is a 'melting-pot'. This has impacted on language. For example, 
recent migrants, typically from Asia/the Far East, to the Caribbean have brought their linguistic 
traditions. Notwithstanding, there is a long tradition of 'creolized' language systems in some 
territories, and where there are indigenous peoples so too are there language systems practiced 
by these groups. The official languages are English, French, Dutch and Spanish for the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, Haiti, Suriname and the Dominican Republic, respectively. 
The diversity of cultural heritage that has come to define the Caribbean is a source of 
great pride, narrated as strength, in identity terms, in these territories at large through a rich, 
vibrant cultural sector. The Caribbean's historical experiences are explored as are the constitutive 
countries' experiences as post-colonial societies, recounted through the works of artists, poets, 
writers, calypsonians (and other musical traditions), carnival mas-makers/performers/revelers 
and other cultural forms that often invoke political and economic nationalism, even West Indian 
nationalism. The concept of unity in diversity and the multiculturalism that has become a 
hallmark of these societies is often showcased on the world stage as a best practice of sorts, set 
against a world where in some countries diversity has not been met with tolerance, instead 
having led to societal and political fracture, discord and, in some instances, war. The societal 
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focus, in many territories, on cultural and religious events and festivals, with the active support 
of government, is seen as a conscious effort to showcase diversity as an integral building block 
of identity. 
A. (iii) Caribbean Economic Identity 
As a legacy of colonialism, the economic base of virtually all these states has been centered on 
the provision of commodities to the metropole and tied, in trade-terms, to such global hubs. In 
some instances, these states remain heavily agrarian. What is more, going back in history the 
economics of these countries have, for scholars l~ke Best, wrong-headedly informed social 
structures. As he notes, "while in all other situations that I know in the global order, the society 
founded the economy, in the Caribbean it is the economy that founds the society. You have the 
economy first, and then you bring in society as labour power" (Ibid., 7). 
Historically these territories served as plantation economies for such cash crops as 
bananas, rice and sugar, though this is steadily changing due to contemporary challenges that 
have visited these states from within and without. The traditional mono-crop economies that 
came to define the economic bases of many of these countries in the heyday of colonialism and 
even, to some extent, in post-colonial times have been overhauled in recent years, sometimes 
through no choice of their own. The woes experienced by such economies in recent years have 
been made worse not just by economic shocks, but weather-related events. As such, the 
economic fortunes of many of these states are intimately related to climactic events, and climate 
change has increasingly come to define the identity-related narrative of the economic fortunes, or 
otherwise, of these states. The narrative of vulnerability of these countries springs most 
conspicuously from this economic-climactic reality; what can be termed the 'economic-climactic 
complex'. 
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Further, sub-sets of these countries rely on extractive sectors, namely gold, bauxite, 
alumina, oil and natural gas. Many are experiencing windfalls from such sectors, given the 
increasing demand for these commodities in the world market. However, even amidst this boon 
vulnerability looms large; given the fluctuating fortunes of commodities in the global market. 
The twin-island republic of Trinidad and Tobago is a notable exception to the mono-
economy narrative, in so far as it (namely Trinidad) has a highly industrialized, diversified 
manufacturing-centered economic base. It is oil-rich, and the natural gas industry plays a crucial 
role in its economic fortunes. 
For the most part, these states have made forays into tourism, and some have made the 
leap successfully to offshore banking, albeit mostly at the lower end of the value chain. In most 
cases Services have come to occupy a significant percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), 
though significantly skewed towards tourism. Notwithstanding, their economies are extremely 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks, be they brought on by the vagaries of the global economic 
system or-as previously noted-natural disasters, namely hurricanes and other climactic events 
associated with hurricanes or broadly climate change. 
In terms of trading relations between CARIFORUM and the EU, the latter is a trading 
partner of consequence for CARIFORUM, accounting for some 12% of trade flows from the 
Region. According to 2011 data, Caribbean exports to the EU stood at €3. 7 billion, and are 
primarily commodity-centered.28 Alumina, bananas, bauxite, fuels, rum and sugar loom large, in 
this regard. However, given that Services rank high as a percentage of GDP in regional states, 
Services also have an important place regarding trade with the EU, albeit skewed towards 
tourism and travel-related services. 
On the ·other hand, for 2011, the Region's imports from the EU amounted to €3 .4 billion. 
28 Gleaned from email correspondence between the author and European Commission officials: 15 to 20 June 2012. 
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Higher value-added goods loom large, in this regard. 
The Region's trade with the EU is dominated by the Dominican Republic. Amongst 
regional states, The Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago also have strong trading stakes 
in the EU. Many enterprises from the smaller Caribbean territories are not yet sufficiently primed 
to effectively contest the EU market. An important identity narrative, in that regard, is the 
absence of scale economies and acute supply side constraints, amongst other constraints, that 
inhibit breaking through the EU market. 
A. (iv) Caribbean Geographic and Historical Identity 
I want, now, to engage in an account of the Caribbean's geographic and historical referent(s) in a 
less than conventional manner. The standard refrain would be to point, rather arbitrarily, to a 
map and situate the Caribbean, musing that the 'West Indies' has a history that is intimately tied 
into standard textbook accounts of discovery by Christopher Columbus. My interest, however, is 
in delving into a geographic-cum-historical account of 'the' Caribbean by calling attention to 
intersubjective images/understandings of what and where it is, and how it has been situated 
through history. Such an account serves as an instructive preface to my own efforts to describe 
the major actors involved in contemporary Caribbean regionalism and a constructivist research 
program that can be brought to bear to understand how actors within that region interact among 
themselves and third parties, and to what end. 
The scholars whose work I engage with below make scholarly incursions into the study 
of 'the' Caribbean. Perhaps the best place to start this discussion is with a work that is widely 
seen as a triumph both for Caribbean studies and Latin American literary studies, more 
generally-Antonio Benitez-Rojo's (1996 [1992]) The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and the 
Postmodern Perspective. It is one of many works that have grappled with the vexing issue of 
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what 'the' Caribbean 'space'29 is. The Repeating Island stands out as a profoundly innovative, 
provocative and fascinating intellectual journey, in this regard, on the mantle especially of 
polyrhythm: Benitez-Rojo leans on Chaos Theory. 
As the subtitle of his book suggests, his work also plays on postmodernism; and, as a 
result, eschews the notion that there is a single truth to defining the Caribbean. Ultimately, his 
work sheds greater light on the poignant, central place of the plantation and related legacies in 
the 'Caribbean story'. 30 They have permeated the Caribbean experience; repeated in this space. 
If repetition/rhythm is to be pinpointed in respect of regularities or patterns beholden to 
what the Caribbean is, a common refrain is the plantation-qua-plantation grounded 'social 
system'.31 The plantation is at once a referential devise, but a metaphorical one too-with respect 
to the dialectic of colonialism and creole cultures.32 But in this discourse, as with his eclectic 
exploration of the cultural edifice emblematic of the Caribbean, Benitez-Rojo destabilizes 
traditionally accepted delimitations of what/where the Caribbean is geographically.33 As he 
suggests, "t~e Caribbean is not a common archipelago, but a meta-archipelago .... [thus] it has the 
virtue of having neither a boundary nor a center" (Benitez-Rojo 1996 [1992], 4). 
29 Understood not necessarily in a purely geographic sense; rather, in geo-/socio-cultural terms: i.e. namely, as a 
confluence of historical processes, cultures, peoples, from 'here' and 'there'. Benitez-Rojo's usage of the term 
'Caribbean' does not conform with the geographical parameters set out for it in the present study. 
30 There are at least four "legacies of the postcolonial state: slavery, dependence, commodity production for export 
and the plantation regime" (Salmon 2005, 164). 
31 I borrow the term social system, in reference to 'the plantation', from Eric Wolfs usage of it, regarding field 
research into the 'plantation' in the Antilles around the mid- l 950s. Wolf and Mintz described the plantation not only 
as a social system, but as "webs of social relationships" (1957, 380-381 ). 
32 Benitez-Rojo is careful, though, not to essentialize the Caribbean as a postcolonial society, its narrative 
perennially hinged, as it were, to a metropolitan hub. In this sense, the Caribbean is not singularly derived from or a 
byproduct of its colonial roots. He makes this point through metaphor. Citing Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 
machine, he defines-thus re-reads-the Caribbean as standing apart from (in that it is not a function of) 
metropolitan players: "[ w ]hich is to say that every machine is a conjunction of machines coupled together, and each 
one of these interrupts the flow of the previous one; it will be said rightly that one can picture any machine 
alternatively in terms of flow and interruption" (Benitez-Rojo 1996 [1992], 6). 
33 He also, by extension, disrupts the traditional geographical referents of American/ African American and Latino 
studies. 
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For his part, Gaztambide-Geigel (2004, 127-128) outlines what for him are the various 
meanings of the Caribbean; a term which he describes as having relatively recent usage34: a 
function of the passing of the 'hegemonic baton', in the Region, from Europe to the United 
States.35 Regarding its use over the last fifty or so years, the Caribbean has come to refer to what 
he terms different American sub-regions; namely: "the insular (or ethno-historic) Caribbean; the 
geopolitical Caribbean[;] the Greater Caribbean Basin[;] Central Afro-America" (Ibid., 127). 
For the most part, these 'Caribbeans', as Gaztambide-Geigel refers to them, began to be 
defined in 1898 (Ibid., 13 7). The insular or ethno-historic Caribbean is slightly restrictive in its 
geographic scope36, "coincid[ing] with ... .internally-driven regional identities [; the shared 
(post)colonial experience looming large, in this regard]"37 (Ibid., 138). The geopolitical 
Caribbean is periodized by Gaztambide-Geigel (Ibid., 141), viz-a-viz pre- and post-1945. After 
that date, it comprises the insular Caribbean, Central America and Panama. In the lead up to 
1945, the configuration was the Antillean republics, Central America and Panama. In this 
conception, the Caribbean is seen as those lands that have been heavily caught up in US military 
interventions (Ibid., 141 ). The Greater Caribbean Basin approach envisions the Region as 
building on the previous Caribbeans, in geographic terms incorporating large continental 
Meso/South American countries; namely: Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela38 (Ibid., 143).39 The 
34 According to Gaztambide-Geigel, there has not been consistent use of the term Caribbean "to name a geographic 
region until the twentieth century" (2004, 127). Prior to this, there were permutations of the term (Ibid., 131-132). 
Aspects of Gaztambide-Geigel's usage of the term 'Caribbean' does not conform with the geographical parameters 
set out for it in the present study. 
35 In the late nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, the United States' began to leave a more discemable 
geopolitical footprint in Central America and the Caribbean Basin-these regions taking shape as 'America's 
backyard': "[t]his is the context in which the Caribbean was invented as a region starting in 1898" ((Ibid., 136-137). 
36 These countries are associated, ostensibly, with CARICOM. 
37 This narrative is brilliantly captured in Eric Williams' From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 
1492-1969 (1970). 
38 All three of these countries have islands in the Caribbean sea. 
39 The Association of Caribbean States (ACS) is a grouping emblematic of this conceptualization of the Caribbean. It 
comprises states which lie on the Caribbean Sea, in addition to El Salvador. 
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Caribbean Basin Initiative, unveiled in the 1980s, popularized this conceptualization; though it 
does not include some of the countries in this conceptual schema. The Central Afro-America 
conceptualization is by far the most expansive, at the very least in geographic terms. The 
conceptual pivot is the plantation. The plantation and the social order it engenders provide a 
prism through which we can discern shared experiences, linked to slavery and its legacies in a 
territory spanning the American South (namely, Afro- or Plantation America) and extending to 
parts of Me so-America, the Greater and Lesser (comprising the Leeward and Windward Islands) 
Antilles, and parts of northern South America (Ibid., 146). This schema is also cognitively 
expansive, including the Caribbean diaspora and migrant communities (Ibid., 148). 
Benitez-Rojo's (1996 [1992]) and Gaztambide-Geigel's (2004) respective works are 
important for our purposes, in so far as they underscore that the Caribbean is not easily defined 
or located, cognitively or otherwise. What is more, where, at first blush, the Caribbean may 
appear monolithic, it is not.40 
The just-reviewed works are also important as they represent theoretically-oriented 
research on Caribbean regional identities. The work of Gaztambide-Geigel is especially 
instructive for our purposes, as in reference to the insular or ethno-historic Caribbean he is of the 
view that its geographic scope "coincides with ... .intemally-driven regional identities" (2004, 
138; my emphasis). In general, these scholars' respective works lend themselves to 
constructivist-inspired analysis. Some earlier work on Caribbean 'identities' holds a lot of 
promise, in this regard, too. 
Consider a dated, but important, article by Braithwaite (1957). In discussing the juncture 
40 As Garcia argues, "the concepts of Caribbean and "caribenidad" (Caribbeanness) are problematic" (2008, 56). 
Multiple identities obtain in the case of the Caribbean, per the varying terms used to refer to it as a region and the 
peoples who inhabit it (and the different meanings encapsulated therein); namely, "Antilles, West Indies, Caribbean, 
Antilleans, West Indians and Caribbean ( caribenos )" (Ibid., 56). 
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between World Wars I & II, he notes that the 'federal idea' grew in the West Indies; contending 
that there was "the development of West Indian sentiment"41 (Ibid., 13 7; my emphasis). Patsy 
Lewis (2002) provides a more recent scholarly engagement with this theme. In examining 
regional integration amongst the countries of the OECS, she maintains that a "West Indian 
identity" (framed by common historical and cultural experiences emanating, for instance, from 
slavery) is an important basis for the pursuit of such an initiative. Also informing integration, she 
argues, for microstates such as these is that they all face more or less the same predicament, 
because of size and other shared resource difficulties; and as such banding together in the face of 
a global political economy increasingly unsympathetic to their plight is also an overarching 
integration narrative. 
A. (v) The Movement of Caribbean People and Synthesizing of Caribbean Identity: Toward a 
'Transnational Caribbean Citizenship'? 
In this sub-section, I have explored different identity referents associated with the Caribbean. 
What shoul~ immediately be apparent is that the Region has an 'ideational' backdrop, one that 
has been reproduced over time in that regional space. 
The long history of citizen-to-citizen, intra-regional movement and the everyday, lived 
experiences associated with co-mingling across national jurisdictions in that space has been 
instrumental in fashioning, even synthesizing, Caribbean identity. Whether this movement of 
people has reached its full potential in laying the foundations for a 'transnational Caribbean 
citizenship', however, is an open question. There is greater surety, though, that a 'transnational 
Caribbean citizenship' has taken form amongst bureaucratic elite actors. In what follows, I 
41 This is reminiscent of what Deutsch noted as one of the indicators of "social community .... [and]. ... the defining 
characteristics of integration .... [:] elite and mass attitudes" (Scheingold 1970, 979; my emphasis). 
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consider these two points in turn. 
With respect to 'the man on the street', consider that while the movement of people within 
the Community is recognized as "an essential factor in an ever closer union among the people of 
CARJCOM Member States,"42 the regime in place to facilitate this has faced set-backs. On 
'paper', under the CSME, free movement of Community nationals within the Region has been 
provided for, albeit only for certain categories of persons, who in moving freely to another 
Member State are entitled to the same benefits and rights in relation to the condition of work and 
employment relative to those given to national workers. In 'practice', there have been 'teething 
problems'. Formal mechanisms-like the CARJCOM Certificate of Recognition of Skills 
Qualification (CARJCOM Skills Certificate)-that are meant to support this mobility regime 
have, for instance, not worked as seamlessly as first envisioned. Moreover, there continue to be 
reported cases of instances where CARJCOM nationals face entry difficulties at some ports of 
entry in the Region. 
The regional integration policy environment also looms large in the 'free movement' 
debate. As intimated earlier, the advance of the CSME 'project' has slowed in recent times. Some 
contend that it is in drift. The effect of such a trend is that forward movement of the agenda with 
respect to high-profile matters, like the free movement of Community nationals, is in fact not 
being robustly effectuated. Ironically movement, conceived in these terms, is amongst the most 
tangible way that 'the man on the street' gets to experience integration. 
The fact of the matter is, Caribbean peoples have historically traveled from one territory 
to the other, be it for familial reasons, employment reasons, touristic travel-related (to partake in, 
for instance, sporting events like cricket and in the process common societal conventions, which 
42 Refer to: http://www.csmeonline.org/en/movement-of-people 
47 
lend themselves to the shared Caribbean experience), business-related or any other cultural 
exchanges, etc. 'Regional identity' is further established and woven together, as a result; thereby 
shoring up a collective psyche relating to a 'West Jndian-ness' or Caribbeaness. 
However, to return to the point I made earlier, the creation of a shared sense of 
'community' could be moving further along and growing from strength-to-strength, if only the 
agenda on the free movement of Community nationals and the formal integration agenda, at 
large, got a boost. While scholars of European integration, like Willem Maas (2007), observe in 
the European context that free movement is key to establishing the idea of commonality, it is an 
observation which is just as applicable in the Caribbean context. 
The reality is that Caribbean peoples, even though-in most cases-they are separated by 
sea and are conscious and protective of national identities, are less prone to propagate 
nationalism in contradistinction to a regional identity, but rather as a constitutive part of the 
spatial jigsaw puzzle' that is the wider community of people a la the Caribbean. Their historical 
referent, in this context, is typically commonality of narrative that animates this region, related-
for instance-to imperial domination and struggle. Guilleen, in this regard, says of the Caribbean 
archipelago that it is a "communal yard" (1976, cited in Hillman 2003, 8). 
On the matter of the commonality of narrative, recently the Prime Minister of Barbados, 
the Hon. Freundel J. Stuart (whose country has lead responsibility for the Single Market and 
Economy in the CARI COM Quasi-Cabinet of HoG) recalled part of an address by the late Right 
Honourable Errol Walton Barrow at an HoG Conference in Georgetown, Guyana in 1986. That 
address reads in part, ""[f]or many of our people the regional integration movement has come to 
mean matters which relate exclusively to trade .... [this is not] the exclusive justification for our 
being together. [W}e have a cultural history, a common experience of feeling which goes deeper 
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and is much older than CARICOM and the negotiations about trade"" (Stuart 2012, 21; my 
emphasis). This sentiment is consistent with what Vayrynen refers to as "[i]dentity regions 
exist[ing] in the consciousness of people" (2003, 37). 
What is more, as a number of West Indians who move between the regional territories do 
so as economic migrants, their concern is with the future. The implication is that in as much as 
West Indians would be hard pressed to reach back-figuratively, at least-in history in search of 
one focal point in respect of their origins, in co-mingling with each other as they do they are 
together pragmatically fashioning a common future, of sorts, laden with ideas of identity to 
match. 
With the preceding in mind, I make one final point at this juncture which constitutes an 
underlying reason for the study's focus on bureaucratic elite actors: 
West Indians are, for the most part, seized of a sense of 'transnational Caribbean 
citizenship', and depending on their individual circumstances they are personally and 
even professionally invested in this construct. Given that the free movement of 
Community nationals' agenda has faced some challenges, the contemporary identity 
nexus that transcends sub-regional borders with respect to 'the man on the street' may not 
be dense. This is not the case for bureaucratic elite actors. They regularly operate 
unimpeded across the Region. As identity node agents, they are at the forefront of 
simultaneously being recipients/shapers of foremost knowledge of the regional project's 
identity narrative and integrating that knowledge/insight into collaborative bureaucratic 
and decision-making nodes, which are vital for the formulation/execution of agendas. 
To elaborate, generally networks of Caribbean functionnaires/experts and policy-makers have 
internalized a regional identity affinity in an unparalleled fashion, and this is a determining factor 
with respect to the convergence (or otherwise) of preferences regarding how the regionalist 
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project should be put together and steered. The outlines of 'transnational Caribbean citizenship' 
are especially defined at the level of these actors, at the very least not only because of the 
frequency with which they come into contact with one another in the lead up to, at and following 
meetings/summits (and other initiatives) that are effectuated across the Region, but also because 
they are exposed to each other's thinking on any number of policy issues and strategic matters. 
B. Elite Technocracy: Astute Purveyors of Episteme regarding Caribbean Regionalism 
Suffice to say, the prominence of identity/image narratives in the Caribbean-at times built 
around a seemingly common43 commitment to a regional identity-cum-community (and 
sometimes not)-begs for theoretical explanation from a constructivist point of view. Such an 
approach has, hitherto, been elusive in scholarly work, and constitutes the organizing theme of 
this study. 
From such a vantage point, we can bring into focus the constitutive effect of ideas, as it 
relates to outlook on 'self and worldviews as well as resultant, matching policy 
orientations/outcomes. This study represents a call, then, for an extensive constructivist research 
program on Caribbean regionalism, in its own right advancing this type of research by borrowing 
from close to two decades of constructivist insights applied to international studies to examine 
elements of the socialization of the Caribbean Region. 
Against the backdrop of the preceding discussion, the balance of this sub-section will 
engage with the beginnings of a discussion that the study at large will set out. I want to do so in 
response to two related questions. First, how can the Caribbean be defined? Caught up in this 
question is the notion of circumscribing the Caribbean. So the second question is, to what end is 
43 Statesmen, like former Jamaican Prime Minister the Most Honourable P.J. Patterson, have used the term 
'Caribbean oneness', in this regard (Patterson 2003). 
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the Caribbean framed in a particular way? On this score, the following explanation44 is useful: 
Where the Caribbean's boundaries end, so too do shared understandings/meanings of what the 
Caribbean is. Furthermore in cognitively inscribing the outlines of the Caribbean and attaching a 
- narrative to same, in that act protagonists wish to advance a certain agenda. This explanation 
cannot, however, be divorced from establishing who decides or pronounces on the outlines of the 
Caribbean and the associated narration of the Caribbean problematique. Some actors are more 
prominent in defining a 'we-ness' in states' self-understandings of self and socialization practices 
that emanate in bureaucratic environments, so as to achieve certain ends. 
In this regard, the study identifies bureaucratic elites or the elite technocracy-policy 
makers and officials in regional and state institutions in the Caribbean-as playing a significant 
role. In official settings, they have emerged as the most visible faces in the narration of 
Caribbean regionalism (and, importantly, are imbued with a keen sense ofregional identity). 
This finding is consistent with that of other scholars who study the Caribbean .. Payne and 
Sutton (2007, 3) observe that in relation to policy issues at the heart of the political economy of 
the Region's development, "[w]hat is immediately striking .... [is that the debate] has been led by 
what one might call the tecnicos of the Commonwealth Caribbean, principally either professional 
policy-makers working for national governments or regional organisations." 
These actors are generally committed regionalists. In the case of some contemporary 
HoG (as with those who came before them), like H.E. Kenny Anthony of Saint Lucia and H.E. 
Ralph Gonsalves of St Vincent and the Grenadines-both leaders of Labour Parties in their 
respective jurisdictions and with many years experience in leading regional affairs-they have 
similar ideological stripes, and are scholars in their own right. Prime Minister Anthony has a 
doctorate in law and Prime Minister Gonsalves a doctorate in Government, and both have 
44 It is one that I borrow from Adler and Barnett (1998), adapted for my purposes. 
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infused regional integration processes with their visions for same. They are especially active in 
the Quasi-cabinet of HoG. In point of fact, both politicians are from an era where the view of 
integration is that of a 'project' vital in supporting the sustainable development of small states and 
in providing strength in numbers for territories recently emerged from the yolk of colonialism. 
For their part, many of the officials who grace the halls of Ministries of Trade or 
Caribbean intergovernmental organizations, like the then CRNM, see in the Caribbean 
integration construct a shared destiny for Caribbean peoples. Their work as so-called tecnicos is 
heavily influenced by this world view, not just their considerable subject-area expertise. That 
they come from territories which, for the most part, have a shared regional identity makes for 
strong camaraderie. Indeed the epistemic community involv.ed in trade negotiations/policy is 
relatively small in the Region, and as a tight-knit, nimble group45 there are interpersonal 
dynamics that are conducive to building up trust relations and intersubjective or background 
knowledge. Many of those officials are friends, too. Thus, there are pronounced quotidian 
official network ties. As a result, these officials are aware of each other's motivations regarding 
the integration project. 
It is also important to acknowledge that the 'we-ness' in Caribbean States' self-
understandings and socialization practices has not just been pursued by Caribbean agents, but 
foreign actors too. The earlier NPE discussion points to this. Although the United States has a 
strong influencing imprint on this Region, so too does the EU. More conspicuous is the influence 
that some EU States brought to bear in a by-gone era, colonialism. Less visible have been 
contemporary moves on the EU's part, leveraging the European Commission, to project influence 
relating to how the Region is defined and norms applied thereto, through accords like the EPA. 
45 It is not uncommon for Ministries of Trade in the OECS territories, in particular, to have a staffing complement of 
six or less technical staff. As a regional institution, the then CRNM had within its ranks technical staff numbering 
just over a dozen. 
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C. State-Society Relations and the Study's Approach to Caribbean (lnter)regionalism 
As I close out this section, I want to touch briefly on state-society relations and make the 
connection with the present study. Let me start by acknowledging that there is a long tradition of 
theorizing the state in Western social science, and a spectrum of social science theories have been 
brought to bear in that regard. That debate, while important, is not going to be engaged with here. 
The acknowledgement of this fact will suffice, as it opens the way for the following statement: 
For purposes of this study, Caribbean regionalism and the associated interregionalist 
engagement with the EU is best explained as a formal intergovernmental/state-led, top-down 
process. 
Although the subsequent discussion in Chapter 5 will provide greater insight into this 
approach, it is important from the outset to address any misconceptions that may possibly arise 
from the emphasis placed on the state and inter-state institutional backdrop in the aforementioned 
statement. One quite significant misconception that may arise is that state-society relations are 
somehow eschewed and, more to the point, top-level bureaucratic actors and their principals are 
autonomous from the societal part of the state-society complex. This could not be further from 
the truth. In the balance of this sub-section, I briefly explain why. 
Invoking Massey's approach to 'place', like her I take the view that place is socially-
constructed; further, according to Massey, "what gives a place its specificity ... .is the fact that it is 
constructed out of a particular constellation of relations, articulated together as a particular 
locus" (1993, 66; my emphasis). 
With this in mind, I begin by establishing that the state can be particularized as the 
administrative structure of governance, on which basis public authority is exercised in a 
multiplicity of ways. Yet the state is not an 'island on to itself. It has a relationship with domestic 
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society, to the extent that there is interdependence between the two. 
In the Caribbean, there is a tradition of interaction between the institutions of the state 
and societal groups regarding any number of policy sectors. The state-society complex is 
typically bridged by 'tripartite platforms' that regularly bring together Government, the private 
sector and civil society (e.g. labour/trade union groups), albeit to examine and advance 
consensus on policy matters at the sectoral level. Barbados is a much-cited example of a 
_Caribbean country with a strong tradition of a 'tripartite framework'. At the level of regional 
institutions, too, there are also platforms in place to facilitate such interface. An important 
example, for our purposes, was the establishment of a first of its kind Memorandum of 
Understanding in 2009 between the Caribbean Congress of Labour and the then CRNM. The 
stated intention was to deepen the relationship between the two entities, and as such it outlines a 
framework for the engagement. 
The trade policy-themed issues under study in this dissertation have been the focus of 
consultations between institutions of the state (as well as intergovernmental institutions) and 
societal groups. I contend that this sort of interaction lends itself not just to transposition, in a 
two-way manner, of positions on policy matters per se, but on state/regional identity and the 
implications for policy. 
On the matter of state-society relations, generally speaking, scholars have noted that such 
interaction can be given impetus as a result of corporatist interests, and societal actors' attempts 
to lend their voice on a range of public policy matters. In some extremes, scholars have noted 
that clientelism is a motivating factor. This sort of scholarship has shone the spotlight on 
developed and developing countries, alike. 
I am most interested in the Caribbean, as I am in discerning the 'official' attempt at 
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pivoting the region-building project so as to assert the Region in contemporary international 
relations. In that regard, generally, it is the state and inter-state institutions that play a lead role in 
effectuating and agreeing accords with other states. Indeed 'bureaucratic' institutions and 
practices, legal and otherwise, are in place to facilitate this sort of interaction. Caribbean 
regionalism and the associated interregionalist engagement with the EU, with which this study is 
taken up, are therefore examined in these terms. 
V. Toward a Constructivist Approach to Framing Caribbean Regionalism: 
Central Questions, Thesis 
The dissertation unravels a two-tiered puzzle: 
A. Are some of the world's smallest state regions, like the Caribbean, able to punch above 
their weight in international affairs, thus overcoming limitations of acutely small size? 
B. Is the CARIFORUM-EU EPA part of a larger global governance project spearheaded by 
the European Commission and geared at devising, embedding and projecting perceived 
values/model of modernity, as reflected in EU standards/norms and associated agendas? 
To the extent that this approach has a bearing on the Caribbean as a spoke region, what 
are the implications for the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 'official' 
Caribbean region-building project and regional integration policy thereto? 
The dissertation posits that: 
Thesis I: The social typification/signification of 'the actor' in Caribbean interregionalist and 
intra-regionalist engagements is a key strategy employed by Caribbean bureaucratic elites to 
engender ideas/norms, which have a power all their own in respect of enabling the world's 
smallest state regions, like the Caribbean, to punch above their weight in respect of the 
nature/extent of the gains they secure in international affairs. [An intellectual undercurrent 
that simultaneously buoys this claim and serves as a response to dissatisfaction in the ability 
of conventional structural IR theory to provide a compelling explanation of the enduring 
agency of these types of states, let alone its capacity to do so in normative terms, is 
constructivism and allied approaches.] 
Thesis II: The CARIFORUM-EU EPA was negotiated and is being implemented at a time 
when the EU is asserting itself, as never before, as a normative power on the world stage. In 
this regard, the EU's wider normative agenda is not unrelated to how it has sought to 
negotiate the EPA and its interests with respect to the implementation of that Agreement. At 
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a minimum, the EPA simultaneously feeds into and.flows out of complex NPE narratives that 
are not unproblematic for CARIFORUM. 
Does the evidence support these assertions? The dissertation exammes these propositions. 
According to research findings, they are found to have merit. 
VI. Methodology 
It is to Caribbean and European bureaucratic/elite actors that the study's empirical research has 
been directed. It is with a sampling of them that interviews were conducted, with research 
questions structured in such a way as to draw out their negotiating experiences, knowledge and 
perspectives with respect to the negotiating theatres and the strategies therein under study in this 
work. Participant observation and archival research were also conducted, with a view to gaining 
deeper insight into their roles in socializing the Caribbean, how they did so and to what end. 
In examining how the 'we-ness' in Caribbean States' self-understandings and socialization 
practices thereto took form, be it at the hands of Caribbean or EU agents, the study is informed 
by the following timeframe: 2004 to 2012. 
While setting down 2004 is useful, in so far as this date neatly sets the floor for the period 
under study, the circumscribed window cannot be viewed in isolation from developments that 
came before and that would have unfolded over an extended stretch of time from which the 
period under review in the study proceeds. 
The following timeline of key events (which the study will come back to as it unfolds) is, 
therefore, useful to keep in mind: 
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Chronology of Relevant Events Impacted by Socialization Practices regarding 
Contemporary Caribbean Re.gioualism 
CARIFORUM-EU 
EPA Implementation •n:::::::::> 2009-12*'~ 
fl Q "-_~.·78Pi?,; L::\?l:m\ L1:~of 6 ·~ ) signi!dm u V ~~~!:1.:U-= 2~08 r! J '--~-~:_;'_:;_int_o_, 
'Banana Wru:s' ~ from 1990s i L;::>ri<h< I T~<y~ .... 
European Commission 'Green Paper' (1996) iu 1992 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
[2000.-lO + 2 00 + 3rd;f'u-1al revisicm*'] 
(Prelude .fo whiels wcvs rlrn Loma amJforG·mma 
121TGJJg81J!JtmtS} } 1950s to 1990s 
CDF n::;;;:::> 2009 
(Began operalilJg) 
Re'l.ri$e.d Treaty of 
Chagmrramas c:) 2.0.')1 i (Ariide 158) 
Treatvof 
Ch.agi:1arm:nas c::) 1973 
* 2012 is nn arbitra.ry date up 11nttl when EPA implementation was examined, timed so as to coincide witli 
the end of my field resea~h. The implementation of that Agremmmt will unfold over many years to come. 
** The third andfi:nal revision of the Cotonou Parfuersl1ip Agreement in 2015 will lay the foundation for 
the post-Cotonou environment and will be a previmv to thejfrture of wider ACP-EU relations, particularly 
in post 2020 follo¥.;iug .expiry of the Cotono14 Partnership Agreement. 
Source: Author 
This dissertation's methodology incorporates a qualitative empirical study that comprises the 
following data sources, inter alia: 
A. Field Work: The formal field research period spanned just over two years, from January 
to April 2010 (based in Saint Lucia) and from July 2010 to July 2012 (based in 
Guyana).46 During this extended period in the field, 51 semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews (which, having been transcribed, were subjected to systematic qualitative 
content analysis) were conducted. Interview findings were triangulated against each other 
and, where possible, against primary documentation. The majority of the interviews took 
46 A handful of interviews were conducted in 2009. 
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place across the length and breadth of the Caribbean, with others conducted in Brussels 
and the Czech Republic as a result of brief visits there. The interviews targeted officials 
of intergovernmental institutions and other agencies, including former staffers. Officials 
of Caribbean States-including diplomats posted overseas-were also interviewed, as 
were policy makers and non-state actors, including from the private sector (ostensibly, 
business support organizations) and the civil society community, namely academics and 
some from non-governmental organizations. Some interviewees opted not to go on the 
record. They were candid, as a result. The field work period was not only taken up with 
data gathering, but intense periods of drafting the dissertation. 
B. Participant Observation: The researcher was attached to the CARICOM Secretariat-
based EPA Implementation Unit as an official, through much of the fieldwork. The 
researcher engaged in participant observation of meetings germane to the EPA and in 
interactional processes which form the centerpiece qf intergovemmentalism. This 
experience, drawing on several years of prior experience as a regional trade official, 
provided deep insight into the praxis of the Region's trade/development diplomacy. 
C. Development of Model/Conceptual Tools: A theoretically supported model qua 
conceptual tool-the 'Region Leveraging Nexus' (RLN)47-was developed and utilized in 
order to highlight the interactive relationship between and offer a potentially strong 
explanation of Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism (as relates to the negotiation of trade 
agreements, specifically) and intra-regionalism (as relates to regional integration). A 
methodological innovation was also developed with respect to understanding the NPE in 
the Caribbean context, dubbed the normative-role approach. 
47 The RLN constitutes a theoretical contribution to the ideational study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism. 
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D. Study of Official Documents/Official Speeches and other Literature: Archival research 
was conducted, as was analysis of primary documents and secondary literature, including 
an extensive literature review. This approach was critical, in so far as it forms the 
intellectual backdrop for the empirical analysis of written discourses. 
The upshot of this multi-tiered methodological approach 1s that it serves to hold up this 
dissertation's two principal findings. 
On a final note, given my prior work experience in the Region, and the contacts I had 
established then with members of the epistemic community under study for the present work, 
and the fact that I worked in the CARI COM Secretariat during most of the field work period, I 
had fairly good access to officials/policy makers. 
VII. Summary Findings and Scholarly Intervention 
As a formal intergovernmental/state-led, top-down process, Caribbean States' interregionalist and 
intra-regionalist trade-qua-development diplomacy, respectively, is best understood as being 
informed by two related considerations: (i) the psychosocial abstraction and evocation of 
registers of signification/imagery in respect of the relational construction of the seljhood of states 
on and through what I term the 'Caribbean Regional Platform'; and (ii) the crucial and marked 
role of certain bureaucratic elites therein, located in regional and state institutions, respectively, 
who successfully controlled (i.e. 'kept on message') the regionalism narrative during EPA 
negotiations and worked to 'level the playing field'. The effect was that, EU counterparts were 
sufficiently seized of that narrative such that they were supportive of concretizing/entrenching 
certain concessions and associated norms into the Agreement itself. Further, the strength of 
Caribbean elite technocrats' arguments was that they nurtured a negotiating environment where 
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the 'logic of appropriateness' shone through in respect of elements of the EU's logic of 
(negotiating) action, such that the EU was influenced by the need to do what is right (i.e. moral 
imperatives). The locus classicus and point of departure for framing these empirical cases is the 
RLN. It is the intellectual device (which draws on constructivist insights from critical geopolitics 
which have traveled, in varying degrees, to scholarship germane to the present study) developed 
in the dissertatio·n to anchor the first of two scholarly interventions. 
The second finding stems from a deeper reading of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, which 
determines that the interregionalist negotiating engagement was utilized by the European 
Commission to put the conditions in place for exercise of NPE with respect to the Caribbean. 
The EPA is, thus, deemed to be part of a global governance agenda that lends support to the 
development of the EU as a normative power in its own right. In this regard, the EU's normative 
agenda is found to be problematic both in terms of how it delimits the Caribbean and amplifies 
regional integration challenges thereto. This particular finding is a contribution to the NPE 
literature. 
VIII. Dissertation Roadmap 
This introductory chapter is wide-ranging, forming a cursory, prefatory attempt to engage and 
showcase key themes which permeate my doctoral research and the resultant dissertation. 
Chapter One is the premier chapter of a total of three that comprise Part I of this study, and they 
are comparatively linked: each is geared at determining whether there is systematic theoretical 
treatment of the Caribbean-a small state Global · South region-in the literature of 
interregionalism and regionalism studies as well as island studies, as regards an 
(inter)regionalism narrative. In aid of this primary objective of these respective chapters, a 
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comprehensive survey of relevant scholarship is undertaken. Each chapter engages underlying 
concepts, while also outlining and critically engaging debates in the respective scholarly areas of 
study. In so doing, Part I of the present study reflects the beginnings of a possible inter-
disciplinary conversation among scholarship that forms, in large measure, the intellectual site of 
the scholarly contribution of the dissertation. 
Chapter Four introduces the RLN, the model qua conceptual tool which serves to hold up 
the identity-based framework developed in the present study regarding Caribbean 
(inter)regionalism. The RLN is developed against the backdrop of an analysis of conventional 
international theory's portrayal of small states, with a view to transcending it so as to reveal how 
the interplay of identity and agent/institution can in tum impact on diplomatic outcomes, with 
respect to securing norms in relation to determining what is expected of the EU in relation to 
CARIFORUM. Importantly and in part drawing on the RLN, I later explain why this matters. 
Chapter Five makes the case that the Caribbean's elite technocracy has been actively 
involved in inter- and intra-regionalism, of note in the negotiation and implementation of the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the operationalization of the CDP, respectively. It frames the 
process against which negotiations unfolded and implementation unfolds today for both these 
institutional environments as having a social and normative context, which on the one hand lays 
out the identity of the institution shepherding respective processes and on the other engenders the 
development of favourable norms stemming from interactions with respective third parties. 
Chapter Six examines the emergence of the EU as a global actor and normative power, in 
the first instance making passing reference to the growing literature on this theme. As part of its 
contribution to the debate on NPE, the chapter highlights a hybrid framework that I develop 
called the normative-role approach. The chapter also brings into relief the role of 
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interregionalism in consolidating the EU's rise in the contemporary world order, juxtaposed on 
NPE. That the EU has sought to leverage the EPA with CARIFORUM, in this vein, commands 
the chapter's attention, in so far as it analyzes how the EU has utilized the EPA to promote its 
vision of the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 'official' Caribbean region-building 
project, whilst also examining associated regional integration policy implications. Thus the 
chapter pushes the boundaries of conventional analysis that has come to engender the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA. The analysis provided in this chapter has to date been elusive in the 
NPE literature, too, and so in advancing it several lacunae are filled in respect of understanding 
CARIFORUM-EU relations against the backdrop of the rise of the EU's normative power. 
The concluding chapter follows, and serves to recap the main themes and insights of the 
dissertation, outlining the overarching research findings. It also reflects on possible future 
directions for research, in this vein. The expectation is that the research undertaken and the 
prospective discussion of possible research pathways for a future scholarly agenda will be 
relevant for both the academic and policy communities. 
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PART I 
TRAVERSING BOUNDARIES: 
INTERREGIONALISM, REGIONALISM AND ISLAND STUDIES IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Chapter I 
Interregionalism: 
A Survey of the Literature/Theory and Treatment of Caribbean 
(Inter)regionalism Therein 
1.1 Introduction 
The present chapter surveys the scholarship which forms the intellectual backbone of 
interregionalism studies. In first showcasing definitional issues, the key literature and pertinent 
theoretical approaches, the chapter sets out to assess whether there is systematic theoretical 
treatment of the Caribbean as a small state Global South region in this corpus of work, as regards 
an (inter)regionalism narrative. A determination is made that such a focus has largely been 
overlooked, but also that its metatheoretical 'throw-weight' is diminutive. That attention has not 
been placed on this type of region takes away from the no less important, insightful experiences 
that its interregional interactions and theorizing in this regard can lend to the scholarship. 
Interregionalism research is of recent vintage, comparatively speaking. It has only 
recently come into its own, popularized over a decade ago by the work of scholars like Hanggi 
(2000) and generally . riding the wave of scholarly research around the so-called 'new' 
regionalism 48-literature that took shape through the 1980s and '90s. Interregionalism has been 
characterized as "an emerging international phenomenon" (Hettne 2007, 107), the onset of which 
only began in earnest in the light of the dissolution of the bipolar world order, with the end of the 
Cold War, and in conjunction with an intensified form of globalization-crystallizing in the 
1980s. 
In sum, interregionalism features as one crucial component of the multi-faceted dynamics 
48 That the interregionalism scholarship builds on the new regionalism literature is an important basis for intellectual 
engagement between the two. 
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of global change; in effect contributing to the structural transformation of aspects of global 
governance49 and leaving its mark on (and· creating new) macro-structures of world politics. 
More specifically, interregionalism is a means by which states can geo-strategically position 
themselves with respect to competition, cooperation and conflict in a hyper-globalizing era and 
at a moment when the international order is in flux. 
However, in conceiving of interregionalism we must not lose sight of the 'region'(alism) 
in interregionalism, and how they are implicated in animating each other. Consider that some 
scholars have pointed to what they describe as "[r]egionalism and interregionalism [being] 
impacted by one another", even "relat[ing] to .... each other. In this respect, regionalism and 
interregionalism are effectively joined at the hip" (Doidge 2007, 229, 244). 
That regions are manifest on the international stage is not, however, a novelty. From a 
geopolitical standpoint, for example, they have had a large and long-standing footprint through 
history, dating from classical antiquity or the Greco-Roman world. Over the course of the last 
century, though, world regions-ostensibly the EU-have become considerably more important 
players in world politics and the architecture of the world order (especially so over the last two 
decades, in the wake of the bipolar world order collapsing into itself), and can usefully be 
contextualized in at least two respects, global governance (a discussion of which I will return to 
at the outset of Chapter Six) and IR. 
The chapter proceeds in four steps. It first surveys definitional issues and key literature. 
49 According to Finkelstein ( 1995, 369), global governance can be thought of as governing relationships that reach 
across national boundaries. An important caveat obtains in this context: governing is exercised without any claims to 
sovereign authority (Ibid, 369). In conceiving of global governance this way, it is process-driven. Such a framing 
provides for a more nuanced understanding of global governance. Indeed, Rosenau takes the view that "global 
governance refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations through which the management of 
international affairs is or is not sustained" (1995, 13). In terms of providing a nuanced understanding, governance as 
being process-driven can be seen in one important respect: "[the] formulation and promulgation of principles and 
promotion of consensual knowledge affecting the general international order, regional orders, particular issues on 
the international agenda, and efforts to influence the domestic rules and behaviour of states" (Finkelstein 1995, 370). 
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Secondly, it provides 'snapshots' of some theoretical approaches that can be applied to the study 
of interregionalism, also drawing attention to the development of the scholarship. Coterminously, 
it determines whether there is systematic theoretical treatment of small state Global South 
regions like the Caribbean in this corpus of work, as regards an (inter)regionalism narrative. It 
finds that the literature has tended to neglect the constellation of small regional actors in 
international society (the Caribbean is no exception), oriented instead toward much larger 
regions. This gaping hole in coverage means that important analytical devices and insights which 
such regions and their study can provide are lost on the scholarship, which ultimately takes away 
from the theoretical and policy strength of this body of knowledge. This latter point is explored 
in the chapter's conclusion. 
1.2 Conceptualizing Interregionalism: Towards a Definition and Tracing Key Scholarship 
Interregionalism scholarship can be characterized as attempting to take account of a relatively 
nascent feature of global governance: formalized, increasingly routinized interaction involving 
world regions. However, Hettne acknowledges that as an emergent "phenomenon in international 
relations [t]here is no consensus as far as definitions [of interregionalism] are concerned" (2007, 
107). A streamlined definition of the phenomenon, thus, proves difficult. 
To bear this point out, consider that in some cases such relations are region-to-region in 
nature, and in others they involve state-based interaction with regional entities; with variations 
on these forms. Perhaps in recognition of these permutations, for Rossler, "[i]nterregionalism can 
be explained as different forms of bi- or multilateral relations between one or more regional 
organisations, or between regional organisations and states, under the condition that the regional 
grouping is acting as an entity in the international system" (2009, 317). 
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A useful definition of interregionalism and one that resonates with the present study is 
provided by Doctor: "institutionalized closer relations between two regional blocs" (2007, 281; 
my emphasis). 50 This is described as the deepest-indeed pure-form of interregionalism 
(Soderbaum and Stalgren 2010, 5). As regards the more wide-ranging understandings of 
interregional arrangements transcending the bi-regional form, scholars like Ruland (2001, 5) 
emphasize two types of interregionalism, of which the bilateral form-the origins of which he 
locates in the 1970s51-is one and the second, newer form (emblematic of the so-called 'new' 
interregionalism) is transregionalism. This latter arrangement is characterized by "member states 
[engagement] from more than two regions" (Ibid., 6); what Wagner similarly describes as an 
"arrangement which encompasses countries with different affiliations to other regional 
organizations" (2006, 285).52 Ruland's characterization of interregionalism and its 
50 For a similar definition, see Soderbaum and Langenhove (2005, 257-258). Hettne (2004) is careful to highlight the 
role of institutions in mediating interregional interaction. The institutionalized nature of these relations, however, is 
not universally accepted as a defining feature of interregionalism. Reiterer characterizes interregionalism ~s an 
arrangement between two "regionalisms", but underscores that it can be "either contractual or de facto" (2005, 1). It 
is perhaps fitting, at this juncture, to also define and distinguish between regionalism, regionalization and region. 
Regionalism can be seen as top-down, state-brokered and state-driven transnational projects, built around integration 
and/or functional cooperation processes; whereas regionalization is a bottom-up process, animated by non-state 
actors that leverage transnational territorial groupings toward achieving primarily commercial/trade ends. Region 
(understood in the present work as a supra-state unit) is a more contested term that definitionally is subject to 
various understandings, due in large measure to its application across a number of academic disciplines from 
political science to geography, economics and more. In the field of IR, the definition of 'region' tends to be informed, 
to a great extent, by theoretical perspectives. Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches tend to stress 
materialist definitions, typically anchored in static geographic/geo-strategic and economic narratives. Constructivist 
approaches, on the other hand, tend to conceive of regions in a more theoretically and analytically useful manner as 
conceptually produced socio-spatial categories. In this vein, Boas et al underscore that the constructed nature of 
regions stems from "social practice and discourse" (2005, 1). A more detailed discussion of these approaches will be 
undertaken later. 
51 Other scholars suggest as much, too. Referencing EU-Common Market of the South (Mercosur) relations, 
Santander contends that they are based on "group-to-group dialogue" (of which the EU was the hub); this sort of 
interregionalist initiative traceable to the 1970s (2005, 290). In noting the connection between this initiative and the 
so-called old regionalism, he cites 'old' interregionalism, for instance in the context of a dialogue established in the 
1980s between the EC and the countries of the Central American Common Market. Pilgaard maintains that extra-
European regional conflicts/tensions, as was the case in Central America in the 1980s, were catalysts for 
interregional cooperation spearheaded by the EU ( 1993, 108-110). Instructively, Santander acknowledges that such 
interregionalism was "sporadic [,] rather limited by the bipolar international context" of the time (2005, 290). A 
group-to-group interregional dialogue that is also typically cited in the literature for its long lineage-dating back to 
the l 970s-is the EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engagement. 
52In this respect, Wagner cites the case of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation; which does 
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manifestations, though, is but one among many divergent understandings. Hettne, for instance, 
distinguishes "between interregionalism as a formalized relation between regional organizations, 
and relations among regions in a more general sense: transregionalism [envisioned as involving 
disparate actors, running the gamut of state, non-state, even regional organization actors]" (2007, 
107). Thus, in this context, transregionalism encompasses relationships that extend beyond 
intergovernmental engagement and cooperation, to include transnationally networked non-state 
actors under the ambit of interregionalism, namely: private sector and civil society actors. 
Ruland's typology is, however, limiting, in so far as its treatment of permutations in the 
interregional format goes. To a lesser extent, so too is Hettne's template. Hanggi (2006) provides 
a typological advance on both, in the process sketching the growing frequency of and reliance on 
interregional permutations over the last four decades, spanning a cross-section of the Global 
North, and, increasingly, cutting across the Global North and Global South, and more recently re-
formating some historical pan-Global South alliances. 
Excluding his account of triad-based interregionalism and triad-cum-non-triad 
interregionalism, Hanggi's (2006) classification scheme sets out five types of interregional 
relations, which by his own admission may not adequately reflect "real world" complexities. 53 
Hitherto, this classification attempt stands out as an especially expansive stock-taking of 
arrangements traditionally viewed as interregional in nature, in addition to outlier cases. His 
not fit with conventional understandings of group-to-group interregionalism. Rather, he likens it to a megaregion, 
given that the countries-fourteen in all-constitutive of this arrangement are members of five respective regional 
groupings: the Southern African Development Community, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation, ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
53 Hanggi tracks the emergence of the various types of interregional relations, including what he terms "quasi-
interregional relations", "relations between two regional organizations", "relations between a regional organization 
and a regional grouping", "relations between two regional groups", "megaregional relationships", "interregional 
relations within the triad", "interregional relations between triad and non-triad regions" (2006, 44-45, 47, 48, 49, 50-
51, 53, 55). 
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analysis expands on a three-pronged categorization of interregionalism, which he developed in 
an earlier paper: "(a) relations between regional groupings; (b) biregional and transregional 
arrangements; ( c) hybrids such as relations between regional groupings and single powers" 
(Hanggi 2000, 1 ). 
1.3 Interregionalism: Theory in Perspective 
Some scholars have determined that there are five broad functions of interregionalism: 
"balancing [i.e. Triad-centric actors attempting to balance each other (and similarly position 
themselves with respect to non-Triad groupings), as regards power], institution building [in the 
context of global governance], rationalizing [decision-making in global forums], agenda setting 
and collective identity formation" (Doidge 2007, 232). From the vantage point of IR theory, 
interregional relations' balancing role pertains to realism (Ibid., 232). Collectively, institution 
building, rationalizing and agenda setting are liberal institutionalist in orientation (Ibid., 232). 
Collective identity formation is especi~lly germane with respect to constructivism (Ibid., 232). 
Regarding the second point and with respect to its IR context, the increasingly discernible 
trend of the actor status of certain regions has· further disrupted the long-established, sweeping 
grip (already the target of critical, generally post-positivist theoretical IR approaches, for some 
three decades) that the so-called idealized Westphalian interstate narrative-with respect to the 
evolution of the modern states system-has had on the discipline. States as sovereign, spatial 
political units-perpetuated as such by political fiat-appear to be operating more and more 
alongside world regions. 
Consider that "[f]or the last two decades at least, the emerging global order increasingly 
seems to be characterised by a relocation of political authority to spheres beyond the nation-
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state" (Albert and Reuber 2007, 549). That interregional relations are a potentially lasting feature 
of global governance is of special consequence in terms of the place of these relations, coupled 
with the manifest ( quasi-)unitary strength of purpose and action of certain regions, in challenging 
the disciplinary resonance and currency of interstate paradigms that present the state as the basic 
or elemental unit of social analysis. 
On this score, interregionalism research has not deliberately engaged with how the 
phenomenon represents, in theoretical terms, a challenge to the state-centric orthodoxy of IR 
(though some scholars aligned with the 'new' regionalism research have (see Boas et al 2005)). 
This despite the fact that the group of scholars who have been central in reprising and advancing 
academic inquiry into this phenomenon over the last decade, have sought to situate 
interregionalism squarely in IR (see Hanggi et al 2006). 
What is more, while some interregionalism researchers may have sought to couch their 
scholarly contributions in IR-based theoretical frameworks-realist and liberal-institutionalist (or 
a combination of the two (see Hanggi 2000)), including other variants like constructivism (see 
Gilson 2002)-such engagements have, generally, been thin. But conspicuous by its absence has 
been explicit engagement with the metatheoretical debates that animate concepts such as 
ontology and epistemology54 (Hollis and Smith 1991a/1991b), and that have riven the field ofIR, 
54 Both ontology and epistemology are central to how the analyst generally approaches social inquiry, and the 
discipline of IR specifically; in terms of his take on the nature, purposes, methods, scope of inquiry and criteria of 
the discipline. Ontology relates to the social world and the nature of being, which we can view as units of social 
analysis (and their relationships), deployed in the study of world politics. Epistemology has to do with how the 
analyst comes to know and relate his knowledge to the world, leveraging methodology in the pursuit of knowledge. 
Specifically, the analyst can have an objectivist (essentially materialist) or subjectivist (essentially idealist) position. 
The objectivist position is based on the 'fact-value dichotomy' (Fischer 1998, 130); the subjectivist position obtains 
where the line is blurred regarding what is under study and how the analyst's views are inserted in the process, as he 
is implicated in the reality being studied. Following from this, the analyst can obtain knowledge about the world 
either scientifically-i.e. using positivism. Referred to as neopositivism by Fischer, he describes it as having forged 
a social science occupied with the "pursuit of quantitatively replicable causal generalizations [or relationships, 
emphasizing] empirical research designs, the use of sampling techniques and data-gathering procedures, the 
measurement of outcomes, arid the development of causal models with predictive power .... The only reliable 
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and the level of analysis problem (Singer 1961 )-which, arguably, form core facets of paradigm-
based outlooks on the world and certainly shape perceptions of the disciplinary nature and 
purpose of IR. 55 In important respects, this is reflective of just how neoteric second generation 
attempts to articulate an interregionalism research agenda are. 
This reference to second generation interregionalism research, though fleeting, is 
significant, in that as much as Hanggi's (2000) now decade-plus old paper is a landmark 
contribution to the academic engagement with interregionalism, it is not the first such attempt to 
examine the phenomenon. Rather, it represents a scholarly spark that re-kindled the research 
agenda; what I term-and have already alluded to as-a second generation undert"aking. There 
were much earlier (albeit exiguous) first generation attempts-through the 1960s (see Russett 
1967), '70s (see Cantori and Spiegel 1973) and '80s (see Kaiser 1981)-to examine interregional 
interactions (Hanggi 2000, 2). 
However, interregionalism did not appear to resonate in regionalism literature thirty years 
ago. Prevailing geopolitical (i.e. the systemic break with the Cold War) and geoeconomic (i.e. 
even more concerted globalization-driven integration) realities unfolding over the last two 
decades have, ostensibly, changed this; necessitating that scholars treat with interregionalism 
approach to knowledge accumulation, according to this epistemology, is empirical falsification through objective 
hypothesis testing of rigorously formulated causal generalizations" (1998, 130). Inspired by the work of Karl 
Popper, positivism seeks, in the social science context, to emulate approaches to research in the natural sciences-by 
explaining the world. This, as Cox ( 1981) describes it, is a 'problem-solving' approach. Alternatively, the analyst can 
obtain knowledge about the world by understanding it; essentially interpreting it (i.e. post-positivism), given the 
indeterminacy that animates it. Post-positivism lets go of positivism's empirical shackles. The Frankfurt School-
inspired critical theory of IR, articulated by Robert Cox (1981 ), generally falls into this latter category, having an 
emancipatory intent and making the case for systemic change in respect of the status quo in the international system. 
As such, given ontological and epistemological cleavages, positivist and post-positivist theoretical perspectives in IR 
do not command a consensus on the nature, purposes, methods, scope of inquiry and criteria of the discipline. [This 
analysis draws on discussions with professors and classmates, in the context of the York University Department of 
Political Science doctoral seminar 'Advanced Study in International Relationsl . 
55 Exceptions are scholars like Hettne (see Hettne et al 1999), who have sought to situate the study of regionalism 
on epistemological grounds, making the case for a 'normative-critical IR' as relates to regionalism; pushing the 
envelope, too, with respect to looking beyond the ontological centrality of the state. 
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more deliberately. The prevailing narrative of the EU taking shape as a global actor in world 
politics-in the light of a more internationally present European Commission and, more recently, 
the Lisbon Treaty (which has brought to the fore such institutional innovations as the High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) (see Article l 3a(3) of the Lisbon Treaty))-has also been a catalyst for scholarly 
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mterest. 
While scholarly interest in interregionalism has intensified over the last ten-plus years, 
such literature is far from robust. This is indicative of such research "still [being] in its infancy" 
(Hanggi et al 2006, 6). Typically, the literature has tended to appear as chapter contributions in 
edited volumes, and in academic journals (ibid). In the case of the latter, a set of articles were 
published in 2005 in a landmark special issue of the Journal of European Integration, on the 
theme of the EU as a global actor in the context of interregionalism. 
To date, Hanggi, Roloff and Ruland's 2006 edited volume, lnterregionalism and 
International Relations, is the first book-length attempt to deal in a dedicated fashion with this 
subject matter (Hanggi et al 2006c, xiii). Their book is the culmination of a research initiative 
launched in the early 2000s that brought together a group of scholars from around the world 
interested in advancing research on interregionalism (Ibid., xiii). The volume is described as a 
first attempt to engage with the state of the art in this research field (Hanggi et al 2006). That it 
was only published in 2006 signifies just how recently established the dedicated research agenda 
on interregionalism actually is. 
56 Though institutional reforms that cut to the core of expanding the EU's ability to act in concert in international. 
affairs have only taken shape in recent years, dating back at least to the early 1990s there has been a long-standing 
perception of the grouping's members "as one actor on the world scene, and at the EC summit in Maastricht in 
December 1991 they committed themselves to a political union, including closer cooperation on foreign policy" 
(Pilgaard 1993, 101 ). 
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Hanggi and Ruland have been at the forefront of the second generation undertaking to 
develop a research agenda around interregionalism. As previously acknowledged, Hanggi's 2000 
paper is, in many respects, groundbreaking. Ruland has also advanced an understanding of 
emerging forms of interregionalism; in the 1990s and 2000s publishing work on EU and Asian 
interregional cooperation and the EU as an interregional actor (Ruland 1999 & 2001 ). 
1.4 'Lilliput' Regions in Interregionalism Literature, Against the Backdrop of More 
Studied Regions 
I. The Dominance of Europe in the Interregionalism Literature 
Europe attracts considerable scholarly attention as a so-called apex region, against the backdrop 
of the theme of interregionalism and global governance; so, too, do the other two so-called Triad 
regions: North America and East Asia. Collectively, they are generally examined with a view to 
making sense of the changing world order, notably around the narrative of hegemonic world 
order,57 but also growing, complex interdependence. 
At the risk of overly simplifying the extent of the geographic spread of scholars engaged 
in interregionalism research, a case can be made that concerted research efforts appear especially 
to be clustered within the context of European institutions. This is not surprising, considering 
that-as previously noted-regional actorness, as an overarching theme, looms large in the still 
developing interregionalism research: Europe figuring prominently in this narrative. As such, 
research institutions, especially those in continental Europe that are occupied with the study of 
comparative regionalism and Europe in international affairs, have developed research programs 
57 See Katzenstein (2005); who contends that regions, particularly Asian and European regionalism-leveraged by 
the territorial and non-territorial powers of the postwar American imperium-have assumed a critically important 
place in world politics, especially in the post-Cold War global order. "The United States plays the central role in a 
world ofregions", he argues (Ibid., 43). 
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that either touch (directly or indirectly) on interregionalism. Notable examples are the Belgium-
based United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies, the Center for 
European Integration Studies a research institute at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms 
University-in Germany, and the Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of Europe" 
initiative of the Freie Universitat-Berlin, to name but a few. The School of Global Studies (SGS) 
and the affiliated, recently-established Gothenburg Centre of Globalization and Development at 
the University of Gothenburg are also notable in this regard. The SGS is of particular 
importance, as it is the academic home to a doyen of (inter)regionalism scholarship, Bjorn Hettne 
and his protege, Fredrik Soderbaum. 
II. Small State Regions in the Interregionalism Literature 
Given the above context, it is not surprising why interregionalism research has come to be 
regarded as ostensibly taken up with so-called Triad-based relations; only in recent years having 
gradually broadened its scholarly research to consider the interregional narrative of non-Triad 
(ostensibly Global South) regions. While regions in Asia and Latin America, for instance, have 
been of interest to scholars, as have regions with respect to the African continent-more 
recently-there has, at best, been an indifference toward small state world regions; at worst, a 
disregard. 
Either way, there has been an absence of systematic consideration of small, marginal 
Global South regions, like the Caribbean. This region tends to be subsumed into or has generally 
been relegated to a secondary status in analyses concerned with certain interregional 
configurations. A case in point is Holland's (2006) examination of how interregionalism has 
played out between Europe and the ACP. 
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The Caribbean's interregional experiences are no less instructive than those of other 
regions, regardless of it being an extremely small region, on the periphery of the global political 
economy. These experiences need to be taken stock of. Table 2 in the Annex does exactly that. 
As is evident from Table 2, the Caribbean's interregional encounters run the spectrum of 
permutations. That the region has had a long-standing (colonial/post-colonial) interregional 
relationship with Europe, decidedly bi-regional in nature, spanning wide-ranging ties around 
development aid, political cooperation, trade and other themes, makes for an empirical case 
deserving of deliberative constructivist analysis. The EPA negotiated between a group of 
Caribbean States and the EU, especially, lends itself to this sort of study. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to engage with the interregionalism literature, which is one of the 
scholarly referent points for the present study. In as much as it is an important scholarly anchor, 
it has shortcomings. These shortcomings have been explored, among them the literature's lack of 
engagement with regions like the Caribbean. 
Small state Global South regions like the Caribbean are not inconsequential, not least 
because the particular and unique features of their interregionalist engagements can lead to a 
better understanding of the nature of interregionalism, in general, in theory and practice. Also 
important to keep in mind in the general scheme of things is that, there has been a trend 
(traditionally associated with decolonization and in more recent times where states have frayed 
and unraveled altogether, e.g. the former Soviet Union) where states are becoming smaller. What 
is more, smaller state regions are taking shape and are increasingly being engaged by larger ones 
and vice versa. A cautionary note is, therefore, perhaps apt here: in favouring more conventional 
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research agendas, interregionalism scholarship runs the risk of compromising its ability to offer 
well-informed assessment of emerging trends in interregionalist engagements, thus undermining 
the potency of its explanatory power. 
At this juncture, however, we need to take stock of the regionalism literature, couched by 
an account of integration approaches. This analysis is especially germane, in the light of the link 
established earlier between regionalism and interregionalism, and considering that "[r]esearch on 
interregionalism is .... part of regional integration theory" (Roloff 2006, 21 ). 
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Chapter II 
Regionalism: 
A Survey of the Literature/Theory and Treatment of Caribbean 
(Inter)regionalism Therein 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter turns attention to regionalism studies. I parse the extant literature and some 
theoretical approaches, surveying them, though not with a view to giving an account of the 
current state of the field, per se. While I discuss the nature and contribution of several scholarly 
undertakings, my primary concern is to set the stage to determine whether there is systematic 
theoretical treatment of the Caribbean regarding an (inter)regionalism narrative. Some segments 
of the regionalism literature, it is determined, do take account of this narrative. However, it is 
surmised that while elements of regionalism scholarship do treat with the Caribbean seriously, 
there is scope for the study of Caribbean regionalism to utilize research trajectories increasingly 
prevalent in contemporary scholarship of IR scholars and comparativists that apply constructivist 
insights to study Global North regions. 
Burgeoning interregionalism has focused attention on regions/regionalism. Indeed, there 
has been a resurgence of international regionalism58 through the 1980s and '90s (Hurrell 1995, 
331; Hanggi et al 2006, 3). The comingling of world politics and regions/regionalism is perhaps 
presently at one of its tightest mo_ments in history, given that contemporary "[g]lobal governance 
seems to bring with it a new and strengthened role of regions and regional organisations" (Albert 
and Reuber 2007, 550). 
Hettne and his collaborators cite aspects of the structural transformation of the world that 
58 International regionalism is understood as "the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of 
regions" (Nye 1968, vii); but, importantly, as "the ideas, identities and ideologies related to a regional 
project... .. [R]egionalism is clearly a political project" (Marchand et al 1999, 900; my emphasis). 
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must inform the contextualization but also understanding of recent trends in regionalism, 
namely: (i) the decline of American hegemony, in relative terms (for more detailed perspective 
on this view, refer to (neo-)realist approaches to regionalism, which stem from a foregrounding 
of power relations and hegemony-with a view· to understanding both regional agenda-setting 
and the role of intra- and extra-regional hegemons in this regard (see Gilpin 1975, 1987; Krasner 
1976)); and (ii) shifting attitudes, especially among developing countries as regards 
neoliberalism in its economic and political incarnations (Hettne 2007; Hettne and Soderbaum 
2000). With respect to this latter point, emerging trends in regionalism need to be conceived of, 
too, in keeping with a project to cement neoliberalism-i.e. globalization (Dierckxsens and 
Aguilar 2007, 27). This is especially the case when globalization is propped up by open 
regionalism which buttresses trade and investment liberalization agreements. 59 
The task at hand is to navigate through and draw from the literature on regionalism 
studies, with a view to showcasing various theoretical currents. Given the voluminous research 
therein, for practical purposes a cross-cutting chapter such as this has to be an illustrative, 
selective engagement. 
The chapter is divided into seven parts, followed by concluding remarks. The first section 
engages with the regionalism literature from the vantage point of the grand theories of European 
integration. The second section sketches the study of regionalism, building on Haasian 
neofunctionalism 'beyond Europe'. The section that follows examines further attempts in the 
literature to extend the theoretical and conceptual insights from European integration studies, 
59 Though it has no commonly agreed definition, open regionalism is generally understood to refer to the 
advancement of both regional (trading) arrangements and the global trading system; and thus is an attempt to 
reconcile the two. The view is that the two can be compatible, and that regionalism can serve as a "building block" 
for global liberalization, giving it impetus (Bergsten 1997). 
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with consideration being given to strands of regional integration theory in its broader sense. 60 
The intellectual terrain of regionalism studies is sketched, with particular focus on the New 
Regionalism Approach (NRA). Section four turns the attention of the chapter to the theoretical 
bedrock of the present study, constructivism in international theory. It draws on the notion that 
integration is anchored in social interaction (Deutsch 1953). Section five looks at the application 
of constructivism to the study of European Integration. Section six frames regional identities 
against the backdrop of a constructivist approach to the study of regionalism, which sets the 
stage for the final section which -situates the place of small state Global South regions like the 
Caribbean in the regionalism literature. The conclusion maintains that the record of scholarship, 
in this regard, fares better in regionalism studies; especially finding voice through the work of 
West Indian scholars. 
2.2 (European) Integration Theory at a Glance 
A useful starting point for a review of the extant literature on international regionalism is to 
consider European integration theory, reviewing the theoretical pluralism that has come to 
characterize it. The field of European/( regional) integration theory and international regionalism 
are decidedly distinct, yet have much in common: noteworthy, in this regard, is that the scholarly 
space of each has been heavily trafficked by IR scholars, as is the case with interregionalism 
literature. Thus, at the very least, this scholarship is heavily influenced by IR paradigms. 
European integration studies is interwoven with the idea of a united Europe. It is an idea 
60 
'European' integration theory and integration theory are utilized interchangeably by some scholars (Rosamond 
1995, 391), to refer to European integration studies. A somewhat nuanced view of the two is taken. While, arguably, 
integration theory, per se, is taken up with the study of the European integration and governance narrative, regional 
integration theory attempts to more deliberatively (although not always systematically) grapple with the integration 
experiences of other world regions. 
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that has resonated within academic and policy circles, extending far beyond the disciplinary 
shores associated with the study of Europe as well as Europe's geographical shores, to other 
regions. Hence the interest of some IR scholars in the EU; especially in delineating and 
juxtaposing what has been achieved in integration today against a historical backdrop. 
Although Jean Monnet and French statesman Robert Schuman61 are treated with 
reverence as regards advancement of the idea of a united Europe, they were not the first to 
conceive of it. Other noted historical figures articulated a similar vision, years prior to the 
historically significant Schuman Declaration and Schuman Plan. In a much-cited speech 
delivered in 1945, Winston Churchill, for example, called for a "United States of Europe"62; to 
be tasked with pushing for cooperation and harmonious relations (Mauter 1998, 67). 63 As a 
result, Churchill is "regarded as the father of European unity" (Ibid., 67). In addition to 
intellectual efforts in the 1940s that made the case for a postwar European federation, "a major 
movement of public opinion, with [the establishment of the] Federal Union .. .in 1939 [, tasked 
with promoting] the idea [, also took off] ... , gaining 10,000 members by the spring of 1940" 
(Pinder 1986, 41 ). 
But in looking to history to conceptually situate the push for European integration, there 
is one overarching factor that must be considered. The fact is, the continent's centuries old 
experience with empires that sought to (and those that did) consolidate territories (in some cases 
61 The integration initiatives, at the time, were spearheaded by France, with the support of West Germany and the 
Benelux countries. 
62 Predating Churchill's call for a "United States of Europe", there were impassioned pleas for unification: coming 
against the backdrop of the end of World War I, when in the early 1920s Count Kalergi of Austria made the case for 
a United States of Europe (Basdeo 1990, 104). Foreshadowing what would emerge some fifty years later, the French 
delegation attached to the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva proposed that a European Union be 
established, and that it "operate" in the context of the League of Nations (Ibid., 104-105). These initiatives were 
absent traction, at the time (Ibid., 104-105). 
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"Churchill's interest in European unity [is said to date] to 1930"; though he would later abandon the idea (Mauter 
1998, 67). 
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by force-the Napoleonic Wars comes to mind-and through diplomacy, e.g. the Congress of 
Vienna) meant that the idea of a united Europe had had an extraordinarily long time to germinate 
in a collective European psche, of sorts. 
If some form of union has been a long-standing theme in European history, informing it, 
to a large extent, has been the quest for peace; which, although emerging as an important driver 
of the postwar European integration movement, has been a recurring and central preoccupation 
in the European narrative. This latter point is evidenced 1n the work of Immanuel Kant-the 
foundation for democratic peace theory-and others. In its modem history, Europe has the 
unenviable distinction of having been at the center of two world wars, which, without question, 
make the impetus for and starting conditions of postwar European integration sui generis; as 
does the Euro-polity's ambitious 1957 founding treaty (and associated vision), which set the bar 
high for integration at the very outset.64 Moreover that fairly ambitious integration was steadily 
pursued on the heels of an especially dark period for Europe in the lead up to, shortly after and 
during two world wars is all the more remarkable, accomplishing one of the rarest of feats: peace 
over the last sixty-plus years of European history.65 European integration, namely in the postwar 
64 Professor Andre Sapir (Universite Libre de Bruxelles) and Dr Luk Van Langenhove (UNU-CRIS): Interview by 
author, Prague, Czech Republic, 16th and 17th January, 2010, respectively (on the margins of the Eleventh Annual 
Global Development Conference-Regional and Global Integration: Quo Vadis?). Sapir expounded on the nature 
and inlplication of the Euro-polity's ambitious founding treaty: for him, it is imbued with a political vision; as is 
exemplified by the following passage-"Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe". According to Sapir, this vision has kept the regionalist project on a forward looking path, as 
compared with the European Free Trade Agreement-which had a purely economic vision, and has remained a free 
trade agreement. Thus, as he describes it, the European regionalist project has steadily evolved up the integration 
ladder-facilitated along the way by common institutions/policies having been set in place-from free trade area, to 
customs union, to common market, to economic union; with full integration perhaps not yet on the horizon, but "in 
the cards". He did stress, however, that he wanted to avoid painting an overly rosy picture of EU integration; citing 
the uneven extent of integration, for example in the: "goods markets (very high, free mobility (FM)), services 
markets (medium, partial FM), labour markets (relatively low, but FM) and capital mobility (very high, FM)". Sapir 
emphasized three challenges of EU integration: "l. How to manage partial integration?; 2. How to manage 
increasing size and diversity?; 3. How to manage global integration?" [Elements of this discussion appear in Sapir's 
presentation (entitled 'Regional Integration: The European Experience') to Plenary 2-i.e. Lessons for Regional 
Integration from the EU- is the EU Sui Generis?-ofthe aforementioned conference]. 
65 For much of its history, Europe has been all too familiar with war. 
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years, and the idea of Europe both acquired common purpose through the quest for peace. This 
narrative was evident among the 'big thinkers' in the early days of integration, such as Schuman 
and Monnet. Part and parcel of that ideational story was to reduce the large asymmetries between 
the founding partners. 
At the very least, there have been two intellectual currents motivating the study of the 
EU. The first relates to the latter point: to study European integration has meant gaining a better 
appreciation for its transformative role with respect to sustaining peace in the international 
system. It is no wonder, therefore, why European integration studies has traditionally been 
trafficked by IR scholars, having a close, longstanding association-as a result-with IR. 
Secondly, European integration studies has been informed by scholarly attention on the 
raft of European institutions and related policy fields, political parties (party systems) and 
elections and other issue areas more closely associated with comparative politics and public 
policy studies. Such issue areas have been studied not as a means of attaining greater insights 
into broader questions of war and peace, per se. Rather, they are studied in their own right. 
The intellectual currents I have flagged above represent one interpretation of the 
trajectory of the study of European integration. Another instructive interpretation, provided by 
Verdun (2005), is intellectually not that far removed. She differentiates between two approaches 
that have apparently developed in the European integration studies literature: an American and 
European one. 
The "more theory-oriented" scholarship of the American approaches, Verdun suggests, 
couch the EU in "general phenomena", with a view to "produc[ing] general theories" (2005, 11). 
In contrast, Verdun understands EU approaches as "focus[ed] exclusively on the EU", the 
scholarship more "case study-oriented" (Ibid., 11 ). 
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The gap between the two approaches can be traced to differing points of view in a 
number of areas. Whether European integration is a sui generis case features prominently, in this 
regard. As Verdun argues, European scholars tend to take the position that it is,66 or acknowledge 
this but invoke· a middle ground between it being sui generis and it being "a case like many 
others" (Ibid., 12). 67 American scholars, she contends, frame European integration as a process 
geared at "institution building and policy making" that is comparable to what obtains in the rest 
of the world (Ibid., 12). 
With the above background, we cast our gaze now to integration theory. But we do so 
selectively, taking account of and contrasting major schools of thought that have traditionally 
(and particularly) been employed in the study of postwar European integration, around: (i) why 
the community emerged; and (ii) why and how it has evolved in the way that it has. In what 
follows, the main, contending historical contributions to theorizing European integration are 
outlined; namely: federalism, neofunctionalism68 and intergovernmentalism.69 Flanking the 
review of these classical integration theories (and integrated into a later subsection) is an outline 
of a more recent contribution to the study of European integration, constructivism. 
Under the entry federal, the Oxford Dictionary online resource AskOxford.com cites the 
term as "referring to a system of government in which several states form a unity but remain 
66 Borzel notes that scholars have sought to advance various concepts-such as the new, post-Hobbesian order and a 
post-modern state, even a network of pooling and sharing sovereignty-to "capture the sui generis nature of the EU" 
(2010, 192). 
67 Scholarship in this vein tends to contribute less to the Political Science literature, broadly conceived-according 
to Verdun (2005, 12-13). 
68 This includes the formative contributions to the literature on functionalism. 
69 As classical integration theories, these three have resonated beyond academia, finding broad appeal with 
practitioners and policy makers alike. In the review that follows, I highlight competing explanations of European 
integration as driven either by suprastate relations, leveraged by supraterritorial institutions, or the state (including 
state-based constituents and inter-state processes). As relates to classical integration theories, we can see the core 
dialectic as not being too far removed from the longstanding liberal and realist debate in IR. Like the latter debate 
and the so-called 'neo-neo' divide that came to characterize it in the late 1980s, the debates animating classical 
integration theories appear to have run their course. 
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independent in internal affairs". But it also notes that federalism is a derivative of federal; 
especially noteworthy is the Latin derivation of federal-foedus, meaning "league, covenant, or 
treaty". 
In integration studies, federalism is especially minded of war and peace and how the 
pursuit and achievement of the latter is best assured by states typically operating as unitary actors 
forfeiting sovereignty, and instead uniting as one supranational entity. What. would emerge by 
way of shared institutions and the division of powers between federal, national and local 
authorities occupies scholarly attention in the federalist approach. 
In the context of federalism proper, a common constitution or founding document is the 
glue that binds together what, in effect, would have been units that previously exercised 
sovereignty; subsequently forfeited in its outright sense. Although applied in many different 
contexts, federalism ("highly normative" in nature (Rosamond 1995, 395)) in the context of 
European integration-with respect to different layers of political authority, i.e. central/sub-
central70-probably evokes two landmark documents, the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1950 
Schuman Declaration.71 The Treaty of Rome-signed by what at the time were six founder-
members of the Community, France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries-put 
signatory countries on the path to economic and political integration, that, arguably, came to 
represent an approach to governing Europe that had as one of its core objectives the preservation 
of peace (as already mentioned), in the wake of two devastating world wars-with Europe at 
70 In this type of federalism, the sanctity of political boundaries are preserved, and the (new) relationship between 
sub-central units better defined, as is the relationship between those units and the center. Institutions are also 
important in giving life to the federal system. 
71 Other key events include the Treaty of Paris of 1951, the Single European Act-SEA of 1986, the Treaty on 
European Union of 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht-especially the creation of the single market-of 1993 [The EU 
was established by Article A of the Treaty of the EU, or the Maastricht Treaty], the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (that came to a head in 2004, though its ratification failed in 2005), the Treaty of Lisbon 
(signed in 2007, and entering into force in 2009). The SEA ranks as a key turning point in the integration process, as 
it formed the basis for the crystallization of the single market in the early 1990s. 
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their center. One of the Treaty's core pillars was the European Economic Community (EEC), 
coming on the heels of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 72, 
as regards the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (which expired in 2002). 
There were two objectives to the creation of the EEC and the Common Market: the 
transformation of the conditions of trade, but also manufacture in the Community; and secondly, 
a more political objective that envisioned the EEC as contributing to the "functional construction 
of a political Europe"-constituting a step towards closer unification in respect of Europe, no 
less (EEC Treaty 2007). In the preamble of the Treaty, the signatories declare that they were 
"determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (Ibid., 
395; emphasis added). 
The ECSC, proposed in the Schuman Declaration, envisioned the Franco-German 
production of coal and steel as being "placed under a common High Authority" .... "The pooling 
of coal and steel production [thought to hold the potential to] immediately provide for the setting 
up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe" 
(Schuman Declaration 1950). The economic dimension of European integration was thus seen as 
an important first step to a political union. Consider that "Monnet's approach to the building of 
Europe-a federal Europe-lay in the belief that by forging specific functional economic links 
between states in a way that did not directly challenge national sovereignty, the door to 
federation would be opened gradually" (Burgess 1996, 3). What is more having been involved in 
the post-war reconstruction of France, Monnet viewed the European nation state that standing 
and acting alone as not being a fit with the world that was taking shape. Rather, he embraced the 
notion of a European common market on a continental scale (Monnet 1962). With a devastating 
72 This was a precursor to what has come to be known as the EU, which far exceeds the ECSC in membership and 
policy area reach/remit. 
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war fresh on the minds of technocrats like Monnet, he also saw the integration of Germany into 
the western European economy as a means of counteracting any possible tendency on that 
country's part to unleash war on the continent once more. 
The Treaty of Rome and the Schuman Declaration are invoked above as they can be 
construed as reflecting a push toward a federalist vision for the Euro-polity, by the architects of 
European integration (other initiatives, namely the ill-fated European Defence Community and 
the European Political Community, also embracing this federalist goal). "[F]ederal ideas .... have 
contributed both to the legal, political, and constitutional evolution of the European Community 
and to the creation of the European Union at Maastricht" [; but by the same token,] "the EU has 
not yet become the federation intended by both Monnet and Schuman" (Ibid., l, 3). 
Europe as having been at the center of two world wars (as previously indicated) was 
another recurring theme in the Schuman Declaration and the proposal therein for the 
establishment of an ECSC. That member states would collectively have a stake in coal and steel 
production was viewed as crucial to mitigating the possibility of war and promoting peace and 
prosperity on the European continent. Indeed, as stated in the Schuman Declaration, "[b ]y 
pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind 
France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the 
first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace" 
(Ibid.' 3). 
This narrative became an important driving force behind the study of European 
integration. The federalism literature associated with Davis (1978), Pinder (1986) and Burgess 
(1996) is perhaps most instructive, in this regard. Authored some seventy years ago by Altiero 
Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, The Ventotene Manifesto-which made the case for a federation of 
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European states and served as an important template for the European Federalist Movement 
(Movimento Federalista Europeo )-can probably be intellectually located as a very important 
inspiration for the European integration literature on federalism. 
While "the European Union [admittedly] is not a federation in the classical sense, [for 
some] it has a number of federal-like attributes and dynamics" (Burgess 1996, 3), including a 
commitment to federal principles/values around partnership, equality, recognition (and 
accommodation) of difference, etc.-sketched out in their "covenant". Federalism, thus, seeks to 
explain sovereign European states pursuit of an association, otherwise referred to as integration. 
The need for common institutions feature in this approach, as a way of staving off war between 
states. How a balance is struck between diverse, sovereign nation-states' interests (including 
interstate cooperation) and the wider, declared commitment of these units to the union resonates 
in this theoretical framework. If a balance indeed existed at various points in the history of 
European integration, it is an open question as to whether or to what degree it may have been 
taken off kilter, in the light of what some have recently suggested is an EU superstate is in the 
making (Milward 2005). The Lisbon Treaty has fanned the fears of Eurosceptics, who are 
concerned about a supposedly emerging superstate. 
What of neofunctionalism? Ernst B. Haas was an intellectual giant of this approach (Haas 
1958; 1964; 1975). Arguably, he has left an indelible imprint on neofunctionalism, but on 
integration studies too. Indeed, the emergence of integration studies is thought to coincide with 
the publication of Haas's The Uniting of Europe and the establishment of the EEC in Western 
Europe in 1958 (Moravcsik 2005, 350).73 
73 Leon N. Lindberg's The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, published in 1963, also ranks 
among the classic contributions to neofunctionalism. 
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As the first grand theory of European integration (and its dynamics), neofunctionalism 
has attempted to explain how and why states forgo elements of sovereignty,74 to instead come 
together as a political community pursuing economic and political integration. 75 With respect to 
the latter, integration has been characterized by Haas as a process unfolding over a period of time 
"between the establishment of common economic rules and the possible emergence of a political 
entity" (Haas and Schmitter 1966, 266); integration styled in this vein ultimately being seen as 
leading to a blurring of political boundaries. 
Haas deemed as indicative of successful integration "the growth of a pluralist political 
arena in the context of effective community institutions" (Scheingold 1970, 979). Accounting for 
the supposed near-automaticity76 of a deepening, sector-by-sector linear integration trajectory77 
also occupies much attention in Haas's framework. 
A cornerstone of the early incarnation of this framework is the concept of "spillover", 78 
which represents a prediction-based account of integration-rendering it afait accompli. By way 
of background, Haasian neofunctionalism sought to illustrate (in a non-normative, empirically-
centered fashion 79) how cooperation, per "Monnet's approach to the building of Europe", around 
fairly technical but relatively non-contentious areas/sectors (e.g. coal and steel, to some extent) 
74 While ontologically problematizing the state, Haasian neofunctionalism is epistemologically rationalistic and 
actor-centered. 
75 For Haas, "political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed 
over the existing ones" (Haas 1958, 16). Rosamond contends that in the neofunctionalist approach "integration 
amounts to the transposition of the pluralist polity from the national to the regional level" (2005, 395). 
76 Years later, Haas would question the soundness of this claim (Haas 1975). 
77 Albeit, in "low politics", in the first instance. 
78 Another related concept is "unintended consequences": integration creates situations where bottlenecks, for 
example, that may arise are configured in such a way that solutions are only possible in terms of deeper integration 
efforts. 
79 This was perhaps inspired by the social scientific or positivist methods of the behaviouralist revolution in the 
social sciences, at the time. Haas has been described as conceiving of neofunctionalism "as a variety of rationalist 
theory" (Rosamond 2005, 241 ). 
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political institutions, is an important neofunctional proposition. 84 Shifting loyalties, as a 
transmission mechanism, of sorts, solidify supranational85 entities as foci of new-found loyalties, 
at the expense of national institutions. 86 Cultivated spillover constitutes the third variant in the 
spillover narrative; one that highlights the role of· the central supranational institution in 
addressing conflicts, and doing so under the premise that it represents the common interest. 
Effectively, this would strengthen the case for supranationalism, and integration more broadly, as 
deepening integration would bolster such an organization. 
Though enthusiastically received when it first emerged, neofunctionalism came up for 
criticism. 87 That criticism seemed increasingly justified by the late 1960s and 1970s; a period 
when the pace of European integration had slowed considerably, integration having become 
increasingly dysfunctional-as exemplified by the "empty chair" tactics of President Charles de 
Gaulle, from the late 1950s to late 1960s. Some of the fiercest opposition came from 
intergovernmentalism88 (Hoffman 1966; 1982), sharply critical of what its key protagonist-
Stanley Hoffman-argued was neofunctionalism's penchant to downplay the significance of the 
84 This feeds into the notion that new authority points emerge, concomitant to a weakening of authority at the level 
of sub-central units. This is in contrast to federalism, where in the name of preserving and accommodating the 
diversity of sub-central units, the authority of those units is not lost to a central (supranational) authority, through the 
process of integration. 
85 The notion of a supraterritorial authority was also envisioned by the precursor of neofunctionalism, functionalism. 
The contention is that integration galvanized around functional/technical areas spawns an internal dynamic, 
rendering integration self-reinforcing (Mitrany 1933; 1948; 1966). 
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"At times neo-functionalists gave the impression that spill-over was inevitable; and they thought that a 
supranational agency (such as the Commission of the EC) would lead the process, coopting national civil servants 
and representatives of interest groups for the purpose" (Pinder 1986, 43, some themes attributed to Lindberg 1963). 
National elites would, thus, become champions of integration. 
87 The salience of neofunctionalism has been questioned, in recent years. Some scholars, including Haas, have 
reflected on whether neofunctionalism had in fact outlived its usefulness (Haas 1975; 2001 ). Some thirty years ago, 
Haas famously declared neofunctionalism obsolete; after having attempted to rework some of his core claims, in 
response to critics. Arguably, neofunctionalism was moribund for a time. Yet some scholars, like Tranholm-
Mikkelsen (1991 ), have attempted to reprise neofunctionalism, in the light of the "new dynamism" in what is now 
the EU, since the mid-1980s. Indeed, in one of his last works before his death, Haas would assert that 
neofunctionalism "is no longer obsolescent" (Haas 2004, liii). 
88 This is seen as being of the realist kind; as distinct from Moravcsik's (1991) liberal intergovemmentalism. 
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nation-state in the integration narrative, characterizing it more as a bystander than active, leading 
participant. 
Amongst Hoffmanian intergovernmentalism's core claims is that the power to press ahead 
(or not), through a process of "interstate bargaining", with integration rests with member 
governments; thus placing intergovernmentalism squarely in opposition to neofunctionalism. If 
supraterritorial institutions exhibit power, it is only because governments wish them to, was the 
contention. What is more, national governments do not stand in the shadow of what are 
supposedly all-powerful supranational institutions: if power is indeed wielded by one over the 
other, the reverse is apparently the case. 89 Importantly, for Hoffman, integration is not seen as 
formulaic, nor automatic. Thus, to the extent that neofunctionalism marginalizes states, 
intergovernmentalism brings the state back in. 
Integration theory-i.e. neofunctionalism-geared at framing the European integration 
narrative in terms of member states being engaged in forging a supranational political entity that 
ultimately overshadows them is roundly rejected by Hoffman (Kjrer 2004, 103). Rather, some 
contend that the EEC should be seen as an international regime, "[i]ncreasing cooperation and 
the pooling of sovereignty in some economic areas .... not necessarily lead[ing] to the overall 
decline of national sovereignty. On the contrary, participation in a regime can enable states to 
adapt to a changing world economy. Hence, the EEC has helped preserve the nation-state as a 
basic unit in Europe, according to Hoffman" (Ibid., 21 ). For Hoffman, "relations between the 
89 Like neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism would later go through a period of reflection. As with efforts to 
reprise neofunctionalism in the early 1990s, in the wake of the bolstering of European integration in the mid- l 980s, 
though, intergovemmentalism would similarly have new life breathed into it; but with a twist. In the early '90s, 
Moravcsik (1991) sketched the liberal intergovernmental approach, combining rationalist institutionalism 
(bargaining theory) and neofunctionalist insight; in calling attention to domestic processes, he places special 
emphasis on economic interests. As such, there are two theoretical traditions that are evident in 
intergovemmentalism: a realist orientation, associated with Hoffman, and a liberal orientation, associated with 
Moravcsik. 
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[European] Community and its members are not a zero sum game; the Community helps 
preserve the nation-states far more than it forces them to whither away" (1982, 21 ). 
In Hoffman's work, there is a conscious effort to dismiss the triumphalism that app~ars to 
reverberate in neofunctionalism over a seemingly over-enthusiastic outlook on cooperation and a 
spillover effect. Intergovernmentalism brings into relief national (domestic) interests, against the 
backdrop of the so-called anarchical international system and the touted self-interest that stems 
from this amongst state actors, and the bearing that this has on any sustained drive toward 
integration. 
As a result, "intergovernmentalist analyses of European integration have tended to focus 
on the bargaining among national governments" (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 269). In important 
respects, "intergovernmentalism is essentially an application of the realist image of international 
relations to the analysis of the European [Union]" (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 8); where 
neofunctionalism is focused, instead, on non-state actors, such as supranational institutions (e.g. 
regional secretariats).90 
In addition to underscoring the primacy of the nation state, Hoffman also held up the 
external environment-the geopolitics of the Cold War, for example-in the context of the 
integration narrative. "High politics", he contended, made for a "logic of diversity" (as regards 
sparking divisions), rather than the "logic of integration" (1982, 21 ). This was borne out with 
90 As previously alluded to, this is reminiscent, to a certain degree, of the realist and liberal dialectic in IR proper. 
What is more, neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism stood in opposition to one another for a host of reasons 
associated with their approach to and the dynamics of the integration process, but fundamentally because of core 
ontological differences. Neofunctionalism was held up as a challenge to the dominant realist IR state-centric 
narrative and power-centred logic, to which Hoffinannian intergovemmentalism subscribes. But Haas was wary, too, 
of liberal idealism's claim that a Kantian international legal order would effectively enable conflict to be transcended 
(Rosamond 2005, 239). (This Haasian IR perspective is noteworthy, as Haas was deemed an IR scholar first, as 
opposed to an area studies specialist. Ruggie et al ask, "if neither realist nor idealist, who was Haas, intellectually 
speaking?" (2005, 274). Their answer: "Haas's most enduring premises and approaches are essentially Weberian" 
(Ibid., 239)). 
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respect to Gaullist France's opposition, from 1958 to 1969, to Britain joining the then EEC 
(Moravcsik 2000, 4, 7). De Gaulle had long been suspicious of Britain acting as the handmaiden 
of US geopolitical designs in Europe, against the backdrop of his own aspirations for France's 
"politico-military dominance in Europe" (Ibid., 7, 8). 
Moravcsik makes clear, however, that, in the final analysis, the factors most influencing 
de Gaulle's reticence to British membership were "enduring French agricultural and industrial 
interests" (Ibid., 54).91 Notwithstanding the preponderance of factors at play in Gaullist France's 
policy toward British membership in the EEC, the point is, with respect to intergovernmentalism, 
national interests cannot simply be discounted in the integration narrative. 
The approaches set out above constitute a first wave of path-breaking integration 
research, intellectually aligned more to an IR approach to EU studies than a comparative politics 
one. They have provided sophisticated insight into economic and political integration. 
A slate of other, insightful approaches have emerged in their wake, including social 
constructivist applications to the study of European integration (Adler 1998; Jorgensen 1997; 
Christiansen et al l 999). Over the next few sub-sections, I consider social constructivism's 
application to the study of the EU integration narrative but also the study of regionalism more 
generally; before which it is put in context. First, however, I consider whether the preeminent 
integration framework (i.e. neofunctionalism) associated with EU studies resonate with the study 
of other, non-European regions, after which elements of regionalism studies, in general, are 
sketched. 
91 This thesis goes to the core of Moravcsik's liberal intergovemmentalist approach, privileging economic 
imperatives in European integration (Moravcsik 1993; 1998). For his part, Hoffman "advocates .... a geopolitical 
interpretation of de Gaulle's European policy" (Moravcsik 2000, 56). This is a view shared by countless other 
scholars. Moravcsik goes against the grain with his thesis privileging 'low' over 'high' politics, with respect to de 
Gaulle, as argued by scholars like Vanke (2000) who responded to Moravcsik's 2000 article. 
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2.3 Haasian Neof unctionalism beyond Europe 
It is an open question as to what extent Haasian neofunctionalism can be applied expansively, 
beyond certain regional-types as the EU: as some scholars assert in the context of 
neofunctionalism, "settings [on which generalizations are to be made] must. ... be limited to 
groups of countries with open industrial economies, pluralist societies, and democratic political 
systems" (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 3). By the same token, Haas did consider other regional 
integration templates; such as Latin America, for example (Haas 1967, Barrera and Haas 1969). 
In short, although the intention may have been to pivot neofunctionalism as a general 
theory of integration, in practical terms Europe was the focal point of research. What can be said 
on this score is that in its broadest disciplinary sense, Haasian neofunctionalism is situated in IR. 
But it has been dedicated to accounting for a particular form of and experience with 
international cooperation/organization, as has emerged in and that is relevant to Western Europe 
and its industrialized societies. As such, while "the study of European integration has long been 
synonymous with Haas and his intellectual legacy [h ]is name .... does not figure prominently in 
recent contributions to the rapidly growing field of comparative regional integration" (Mattli 
2005, 327). 
This raises a broader question: do integration theories traditionally associated with EU 
studies travel well as regards the study of other, non-European regions? The short answer is no;92 
but with two caveats: (i) European integration theories have provided an important intellectual 
bedrock for and as such are genealogically related to certain theoretical templates that have come 
92 As Laursen notes, "[t]heories of integration have mainly been developed to explain European integration" (2008, 
3). 
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in their wake-many whose geographical reach (and referent) extends well beyond Europe;93 
and, (ii) Some can provide important theoretical insights, with regard to studies of non-European 
regions. Neofunctionalism is especially promising, in this regard; notwithstanding that it was 
originally devised in· the 1950s to explain how and why a political community was developing in 
Western Europe. 
To his credit, in a self-critique that came over a decade after The Uniting of Europe, Haas 
argued "[t]heories that ignore the need for focused general theories, and instead treat regional 
integration as a sui generis phenomenon ..... , breed theoretical insularity and are little more than 
'pre-theories' " (cited in Moravcsik 2005, 356-357). 
In a stinging indictment of sui generis theory, Moravcsik argues "[ m ]uch scholarship on 
European integration over the past two decades remains blissfully uninformed by the self-
criticism of neofunctionalists - and by advances in international relations theory over the past 
thirty years" (Ibid., 357)._ A quarter century ago, Puchala expressed a more extreme view of 
integration theory: that going forward it will be held up as "a rather long but not very prominent 
footnote in the intellectual history of twentieth century social science" (1984, 198). 
However, there is a contrarian view. Tranholm-Mikkelsen's view is more forgiving 
(revealing his neofunctionalist stripes), maintaining that neofunctionalists' "object of study was 
'regional integration' in general and European integration in particular" ( 1991, 3 ). Rosamond 
does underscore "that a considerable amount of contemporary writing on the EU is intent qn 
locating its analysis of integration in a global context" (1995, 399). Rosamond goes further, still, 
93 Some scholars are not willing to concede ground even on this point; for them it seems as if the European 
integration/regionalism experience and legacy has singularly been touted in scholarship in this vein, at the expense 
of other regionalist experiences-so-called comparative regionalism questioning just how meaningful this narrative 
is to the study of other regional communities that have surfaced (Postel-Vinay 2007, 555-556) .. 
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suggesting that Haasian neofunctionalism was not intended to develop a theory of European 
integration, "but to arrive at a more generic portfolio of propositions about the dynamics of 
integration in any context" (Ibid., 243). 
But these views are out of step with what, on balance, has over the years been a trend of 
scholars separating out literature on international regionalism from EU integration studies 
(Postel-Vinay 2007). Consider the view that "[t]here has been an on-going debate about the 
heuristic status of the European Union (EU) within regional studies, underscoring a widening 
divide between a somewhat self-introspecting field of EU studies and an international 
regionalism studies one which provides little insight, other than tautological, on the European 
experience's singularity" (Ibid., 555). 
This intellectual bifurcation-as relates to international regionalism-dates to the 
emergence of European cartographic (i.e. geo-historical/civilizational and continental) 
worldviews,94 but also the American tradition of area studies, that took shape as a result of the 
scale of the United States' geostrategic, "intelligence gathering and war planning efforts" during 
World War II that necessitated systematic, data compilation oriented study of the regional 
geography of the globe (Ibid., 559-560; Farish 2005, 663-664). Indeed according to Katzenstein, 
"[t]he political and intellectual impetus for area studies came in the aftermath of World War II" 
(Katzenstein 2005, x). Area studies would come into its own during and be closely associated 
with the Cold War (Postel-Vinay 2007, 559-560), its narrative having made a lasting contribution 
to the field of regionalism studies. 
94 Scholars had varied disciplinary backgrounds, across a continuum inclusive of area specialists, Western 
geographers, etc. 
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2.4 Regionalism Studies in Perspective 
Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1989) (see also Nye 1971) can be thought of as scholars 
who attempted to extend the theoretical and conceptual insights from European integration 
studies,95 to what was in the 1970s a new field, international political economy (IPE).96 The 
focus was initially on transnationalism and non-state actors (see Keohane and Nye 1972), though 
later overshadowed-at least in the 'American school'97 ofIPE-by a state-centric narrative. 
The study of regionalism in this vein relied on neoliberal institutionalist framings.98 
Cooperation amongst state actors looms large in this approach-this narrative easily carrying 
over to the role that regions (but also interregional interactions) play in the international system, 
in this regard. 
Whereas for hegemonic stability theory regionalist cooperation is framed in concert with 
and as serving the self-interest of a self-regarding, rational acting, rule-setting hegemonic 
state/leadership (i.e .. the United States' preponderance, or a US-led world order)-akin to 
95 lndeed, Keohane and Nye are described as interdependence theorists, said to have acknowledged an intellectual 
debt to neofunctionalism, despite core differences (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 21, 8, 9). In point of fact, Keohane 
and Nye's 'complex interdependence' can be traced to neofunctionalism; neofunctionalism having far-reaching 
effects in the field of IR, laying the intellectual groundwork for neoliberal institutionalism and the strength of its 
intellectual challenge to neorealism, in the so-called 'neo-neo' debate. 
96 In so far as the often mutually constitutive worlds of international relations and international economics collide, 
the field of IPE can be leveraged in the study of that interaction. 
97 I attribute this term to Benjamin Cohen (2007), who differentiates two distinct schools in IPE; the other being the 
'British school'-which also figuratively extends to the European continent (Canadian neo-Gramscian, critical 
theory scholars can be tacked on, too). The American school is the "dominant [or] hegemonic version" (Cohen 2007, 
198). It is decidedly in the intellectual straight-jacket of positivism and empiricism; in stark contrast to the 
normative and interpretive agenda of the British school, according to Cohen (2007, 198-200}-that, at the very least, 
has resulted in an ontological and epistemological "transatlantic divide" in the IPE tradition. The British/ American 
school dichotomy goes beyond the traditional descriptions of the divisions that have characterized IPE: Liberalism, 
Mercantilism and Marxism; IPE approaches having more recently been subdivided into: "neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, social constructivism and the critical approaches" (Verdun 2005, 17). In some respects, the 
dichotomy can be thought of as an intellectual convenience, streamlining IPE approaches that have been variously 
compartmentalized. 
98 Methodological individualism is steeped in this ostensibly rational choice-oriented institutionalism, as compared 
with sociological and historical institutionalist versions. 
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bandwagoning, in grand strategy99-for neoliberal institutionalists the prospects for cooperation 
(i.e. states calibrating their behaviour to suit the preferences of others) amongst states after 
hegemony is the object of analysis in the context of regimes 100 and institutions 101 (Keohane 
1984).1°2 Neoliberal institutionalists do not necessarily discount power-seeking or even self-
interested, rational acting states in their narrative, though amongst the major points of difference 
compared to neorealists is their embrace of absolute gains; as opposed to neorealist's animating 
state behaviour in the context of relative gains. 
A centerpiece of the difference between the two is neoliberal institutionalism's unabashed 
faith in cooperation (because the power-seeking/self-interested nature of states is curtailed or 
constrained by norms, it is argued), and the ease with which it can crystallize and be sustained 
between states. In this context, regions provide a cooperation template for member states to 
pursue common interests, and similarly for gains to be divided evenly. Cooperation among states 
is that much more likely, argue Keohane and Nye in their important work of the 1970s-the 
volume Transnational Relations and World Politics-given the rise of economic (but also other 
forms) of interdependence, against the backdrop of the declining use of military/coercive power, 
in the global political economy. 
This thesis stood in opposition to realist propositions, which traditionally have had a large 
intellectual footprint in the study of IR, especially in the American academy (Cohen 2007, 202). 
In this institutionalist thinking the global political economy is animated, then, by complex 
interdependence. Regionalism figures prominently in this regard; the transnational inter-
99 For neorealists, regional undertakings also make sense for balancing purposes; the primary interest of less 
riowerful states in getting together in such groupings typically represented as motivated by an external threat. 
oo Regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1983, 2). 
101 I . . d b h . nstltut10ns generate norms aroun state e av10ur. 
102 In this context, states have a vested interest in preserving the system established under the banner of the 
hegemon-that system perpetuating itself even after the hegemon has fallen to the wayside. 
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relationships, governmental and otherwise, that figure prominently m the complex 
interdependence approach resonating with interregionalism, too. 
Threat perceptions and balance of power, by contrast, are logics typically applied by 
neorealism to contextualize states coming together (in an anarchic international system), in the 
first place, and then utilizing that regionalist platform as a springboard into interregional 
cooperation. N eorealists argue that cooperation amongst states (framed as self-interested, 
rational-egoist in their narrative103) is a possibility, as a means for some of them to gain or restore 
power. In other words, it is anchored in self-help. In the final analysis, cooperation is held up by 
hegemonic leadership; this according to hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin 1987). For 
neorealists, regionalism develops "more fully in those areas of the world in which there is a local 
hegemon able to create and maintain regional economic institutions"; while the reverse is also 
the case: "regionalism is at a less pronounced pace in those areas where local hegemonic 
leadership is less visible" (Grieco 1997, 173). An important dimension of this neorealist narrative 
is the security-related dimension of a given regionalist project. 
In both the neoliberal institutionalist and neorealist approaches outlined above, 
transatlantic regional states feature. A trend that shifted the focus, in terms of the geographical 
referent (to seriously consider non-North American-cum-European regional groupings), of 
regionalism studies was the end of colonial rule in vast tracks of the Global South in the 1960s 
and '70s. For instance, many African leaders-like Ghana's first president, K wame Nkrumah-
sought to anchor the development vision of his newly-independent country in forms of pan-
Africanism. The New International Economic Order and Third Worldism (exemplified by the 
Bandung Conference era, and Afro-Asian solidarity built around this) in the 1970s also hastened 
103 For realists, regional cooperation is driven by national interests; so in the final analysis, realists treat with 
skepticism the "viability ofregionalism" (Jayasuriya 2003, 200). 
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the pace of diversifying the geographic focus in the literature. At the time, developing 
countries-many of them newly-independent-were more forcefully v01cmg their 
concerns/interests over their economic lot in the international economic system. Also providing 
impetus for scholars to shift their gaze to other regions were trends, with respect to 
globalization, 104 animating the global political economy over the preceding three-plus decades 
that were not being adequately addressed in integration theory. Growing pressures for a 
traditionally Eurocentric integration theory to breach its narrow focus on Western Europe also 
compelled scholars to branch out (Nye 1971; Holsti 1995, 320). 
Suffice to say, regionalism research has proliferated over the last two decades. 105 
Globalization has informed the more recent generation106 of regionalism studies, christened new 
regionalism107 (Hettne 2005, 543; Ruland 2001, 5).108 According to Paasi, "[p]olitical 
geographers and political scientists developed the label 'new regionalism' just to remind that 
while old approaches on regionalism were often based on economically focused integration 
theory, new approaches had to go beyond them and to emphasise social, political and cultural 
dimensions as well" (2009, 128). What is more while old regionalism literature has generally 
confined its analytical currents to geographically bounded notions of units, new regionalism 
informed literature transcends these currents. This is the case largely because the literature 
grapples with issues not constrained by borders and draws from analytical constructs for which 
104 There has been a "virtual absence of discussion about globalization in the literature on integration theory" 
(Rosamond 1995, 392). 
105 See Fawcett and Hurrell (1995), Gamble and Payne (1996), Grugel and Hout (1998), Mansfield and Milner 
(l 997a), Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel (1999), Soderbaum and Shaw (2003). 
106 See, for example, Breslin et al (2002). 
107 Hurrell (1995, 332) outlines four characteristics of new regionalism: (i) the crystallization of North-South 
regionalism; (ii) the institution-dense EU regionalist model is being eschewed by some regional groupings that 
favour the institution-lite approach; (iii) a blurring of the dividing line between economic and political regionalism, 
thus reflecting a multidimensional character to regionalism in response to geopolitical realities and realities relating 
to an ever changing global political economy; and, (iv) a marked increase in regional awareness, on the part of 
regions. 
108 Scholars like Postel-Vinay are critical of the new regionalism approach for framing regionalist projects in the 
context of globalisation, "rather than .... a specific global order" (2007, 564). 
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borders have limited significance. 
Hettne and Soderbaum argue that new regionalism manifested itself in the mid-1980s, 
marking a turning-point in the study of regionalism (2000, 457). This at a time when the global 
system was going through a sweeping overhaul (Ibid., 457), and when the passing of the Single 
European Act brought new life into the European integration project-indeed, it constituted one 
of the key reasons why the academic pendulum swung back in favour of the study of regions. 
New regionalism has special resonance in the context of interregionalism, as the 
exigencies of interregionalism are such that they favour new regionalism. As a result, 
interregionalism has been characterized as a corollary of new regionalism (Santander 2005, 290, 
302). As a second "wave", the latter109 is distinct from 'old' regionalism, temporally and in terms 
of the scholarship it has generated (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005, 254-255). Shaw describes 
the subject matter of 'old' regional studies as "formal, interstate economic and strategic relations, 
from European Community/European Union to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)" 
(2000, 401 ). 110 He contrasts this with the focus of new regionalism, which extends to less (non-) 
formal, non-state relations-not just in the Global North but the Global South, too-involving 
national and global levels, in an environment informed by the "hegemony of neoliberal values" 
(Shaw 2000, 401-402). 
The NRA, 111 developed by Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum (2000), emphasizes the 
109 Emblematic of the new regionalism scholarship that is closely associated with Hettne and his collaborators is the 
five-volume New Regionalism Series published over a decade ago by the United Nations University-World Institute 
for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) project on new regionalism. 
l lO Thus the European integration literature, leading up to the late l 960s/early 1970s, formed part of the old 
regionalism research. Old regionalism was also informed by bipolar Cold War geopolitics. Other factors, too, 
spurred this research, including de-colonization and resultant regionalist projects, intended to shore up respective 
chunks of the Global South. 
111 Soderbaum describes the NRA-which came about in the mid-l 990s-as: "an eclectic and explorative effort to 
understand the regional phenomenon in the context of economic globalization .... [- its focus in the 1990s]. ... was on 
systemic factors (especially globalization and end of the Cold War) rather than the intra-regional factors and 
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dichotomy between old and new regionalism; the research project( s) that framed old regionalism 
having famously been written-off by Haas in the 1970s. 112 
That new regionalism is linked to processes of neoliberal globalization is particularly 
significant from an analytical point of .view, in that it demands a multi-dimensional framing of 
regionalism and the region itself. For Hettne and Soderbaum, contemporary trends in regionalism 
a la new regionalism need to be understood more so from the vantage point of social processes 
and the "ideology of regionalism"; rather than being informed solely by notions of geographic 
contiguity (2000, 457). As Katzenstein argues, "regional designations are no more 'real' in terms 
of geography than they are 'natural' in terms of culture" (1996, 125). In essence and drawing 
from constructivism, from Hettne and Soderbaum's standpoint regionalism is first and foremost a 
social construct building on shared identities; the notion of discrete regions premised on distinct 
identities. 
Although the view of Hettne and Soderbaum appears far more convincing, the established 
literature-notably an important contribution to it (see Mansfield and Milner 1997b, 3)-tends to 
be weighted towards a definition of a 'region' on the basis of geographic proximity (Ibid., 3). To 
frame a 'region' simply as a specified geographical area and 'regionalism' as forming, for 
instance, the locus of concentrated economic interactions but also coordination of aspects of 
statecraft amongst a group of states (Ibid., 3) has limited analytical resonance. 113 Katzenstein 
suggests as much, arguing that the geographic designations of regions are neither "natural" nor 
interdependencies that characterized many of the so-called old approaches, especially the neofunctionalism approach 
by Ernst Haas and others" (Schouten 2008, 2). Regional agency and the construction of regions/'regionness' also 
proved an important narrative in the NRA (Ibid, 2). Instructively, the NRA views "state-led regional 
organizations .... as a second order phenomenon compared to the processes ofregionalization" (Ibid, 2). 
112 See Haas (1975; 1976). 
113 In point of fact, "[ o ]ur regional images are often based on unexamined and outdated metageographical 
conceptions of the world-a perspective dubbed the "jigsaw-puzzle view" that assumes discrete, sharply bounded, 
static continental units fit together in an unambiguous way. Yet, the world is not structured in such a neat manner" 
(Vayrynen 2003, 25). 
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are they "essential" (1997, 7). 
In the final analysis, a core question that surfaces is: does one study the region as an 
object or as a social process? The latter approach is, perhaps, a more promising one; in that it 
enables an examination of how regions are (re)produced as constructions of reality. What is 
more, it takes account of regions' mutability; how they are (de-)constructed through social 
practice and discourse (Hettne and Soderbaum 2002, 36-37). 
We need to better appreciate what the study of regions as social processes can reveal. To 
do so, we tum now to an exploration of constructivism, the intellectual bedrock of this type of 
analysis. 
2.5 Constructivism in International Theory 
Constructivism has had a long association with social theory-cum-the philosophy of the social 
sciences (Onuf 1989). 114 In recent years, it has permeated the social sciences, including IR. It is, 
therefore, not indigenous to IR (Hollis and Smith 1991 a, 3 93). 115 Neither is it a theory ofIR, per 
se. 
Rather, constructivism is an approach that is applied to the study of IR and international 
politics, generally at odds not just with purely materially-conceived notions of actor-based 
114 Although Onuf is frequently cited as an intellectual doyen in this regard, a much earlier work is also deserving of 
mention; in important respects laying the groundwork for constructivism. That work is Berger and Luckmann's 
(1966) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. The central theme is the 
exploration of how the roles of actors in social systems are habituated in the course of everyday existence; over time 
institutionalized. Following from this, reality-in the sense of the material world-is assigned meaning (e.g. 
linguistically) as an outgrowth of human consciousness; rather than a priori being possessed of it. The material 
world, then, hinges on intersubjective awareness. As a work informed by a phenomenological approach to the 
sociology of knowledge, the end result is the revelation that reality, in a social system/world, is socially constructed. 
However, constructivism's intellectual roots run deeper still. Berger and Luckmann's landmark work 
notwithstanding, amongst the earliest constructivist scholarship--forming the basis of contemporary constructivist 
analyses-is that of eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico. 
115 The migration of constructivism and the (vexing) issues that command the attention of such scholars (e.g. the 
structure-agent problem) have not gone over well with some IR scholars. Hollis and Smith caution others in the field 
to be wary of the " 'wonder drug' character" of what are ultimately "nuanced" constructivist ideas, "simplified in the 
course of translating them .... from elsewhere in the social sciences" [to IR] (1991 b, 393). 
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environments, but also the default position of methodological individualism that typically 
animates agency-derived or structure-centered rationalist approaches. It came to IR (in earnest) 
in the 1980s, 116 a time when the discipline was in the throes of the early stages of a fourth wave 
of intellectual ferment. 117 
Constructivism was framed as a challenger to dominant, rationalist approaches in IR 
theory-namely, structural realism or neorealism118 (Wendt 1987, 1992, 1999; Onuf and Klink 
1989; Dessler 1989; Ruggie 1998a/1998b; Patomaki and Wight 2000; Lebow 2001). In a 
presidential address to the International Studies Association in 1988, Robert Keohane argued that 
rationalistic perspectives (to which he assigns "neorealist theories"), long-leveraged in the study 
of international politics, have been facing a challenge to their "intellectual predominance", by 
what he referred to as a "reflective" approach (a catch-all for a broad set of reflectivist theories 
intellectually opposed to rationalist, positivist dominant IR approaches) that since then have 
116 Although a constructivist pedigree in IR dates back further, to early work in the English School (which 
theoretically is grounded in the study of the global society in social terms (Cohen 2007, 212)). However, Lebow has 
made the "radical assertion [that] Thucydides [, an icon in IR,] is a founding father of constructivism"; not 
withstanding that [r]ealists claim Thucydides as their "forebear" (2001, 547). In terms of other perspectives on its 
antecedents, constructivism in IR is also traced by Ruggie to neofunctionalism; which he argues "embodied 
elements that we now recognize to be social constructivist in character, but it did so largely unconsciously" (1998b, 
862). Indeed, in one of his final works, Haas (2001) flirted with the idea of neofunctionalism's constructivist 
proclivities. Ruggie goes on to say, "Giddens' work [in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially] profoundly 
affected the emerging constructivist project" ( l 998b, 862). 
117 IR has been the object of four 'great debates', starting from the early part of the last century. The first was 
between idealism and political realism; otherwise referred to as the 'inter-war debate'. The second pitted 
traditionalists against positivists (i.e. those advancing the scientific ambitions of behaviouralism). It was not so 
much a theoretical as it was a methodological debate, unfolding over the 1950s and '60s. The third showcased the 
divide between interdependence-styled liberals and realism. The fourth is witness to various strands of post-
positivism (one branch of constructivists aligned to this approach) juxtaposed against positivists, of which 
neorealism is emblematic. The core narrative in this latter debate is that there are two stories to tell, with respect to 
explaining and understanding (Hollis and Smith 199la, 1 (in citing Hollis and Smith's quip two stories to tell in this 
context, I am aware that they also employ it in a different context: the agent-structure problem and IR's "failure to 
resolve it" (Doty 1997, 367)). In this vein, Wendt maintains that "there are significant analytical and methodological 
differences between causal and constitutive theorising, which reflects the different kinds of questions that they 
answer" (1999, 85-6). 
118 Along with neoliberal institutionalism, though increasingly problematized, neorealism was especially prominent 
in the 1980s, converging "around neo-utilitarian precepts and premises" (Ruggie l 998b, 855). 
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come to be termed constructivism (Keohane 1988, 379, 381). 119 For Keohane, then, there 
appeared to be a binary debate. 120 
But the fact of the matter is, constructivism is also seen as a middle-range approach121 (a 
middle-ground, of sorts), that can be wedged (and even construed-for scholars such as 
Alexander Wendt-as a bridge) between rationalism and reflectivism, 122 as it draws on elements 
of both. 123 This is an overly simplistic (if not misleading) but nonetheless necessary portrayal, 
considering the epistemological, 124 ontological and methodological differences at play. 
Moreover, although labels-i.e. rationalism, reflectivism and constructivism-risk 
simplifying what are sophisticated, even eclectic, intellectual currents; 125 they are useful, 
particularly in this context, where reflectivist (e.g. postmodernist) and constructivist approaches 
119 This dichotomy is not watertight, and indeed is awkward, in so far as one category of constructivists (self-identify 
as and) are 'positivist' (certainly in their epistemological orientation, e.g. Wendt), whilst another category is 
'interpretive', more focused on discourse/linguistic method (Reus-Smit 2002, 495-496). 
120 A decade later, Keohane contended that "constructivism and rationalism [would] provide the major points of 
contestation shaping the field in years to come" (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 391-392). 
121 This is a view that is especially held by those constructivists who are epistemologically positivist. 
122 Namely, postmodernist/post-structuralist-also referred to as 'relativist' approaches by scholars such as Adler 
( 1997}-and critical theories, amongst others. 
123 The constructivist attempt at bridge building has not occurred in a vacuum; as at the level of social science 
methodology, some scholars have attempted to overcome epistemological divisions, too. 
124 Constructivism, in some circles, does apply 'scientific' methods. Wendt makes the case, for instance, for publicity 
of evidence and falsifiability (Chernoff 2005, 60). Wendt, therefore, "endorses a positivist epistemology and post-
positivist ontology" (Ibid., 61; my emphasis). Notwithstanding, other constructivists reject the positivism that has 
come to personify mainstream theoretical currents in IR. 
125 See, for instance, the discussion that follows on constructivisms: various forms look to but also dismiss 
rationalism and reflectivism. The latter two can be seen as intellectual parents to different constructivist strands. For 
example, Alexander Wendt (a preeminent constructivist) takes issue with rationalist approaches not on 
epistemological grounds. Rather, the differences come through ontologically. More reflectivist minded 
constructivists are ontologically and epistemologically opposed to rationalism; and, by extension, they are 
epistemologically at variance with their more conventional constructivist cousins. The result is a deep intellectual 
chasm/dissonance-often resulting in a "dialogue of the deaf' (I borrow this phrase from Der Derian (1995), who 
utilizes it in a different context). In. certain respects, it is difficult to see how these constructivist strands can 'sing 
from the same hymn sheet' epistemologically. Elements of how and why they are riven, given their respective 
rationalist and reflectivist lineages, are a microcosm of the vexing debate involving rationalist and reflectivist 
schools, in general, on the nature, purposes, methods, scope of inquiry and criteria of IR. Notwithstanding, some 
constructivists have not shied away from calling for a shared epistemological approach; convinced that this will 
advance the lot of constructivism in IR. Adler, for instance, calls on constructivists to work toward "a coherent 
constructivist methodological base that suggests a practical alternative to imitating the physical sciences" (2002, 
109). 
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are sometimes conflated. 
In terms of constructivism being framed as a challenger to neorealism, it was one 
particular framing of constructivism-constructivism associated with Wendt (i.e. 'systemic' 
oriented (Price and Reus-Smit 1998))-that was especially visible in the formative period of its 
challenge. Thus, it is a misnomer to refer to constructivism, in the singular (although for ease of 
reference, I do). Given that "there are many constructivists, [it is perhaps more accurate to refer 
to]. .. . constructivisms" (Price and Reus-Smit 2000, 181; my emphasis). 
Indeed, Adler (2002, 96-98) points to a spectrum of constructivist strands; namely: 
modernist (e.g. Finnemore 1996), modernist linguistic (e.g., Onuf 1989, Kratochwil 1989), 
radical/critical (e.g., Ashley 1986, Walker 1993-both of whom are postpositivists ). Katzenstein, 
Keohane and Krasner identify three forms: conventional, critical and postmodern (1998, 675-
678). For his part, in discussing the variants of constructivism, Ruggie differentiates between 
three: (i) neo-classical constructivism (i.e. "an epistemological affinity with pragmatism ... and 
analytical tools [e.g. speech act theory] necessary to make sense of intersubjective meanings"126); 
(ii) postmodernist constructivism ("[h ]ere the linguistic construction of subjects is stressed, as a 
result of which discursive practices constitute the ontological primitives, or the foundational 
units of reality and analysis"127); (iii) naturalistic constructivism ("[i]t combines aspects" of the 
first two. It is informed by scientific realism; especially Roy Bhaskar's work. Wendt and Dessler 
also loom large in this variant) (1998, 880-881). 
126 Onuf, Kratochwil, Ruggie, Katzenstein and Finnemore fall into this category. 
127 Foucault and Derrida can be assigned to this category, as central figures. Richard Ashley, R.B.J. Walker, 
Campbell and Der Derian also loom large, in this regard. 
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Given that there is an epistemological pluralism characterizing constructivism, 128 there is 
no methodological129 uniformity across the board (ontologically, however, constructivist strands 
are not necessarily dissimilar). This makes for a rather unfortunate situation: because there is no 
epistemological 'meeting of minds', there tends to be a reticence amongst certain constructivist 
strands to meaningfully engage one another. 
Constructivists are also taken up with the agent-structure debate, 130 in social theory and 
IR alike. "[C]onstructivist research generally stresses the importance of the mutually constitutive 
relation between agent (state) and structure (international system), in which neither unit of 
analysis is "ontologically" [prior]" (Curley 2009, 653). Instead, they are characterized by a 
duality. Thus, constructivism is informed by the interpenetration of the two. 
At its most basic, constructivism can be understood as "draw[ing] heavily from sociology 
and social psychology" (Thies 2002, 149), so as to deliberatively theorize the place of 
ideas/ideational factors, intersubjective meanings, norms, values, socialization and identities in 
world politics-all of these constituting constructivism's social ontology. In this framework, 
reality (e.g. the international system) is not exogenous to or divorced from human consciousness. 
To the contrary, the material world is anchored by intersubjectivity. As a result, in international 
affairs ideas trump material forces, and-as such-the study of international affairs must be 
taken up with the shared understandings of actors. This rationale certainly requires a degree of 
128 This also reflects a transatlantic divide in constructivist theorizing, the more conventional approaches reflected in 
the US tradition (such as constructivism tending, methodologically, to be liberal-idealist in this tradition (Barkin 
2003, 336)), while the more critical variants are especially apparent in Europe (Checkel 2004). What is more, so-
called 'thin' constructivists technically are not so much even at variance with rationalist approaches on 
epistemological grounds as they are theoretically and ontologically differentiated. 
129 In their work, constructivists apply varying approaches-namely: process tracing (common amongst more 
conventional constructivist work, which is epistemologically positivist) and discourse analysis (common amongst 
more critical constructivist work, which is epistemologically post-positivist). More radical constructivists, like their 
critical constructivist counterparts, make use of textual methods, but play on power-centric narratives in discourse (it 
is not an exaggeration to suggest that they have a postmodernist flare). 
130 Giddens' (1984) structuration theory has an important bearing, in this respect. 
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abstraction, but the conceptual and analytical pay-off is great; considering the rationale has 
powerful implications: not least, constructivism is positioned to take to task a core assertion of 
neorealism that, systemic change in the international system is unlikely. 
For constructivists, generally, far-reaching change is not outside the realm of possibility, 
as actors make of the international system what they will. In point of fact, ideas are malleable. 
Fallowing from this, because the international system is underwritten by ideas, it is far from 
static. As Wendt puts it: "anarchy is what states make of it" (1992). 
Thus, a key proposition of constructivism is that the material world is subject to 
interpretation, in so far as meaning is assigned to its various facets. Therefore, reality is socially 
constructed; the material world is given meaning as a result of cognitive structures (Wendt 1995). 
But there is a dual meaning to this notion of socially constructed. Applied to gain an 
understanding of the world, the notion suggests that the world is a work in progress. The world 
and the 'system' that animates it, therefore, are not static. This leaves open the possibility for 
change. Thus, on the face of it, constructivism lends itself to: (a) contingency; and, (b) an 
emancipatory narrative; especially given more critical strands' commitment to interpretation over 
explanation. 
Further, constructivism is in opposition to the core meta-theoretical claims of 
neoutilitarian perspectives. Ultimately, constructivism "results from the combination of objective 
hermeneutics with a "conservative" cognitive interest in understanding and explaining social 
reality" (Adler 2002, 97-8). 
As applied to the study of IR, at least one pillar of constructivism is taken up with 
"emphasiz[ing] the importance of identity in understanding international politics" (Thies 2002). 
Thus, "[i]n contrast to neo-utilitarianism, constructivists contend that not only are identities and 
108 
interests of actors socially constructed, but also that they must share the stage with a whole host 
of other ideational factors that emanate from human capacity" (Ruggie 1998b, 856). As such, 
constructivism can be leveraged to better understand state behaviour through the lens of 
identities and norms, and the effect that the two have on interests. 
2.6 Constructivist Applications in the Study of European Integration 
Constructivism has only recently been applied to the study of European integration, and in this 
regard owes an intellectual debt to Karl Deutsch's (1957) work on 'transactionalism' 
(communication theory) in the 1950s. Transactionalism primarily has been focused on "how 
peace could be established through post-national community building ... [; and, in this regard] the 
applicability of transactionalism to regionalism lies in Deutsch's assertion that the states system 
could be stabilised through building a sense of community across a region, as a function of 
communication, or transaction" (Thomas 2004, 39). 
Indeed, Katzenstein et al contend that Deutsch's "research program ... foreshadowed what 
later came to be labeled constructivism. It highlighted the importance of identity formation 
measured by social transactions and communications" ( 1998, 654 ). Especially germane is how 
Deutsch's work has proved to be a touchstone for theorizing the role of social 
interconnectedness/interdependence (and how this is animated by shared/common goals) in 
spurring integration. 
The first "systematic and focused" (Christiansen et al 1999, 527) application of 
constructivism to the study of European integration came in 1999, in the form of a special issue 
of the Journal of European Public Policy. 131 Particularly interesting, in this regard, have been the 
131 However, in the lead up to this special issue, Risse-Kappen found fault with some of the standard-bearer theories 
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attempts to examine how the EU is constructed on the shoulders of language: discourse analysis 
(relating to communicative practices or speech-acts, for example) in the study of European 
integration, then, figures prominently (see Diez 1999). 
Schmitter (1996) is another notable scholar who has considered the effect of language in 
the context of European integration; specifically exploring the impact of so-called "Euro-speak". 
Similarly, interesting constructivist work in the area of European integration, as a contribution to 
institutionalist research, has been undertaken by Checkel (2001 )-a constructivist known for 
work on social learning. 
An equally instructive constructivist approach to the study of European integration is 
sketched by Christiansen et al (1999). They consider the "transformative" effects of the 
European integration process, European governance and the Europeanization of policies and 
politics on the European states system, from the vantage point of agent-specific "identity 
formation" and/or endogenously generated interests (Ibid., 529). 
In a similar vein, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse-Kappen's now decade-plus old edited 
volume examines how Europeanization-i.e. "the emergence and the development at the 
European level of distinct structures of govemance"-affects (to the point of changing) the 
formal domestic structures-cum-associated political cultures, and how the EU impacts on 
informal structures (e.g. nation-state identities, etc) at the level of EU member states (2001, 1 ). 
Thus, the notion of "EU identity", writ large, and European states and how the two-in 
the ontological context of structure and agency--constitute each other, represents an important 
of the study of the EU; and at the time was one of a handful of scholars making the case, instead, for constructivism 
"to be taken more seriously" in this regard-taking a que from the "constructivist turn" in IR theory (1996, 54). In 
addition, amongst the earlier, and sometimes linguistic, attempts to look at identity as relates to the institutional 
aspects of the EU was undertaken by Chilton and Illyin (1993), Bulmer (1994) and others. 
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current in constructivist work on European integration. EU enlargement-especially in light of 
the 2004 expansion of the membership from fifteen to twenty-five states132-is also attracting 
more scholarly attention, constructivist-informed analysis seeking to explain the decision to 
enlarge. 133 
All told, the advance of constructivism in the study of European integration has received 
an intellectual fillip from the aforementioned special issue of Journal of European Public 
Policy. 134 Four points are particularly noteworthy at this juncture: (i) European integration 
studies is amongst the latest scholarly battleground for rationalists and constructivists (Checkel 
and Moravcsik 2001, 219); 135 (ii) Some (i.e. more conventional) constructivist work carries 
forward the tradition of constructivist scholarship in IR with respect to bridge building, but 
obviously targeting rationalist (materialist) work in EU studies: a prime example is recent 
scholarship on institutional theory and the EU (see Caporaso et al 2003);136 (iii) Whereas the 
integration theories previously discussed were developed, primarily, as theories of European 
integration, constructivism was not. Just like it was imported into IR, thus is not indigenous to it, 
132 The largest single expansion of the EU in any one accession cycle, in terms of member states, came in 2004; 
entrants comprising eight states in Central and Eastern Europe, in addition to two Mediterranean islands. Two more 
former eastern bloc countries acceded in 2007. This brought the total count, to date, to twenty-seven EU countries; 
this latest tranche of entrants representing the sixth successive enlargement. Accession negotiations are under way 
for other hopefuls (like Turkey), which have achieved candidate status. Countries that are in the pipeline for 
accession are in the Western Balkans, amongst them Croatia. Other countries in this sub-region have also applied for 
membership, in the last two years. 
133 See Sjursen (2002); who makes the case that eastern enlargement has been motivated by "kinship-based duty" to 
Eastern Europe, by Western Europe. 
134 Other journals have followed suit. Noteworthy is a recent Special Issue of Comparative European Politics (Vol.8, 
Iss.1), entitled 'Mainstreaming Sociology in EU Studies'. 
135 Important parrallels can be drawn between the rise of constructivism in European integration studies and IR. 
Specifically, some constructivist strands problematize certain grand theories of European integration, on ontological, 
epistemological and methodological grounds; not unlike what first happened in IR in the early- l 980s -in terms of it 
being the intellectual space for a fourth wave of debate-with the rise not only of constructivism but also 
reflectivist/post-positivist perspectives. 
136 However, as with constructivists in IR, constructivists taken up with the study of Europe are grappling with 
vexing epistemological differences of their own. These differences typically play out (but are not restricted) with 
respect to discourse and process tracing methodologies, that militate against intra-constructivist bridge building, 
with respect to study of Europe. 
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constructivism has similarly been applied to the study of European integration-i.e. as an 
approach rather than a theory; (iv) Constructivism is thought to impact studies of European 
integration in three respects: "development of theories, construction of frameworks of analysis, 
meta-theorizing" (Ibid., 538). 
2. 7 Regional Identities: A Constructivist Approach to the Study of Regionalism 
There has been a long-standing scholarly tradition-in Western literary, geographic and other 
disciplinary works-of formulating world regions as cognitive sites with which to frame 
narratives, civilizational and otherwise. That regions are socially constructed1 37 or conceptually 
produced as socio-spatial categories has emerged as an important thread in recent studies of 
regionalism (see Neumann 1994; Paasi 2002; Browning 2003). As Vayrynen states, "[t]he study 
of regionalism is ..... undergoing a methodological renewal that is manifested in the new divide 
between rationalist and constructivist research agendas regarding the processes of region 
formation" (2003, 26). 
The study of the regional dimensions of the social identity construction of actors-i.e. 
regions as social institutions-provides a rich analytical framing. In such research, a singular 
emphasis on crude territorial-cum-geographic determinants of regions (along the lines of 
Mansfield and Milner 1997a and Nye138 1968, for example) is eschewed. 
Methodologically, neo-utilitarian approaches (for instance their materialist orientations) 
are analytically unable to engage with more ethereal, but no less important, logics engendering 
137 In other words, "regions are shaped by the collective perception of identities and meanings with blurred and ever 
shifting boundaries" (Vayrynen 2003, 27). Regions seen as forged around common identities/shared values (e.g. 
liberal values) tend to be conceptualized this way by those articulating the security communities concept, per the 
constructivist research program (Ibid., 37). 
138 Nye defines international region "as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a 
degree of mutual interdependence" (1968, vii). 
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region-building projects: namely, socially patterned regional cohesion-cum-shared regional 
identity. These, too, are important explanatory factors in accounting for regional integration (and 
how common regional spaces are forged and sustained), but also the dynamics and motivations 
of interregionalism. 
Thus (material) physical boundaries take an analytical back-seat to cognitive ones, when 
regions are understood for what they truly are: cognitively compartmentalized territorial 
referents emphasizing identity narratives. 
The work of critical geographers like Anssi Paasi (1986; 1991-namely on the 
"institutionalization of regions"139) in the 1980s were pathbreaking, in this regard. S~holars like 
Iver Neumann (1994-namely the "region-building" approach to regional formation), working 
from an IR disciplinary vantage point, would bring the ontological status of regions into relief a 
decade later (Browning 2003, 46). 
"[T]hat regions are imagined, much like the nation [per Benedict Anderson's Imagined 
Communities (1991)], underscores the relevance of constructivism in analysis of regionalism" 
(Fawn 2009, 31). For Fawn, "at least some of the cohesion of regions must derive from the trust 
and the 'cognitive interdependence' that Hurrell finds in 'cognitive regionalism"' (Ibid., 31 ). Such 
constructivist forays into the study of regions are closely associated with, inspired and 
foreshadowed by the work of geographers: i.e., the literature on regions per the 'new' regional 
geography (see Pudup 1988; Gregory 1989; Johnston et al l 990) and what has been referred to 
as behavioral theories of geography. These behavioral theories put the geographical study of 
139 Paasi reinterprets the region as a concept, advancing it "as a sociocultural and historical category" (Paasi 1991, 
239). In this vein, the region is understood as a process that is historically contingent, "whose institutionalisation 
consists of four stages: the development of territorial, symbolic, and institutional shape and its establishment as an 
entity in the regional system and social consciousness of the society" (Ibid., 239). Instructively, as a region is 
institutionalized, as an entity it assumes "a specific regional identity" that has wide resonance, continuously 
"reproduced in individual and institutional practices" (Ibid., 239). 
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regions on a different footing, "focus[ing] on ·how regions are shaped and reshaped by political 
practice" (Katzenstein 1997, 11 ). In this regard, Katzenstein makes a key point: "[ s ]pace has 
behavioral properties" (Ibid., 11 ). 
It has been suggested that "critical ideas" are one of "three ideas of region that 
geographers perpetually lean back on": the other two being the "pre-scientific" [i.e. a "spatial 
unit, statistical area"] and "discipline-centred" [regions are seen as objects "(e.g., traditional 
Landschaft geography)"] (Paasi 2002, 804 ). The critical ideas approach stresses social practice, 
identities and discourse, in addition to cultural, political and economic processes of a region: 
taken together, this narrative resonates with "work labelled as 'new regional geography' " (Ibid., 
804). In sum, "[ c ]ritical approaches suggest that regions are 'social constructs' " (Ibid., 804). 
This approach resonates with constructivism, extending the imagined communities concept to the 
mosaic of world regions, with a view to showcasing how they can be anchored by and thus 
normatively differentiated on the basis of social practices and discourses: i.e. regional identities, 
against the backdrop of social meaning. 
For our purposes, of immediate interest is whether the Caribbean as a small state Global 
South region has been studied in this vein. The next and final component of this subsection is 
taken up with this discussion. 
2. 8 Small State Regions in the Regionalism Literature 
An important 1999 special issue of the journal Third World Quarterly, entitled 'New 
Regionalisms in the New Millenium', is purportedly "dedicated to new regionalisms in the 
[Global] South" (Marchand et al 1999, 904). In glancing at the titles of the articles in the special 
issue, one is struck by the fact that they are dedicated to case analyses of larger state regions in 
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the Global South, namely the Middle East, Southern Africa, NAFTA (with a focus on Mexico), 
APEC, and ASEAN; along with comparative reviews of the EU and Mercosur, in addition to 
Europe and North America. Only one article, on Central America, engages with a region that is 
comprised of small states. Island regions do not feature at all. 
A similar state of affairs obtains in the landmark five-volume New Regionalism Series, 
coming out of the UNU/WIDER project on new regionalism just over a decade ago. Volume 3 of 
this series, entitled National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the Third World (2000), 
focuses on country studies from the Global South; ostensibly the large (e.g. ·china, India) to mid-
sized countries in East and Southeast Asia, in addition to Brazil and other countries in Southern 
Africa. Only two articles deal with small states-one on Uruguay and the other on the Caribbean 
Basin. 140 Volume 5 of the same series, entitled Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global 
Development (2001 ), takes stock of the UNU/WIDER new regionalism research project and 
pronounces on the prospects for the comparative approach to the study of world regions; but like 
Volume 3 is selective in the regions under study, i.e.: Africa, Asia, Southeast (East) Asia, Central 
Europe, EU, NAFTA and the Middle East. 
Generally, regionalism studies literature in the vein of the two examples flagged above 
only engage small, marginal Global South regions-like the Caribbean-modestly, if at all. 141 
This is not surprising. Given what some deem as its peripheral status in the global political 
economy, the Caribbean's analytical merit does not resonate. Consider that Volume 5 of the 
research project mentioned above is described as 'covering all important regions of the world'. 
140 A third article considers Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Entity; which may be geographically small, but with 
respect to other indicators are not implicated in the small state narrative. 
141 In this regard, the Spanish-speaking Caribbean (namely Cuba and the Dominican Republic) and Haiti have 
traditionally attracted considerably more scholarly and institutional attention, as compared to the Caribbean under 
study in the present work. 
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However, the Caribbean regionalism narrative does find voice in a broad regionalism, or 
at least regionalism-informed, 142 literature. But it does so to varying degrees. In scholarly 
platforms indigenous to the Region, 143 like the interdisciplinary Caribbean Studies Association, 
Caribbeanists regularly engage with this issue. Similarly, journals that spring from the Region 
take this narrative seriously. Flagship journals of the University of the West Indies (UWI), 
namely Social and Economic Studies and the Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, are a case in 
point. 
In addition, regional initiatives like the 'UWI-CARICOM Project'-which weave together 
the Region's primary tertiary institution and the CARICOM Secretariat, in collaboration with a 
prominent regional publishing house, Ian Randle Publishers-under the ambit of The 
Integrationist series (launched in 2001 and recently ended)-have published a number of 
influential volumes on Caribbean regionalism. Those volumes and other like-minded works form 
part of a veritable 'cottage industry' of scholarship. This work emanates from eminent Caribbean 
intellectuals and academics, statesmen and leaders, policy makers and technocrats, over the last 
decade. Said scholarship has been taken up with the study of regional institutions and regional 
integration (and related policies), in addition to the Caribbean in the international system and 
Caribbean development, more broadly (see, for example, Hall and Chuck-A-Sang 2010, Hall and 
Chuck-A-Sang 2007a/2007b, Hall and Chuck-A-Sang 2006). 
Some of the scholars who have contributed to the volumes cited above are associated 
with the UWI-based Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (SALISES), 
142 For example, works such as Demas's The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference 
to the Caribbean (1965). · 
143 A useful web-based platform that features a variety of academic and journalistic work on Caribbean regionalism 
is http://www.normangirvan.info/; overseen by Dr Norman Girvan, Professorial Research Fellow at the Trinidad-
based UWI Institute oflntemational Relations (UR). 
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which is represented across the three campuses in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, 
respectively. The Institute is renowned for its long-standing work on Caribbean regionalism, its 
name-sake amongst a distinguished group of pioneering Caribbean scholars who have engaged 
the issue and who rose to prominence in the mid-twentieth century. 
Within the DWI system, the IIR and departments such as the Department of Government 
(at the Jamaica campus) have made notable contributions in teaching and research in this vein, as 
has the more recently established Barbados-based Shridath Ramphal Centre for International 
Trade Law, Policy & Services. Of particular note, in this regard, DWI-Barbados offers a MSc in 
Integration Studies. This campus has, of late, emerged as an important hub for CARICOM-
related research, with the establishment of a CARICOM Research Park; which houses research 
initiatives like SALISES and the Shridath Ramphal Centre. The Centre for Caribbean Thought, 
which is located in DWI-Jamaica's Department of Government, has also engaged with Caribbean 
regionalism research, albeit indirectly and from an inter-disciplinary approach; its overall 
mandate being the 'examination of Caribbean intellectual thought' and its promotion as a field of 
study. 
Admittedly, there has been a long history of pluridisciplinary engagement by regional 
scholars on themes that have a bearing on Caribbean regionalism. Works on Caribbean 
historiography feature prominently, in this regard. The scholarship is plentiful, but the rich 
intellectual tradition that informs it cannot be fully engaged with here. 
In short, the study of West Indian history from the vantage point of colonialism-cum-
imperialism/postcolonial society and what has been described as "social complexities, class, 
race, and the extraordinary economic relationships that conjoined the diverse human components 
of the islands" (Green 1977, 509), has provided an incredibly rich source of understanding of the 
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Caribbean region. Some of the notable work that exemplifies the breadth of scholarly interest in 
the Caribbean regional space/studies includes that of Dr Eric Williams (1944), Gordon K. Lewis 
(1968; 1983), Elsa Goveia (1956 [1980]), Lloyd Best, George Beckford and the Plantation 
School 144 (what became known as the New World Group; see Meeks.and Girvan (2010)), among 
others. 
In addition to work on Caribbean regionalism being taken up by West Indians, the subject 
has also increasingly attracted scholarly attention from a small (but growing) community of non-
West Indian academics; notably longtime and noted contributor to scholarship on the Region 
Professor Tony Payne, a University of Sheffield-based Political Science scholar and a cluster of 
junior and senior scholars who collaborate with him. These academics are attached mainly to 
European (particularly British) universities, but also North American institutions. Regarding the 
latter, affiliations are typically with Centres and Institutes for Latin American and Caribbean 
Studies (many of which are Latin American focused). 
The North American academy notwithstanding, many British universities (e.g., the 
University of London's Institute of Commonwealth Studies) and think-tanks (e.g. the Overseas 
Development Institute) have a long track record of Caribbean regionalism research. Amongst 
North American think-tanks, the Canadian-based Centre for International Governance Innovation 
has carved a niche for itself in the study of the Caribbean region and related thematic areas 
through its Caribbean Papers series which examines policy issues germane to the Caribbean's 
144 Dependency theory, especially in the 1960s and '70s, emerged as a highly influential explanation of Latin 
American underdevelopment (see Frank 1966)-problematizing, for example, metropolitan powers imposing 
agrarian structures-cum-patterns of dependent agricultural production and trade in the periphery as laying the 
groundwork for dependent capitalist development. The Plantation Economy Model (PEM), on the other hand, can be 
thought of as having been devised to explain underdevelopment in the Caribbean context; specifically, it "explain[s] 
the origins and persistence of the structures and processes of underdevelopment in the [Region; problematizing] the 
establishment there of plantation economies by western European colonial power since the sixteenth century" 
(Dupuy 1983, 237). Like dependency theory, the PEM is a critical alternative to traditional theories of development; 
i.e. Modernization theory (Ibid., 240). 
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'economic future'. In terms of the handful of Caribbean-based think-tanks, the Caribbean Policy 
Research Policy Institute stands out for its broad-ranging research, which has included work on 
regionalism. 
While relatively robust in the contexts reviewed above, little attention has been paid to 
Caribbean regionalism research in a range of international journals, some of which-in name, at 
least-are associated with the study of the Caribbean. In regards to the latter, the record of 
representation has been far from stellar in the Canadian Journal of Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies, the European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Latin 
American Politics and Society (formerly Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs), 
among others. 
2.9 Conclusion 
The foregoing has charted a cross-section of scholarly waters pertaining to regionalism studies. 
While regionalism scholarship has come a long way both in respect of its geographic breadth 
and the depth of theoretical innovations applied to its study, on both counts significant strides 
could yet be made in the study of the Caribbean. 
The study of Caribbean regionalism stands to benefit significantly from the research 
trajectories of more contemporary scholarship on regionalism reviewed above, notably in the 
vein of the track record of IR scholars and comparativists applying constructivist insights to the 
study of regions. It is a pertinent theoretical framing for the cooperation narrative of Caribbean 
(inter)regionalism, one that could make available an explanatory construct with the potential to 
provide significant insight into the determinants of the behavioral interactions of small state actor 
types-like the Caribbean-on the international stage. 
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. We now transition into a discussion of island studies. What becomes apparent is that 
studies of islands in a material sense take a back seat to what are serious efforts to abstract 
islands, at least in certain disciplinary strands of the social science arm of the field. This sort of 
intellectual pivot is a useful one, for our purposes. 
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Chapter III 
Island Studies: 
A Survey of the Literature/Theory and Treatment of Caribbean 
(Inter)regionalism Therein 
3.1 Introduction 
This final chapter in the series that constitutes Part I of this study is taken up with an engagement 
of island studies scholarship. As with the first two chapters, this one seeks to interrogate 
pe1tinent literature and theory from the vantage point of gauging the treatment the Caribbean, set 
against an (inter)regionalism narrative. While replete with micro-state and island references 
pivoted against disparate policy areas, it is found that the literature has a paucity of an 
(inter)regionalism narrative. This is unfortunate, as such an approach could prove useful when 
viewed through a constructivist lens. It is determined that such a framework is a promising 
approach for furthering an understanding and reappraisal of the role of regional identities in how 
small states conduct aspects of their international affairs, at a time when these actors are 
increasingly being taken more seriously in international studies. 
It should be noted from the outset that island studies is seen as "the global, comparative 
and inter-disciplinary study of islands on their own terms".1 45 It is, therefore, a dispersive 
scholarly space; a richness of inter-disciplinary engagement characterizing the study of 
islands. 146 This is a strength of the field, for some. For Baldacchino and like-minded scholars, for 
example, "[t]he adoption of 'island studies' as a focus of inquiry, straddling as well as going 
beyond conventional disciplines, can be a powerful force towards a better understanding of the 
145 This definition appears on a clearinghouse-styled website for island studies, http://vre2.upei.ca/islandstudies.ca/. 
Managed by Dr Godfrey Baldacchino, Canada Research Chair in Island Studies at the University of Prince Edward 
Island, the site is described as a depository of research supporting the study of islands. 
146 Indeed, courses in the field tend to be taught in an inter-disciplinary fashion (see the following weblink, for an 
Introduction to Island Studies course syllabus designed by and taught at the University of Prince Edward Island by 
the author: http://www. upei .ca/islandstudies/files/islandstudies/IS201-Comp leteCourseOutline. pdf) 
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world and the furtherance of knowledge" (2006, 6). 
For others, this interdisciplinarity-and the difficulty this brings in delimiting the field-
is a source of apprehension about island studies' "legitimacy" (Baldacchino 2004, 327). In fact, 
Selwyn questions the merits of treating as "distinct" small islands from small countries (1980, 
945). He was among the first to dismiss the usefulness of islands as a social category, "in 
analytical, predictive or policy terms" (Ibid., 945). 
With the foregoing in mind, ·this chapter proceeds in the following manner. The first 
section contextualizes island studies, drawing particular attention to islandness and its emergence 
as a field of academic study. The respective analyses are segmented into sub-sections. A 
discussion of the small states literature in IR is showcased as a fourth standalone sub-section. 
Section two traces how islands have loomed large in the mythical geographies of Western 
cultures, underscoring the applicability of the islands as metaphor approach to IR not being 
underestimated. The third section explores the vulnerability and resilience narratives of small 
state island actors, which forms the basis for the final substantive section that seeks to account 
for an (inter)regionalism narrative in island scholarship. Some concluding remarks, which sum 
up findings, round off the chapter. 
3.2 Island Studies in Perspective 
I. The Context 
While island studies' disciplinary eclecticism has made for challenge from without the field, this 
does not mean that the field itself is a cohesive one. Island scholars147 generally put up a 
147 It must be borne in mind that these scholars are of varied disciplinary affiliations, some of whom shy away from 
being labeled island studies scholars, per se. 
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common front in defence of the field, but in their own 'house', so to speak, there are fissures. 148 
What is immediately apparent is that the field's heterogeneous disciplinary makeup is, at the very 
least, a source of methodological and epistemological difference. 149 Hay (2006) draws out other 
faultlines, in an important article in which he delves into whether a coherent theory of nissology 
is possible: he holds up place theory as a theoretical framing with great potential for island 
studies. For Hay, three (potentially divisive) faultlines obtain regarding nissology: (i) the nature 
of the island 'edge'; (ii) the import for questions of island memory and identity, as relates to the 
movement of people to and from islands; and (iii) the metaphoric use of islands (which he 
wrongheadedly discounts, arguing it be jettisoned from island studies. 150 This is not a surprising 
move on his part, considering his juxtaposition of place theory). 
For scholars taken up with the study of islands, islands have traditionally been depicted 
and studied in opposing ways: physical attributes151 vs. perception152. On the one hand, they 
occupy a geographical/physical place in the world (and, thus, are the objects of a host of 
disciplinary questions arising from their circumstances/attributes relative to the rest of the 
world). On the other, they are also cognitive sites (thus, subject to abstraction, per understandings 
148 Indeed, there is some question as to whether there is sufficient dialogue amongst the subfields-some more than 
others. This sort of collaboration is not outside the realm of possibility, as nissology remains at the core of the 
field-its common purpose. What is more, this is the intent; given the field's interdisciplinarity: the fact is, 
"[i]nterdisciplinarity refers to the integration of discrete bodies of knowledge with each other to create new 
knowledge syntheses" (Griffin et al 2006, 11 ). Such collaboration, though, is not immediately visible. The research 
specializations seem to grudgingly lend themselves to dialogue; raising questions about how tightly knit island 
studies is as a field. 
149 Rather than something to be frowned upon, this is generally accepted as an inescapable reality of the field's 
interdisciplinarity. As Baldacchino notes, "[i]t....need not have a distinctive methodology" (2006, 9). 
150 As we will see in the 'Island Imaginaries' sub-section, some of the most insightful analyses of islands utilize this 
approach. Indeed, today there is wide acceptance of the need to critically evaluate the literal and metaphorical 
meanings that permeate islands (Dodds and Royle 2003, 492). 
151 This objective approach tends to be subscribed to by scholars in the hard sciences, or some scholars in the social 
sciences who share an epistemological affinity with the modalities of research in the hard sciences. 
152 This subjective approach tends to be subscribed to by scholars in the social sciences, namely those with post-
positivist research approaches, goals and outlooks on the world. 
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or perceptions of their meanings/potentialities as islands). 153 With respect to the latter, the lived 
experience associated with islands has a deep and complex meaning, typically anchored in the 
term islandness. 
II. Islandness: What is it? 
Islandness, in the words of Gillis and Lowenthal, "is not easily defined" (2007, iii). It is, 
however, thought of as the qualities and characteristics of islands that distinguish them from 
continents. An obvious difference is one of scale (Downes 1988). Dommen notes differences in 
the size of islands, relative to continents; but also such physical characteristics as geology and 
climate (l 980a, 929), but also the environment and fragilities as relates to bio-diversity, etc. The 
economic size and vulnerability of island economies have also been used to distinguish an island 
narrative; amongst these, trade dependence and the bottlenecks that obtain as a result of 
geographic remoteness, limitations regarding economies of scale and natural resources, overly 
narrow export and sectoral base, limited ability to leverage diverse developmental policies, 
capacity constraints regarding public administration, etc (see Briguglio 1995; Streeten 1993). 
For his part, Dommen explores islands' distinct character, transcending a purely economic 
narrative to engage with a range of policy issues ( 1980b; 1985). But there is something to be 
said, too, about what bearing these physical aspects and, importantly, the palpable boundedness 
of islands have on the lived experience of islanders themselves; in terms of their outlook on 
themselves, their place in the world (from the vantage point of self and their community) and the 
world in general. But while the deployment of an overarching understanding of islandness in the 
service of a discemable pattern of a shared island narrative may make sense in certain respects, it 
153 For Skinner, there is increasingly a recognition that "[t]he island [is]. .. a legitimate subject for social scrutiny, 
whether as conceptual device, as metaphor, or as ... distinctive location" (2006, cited in Baldacchino 2006, 6). 
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may be too simplistic to guide how we study all aspects of the kaleidoscope of the world's 
islands, in general. 
So it may be better to think of islandness on a case-by-case basis, tempering how we 
deploy its constitutive meanings with cognizance of the uniqueness of each of the world's 
islands, or, at the very least, island groupings (Hay 2006, 20). Here, perhaps, is where some of 
the complexity of the concept of islandness comes through. As Weale describes it, "[i]slandness 
becomes a part of your being-a part as deep as marrow, and as natural and unselfconscious as 
breathing" (1991, 81 ). He refers, in this context, not to an "island way of life", the meaning of 
which is not as deep; but rather islandness going to the core of islanders' identity, "nature and 
essence"-at the level of the individual and community (Ibid., 81-82). As Conkling says of 
Weale's definition of islandness, it speaks to "a quality of being that is deeply internalized and 
ultimately cannot be separated from an islander's identity without risking "soul-destroying" 
failure" (2007, 198; emphasis added). For Conkling, "there is self-consciousness about 
islandness amongst islanders" (Ibid., 193 ). Perhaps a most poignant characterization of 
islandness is that in addition to islanders being more in touch with (and respecting) their natural 
environment than mainlanders, islandness "lives in one's mind and imagination and therefore can 
be carried within one no matter where one might be" (Ibid., 199). 
III. Island Studies: Its Emergence as a Field of Academic Study 
Out of the two conceptions of islands-i.e. as place and cognitive site-have flowed a range of 
scholarship: a common thread with regards to the study of islands in these respects being an 
experiential discourse. For example, building on the place of islands in the world, bio-
geographers typically seek to draw on evolutionary and climactic lessons that the study of islands 
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may have for the wider world. Literary studies scholars, on the other hand, have typically sought 
to underline the polysemic nature of the island narrative, juxtaposed against time and space. 
That is to say, islands and the island experience acquire certain meanings, compared to 
continents. Thus they lend themselves to d(fferential representations. This approach to the study 
of islands has important parallels with constructivism, which hitherto have not been interrogated. 
I will draw parallels between them shortly. The immediate concern is, however, to outline the 
field of island studies. 
Scholars have suggested that it is difficult to pin down the earliest work featuring islands 
(see Baldacchino 2007, 7). The fact is, islands have been the subject of literary and other works 
dating back thousands of years. There is a sense, however, that ~ngagement with islands in a 
scholarly fashion has a more recent lineage; one that can probably be traced to the work of 
evolutionary biologists, bio-geographers, human geographers and social anthropologists some 
two hundred years ago (Ibid., 7). Certainly, the work on evolution of the naturalist Charles 
Darwin-especially his On the Origin of Species (1968), which drew from his voyages to far-
flung parts of the world, including islands like the Galapagos Islands-is an important marker. 
These pioneering scientists treated with islands as if they were laboratories; their small, discrete 
nature holding the potential to uncover scientific narratives about the wider world. 
In terms of other, particularly social science, disciplines, islands have garnered attention 
relatively recently. Economics (especially development economics), development studies, public 
administration, political science and environmental and tourism studies come to mind. Even 
more recently, island studies has emerged as a field of academic study. Island studies programs 
have been established in a modest number of tertiary institutions, notably the University of Malta 
and the University of Prince Edward Island (UPEI). Related to the latter, a number of initiatives 
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have taken root in the last five years that have served to raise the profile of island studies as a 
field. Especially noteworthy is the launch of Island Studies Journal, one of only a handful 
dedicated to the field; 154 amongst a small cluster of journals more loosely taken up with the 
island narrative from different discip1inary vantage points. 155 
Also, a Canada Research Chair in Island Studies-the first of its kind-was awarded to 
Dr Godfrey Baldacchino. A number of research projects have emerged, as a result. Indeed, Dr 
Baldacchino has been at the forefront of and is widely recognized as an authority amongst a 
small but active community of self-identified island scholars, who dot universities spanning the 
globe. 
Nissology has also become a more organized scholarly undertaking over the last two 
decades, in the light of the formation of the International Small Island Studies Association 
(ISISA). It was established in 1992, at the Islands of the World Ill conference, in The Bahamas. 
Conferences of ISISA are convened biennially. 156 
But the profile of work on islands in academia has also benefited from international 
initiatives in policy circles over the last two-plus decades, especially as relates to the United 
154 The others are INSULA: The International Journal of Island Affairs and Shima: The International Journal of 
Research into Island Cultures. The International Journal of Small Economies focuses on a range of matters relating 
to public policy in small economies, but stands apart from the latter two journals which are specifically taken up 
with advancing the island studies field. Although the emergence of such journals is an important step on the road to 
island studies coming into its own as a field, Baldacchino laments that a "suitable branded journal of island studies 
has yet to come to light" (2006, 8). There is a risk, he contends, that in the absence of such a journal island studies 
research published across a swath of journals is "much more likely to remain a loose and uncoordinated collection of 
research initiatives in search of a home" (ibid). Baldacchino is, however, spearheading an initiative to establish a 
new journal around the theme of small states [Interview by author of Dr Baldacchino, Charlottetown, Prince Edward 
Island, 16th October, 2009]. 
155 See, for example, Caribbean Journal of Education, Caribbean Quarterly, Caribbean Studies, The Contemporary 
Pacific, Cuban Studies, Journal of Caribbean History, Journal of Caribbean Studies, Journal of Eastern Caribbean 
Studies, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Social and &anomic Studies. Some other journals have also routinely 
published articles with an island theme; namely: Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Callaloo, Commonwealth & Comparative 
Politics, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Journal of Mediterranean Studies, Mediterranean 
Politics, and The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. 
156 The most recent one, islands of the World XI, took place in 2010. 
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Nations. The Barbados Programme of Action is an important one, in this regard. One such 
initiative, in particular, that has drawn on the expertise of island scholars is the Commonwealth 
Secretariat's support to so-called small states, as relates to their special circumstances arising 
from the constraints of size and vulnerability. This effort is, in many respects, a continuation of 
the groundbreaking work on island developing states first undertaken by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the 1970s. Since then, other, important, 
United Nations programming on islands has been put in place: notably, under the ambit of the 
United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States. 
Other notable initiatives, more so on the academic front, that have fed back into the 
policy community have been pursued by institutions such as the University of Malta's Islands 
and Small States Institute; but also more recently the Helsinki-based UNU-WIDER. On this 
score, there has traditionally been vibrant interaction across scholarly and policy spaces. 
The potentiality of island 'studies' was perhaps brought into full view, in a big way, by a 
series of articles appearing in a special issue of World Development, three decades ago. 
According to Baldacchino, it is perhaps the first academic journal to have come out with an issue 
dedicated to islands (2004, 327).· Since this 1980 special issue, there have been others in the 
pages of this journal. 
Other journals-virtually all of which are listed above-cutting across a spectrum of 
disciplines, have followed suit. In terms of book length studies, a number have been authored. 157 
One is of particular significance: the volume A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader. It is 
157 Amongst the classics are Carlquist (1965) Island Life: A Natural History of the Islands of the World; and more 
recently Bayliss-Smith et al (1988) Islands, Islanders and the World, and Connell (1988) Sovereignty and Survival: 
Island Microstates in the Third World. 
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described as the first global reader-and a pluridisciplinary one, at that-on the study of islands; 
and is edited by Dr Baldacchino (2007). It has done for island studies what Hanggi, Roloff and 
Ruland's 2006 lnterregionalism and International Relations did for interregionalism studies: 
trace the outlines of a relatively recent scholarly undertaking. 
While not generally acknowledged, the emergence of island studies as a field and the 
research strand within it that focuses on international political economy and political economy of 
development issues around islands has been given impetus by the small states literature in IR. 
IV. The Small States Literature in IR against an Island Studies Backdrop 
The intellectual space for small states in the IR literature was carved by the foundational work of 
Baker-Fox (1959) and Vital (1967), and later by the work of scholars such as Katzenstein (1985). 
Many scholarly contributions have been made, since these early works (see Kassimeris (2009), 
for a good overview). This literature-distinct from scholarship (with which the present study 
can be aligned) that has also made use of the small states nomenclature, but in reference to 
smaller developing countries (see, for example, Persaud ( 1986); and the work of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat (see Sutton 2001))-paved the way for the systematic study of an 
often neglected group of states in the scholarship on international affairs. To a certain degree, 
elements of the island studies scholarship and small states literature in IR are not all that 
dissimilar, in so far as their 'emancipatory' research current is concerned. 
Generally although cognizant of the vulnerability of small states, common to both is an 
effort to defy the stereotyped expectations of the limits of the possible for small states and affirm 
their lot in international affairs (see Baldacchino and Bertram 2009 and Ingebritsen et al 2006, 
respectively). Both sets of scholarship have had to contend with those who would dismiss the 
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scope and objects of their study, and they have come up against an academic mainstream that has 
challenged their relevance (see Selwyn 1980). 
Indeed, far from being impervious, the research ramparts between the two are, on 
occasion, not that distinguishable; analyses as of late spilling in to each others' analytical 
purview (see, for example, Cooper and Shaw 2009). This interlinking appears increasingly more 
likely, as some small states scholars continue to branch into the study of states other than small 
western European ones. There are, however, important differences. For one, the small states 
literature is flush with IR scholars and the disciplinary conventions therein; for example, the term 
·small in small states is understood in the context of 'power', not 'size' per se (Elman 1995, 171). 
Not so for island studies. 
Also, island studies' interdisciplinarity has given its scholarship license to roam a larger 
research range-case studies often being of a diverse nature-across a spectrum of smaller 
countries. This has not necessarily been the experience of the small states literature, its pedigree 
being its focus more so on the statecraft and/or political economy of small advanced industrial 
(European) states (see Keohane 1971, Goetschel 1998, Thorhallsson 2000, Schwartz 1994 and 
Schmidt 2003). Specifically, it is said that three strands of literature obtain regarding "the study 
of small states: a first tradition is concerned with issues of self-determination, a second strand 
deals with the foreign policy options of neutrality or alliance, and a third thread comprises the 
comparative literature on politics and policy formation in small states" (Neumann and Gstohl 
2006, 15). 
All this notwithstanding, small states is a contested category in world politics. As 
Crowards notes, "[ n ]o widely accepted definition of small states has yet emerged" (2002, 143). 
Part of the problem is the term is bandied about in different literatures. In the small states in IR 
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literature, the category of small states has evolved through history (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 
5). With the dismemberment of European empires in the first part of the twentieth century, 
smaller states emerged (Ibid., 5). They came to assume the title of small states given that they 
were not great powers, nor did they lay claim to the title of middle powers; as was the case with 
countries like Canada (Ibid., 5). Instructively, associated with the category of small states is the 
notion of 'inconsequentiality', in the context of realpolitik (Ibid., 5). In scholarship in the vein of 
island studies, it typically has been utilized in the context of Global South (island) states. It is to 
this latter literature's reference to small states that I refer. In this latter literature, generally, 
indicators like population and territorial/ geographical size have been used in this regard; but 
others have been identified (see Streeten 1993, 197). 
However, their use is not that straightforward. Consider that in the case of population, for 
example, some have benchmarked the cut-off for small states as 1.5 million (Commonwealth 
Secretariat 1997). But using this indicator alone is misleading. Jamaica's population, for instance, 
stands at well over 2 million. By this measure, alone, it would not fall into this category. But 
surely it is a small state. Regarding size, Botswana is also considered a small state; but it towers 
over the likes of tiny Montserrat. Judging smallness, then, is a matter of perspective. Arguably, it 
is not a static position (Streeten 1993). Importantly, it has an intangible quality about it. In the 
words of Streeten, "we know a small country when we see it" (Ibid., 197). What smallness 
evokes, then, is vulnerability. My meaning, by way of the latter, is simply that any undertaking 
by such states is more challenging than it would otherwise be for larger counterparts. 
An important current in the study of islands, however, is their theoretical abstraction. This 
is an approach that is common to and one that redounds to the benefit of the array of disciplinary 
engagements of islands within the field. This approach is taken up in the following section. 
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3.3 Island Imaginaries 
Islands loom large in the mythical geographies of Western cultures, etched in what have been 
termed "mental maps" (Gillis 2007, 274); what I understand to be islands as cognitive sites. 
Gillis offers an instructive point, which helps crystallize this understanding: "[i]slands are among 
the features of the landscape that have always been indispensable to Western thought processes. 
Along with mountains, seas, and rivers, islands provide metaphors that allow us to give shape to 
the world" (2007, 276). 158 Thus, islands have been described as "symbolic: the material and 
experiential significance of islands [captured] in artistic imagination" .159 As Thomas explains, 
"[i]slands [have] lent themselves well to the imagination [having] engendered notions of the 
fantastic and the inversion of values .... [literary works and voyages of intrepid explorers centuries 
ago having] created a psychological space in the Western mind, offering the promise of safety, 
destiny, travel and adventure in an environment without the trappings of regimented industrial 
civilisation" (2004, 79). 
There is a long history of islands being looked upon metaphorically; imaginings of 
islands playing off and into every conceivable human emotion, but also cultural and behavioural 
practice. For example, since time immemorial, idyllic, utopian island narratives have been 
commonplace. The allure of islands is weaved into romanticized perceptions of innocence and 
paradise (in Edenic terms); 160 islands seen as harmonious, pristine alternatives to bastions of 
modernity (and all its dysfunctions) that are metropolitan powers (Schulenburg 2003, 536; 
158 But Gillis's understanding of the place of islands in our psyche cuts deeper. We are inclined, as human beings, to 
find order in chaos. We compartmentalize, to distill order (Gillis 2007, 276). This bounded approach in respect of 
self compared to others, community to nation, nation to region, region to world, exemplifies a proclivity for what 
Gillis refers to as islanding; in the West, Gillis argues, we think archipelagically (Ibid, 276). 
159 I attribute this statement to Kathy Stewart; an island scholar affiliated with the Institute oflsland Studies, UPEI. 
160 We need only look to Greek antiquity. Plato, for instance, viewed islands coterminously as concepts and 
metaphors; in and of themselves a basis to engage with utopian possibilities (Connell 2003, 556). 
132 
Connell 2003, 554, 573). 
For the most part, then, islands have come to be associated with an 'idealised image'. In 
fact, islands have a hallowed place in some of the earliest and most important literary works in 
Western culture, especially those of Greek antiquity. Of note is Homer's Odyssey, centered 
around Odysseus's mythical voyage home, after the Trojan War. Islands, like the Ionian Islands, 
feature prominently. Thomas More's Utopia is another excellent example, published in the 
Renaissance era. It contrasted a near-idyllic, fictionalized island's political and societal system 
with the society in which More lived, which he perceived as dysfunctional on a number of levels. 
As previously noted, Dodds and Royle contend that today there is wide acceptance of the 
need to critically evaluate the literal and metaphorical meanings that permeate islands (2003, 
492). An example of scholarship in this vein is work which has sought to explore how the 
naming of islands as well as the narratives built around them and their associated oceanic regions 
simultaneously reflects and reinforces geopolitical-cum-civilizational imaginings, forged around 
their storied past and prospects going forward. 
Smith's (2009) article is a good example of this. She focuses on Australasia-not an 
unproblematic reference. At first glance, it may be seen as referring to Australia and New 
Zealand. She is more interested, however, in how it came to pass as a name. 
The naming of a place is not a neutral exercise, politically or culturally (Ibid., 1117). 
Rather, it is an assertion of "power, proprietorship and propinquity, and bestowing names on the 
earth's larger geographical forms such as oceans, continents and archipelagos is often a perquisite 
of regional or global power" (Ibid., 1099). 
Today, the connotation of and term Australasia is a shadow of what it once was; the 
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political legitimacy of this arbitrary label having long smce lost its luster (Ibid., 1099). 
Ultimately, the geopolitical narrative of place nammg 1s often tied up with shared 
civilizational/historical narratives: i.e. Australasia (weighed down by a British perspective), as 
distinct from Oceania (caught up in French and US perspectives), in the context of cartographic 
representations and perceptions of the Pacific (Ibid., 1101, 111 7). 
As Jolly maintains, imagining a world region is generally aided by a map: "[y ]et the maps 
we draw are never reflections of the world as it is, but always partial representations of it-
representations powerfully shaped by who we are, where and when we are, and what motivates 
our interests in that place" (2007, 508). 
In discussing Micronesia, Hanlon notes that the term was devised in the early 1800s 
(2009, 93). He outlines the ethnographic criteria employed by the academics who met some two 
hundred years ago, to divide Oceania into five regions; of which Micronesia was one. What, 
perhaps, is most striking about his account is that the geographers labeling distant parts of the 
world were French/European, convening their meeting in Paris (Ibid., 93). What is more, some of 
these academics had limited or no contact with those distant lands. 
This case of a foreign (more precisely, Western) hand in the nammg of lands and 
characterizing associated narratives-rife with cultural misrepresentations-is not an isolated 
one. Ultimately, discursive practices have come to colonize cultural, ethnographic, sociological 
and cartographic narratives, in places like the Pacific. 161 As Jolly notes-in the specific context 
of Oceania-in considering foreign representations of place (and its peoples), we need also to 
161 Thomas notes, "[t]he age of European exploration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries .... produce[d] the 
long-held subdivisions of the Pacific islands into the artificially constructed zones of Melanesia, Micronesia and 
Polynesia', laden with Western assumptions and stereotypes" (2004, 76; my emphasis). The end result of the naming 
and subsequent academic study of the Pacific by Europeans is that a series of pseudo-identities for Pacific islanders 
has been created (Ibid., 80). Such European practices have fostered a "salvationist message" (Fry 1997, 305); linked 
to the notion of a white man's burden, no less. 
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consider indigenous representations (2007, 509). Taken together, they are not separate visions, 
per se; rather "double visions" (Ibid., 509). No surprise, then, that there has been a long tradition 
amongst most Pacific writers to unshackle Oceania narratives from their colonial-cum-
metaphorical chains/legacies, in keeping with "a growing regional consciousness linked to an 
Oceanic literary and cultural formation opposed to colonial impositions .... The important work of 
dismantling orientalism had begun in the region some time before Edward Said named the 
phenomenon" (Subramani 2001, 150-151 ). Indeed, Thaman calls for Pacific studies to be 
decolonized: "[i]f we are to apply Said's suggestions about the Orient to the Pacific, we might 
conclude that what we delineate as "the Pacific" had been produced politically, socially, 
ideologically, and militarily by westerners" (2003, 3-4; emphasis added). 
Not unrelated to this theme is a point made on 'island imaginaries' by Steinberg (2005, 
255). He is of the view that it has been invoked to idealize metropolitan powers, such as Britain. 
By the same token, it has been important in the 'othering' process, as relates to (former) colonies. 
The term 'island' took on a deeper meaning, in this framing. As Steinberg explains: 
In Britain's colonial ordering framework, the label 'island' (along with all of the imagery 
associated with colonies that bore that label) was used to characterize places that were 
viewed as isolated, backwards, controllable, and valuable primarily as sites for 
plantation production, for extraction of raw materials, or for military outposts in 
Britain's ongoing geostrategic competition with other European powers. The fact that 
British Guiana could not be circumnavigated by ship was simply ignored by British 
colonists who sought to construct this colony within the colonial 'island' category 
(2005, 255). 
Conceiving of islands metaphorically is not just an academic exercise. It has resonance in policy 
circles, too. As Peckham (2003, 499-500) points out, around the time of the Falklands War, 
Thatcher played on and evoked a metaphorical narrat~ve about these islands in the Southwest 
Atlantic. This tack fit with and sought to mask or, in part, redirect attention away from Britain's 
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geopolitical aims in retaining a foothold in that part of the world. To naturalize Britain's claim 
over this long-disputed territory, Thatcher's political rhetoric was on the islands' 
"'quintessentially English' identity"; under threat-per that narrative-most recently from 
Argentinean aggression, as it had been in the past "from the Spanish Armada, to Napoleon, and 
Nazi Germany" (Ibid., 499-500). For its part, the Argentinean government played up a 
geographical narrative, in respect of its claim of sovereignty over what it calls Islas Malvinas. 
Argentina's claim rests, in part, on a geological rationale: the islands are deemed to be "part of 
the same continental shelf' (Ibid., 499-500). 
The case of the Falklands/Malvinas is a very good example of how pivoting islands on 
metaphor analysis has wide appeal not just in an academic sense, but resonates especially in 
international affairs policy circles. The applicability, then, of the islands as metaphor approach to 
IR should not be underestimated. Indeed, there are important parallels in conceiving of islands in 
this manner and the constructivist framework, outlined earlier. Consider that for constructivism, 
ours is a social world. Material objects are meaningless, save for the intersubjective 
understandings assigned them. The textualization of islands, building on imagery therein, adopts 
analytical devises that resonate with constructivism, in general. 
As outlined earlier, islands have an allegorical quality; a normative value so often 
ascribed to them by island scholars (Schulenburg 2003, 535). For its part, "constructivism 
concerns the issue of human consciousness in international life" (Ruggie 1998, 878). As 
articulated by Adler, "[ c ]onstructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world 
shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and 
epistemic interpretations of the material worlcf' (Adler 1997, 322; emphasis in original). In sum, 
its contention is that the material world is socially constructed, as are identities and interests; in 
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large measure because of intersubjective exchange and social learning. 
What is more, while metaphor is commonly used in the study of islands, the term social 
construction has also been deployed. Steinberg suggests that notwithstanding the simplistic 
definition of an island as land surrounded by water, there is ambiguity regarding what an island 
is (2005, 54). This, for him, is indicative of "the island" being a social construction, based on the 
narrative of an island as a distinct category (Ibid., 54 ). As Steinberg describes it, "social 
properties [are] typically .... associated with island essences"; e.g. being "frozen in time, isolated, 
homogenous and pristine" (Ibid., 54). He argues that if the difference between islands and 
mainlands are seen as arbitrary, the handy-work of humans as opposed to nature, then island 
essences can be seen for what they truly are: "social constructions, rooted in specific historic 
contexts" (Ibid., 54). 
Indeed, metaphor also features as a type of scholarship in IR: "[m]etaphors are [seen as] 
invitations to reason by analogy. An imaginary construct is used to accentuate certain aspects of 
reality .... The power of metaphors [in this context] lies in their ability to orient, evoke, and even 
provoke and mobilize" (Chan 2002, 747-748). 
What of vulnerability? If not at the center it has long been a bedfellow of research in the 
field of island studies; though, as of late, this research current has been somewhat muzzled by 
those who deem its narrative to be dis-empowering for islands and its original meaning distorted. 
Instead, resilience has become a popular refrain. 
3.4 Vulnerability (and Resilience) of Small State Actors: A Review 
Within island studies, there is an extensive literature on vulnerability; one that has traditionally 
cast a long shadow over the field. For a time, at least, it perhaps was seen by some as the field's 
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signature issue. But in recent years, aspects of the vulnerability literature have become 
unfashionable. In considering this literature, we must first elaborate on the theme. Let us begin 
by turning to a United Nations' definition of vulnerability. 
In looking at least developed countries, the United Nations defines vulnerability "as the 
risk of being negatively affected by unforeseen events" (1999, 29; emphasis in original). This 
definition lacks specificity. The report does, however, go on to dissect the concept, outlining 
economic vulner8=bility (namely, structural and conjunctural) and ecological fragility; 
recognizing that the two are linked (Ibid., 29). 
Regarding economic vulnerabilicy, there has been a long-standing policy discussion 
around island developing states and the challenges that emanate as a result, which pose a serious 
challenge to their development. 162 The link between the two garnered the international spotlight 
in a big way in the early 1970s, at UNCTAD III (Briguglio 1995, 1615). 
The special challenges of these states were under discussion at the conference, opening 
the way for other fora like it over the following three-plus decades. But, it was "thanks to 
diplomatic processes" in some of a series of high-profile international conferences, especially in 
the 1980s, on the theme of sustainable development and the environment that an internationally 
recognized category for what are ostensibly island developing states "took root" .163 
At one of those gatherings, the 'Rio Summit', in 1992, the category of Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) 164 was recognized for the first time. Along with Agenda 21 and other 
platforms, a distinct narrative was weaved for these countries on the basis of vulnerability 
162 Caribbean trade official: Interview by author, 6th September, 2009. 
163 Former Caribbean diplomat: Interview by author, 3rd August, 2009. 
164 This is a United Nations classification. In addition to island nations, the category includes low lying ones. They 
are generally categorized regionally, as follows: the AIMS (Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China 
Sea), the Caribbean and the Pacific (see http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/sids_members.shtml). For a list 
of SIDS, see http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/sid/list.htm 
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stemming from environmental considerations, like global warming. 
Coming out of conferences, like those of UNCTAD, that were taken up with elaborating 
on the vulnerability problematique, in the early 1990s experts in the academe and the policy 
community pressed for "a composite index to serve as a yardstick that could measure the degree 
of· overall vulnerability of these countries" (Briguglio 1995). 165 This was seen as vitally 
important, considering that traditional economic measures were "deemed inappropriate and 
unable to capture the nuances and minutia of the SIDS' problematique". 166 
As regards the body of literature on vulnerability, it is a prime example of an intellectual 
space where academics, experts in the policy community and scholar-analysts have shared in its 
development. What has been especially apparent is the great strides that have been made to 
cross-fertilize debate and threads of concept/theory-building emanating from the academe to 
practitioners, and vice versa. Amongst some of the notable work is Benedict ( 1967), 
Commonwealth Secretariat (1985), Downes (1988), UNCTAD (1988), Briguglio (1995), 
Commonwealth Secretariat (1997), Armstrong et al (1998), Commonwealth Secretariat and 
World Bank (2000), Easterly and Kraay (2000), Briguglio et al (2004), UNCTAD (2004), 
Fairbairn (2007), and McGillivray et al (2008). 167 
In terms of their sustainable development challenges, broadly conceived, SIDS are 
viewed in such work as having common physical and structural challenges. 168 By far, size 
165 Briguglio (1995), who has worked closely with the policy community on a composite index and SIDS issues 
more generally, put together an index of economic vulnerability. Others that have been constructed include the 
Commonwealth Vulnerability Index, coming out of the Report of the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Joint 
Task Force on Small States (see Atkins et al 2000). 
166 Caribbean trade official: Interview by author, 6th September, 2009. 
167 The articles on islands that featured in the aforementioned, landmark 1980 special issue of World Development 
can also be included as influential ones, in this regard. 
168 See http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/sids_members.shtml where they are succinctly sketched. Also see 
Briguglio (1995). 
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features prominently.169 These idiosyncratic size-cum-development chaHenges have been 
reinforced over the last three decades by influential explanatory frameworks, such as the 
MIRAB 170 economy approach. For the most part, such scholarship is replete with the notion that 
the effect of those idiosyncrasies is that SIDS' economies are made "very vulnerable to forces 
outside of their control-a condition which sometimes threatens their very economic viability" 
(Briguglio 1995; my emphasis). The emphasis, very clearly, is on economic vulnerabilities 
(Carment et al 2004, Santos-Paulino et al 2010). 
Though some raise the issue of viability, more so than others, this line of argumentation 
has touched a nerve in certain quarters. These scholars have deep misgivings about and push 
back on the case that has traditionally been made regarding vulnerability, and would, no doubt, 
have a preference for a resilience narrative to attenuate if not upstage the vulnerability one (see, 
for example, Baldacchino and Bertram 2009, Armstrong and Read 2002). 171 For Baldacchino and 
Bertram, to infer weakness because of smallness and that smallness is the cause of a host 
dysfunctions "is a version of structural determinism" (2009, 141 ). 172 They argue, "many small 
states not only survive but thrive in the modem global order"-the mere fact that they have 
survived, Baldacchino and Bertram argue, speaks not to weakness; rather strength (Ibid., 142). 
They take to task the empirical work that says otherwise, albeit with the proviso that their 
position is not that challenges do not obtain in respect of small states. Rather, it is their 
contention that we should not underestimate, in an evolutionary sense, the coping abilities and 
169 The small states literature in the context of IR has also recently waded into analyzing the effects of size; notably 
in the context of member states of the EU. A 2006 Special Issue of the Journal of European Integration, entitled 
'The European Union's Member States: The Importance of Size' (Vol. 28, Iss. 1), was dedicated to this theme. Pace 
characterizes the literature on small states and the EU as falling into two categories: (i) examining "the 
behaviour[/influence] of small states in the Union's institutions"; and, (ii) from the vantage point of comparative 
politics, ''the process of European integration from a particular small state's perspective" is explored (2006, 34). 
170 An acronym that captures a problematique especially associated with these countries: migration, remittances, aid 
and public sector bureaucracy (Bertram and Watters 1985). 
171 Some have even argued that small size is an advantage (see Baldacchino 2005). 
172 To be fair, not all in the 'vulnerability camp' make this link. 
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responses to challenges that (most of) these states are able to bring to bear (Ibid., 142). 
The vulnerability and resilience approaches to small· state actors' problematique, then, are 
two, (often) opposing views. As Hay notes, "[p ]erhaps the most contested faultline within island 
studies is whether islands are characterised by vulnerability or resilience" (2006, 21 ). 
There is not likely to be scholarly consensus anytime soon. The upshot is, both sides of 
the debate have merits, but also shortcomings. Realistically speaking, though, it is difficult to be 
situated squarely in either one or the other. The fact of the matter is, especially since the 1990s, 
Global South island states have had to face new and mounting security, political economy 
(broadly conceived) and environmental challenges, associated with the post-Cold War era. The 
literature, however, has had mixed success in explaining the tacks/strategies these states have 
adopted, in this regard. It has, for instance, engaged well with regionalism. This is not so for 
interregionalism. 
3.5 (lnter)regionalism in Island Scliolarsliip 
Conspicuous by its absence in island studies is research on interregionalism. The fact is, 
interregionalism is deserving of attention in island studies at a time when one of the most striking 
developments in the international affairs of small/island states today is that they have come to 
rely on interregionalism in the pursuit of strategic international policy; as is the case in the 
Caribbean, for instance through the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
Short of the many commentaries and some scholarly work that has appeared on the 
Agreement in other disciplinary folds, the CARIFORUM-EU EPA has apparently not resonated 
in the field of island studies, standing on its own or couched in interregionalism. To the extent 
that academic analyses are influenced by events in the world, this is surprising. A theoretical 
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framework and associated analysis of some of the most pressing issues in this emergent Global 
North and Global South region arrangement is long overdue in the field of island studies. 
3.6 Conclusion 
With respect to its approach, the chapter takes stock of island studies. This review, in the 
chapter's first part, is flanked by consideration of the substantial body of empirical work on the 
'vulnerability' (and 'resilience') of small state actors, but also engagement of some of the 
literature in which islands are abstracted as cognitive sites. Finally, referring to research on the 
Caribbean, a determination is made that interregionalism, curiously, has largely escaped the 
attention of scholars in this field; though regionalism has not. 
The foregoing has taken stock of island studies-a large and diverse literature-and, 
tangentially, the small states literature in IR. Instructively, I underscore that while this latter 
literature has contributed to the establishment of island studies, unlike the small states literature 
in IR which has gravitated toward constructivist frameworks work in the genre of island 
studies-for the most part-has not. An embrace of such an approach by these latter scholars 
may provide the grounds for a deeper engagement with one another on the part of these two sets 
of scholars, who generally are disengaged from each other. Calls for such interface have been 
elusive, especially because the bridge-building role of constructivism has not garnered attention. 
The survey and theoretical engagement that constitute this chapter are instructive for our 
purposes, in so far as they point to much being gained from drawing on sociological or 
constructivist approaches with respect to the study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism. This does not 
mean to suggest that constructivism fully explains the diplomatic and policy tacks of such states. 
Rather, as we will see, a constructivist framework may prove invaluable, against the backdrop of 
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environments where small state-brokered social learning and normative persuasion abound, and 
where power maximization in the realist sense takes a back seat to identity-centric, 'appropriate' 
state behaviour. We first need to frame this sort of analysis with a theoretically supported model 
qua conceptual tool. 
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PART II 
CARIBBEAN (INTER)REGIONALISM: 
TOWARD A MODEL, IN LIGHT OF SOME THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Chapter IV 
International Theory and the 'Region Leveraging Nexus' (RLN): 
Toward a Model of Caribbean (Inter)regionalism 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the RLN, the theoretically supported model qua conceptual tool which 
serves to depict and provide a frame for identity informed diplomacy of which an account is 
given in the present study. The RLN serves to lend insight into the pragmatism and dynamism of 
agency-laden Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism (as relates to the negotiation of trade 
agreements, specifically) and intra-regionalism (as relates to regional integration), and the nexus 
between. The analysis of the RLN is juxtaposed on a review of conventional international theory 
and the place of small states in it. This is done with a view to sharply contrasting stale, 
unsatisfactory mainstream accounts of the inability of small states to be stewards of their own 
destiny with an innovative approach to framing their agency-which draws on progressive 
scholarly currents-that suggests otherwise. 
The theoretical literature on (inter)regionalism regarding small state Global South regions 
like the Caribbean remains uneven and fragmented, certainly absent dedicated study of how such 
states leverage notions of socially constructed regions to the advantage of their various 
diplomatic and policy tacks. The present chapter, and the study at large, is an effort to make 
scholarly headway into filling some of the gaps, with a view to making the case that such states 
are by no means 'powerless' as conventional international theory contends. 
The chapter is divided into two parts, the first of which is constituted of two sections. The 
first section conceptually situates how small states are portrayed in conventional international 
theory. It questions what remains a relatively narrow focus on generalizing these states' supposed 
inability to affect change for themselves, and to do so on their own terms. The second section 
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discusses SIT, post-structuralism and, briefly, Habermas' normative social theory-namely his 
theory of communicative action. The balance of that section explicates how these approaches can 
lend conceptual and analytical weight to the constructivist framework that underpins my case for 
theorizing Caribbean (inter)regionalism in ideational terms, where agency 173 is frontloaded. 
The chapter's second part sets forth and examines the RLN. The RLN turns its sights on: 
(i) the interactive relationship between and offers a potentially strong explanation of Caribbean-
pivoted interregionalism (as relates to the negotiation of trade. agreements, i.e. the EPA, 
specifically) and intra-regionalism (as relates to regional integration); and (ii) how regional 
social identities at times work against the production of norm cohesion-type discourses in 
regional cooperation and regional governance. 
In its concluding section, the chapter showcases a point that forms a centerpiece of this 
study: state agency is better animated by the best argument, set against the backdrop of state 
identity construction, than by established explanations in IR which assign misleading 
conceptions (even presumptions) relating to state agency. 
4.2 International Theory: The Traditional Agenda, the place of Small States in it; · 
Recasting Caribbean Regionness 
The study of the behaviour of states in world politics is one of the central concerns of 
predominant, rationalist IR theory. 174 Realists and neoliberal institutionalists, alike, hold that 
outside physical forces affect the behaviour of actors (Adler 1997, 322). Neorealists, for instance, 
conceive of self-help styled international anarchy as a structure that conditions state behaviour 
(Wendt 1992, 391; Waltz 1979), and states as "try[ing] to maximize their interests based on fixed 
173 I understand agency to simultaneously refer to purposiveness and choice, rooted in extant social engagement. 
174 In addition to being rationalistic, realism and institutionalist theory are utilitarian (Keohane and Martin 1995, 39); 
neo-utilitarian, for Ruggie (1998, 855). 
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ex ante preferences" (Verdun 2005, 17). 
In this dominant IR perspective, a structural theory of international politics, there are 
highly restrictive notions of agency; which come at the expense of some of the smallest states in 
world politics: agency is assumed out of existence for them. Consider that small states have been 
described as "not hav[ing] a foreign policy; they merely have a policy of existence" (Fauriol 
1984, cited in Thorburn 2007, 244). Not only are foreign policies elusive, but purportedly these 
states are beholden to larger states (Hey 2003, cited in Thorburn 2007, 244). Small states are 
thought to exhibit vulnerability with respect to what has been described as "patterns of power 
and alignment" that obtain in the international system, said to "leave them exposed to predation 
and ambition by states" (Sutton and Payne 1993, 591-592). Small islands have also been 
characterized in similarly unflattering terms; described as "helpless pawns in the game of 
international relations" (Shibuya 2003, cited in Thorburn 2007, 244). 
The lived experiences of especially small states in world politics tend to be overly 
simplified by such descriptors, which, at the very least, embody a neorealist orientation. At best, 
this theoretical orthodoxy provides only fragmentary insights into the statecraft of 'Lilliputian' 
states; at worst, it reinforces stereotypes. Simply put, on offer are materialist explanations; the 
main axis of theorizing. The impetus behind such unspecific, tenuous characterizations is easily 
understood, though: it suits the austere parsimony of neorealism (an exemplar of scientific, 
systems-based IR theory), which in the service of social scientific or positivist methods truncates 
the repertoire of state behaviour. 
Neorealism's preoccupation, after all, is with the security-oriented behaviour of states, in 
the context of what, at its root, is a rather 'linear' understanding-inspired by the scientific 
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ambitions of behaviouralism 175 (in the vein of David Easton's scholarly work)-of the logic of 
international anarchy: described as law-like, systems-based 'regularities' modeled on cause and 
effect. 176 Mainstream (typically American) IR scholarship has, thus, traditionally been pregnant 
with a program of rational choice analysis (i.e. game theory), dedicated to determining/predicting 
state behaviour based on conceptions of the material capabilities of states that are likened to 
'billiard balls'. Indeed, "neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are drawn directly from 
microeconomics" (Ruggie 1998, 862); the centerpiece being individuals as elemental units of 
social analysis-i.e. methodological individualism. 
Such an approach exogenizes the underpinnings of state behaviour (Wendt 1994, 384), 
and cannot begin (nor does it have the methodological scope) to fully grasp the significance of 
state identities and interests in what, in effect, is a socially interactive international system. For 
neorealism (and neoliberal institutionalism), state identities and interests are the result of their 
material positions, exogenous and given (Ruggie 1998, 862); essentially, bracketed. In this 
framing, the material is essentialized, at the expense of the ideational. As such, constructivists' 
"critique of neorealists and neoliberals concerns not what these scholars do and say but what 
they ignore: the content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics" 
(Checkel 1998, 324; emphasis added). 
175 Dating back to the 1950s, "behaviouralists argued that the field [ofIR] would be jmproved by shedding many of 
its traditional methods of enquiry to emulate more closely the natural sciences" (Chernoff2009, 161-162). 
176 The ahistorical nature of this project-which essentially has impoverished realism in the tradition of Morgenthau 
and Carr-and its unflinching commitment to the application of "images taken from Newtonian mechanics or 
Darwinian biology ... [and] ... the logic of scientific explanation [associated with] the sciences of inert matter to 
encompass patterns of probability in historical processes" (Walker 1993, 97-98), have been the centerpiece of 
important critiques of neorealism {Ashley 1984, Walker 1993, Gill 1993). This latter critique is reminiscent of one of 
three broad criticisms of positivism in the context of the philosophy of science: "the application of positivism [in the 
context of a naturalist perspective] to the social sciences" (Chernoff 2005, 39). The others are: "the inadequacies of 
positivism as an account of science. The third set is by authors who reject causal theory altogether and defend 
constitutive theory in the social sciences, notably interpretivists and supporters of the hermeneutic tradition (HT)" 
(Ibid, 39). 
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That state identities and interests are, in effect, . sidelined, any understanding of state 
behaviour is incomplete; indeed, it is overly simplistic. The result, in the case of (very) small 
states, is that their statecraft, and agency therein, is narrowly, arbitrarily and naYvely conceived 
of. 
To be sure, small states are challenged by their idiosyncratic size; and there is a 
determinacy to their agency on the international stage. It is not my intention to downplay this. 
However, smaller size cannot simply (or arbitrarily) be equated with or seen as 
predetermining/engendering diminishing returns on agency. This is a reductionist approach. It 
flies in the face of the complexity (even contingency) that characterizes international affairs and 
the reflexive nature of actors therein; in effect, trading complex social reality for explanatory 
expediency. With this prescriptive, predictive approach, the considerable complexity and nuance 
of action of social institutions-state-based or otherwise-at the heart of statecraft risks being 
lost. 
However, they can be successfully uncovered by analytically engaging with state 
identities and interests. Analysis of plasticity, with respect to how state identities and interests are 
leveraged, holds the promise of providing a more complete picture of agency, especially in the 
context of 'Lilliputian' state actors. 177 
Privileging state identities and interests in the study of world politics, though, requires a 
shift away from the theoretical mainstream, typically toward constructivist but also socialization 
theories, more broadly. Instructively, constructivism has come to be seen as the main challenger 
to the theoretical orthodoxy in IR (Hopf 1998, 171 ), over the past two decades. Indeed, 
constructivism is at variance with perspectives such as neorealism, on meta-theoretical 
177 I borrow the term plasticity from Legro (2009). 
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grounds. 178 If state identities and interests are considered salient in locating agency, and in this 
regard understanding how states are socialized in a norm-animated international system, 
adopting a constructivist approach is imperative. 
Constructivism emphasizes the constructed nature of and the intersubjective framework 
behind the identity-driven image(s) and normative role of actors in world politics. 179 In effect, 
culture, norms, identities, ideas, ideology and socialization have a bearing on state interests and 
policy preferences. 
In recent years, analysts have assigned greater importance to ideas and ideational 
structures, against the backdrop of the study of international affairs where for a long time 
material forces and capabilities occupied center stage. 180 This has led the way to analyses of 
actor or agent identities and the complex interplay with an ideational structure. In this regard, 
students of IR have been able to better appreciate the role of interstate socialization-per social 
learning and normative persuasion or the 'logic of appropriateness' (see March and Olsen 
1998)-in the diffusion of norms. 
Some constructivist scholars have pointed to how states' identities are formed and built by 
state-to-state interaction (Marcussen et al 1999; Wendt 1999). Others flag the role of ideational 
and normative factors (Checkel 1997; Finnemore 1996). Both these threads of research are of 
interest, and are relevant for our purposes. 
However, while constructivism usefully provides a theory of identitive socialization, 
strictly speaking it "lacks a theory of the agent" (Flockhart 2006, 93). For Curley, "[i]nstead, 
constructivist research generally stresses the importance of the mutually constitutive relation 
178 In fairness, because of the many strands of constructivism, when compared with the theoretical mainstream on 
ontological and epistemological grounds some branches of constructivism vary to a greater degree than others. 
179 The constructivist position, ofcourse, is that norms constitute state identity, by extension state interests. 
180 In important respects, this conventional approach is still the predominant one, as reflected by mainstream 
scholarship. 
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between agent (state) and structure (international system), in which neither unit of analysis is 
"ontologically" [prior]" (2009, 653). Thus, in this framework, ontology is grounded on the 
relationship between agents and structures. In effect, constructivism is informed by the 
interpenetration of the two. 
As a result, an agent-level theory is needed, which can be paired with the socialization 
narrative of constructivism. Indeed, it is vital, given the state-as-agent approach adopted in the 
present study. 
Like Flockhart, I turn to "Social Identity Theory (SIT) [an agent-level theory from social 
psychology] as social constructivism's theory of the agent" (2006, 92). 181 SIT is taken up with 
the study of identity (especially identity formation), in the context of social group settings-seen 
as collective social constructs, principally forged on criteria of differentiation/ distinctiveness. It 
looks at intergroup behaviour, underscoring how social groups play a role in defining the social 
identity of its members. What SIT is especially helpful in doing is distilling the in-group/out-
group comparative dynamic, at play in social contexts (see Tajfel 1978). 
In the context of world politics, group membership forms part of and is critical to identity 
formation regarding state actors. At this level of social reality or social structure, regionalism is a 
common manifestation of group settings; group identity looming large in such interactional 
spaces, such that regions may also serve as agents. 182 In point of fact, states derive a sense of 
self, or social identity, in large part from membership in a regional grouping. This is not unlike 
people, who also attach a value but also are emotionally invested in a social grouping (Ibid., 63). 
181 Social psychology is one of"two different fields of decision analysis" (Reiter 2006, 232). 
182 Regions as agents or actors should be conceptualized from a constructivist vantage point. Furthermore, they can 
be thought of in a similar way as the 'English School' of IR conceives of international society: "A society of states 
(or 'international society') exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, 
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations 
with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull 1977, 13). Indeed, the 'English School', 
having gained prominence in the l 960s/'70s, has influenced constructivist work in IR. 
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By way of SIT, then, state identity construction can be conceptualized. In this regard, in 
conceiving of states as actors in world politics, they can be assigned "person-hood" (Jackson 
2004, 255). Indeed, they are thought of as having "anthropomorphic qualities" (Wendt 1999, 
cited in ibid, '256). Following from this formulation, properties that are ascribed to human beings 
also hold with respect to states; amongst them identities (Wendt 2004, 289). 
In this context, identity can be understand to refer to "relatively stable, role specific 
understandings and expectations about self .... [indeed], [i]dentities are the basis of interests" 
(Wendt 1992, 397-398; emphasis added). In point of fact, "[c]onstructivists claim that interests 
are only given meaning in the social context in which an actor interprets these interests"; in stark 
contrast to the economistic, neorealist assumption that actors are utility maximizers (Curley 
2009, 653). Both identities and interests are, thus, socially constructed-in the constructivist 
framing, at least. Taken together, identities, interests and the structure( s) in which they are 
contained are "mutually constitutive" (Wendt 1995, 137). 183 In the context of state identity, 
Katzenstein notes "[ c ]ultural-institutional contexts do not merely constrain actors by changing 
the incentives that shape their behaviour. They do not simply regulate behaviour. They also help 
to constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to regulate" (2005, 22). Identities, then, are 
internalized by states. As a result, as "purposive actors", states have "a sense of Self' (Wendt 
1999, cited in Neumann 2004, 259; emphasis added). 
My theoretical framework also incorporates the discourse-theoretic approach of 
poststructuralism, on account of the view that actor-centred perspectives make sense with respect 
183 To be fair, Wendt also reveals his proclivity for causal effects, in considering social structures (Chemoff 2005, 49, 
60). So, on balance, he envisions constitutive relations in the context of social structures, but points to the causal 
effects of those structures too (Ibid., 60). This would not sit well with pure constructivists, focused on constitutive 
relations (Ibid., 61 ); and so this speaks to the diversity of approaches within constructivism itself. 
152 
to the study of norms when conjoined with discourse-centred perspectives. 184 
Poststructuralism in IR goes by different labels. Poststructuralism is used by some. For 
others, their referent is postmodemism, and also intertextuality, even re/de-constructivism 
(0sterud 1996, 385). The labeling is used interchangeably by some; a practice frowned on by 
those for whom the varying labels are not just cosmetic, but speak to "crucial distinctions" (Ibid., 
385).185 
Amongst the more widely known scholars writing in this vein are Richard K. Ashley, 
David Campbell, James Der Derian, Michael J. Shapiro and R.B.J. Walker. My interest here is 
not in carrying out an in-depth discussion of this kind of work. Nor is it with this work's 
methodological and epistemological quarrel with scientism, a la the social science (even IR) 
mainstream, or its long-recognized attempts to strike at certain understandings of modernity qua 
the Enlightenment, knowledge, etc (Ibid., 386). Rather, of interest are its socio-linguistic 
insights, for which research in this vein has come to be known. In this regard, its discourse186 
analytical approach to the study of foreign policy is of special interest, namely: "discourses as 
systems of signification" (Milliken 1999, 229). Instructively, discourses can be seen as 
"structures that are actualized in their regular use by people of discursively ordered relationships 
in 'ready-at-hand language practices' or other modes of signification" (Ibid., 231 ). Discourse 
understood in this way would imply "that discursive studies must empirically analyse language 
practices (or their equivalents) in order to draw out a more general structure of relational 
184 I attribute this insight to Htilsse and Spencer, though their's is not so much a call for balance in respect of the two 
as it is for "a shift of perspective ... from an actor-centred to a discourse-centred perspective" (2008, 571); albeit in 
their discussion of terrorism studies. 
185 Subaltern (postcolonial) scholarship and feminist writings, regarding gendering the study of international 
politics/international political economy, are amongst some other perspectives that are thought, by some, to be 
classified as poststructuralist theories 
186 Like Achard, I understand the term discourse to refer to "any language use in a social context, whether in spoken 
or in written form" (1993, 75). 
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distinctions and hierarchies that orders persons' knowledge about the things defined by the 
discourse" (Ibid., 231 ). 
The approach has a lot to off er how we think about and can theorize states bringing their 
respective identities to life; not unlike the interpretive or more critical variant of 
constructivism-that the present study subscribes to-does. Importantly, the significance of 
'speech acts' and official rhetoric in norm formulation can be uncovered. In this sense, discourse 
analysis opens the way for a better understanding of social reality, in so far as language gives it 
meaning. 
There is no one way of undertaking discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992). However, a 
method that is commonly utilized, and for our purposes is sufficient, is to analyze a set of policy-
type documents, including speeches and statements. Referred to as "predicate analysis", this 
method allows for language practices that are utilized in texts to be studied (Milliken 1999, 
231).187 
By so doing, the meanings that are generated by and assigned to social actors can be 
distilled, at least in part, through looking at language. Discursive practices, the use of text, 
rhetoric, etc., all form an important element of how states are represented, portrayed and 
otherwise animated as actors on the international stage. 
In in-built normative practices, therefore, is language-based state identity positioning. To 
what end? In the socialization process that is entailed, meanings are derived. They are brought 
about through processes of negotiation, the end result of which are normative regimes. As 
Kratochwil notes, "[a ]ctors are not only programmed by rules and norms, but they reproduce and 
187 In regards to language practices, consideration can be given to "the language practices of predication - the 
verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns" (Milliken 1999, 232). The effect of predication, with respect to a 
noun, is that the noun becomes a thing(s) (Ibid., 232). Subjects take on this meaning, in this kind of analysis (Ibid., 
232). Subjects, then, become "defined through being assigned capacities for and modes of acting and interacting" 
(Ibid., 232). 
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change by their practice the normative structures by which they are able to act, share meanings, 
communicate intentions, criticize claims, and justify choices" (1989, 61 ). 
Per the latter point, constructivism is useful in framing state socialization as norm-driven, 
subjected-in how norms are negotiated-to the 'logic of appropriateness' (see March and Olsen 
1998, 949-954). The latter is one of two logics of action studied by March and Olsen (Ibid., 949-
954 ), with respect to international orders. The 'logic of consequentionalism' is the other. 
Where rationalist perspectives adopt methodological individualism, so as to portray 
actors as utility-maximizers, constructivism generally transcends the implied logic of 
consequentionalism therein. Rather, the logic of action in constructivism can be characterized by 
the logic of appropriateness, in that the forging of preferences by actors is not done solely 
instrumentally. As March and Olsen contend, "[!]inking action exclusively to a logic of 
consequences seems to ignore the substantial role of identities, rules and institutions in shaping 
human behaviour .... Human actors are imagined to follow rules 188 that associate particular 
identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing 
similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self 
and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that 
identity or role to a specific situation" (Ibid., 951 ). 
My point is that, rather than construing actors as taken up solely with dispassionate cost-
benefit-styled analysis of utility and preference maximization, per the logic of 
consequentionalism, the logic of appropriateness affords an opportunity to view actors' logic of 
action as influenced ostensibly by doing what is right. 189 Ultimately, theirs' is social action, 
188 These rules are socially constructed; both identities (around "senses of belonging") and rules forged by "social 
interaction" (March and Olsen 1998, 952). 
189 Appropriateness can be conceived of in respect of several dimensions, including a cognitive . dimension: 
appropriate action, in this regard, "is essential to a particular conception of self' (Ibid., 952). 
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where preferences need not be fixed; a radical departure from how rationalist perspectives would 
have us conceive of actor behaviour. 
Like the understanding of action sketched above, social psychology, communications 
theory and also· sociology-oriented scholarship have, for instance, made important contributions. 
But one type of analysis that has increasingly commanded the spotlight in IR, proving incredibly 
useful in understanding how action is undertaken, builds on Habermasian propositions; namely, 
the theory of communicative action. 
Communicative action refers to multiple actors establishing a relationship, with which 
they "seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order 
to coordinate their actions by way of agreement" (Habermas 1984, 86). In essence, Habermas' 
communicative action approach contends that given societal actors pursue common 
understanding, and what is more they seek to 'coordinate actions' based on reasoned argument 
I 
but also consensus and cooperation (Ibid., 86). Communicative action, then, stands opposed to 
so-called teleological action, which perhaps would go over well with rationalist IR perspectives. 
In the former, action is interpretively hinged. This is not so, per the teleological variant.190 
When viewed in concert, the above theoretical pathways form an important basis for 
understanding how norms come about in world politics, especially from the vantage point of 
small states in the Global South, like those of the Caribbean. 
To make this case, I conceptualize Caribbean States in the context of their interregional 
relationships and intra-regional relationships, and begin to address the effects of institutions 
(themselves vessels for norms and intersubjective understandings) and processes therein. 
Regarding their interregional relationships, for our purposes, these states can wholly be 
190 This schema of communicative vs. teleological action has parallels at the macro-level with the dichotomy of 
constructivist and rationalist approaches. But it also resonates with the earlier discussion of March and Olsen's 
(1998) scholarly work. 
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conceived of as what Wendt refers to as psychological persons, "possess[ ed] [of] certain mental 
or cognitive attributes" (2004, 294)-amongst them, negotiating savvy. For their part, the larger 
negotiating counterparts of the Caribbean can be thought of as Wendtian-styled moral persons, 
"accountable for actions under a moral code"· (Ibid., 294). Following from the 'logic of 
appropriateness', it is reasonable to surmise that some of the time, these moral persons can be 
'persuaded' to do what is right, regarding their norm-based responsibilities. In the context of the 
interregional relationships raised here, I am particularly interested in socializing agents, 
including the related institutions (specifically, their role in crafting preferences) and processes 
that obtain, in the context of regions. 
What of Caribbean States intra-regional relationships? In this case, Caribbean States can 
be seen not exclusively as psychological persons. They are only partly so. They can also be 
conceptualized as one part moral persons; in addition, operating under the status of what Wendt 
terms legal persons. The latter have "rights and obligations in a community of law" (ibid). 
Following from the logic of appropriateness, it is reasonable to surmise that most of the time, the 
moral persons in this schema can be 'persuaded' to do what is right, regarding their norm-based 
responsibilities to legal persons. In the context of the intra-regional relationships raised here, I 
am particularly interested in socializing agents, including the related institutions (specifically, 
their role in crafting preferences) and processes that obtain, in the context of states. 
Regarding an elaboration of the above inter- and intra-regional relationships, generally, 
and what I see as their persuasion-centered approach, it is my considered view that Caribbean 
States are more likely to resort to "arguing and reason-giving". 191 As regards the latter point, I 
draw on insights from Ulbert and Risse's (2005, 352) work on 'argumentative talk' (which is 
191 Arguing is understood as "a reflexive process .... characterized by an exchange of arguments that is based on a 
common frame of reference that is adjusted in the course of communication" (Ulbert and Risse 2005, 352). 
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informed by the theory of communicative action), with respect to multilateral diplomatic 
negotiations. 
Through a series of empirical studies on deliberation and arguing, they determine that 
arguing and reason-giving are prevalent, for the cases studied, throughout the life-cycle of the 
reviewed international negotiations (Ibid., 352). This finding appears especially germane for 
Caribbean States, typically engaged in negotiations as 'under-dogs'. To secure gains, in certain 
.. 
contexts, evidence192 -suggests that they fall back on arguing and reason-giving, in hopes that the 
pay off for such efforts, if successful, are counterpart agents' preferences being changed (Grobe 
2010, 6). By extension and in keeping with the Habermasian communicative action-informed 
argumentative talk approach, I surmise that "[a]gents .... do not [necessarily] try to maximize their 
own utility functions, as rationalists would assume. Instead, they are ready to succumb to the 
better argument, even if such behaviour required reformulating their preferences throughout the 
interaction" (Ibid., 6). This leaves room for altruism, the resulting negotiated outcome( s) tending 
to redound to the benefit of persuader Caribbean States (PCS). 
I shall re-visit the Wendtian-styled state typology as well as the argumentative talk 
approach to multilateral negotiations, discussed above, in the final section of the chapter. Three 
points should, however, be immediately apparent, at this juncture. First, small states, like those 
of the Caribbean, can be viewed as taking on different personas, to suit inter- or intra-regional 
relationships. Second, be they inter- or intra-regional relationships, it is reasonable to infer that 
they are founded on and eventually mediated by norms. Third, the establishment and 
operationalization of norms can be seen as dependent on the state socialization process; that 
process, in tum, contingent on social learning. It is fair to say, Caribbean small state-driven 
persuasion would loom large, in this regard; argumentation around and appeals to, ostensibly, 
192 Interviews with senior Caribbean and European technocrats, over the period 20 I 0-12. 
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moral standards or moral imperatives directed at bringing about attitudanal adjustments in 
counterparts, "without [the] use of either material or mental coercion" (Flockhart 2006, 97). If 
successful, the following outcomes are expected: (i) the interests of socializing agents are 
advanced; (ii) counterpart agents' outlook on what they stand to gain by signing onto the norm(s) 
(but also lose, by not) is altered, as are their preferences, such that they are amenable to adjusting 
their bargaining positions. At the core of this interaction is actor-based, interest-driven 
representational self-imaging. 
With the preceding in mind, one caveat is in order, at this stage. What I have done thus far 
is to sketch a framework for state socialization, especially applicable to the regionalist project of 
the Caribbean. The intention is not, however, to suggest that the regional diplomatic and policy 
tacks possibly engendered by this framework are always successful. This is a separate matter, 
which will be taken up later. 
Let us now take stock of where we have come from in this sub-section, but also where we 
are headed in terms of an alternative theorization of the Caribbean in international affairs. In 
what follows, I am interested in setting out issues related to theory, especially agency. 
First and foremost, the handful of alternative perspectives flagged above open theoretical 
space for recast narrative framings of small states-like those of the Caribbean-in the 
international system, and in explaining diplomatic outcomes in their favour. This narrative is 
vastly different from and indeed is at odds with that of the prevailing approach to the study of the 
Caribbean in world politics, which upon classifying them as small states would singularly view 
such states as "inarguably constrained by their external environment and .... "system level 
phenomena" .... [their] foreign policy and international relations ... .largely defined by larger, more 
powerful actors and situations" (Thorburn 2007, 244; emphasis added). In their study of the 
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security strategies of microstates, Wivel and Oest contend "[ m Jost microstates have had, 
therefore, little or no independent foreign policy, and even fewer have implemented any 
independent security policy" (2010, 430). This prevailing approach tends to be rationalist (Atkins 
2001, 33). Neorealism fits this mold. As Cox (1981) contends, neorealism is 'problem solving' in 
nature. 
The alternative perspectives I have discussed cut against the (mainstream) grain, not 
unlike the political economy analyses of the Region offered up by some prominent West Indian 
scholars three-plus decades ago. This literature exhibits a critical hue, much like the scholarship 
of the dependencias of the same era, occupied with problematizing the political economy of 
Latin American development. This period witnessed the emergence of the PEM, associated with 
the so-called New World Group. This tradition of critical theorizing has continued apace, some 
contemporary Caribbeanists having brought a new spin to the critical geoeconomic study of the 
Caribbean, engaging seriously with postcolonial/reflectivist perspectives. The recent edited 
volume of Barrow-Giles and Marshall (2003), entitled Living on the Borderlines: Issues in 
Caribbean Sovereignty and Development, is an important example of scholarship in this vein. 
But as Atkins (2001) notes, post-positivist approaches to the study of the Caribbean are relegated 
to scholarly margins. It is fair to say, then, that while theoretical pluralism has visited Caribbean 
IR, just how expansive these forays have been is an open question. 
Clearly, the study of Caribbean international affairs is unfamiliar terrain for constructivist 
and SIT-informed analyses. This is surprising. As will be shown in the final two sections, themes 
such as Caribbean (inter)regionalism can nicely be viewed through the prism of these theoretical 
perspectives. It becomes apparent that the ideational study of the international affairs of this 
Region possesses considerable potential for and is appropriate to deepening an understanding not 
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only of why diplomatic and policy tacks around regional identity are positioned the way they are, 
but also the agency upon which such socialization tacks have come to rest. 
The fact remains, such states leveraging social learning, through their persuasion-based 
engagement with each other and collectively as a region with third parties, to deliberatively 
affect social change is under-examined; indeed, to date, it has been undertheorized. The 
advancement of this sort of research, along the lines discussed above and building on the insights 
of critical geopolitics193 viz the socially constructed nature of regions, can go a long way in 
striking up an inter-disciplinary conversation around interregionalism, regionalism and island 
studies. 
What is more, what SIT, post-structuralism and Habermas' normative social theory can 
theoretically hold up, when paired with constructivism, is the contention that it is in processes of 
and institutional cooperation that mediates state socialization that agency can be re/uncovered, 
with respect to the smallest of states-like those of the Caribbean. My core point is that in 
relationships, Caribbean institutions, as it turns out, are norm-makers, 194 not norm-takers, as is so 
commonly assumed. 
This chapter seeks to advance this sort of understanding of small states, which has 
escaped neorealists, who by default proscribe power politics and material balance of power 
explanations-given their mantra of self-help and relative gains. For their part, neoliberal 
institutionalists would accord greater weight to cooperation (partly through the lens and wholly 
by way of an instrumental approach to norms), spurred by international regimes/organizations. 
193 See Neumann (1994); Paasi (2002); Massey (1993). 
194 Indeed, practitioners of Caribbean regionalism suggest as much, in reference to the diplomacy of such states. The 
former acting Secretary-General of CARI COM, Ambassador Lolita Applewhaite, has said "[i]t is the force of ideas 
and creativity that are our strengths as we grapple with the issues and attempt to make a difference in the 
international arena. It is the use of these strengths that give our small states a voice on equal terms with the most 
powerful states to advance those issues which are of particular concern to us" (CARI COM 2011; my emphasis). 
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However, that cooperation and the preferences that channel it would be theorized against the 
backdrop of incentivization-with respect to material rewards, or, conversely, punishment. This 
rationalist bargaining theory (which has so captivated the thinking of academics and 
practitioners, alike) would, thus, gloss over other negotiating tacks particularly utilized by small 
states-touched on in the earlier discussion on socialization-that tend to be born of 
argumentative rather than instrumental rationality. 
Ultimately in both the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches, small size 
predetermines the degree of influence. After all the central tenet of realists, in particular, is 
power, which is synonymous with exacting influence. 195 Power is a relative term, in this 
construct. The differentials therein are typically associated with the size of the state concerned 
and the material resources (e.g. military, economic, etc.) at its disposal, though strictly speaking 
structural realists, whose focus rests more so on sovereign states occupying and operating in an 
anarchical (i.e. supra-authority lacking) international system, would ascribe that system as being 
the locus of power. All things considered the larger the size of the state and the resources 
available to it, the state in question has an increased ability to secure its interests because it is 
said to have greater recourse to the exercise of power a la realpolitik. An inverse relationship 
holds in this realist framework, the smaller the state. Thucydides's much-cited dictum that the 
strong do want they want and the weak endure the consequences is apt, in this context. 
However neither one of the aforementioned neo-utilitarian approaches is as nuanced as 
explanations of small regional states in international politics-in the Deutschian but also 
'imagined community' sense-based on identity, intersubjective meanings and the development 
of socially-oriented norms. In this constructivist or cultural theoretical framing, states are far 
195 I stop short of providing an outright definition of power in the context ofIR, as it has long been a contested term. 
It has come up for scrutiny definitionally, but also in respect of its measurement and usage. 
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more accurately portrayed in the international system as doing "what they think most 
appropriate"; in sharp contrast to the realist line, especially, that "[ s ]tates do what they have the 
power to do" (Farrell 2002, 52; emphasis added). The realist explanatory range, especially, is not 
sufficient in understanding and precludes an appreciation of the nuances of these states' foreign 
policy. Not so for ideational explanations. 
The subsequent description of the RLN seeks to reinforce the theoretical case set out 
above and showcase under what conditions Caribbean States' norm-driven persuasion strategies 
can be successful. 
4.3 The 'Region Leveraging Nexus' (RLN) 
With a better appreciation now of the social identities of states at' play in the Caribbean region 
and the ideational and normative perspectives that can be brought to bear in their study, I want to 
concretize how Caribbean (inter)regionalism can be conceptualized. To this end, I outline the 
RLN model qua conceptual tool, below. 
As indicated earlier, I have a very specific understanding of Caribbean-pivoted 
interregionalism. It relates to the Region's negotiation of the EPA. As I also indicated, the CRNM 
has loomed large at least regarding the negotiation dimension. For its part, the intra-regional 
narrative is taken up with regional integration, relating to the CSME. In this regard, CARICOM 
states loom large, particularly so in such institutional set ups as the CDF. These two institutional 
cases make for important heuristic examples of the practical relevance of my approach to 
Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism. 
Let us consider the Wendtian-styled state typology again, in the present context. For ease 
of reference, I will refer to psychological persons as PP; moral persons as MP; legal persons as 
LP. 
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In interregionalism, PP would loom large, juxtaposed against what is hoped are MP 
negotiating partners. There is a propensity for personas to be changed up in the regional 
integration context, however; because dissonance-based narratives take hold intra-regionally, as 
Member States jockey for differential treatment amongst themselves. What obtains in this 
scenario is PP, MP and LP. 
Thus, the RLN model qua conceptual tool-at the heart of what I call strategic 
inventiveness, which holds out the promise for agency with respect to these 'Lilliputian' states-
can be developed, which takes account of two distinct regional identity-centric narratives: 
I. Interregionally-in the context of world politics-where efforts are made to give 
impetus to regional coherence and cohesion (the narrative, in this regard, built on 
commonality-i.e. policy-based convergence), and by extension primarily 
intergovernmental-bolstered attempts at pan-regional, (though) state-derived 
'identity socialization'. Informing this approach 1s the Region's 
negotiation/implementation of international trade agreements, as a single entity. 
Thus, they must not only establish a common position in engaging a third party, 
but must "sing from the same hymn sheet". 196 The norm entrepreneurs in this 
context are overwhelmingly intergovernmental institutions; and, 
II. Intra-regionally-in the context of the regional configuration-where propelling 
regional integration features prominently, as do primarily state-bolstered attempts 
(typically constitutive of divergent, sometimes conflicting, sub-regional/state 
agendas) geared at ensuring tailored accommodation in terms of intraregional 
treatment, based on distinctive features of size and levels of development of states 
that set respective state problematiques apart from each other. A narrative of 
difference (i.e. policy-based dissonance), the advocacy and diffusion of which is 
largely the province of states, informs a push for accommodation, which tangibly 
is played out regarding how much of the 'integration adjustment pie' is divvied up 
to Member States. The norm entrepreneurs in this context are overwhelmingly 
state institutions. 
196 Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009. 
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The following three hypotheses are developed for this model/conceptual tool, at large: 
A. Most of the time, these small states will generally be able to extract the 
most gains for and norms regarding their special treatment during periods 
that are seen as marked by great challenge for them, with deep structural 
implications for their political economies. 
B. The 'argumentative talk' approach is likely most effective during times 
alluded to in the above point. The persuadee will probably be more 
empathetic to their cause, buying into or internalizing, as it were, 
associated norms. Moreover, against this backdrop, Caribbean States' case 
will tend to appear more credible. Ulbert and Risse make the point that, 
"as far as the persuasiveness of .... reasoning is concerned", credibility plays 
a "crucial role" (2005, 359). 
C. Finally, if these states 'stay on message', in terms of how they frame 
norms, once they have secured one norm-thus establishing a precedent-
other related norms should be easier to secure. As Ulbert and Risse note, 
actors "speak[ing] and act[ing] consistently" is deemed as a gauge for 
credibility (Ibid., 360). As constructivists underscore, "arguments have to 
'resonate' with prior knowledge, agreed-upon principles and norms, or 
commonly held worldviews in order to become persuasive" (Ibid., 361; 
emphasis added). 
The RLN is illustrated below. It incorporates the hypotheses set out above. 
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Region Leveraging Nexus 
(Macro-level Rendering) 
Caribbean regionalist engagement continuum 
Source: Author & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policy makers. 
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On the face of it, the actors and processes that inform interregionalism and intra-regionalism appear 
to work against and are at odds with one other. However, this is an overly simplistic reading of the 
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relationship, which exaggerates the dialectic at play. Upon closer inspection, these roles also suggest 
that external trade negotiations provide a framework against and conditions under which the ideas and 
practices encompassing regional integration can be reproduced, politicized and legitimized. Regional 
integration, for its part, also buttresses trade negotiation undertakings with third parties. Thus, there 
is a nexus between the inter- or intra-regional narrative. Ultimately, the actors and processes do 
leverage the Region differently (the degree to which this is done is given expression through leveraging 
quotients), such that distinct normative foundations can be propped up and states, too, can be 
constituted differently in identity-centric narratives; a la the inter- or intra-regional nature of the 
negotiating undertaking. 
The relationship between plying regionness and the leveraging quotient(s) that stem thereto 
and the respective norm which results and is subscribed to is illustrated below. 
Regionness-Leveraging QuotientCsl-Norm Nexus 
(RLN Meso-level Rendering) 
Source: Author & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policy makers. 
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Norm Process Inputs (NPI) are the interrelated actions pursued by the region in question in pursuit 
of the norm(s). Norm Process Assets (NPA) is the process value generated as a result of NPI, which is 
in turn utilized to provide guidelines and criteria for Norm Process Agenda Setting (NPAS), which 
literally forms the basis for the norm(s). NPI, NPA and NPAS correlate with the leveraging quotient, 
but ultimately are integrative in the service of the norm(s). NPI, NPA and NPAS each ebb and flow 
as the norm(s) evolve(s). What is more, NPI, NPA and NPAS interact at various points on a 
continuum-what can be called a stream-in norm evolution. The end product is the norm. The 
integrative nature of the NPI, NPA and NPAS is illustrated below. 
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Source: Author & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policy makers. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to develop a framework for conceiving of Caribbean (inter)regionalism, 
using constructivism, SIT, post-structuralism and Habermas' normative social theory. Its 
theoretical agenda has been to draw insights from all four perspectives, which together form the 
theoretical basis for what I call the RLN model; from which can be gleaned incisive insights into 
the international affairs tack of this Region. Of note, by way of the RLN, this chapter proposes 
that how some of the smallest states in the world conduct their regional/international affairs is 
best understood from the vantage point of them assertively attempting to gain a foothold over 
their destiny, than by established explanations that would have us believe that they are ineffective 
and incapable of steering their own course in today's international system. 
Moreover, power can be derived from the 'better' (convincing) argument. As Risse 
contends in reference to 'arguing', "actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any 
causal and normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their 
understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their 
action" (2000, 7). Little, if any, attention is paid to this sort of emancipatory narrative in 
established scholarship. 
In summary this chapter has taken the dominant IR perspective to task, in respect of its 
pathologies and by extension how it severely circumscribes and frames the 'limits of possible' for 
states like those of the Caribbean in world politics. A complementary framework to such states 
laying claim to more agency than they are often given credit is the RLN, which can theoretically 
hold up the praxis of persuasion and norm formation as discussed in the foregoing. The RLN 
showcases under what conditions Caribbean States' norm-driven persuasion strategies can be 
successful. 
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The crux of what should be understood in terms of the operation of the RLN-. drawing 
on insights from Risse's (2000) application of Habermasian communicative action to the concept 
of 'arguing'-is this: the realist notion of the power of the state(s) involved in negotiations is a 
secondary consideration, in respect of the negotiated outcome or agreement. There need not be a 
correlation-as conventional theory would have us believe-between the outcome of interstate 
negotiations and so-called 'powerful' (invariably large) actors, such that the latter's size and self 
interest would be the determining or overriding factors in the negotiated result being in that 
state's favour over a much smaller state. The notion of diminutive small states, with all the 
negative connotations that go along with them, thus does not hold. 
Instead, what looms large is the best argument. Such an 'argument' has the potential to lay 
the ground for third .party negotiators of big states-who ultimately are seized of securing the 
best collective outcome/reasoned consensus-to revise their beliefs and existing preferences in 
. 'real time'; in other words at the negotiating table. As such, what matters is the ability of small 
states to strategically and pragmatically persuade other parties to change their 
thinking/negotiating positions reflexively, and that this is at all possible suggests that predictive 
notions of static, rational state behavior attuned to rational utility maximizing/bargaining actors 
are overly simplistic. Instructively, small state actors can play a role geared at the generation of 
norms, especially those that emerge in response to 'identities' of the norm-maker and social 
learning informed by the 'logic of appropriateness'. The empirical cases set out in the following 
chapter explore these themes in considerable detail. 
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PART III 
ELITE TECHNOCRACY, CARIBBEAN INTER/INTRA-REGIONALISM: 
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, IDEATION AL STRUCTURES, 
PROCESSES AND NORMS 
Chapter V 
Elite Technocracy: 
Interregionalism, Intra-regionalism and the Role of Caribbean Regional Institutions 
and Caribbean States in Identity/Norm Agenda-Setting & Cooperation 
5.1 Introduction 
Are there socialization processes amongst Caribbean States that frame the Region's collective 
interregionalist and intra-regionalist engagements, respectively? The present chapter draws on 
two empirical cases-(i) the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements, namely the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA; and (ii) the operationalization of the CDF-to argue in the affirmative. 
The empirical evidence reveals that there is an important precursor step to the internalization and 
projection of norms with respect to Caribbean interregionalism and intra-regionalism. On the 
face of it while this is a novel finding deserving of attention the chapter proceeds to explore why 
this matters and instances of norm formulation a la special and differential treatment (S&DT) in 
the EPA and the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, all the while showcasing the role of 'elite 
technocrats' therein. In the process, the central proposition of the present study is substantiated in 
respect of regionness and the Caribbean: i.e. the Caribbean was able to Punch Above its Weight 
in negotiations with a significantly larger actor in the EU by making considerable tangible end-
result gains on the shoulders of an ideational narrative about itself, which like-minded elites did a 
masterful job of controlling. 
The exercise and interplay of inter- and intra-regionalism have long been central to 
diplomacy by and within the Caribbean, respectively. While the institutional environments that 
animate them have been studied (Grant 2000; Byron 2005), to some extent, albeit in instrumental 
terms their social and normative contexts have been a 'blind spot'. Similarly, while the 
negotiation and implementation of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the operationalization of the 
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CDF, respectively, have elicited some research, the persuasion-centered process against which 
negotiations unfolded and implementation unfolds today in both regards has not been on the 
scholarly radar. 
The implications of this intellectual neglect are stark, in so far as insights that otherwise 
are ripe for the picking (indeed are 'low hanging fruit') are not gleaned. On balance, the research 
agenda along these lines is for the Caribbean relatively untapped and in need of much more 
systematic and comparative analysis. It falls behind research in this vein that targets other 
regions, principally Europe. Ideational scholarship, in this regard, has long been robust and 
continues to grow because of its insights. Such insights are no less important with respect to the 
Caribbean. 
In the sections that follow, I examine the exercise and interplay of identity and 
agent/institution on the Caribbean regional plane, with a view to advancing an understanding of 
the impact of the praxis of region leveraging on diplomatic outcomes, as it relates to securing 
norms. Importantly and drawing on the RLN, I explain why this matters and showcase the role of 
elite technocrats therein. 
This chapter is organized into and proceeds along three substantive sections, and is 
brought to a close by some concluding reflections. Firstly, the elite technocracy-which I am 
especially interested in showcasing as socializing agents, with respect to oppositional self/other-
centric discourse motifs and norm generation-is introduced. Secondly, the EPA is reviewed 
(with attention paid to the link with the EU's protective Banana and Sugar regimes), as is the 
institution-i.e. the CRNM197-which led the charge during the negotiations (with brief 
consideration of the architecture that undergirds EPA implementation), and a sociological 
197 Now referred to as the OTN of the CARICOM Secretariat. 
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analysis of the institutional environments that shore up the core policy negotiating/making end of 
the Caribbean Regional Platform viz-a-viz interregionalism is provided. Un/recovering the 
dynamics of the generation, internationalization and projection of a 'regional narrative' occupies 
significant attention, with particular attention being afforded to instances of norm formulation 
with respect to S&DT in the EPA. The constituent parts of this second section culminate in two 
sub-sections that turn attention to the praxis of the RLN, with respect to Caribbean 
interregionalism, as well the norms generated as a result of Caribbean interregionalism, 
respectively. The intention here is to draw out how the Region sought to 'level the playing field'. 
Fallowing from this, attention is turned in section three to socialization processes and 
Caribbean intra-regionalism, with a view to highlighting how elite technocrats are implicated in 
this regard through the operationalization of the CDF. The interregional dynamics of the 
generation, internationalization and projection of a 'regional narrative' are revisited and tweaked 
to suit the intra-regional institutional environment under consideration (where the extreme 
reluctance of elite technocrats to bend to and make the case for a 'regional narrative' is 
highlighted), which is also subjected to an analysis regarding norm formulation and S&DT this 
time with respect to the Revised Treaty. The section culminates in an analysis of the praxis of the 
RLN regarding Caribbean intra-regionalism, as well as a look at the norms generated as a result 
of Caribbean intra-regionalism, respectively. A capstone section follows, serving to instantiate 
the kernel of the chapter's argument and demonstrate causal relationships. The chapter ends with 
a concluding section, which serves to highlight key findings. 
5.2 Anthropomorphising the Caribbean Regional Order: Towards an 
(Auto )biographical Narrative 
Drawing on constructivist and SIT insights, consider that like people, through regular interaction 
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with one another, states weave a story about themselves and what can be expected regarding 
their behaviour. According to Legro, "states adopt labels and positions" (2009, 38; emphasis 
added). 
These interactions secure relationships, guided by certain negotiated but agreed social 
identity-centric norms. The states of the Caribbean are no different, in this regard. They have 
what I call an identity repertoire, and on this basis are anthropomorphised to achieve certain 
ends. 
An elite technocracy-what can be thought of as epistemic communities198 or norm 
entrepreneurs199-make up the core policy negotiating/making end of the 'Caribbean Regional 
Platform', and are nested or embedded, ostensibly, in intergovernmental and state-related 
institutions as bureaucratic actors.200 
This technocracy comprises a mix of top-tier policy makers and high-level technical 
experts/officials who are inserted into interregionalist and intra-regionalist engagements across 
the full spectrum of processes: negotiations/implementation to leading the charge in steering 
policy and related decision-making. In respect of the latter, their exercise of communicative 
198 Peter Haas notes epistemic communities are "networks of knowledge-based experts" (1992, 2). I share the view 
of Haas that it need not apply strictly to scientific communities; rather epistemic communities as characterizing 
professionals with shared beliefs of particular knowledge and a "recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" suffices (ibid, 3). 
Instructively, referencing the 1992 special issue of International Organization, entitled 'Knowledge, Power, and 
International Policy Coordination', Adler and Haas (1992) assert that this set of articles - which represent the so-
called epistemic communities approach - responds to Keohane's 1988 call for a 'reflective' research program. 
Although Haas popularized epistemic communities, Ruggie ( 1975) was the first of such scholars to engage with the 
concept. Of note, studies of Caribbean epistemic communities are rare. Notably in a 2002 article, Clegg highlighted 
policy communities with respect to Jamaican, Windward Island and Belizean banana exports, particularly to the UK. 
He described this network as a historically "tightly knit relationship between the main actors involved in exporting 
Caribbean bananas to the UK, including the bananas producers, the private corporate interests, and the relevant UK 
government departments .... The close relationship developed into a 'policy community'" (2002, 65). 
199 I borrow this term from lngebritsen (2002). 
200 March and Olsen understand institutions, as do I, to be "relatively stable collection[s] of practices and rules 
defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are 
embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and 
the practices and rules associated with them" ( 1998, 948). 
175 
practice vis-a-vis identity and interest-driven normative regimes is of particular interest. 
I consider in this chapter four discrete-albeit networked-categories of elite technocrats, 
each of which is subject to a hierarchy all their own in respect of their influence over 
bureaucratic action-based policy outcomes and their embeddedness in attendant pluralistic 
processes (e.g. bargaining): 
(i) Principal Bureaucratic Actors (PBA), i.e., Heads of Government, 
Foreign and Trade Ministers, amongst others in the political directorate. 
This category would. also comprise some PB As who are no longer in 
office, but very influential; 
(ii) Technical Bureaucratic Actors (TBA), i.e., Foreign Affairs and Trade 
functionaries at the highest levels (and mid-level Officials) of regional 
institutions (namely regional Secretariats), including at the level of 
states. This category would also comprise some former staffers, who are 
called on to provide advice to Officials; 
Oii) Quasi Bureaucratic Actors (QBA), i.e., representatives of key Business 
Support Organizations (BS Os) and enterprises; and 
(iv) Ancillary Bureaucratic Actors (ABA), i.e., key social partners, like 
labour unions, employers federations and some other segments of civil 
society. 
This bureaucratic actor-based scenario as it pertains to the core policy negotiating/making end of 
what I term the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' (comprised of a constellation of actors involved in 
interregional and/or intra-regional policy engagements) is illustrated in the grid below. In the 
sub-section that follows these bureaucratic actors are juxtaposed in Caribbean interregionalism, a 
la the negotiation of the EPA. 
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The 'Caribbean Regional Platform': 
Influence and Embeddedness of the Elite Technocracy 
High 
Low 
Low High 
Embeddedness 
Source: Author & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policymakers. 
5.3 Socialization Processes: Elite Technocrats and Caribbean Interregionalism 
5.3.1 The CAR/FOR UM-EU EPA: A Review, with attention to the EU's Protective Banana 
and Sugar Regimes 
The EPA, in general, has come to rest on a quadrangle of immutable first principles: partnership, 
regional integration, development, and link to the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was 
signed in October 2008201 by the EU and its Member States202 and fourteen CARIFORUM 
201 EPA negotiations between CARIFORUM and the then European Communities (EC) were launched in Kingston, 
Jamaica on 16th April, 2004. At the time, both sides agreed on a four-stage plan and schedule that would unfold over 
some three years (the Agreement was initialed by all fifteen CARIFORUM States on 16th December 2007). 
202 As at the time of writing, the EU members of the EPA are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
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States.203 The fifteenth CARIFORUM State, Haiti, signed the EPA in December 2009. The EU 
and its Member States and fourteen CARIFORUM States (the exception being Haiti) have been 
provisionally applying the EPA from 29 December 2008. At the time of writing, seven 
CARIFORUM States have ratified the Agreement, i.e.: the Dominican Republic - 29 October 
2008; Antigua and Barbuda - 19 December 2008; Dominica - 30 October 2009; Belize - 31 May 
2011; Guyana - 14 June 2012; Saint Lucia - 25 September 2012; and St Vincent and the 
Grenadines - 22 November 2012. Twelve EU States have ratified the Agreement, to date. 
The EPA is a reciprocal trade agreement between CARIFORUM States and the EU. It 
replaces the trade component of the CPA that was based on non-reciprocity.204 Instructively, the 
EPA places new responsibilities on the CARIFORUM States to undertake. rr,iarket opening and 
rules-related commitments.205 These commitments are wide-ranging, covering inter alia: trade in 
goods, trade in services and investments, as well as in trade-related subjects such as intellectual 
property, competition and government procurement. However, the EPA also commits 
development support for CARIFORUM States to meet national and regional integration 
obligations and adjustments that the EPA requires. 
The EPA ranks as a landmark trade and development Agreement, both in novelty and 
scope; "it constitutes the state of the art as a trade agreement with a development orientation."206 
On the one hand as a trading instrument with development components, upon signing it became 
203 The CARIFORUM members of the EPA are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
204 Articles 36 and 37 of Chapter 2 of 'Cotonou' refer to the negotiation ofEPAs. 
205 Caribbean trade official: Interview by author, 29th February, 2011. 
206 Mr Remco Yahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, 
European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
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the first such agreement of its kind. 207 It is a trade partnership (geared at liberalizing and 
enhancing trade between the two sides) that is intended to give a fillip to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction in CARIFORUM states, whilst promoting regional 
integration and the gradual integration of those states into the world economy. 208 On the other 
hand, the EPA spans a broad set of themes. It is divided into six parts and contains annexes and 
protocols. Part I is titled 'Trade Partnership for Sustainable Development', whilst Part II focuses 
on 'Trade and Trade-related Matters' (namely Trade in Goods, Investment, Trade in Services and 
Trade-related Issues or TRI (i.e. Competition, Innovation and Intellectual Property, Public 
Procurement, Environment, Social Aspects, and Personal Data Protection)). The other parts are 
as follows: Part III-Dispute Avoidance and Settlement; Part IV-General Exceptions; Part V-
Institutional Provisions; Part VI-General and Final Provisions. There are seven Annexes 
(including Appendix I to Annex III - Schedule of Tariff Liberalisation of CARIFORUM States). 
Three Protocols and a Final Act also make up the Agreement. 
The Agreement heralds the dawn of a new era of relations between CARIFORUM and 
the EU.209 Consider-as previously indicated-that one significant difference between the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the trade relationship between the EEC and the ACP is the 
introduction of the reciprocal grant of preferences by the two sides, instead of the non-reciprocal 
preferential (duty free) market access in favour of ACP States, which provided terms more 
207 The CARIFORUM-EU EPA is the first such Agreement to be concluded between the EU and one of six ACP 
regional negotiating configurations. In a related move, the EU has recently completed Association Agreements in 
respect of groupings of Latin American countries. 
208 Ambassador Irwin LaRocque, Assistant Secretary-General Trade and Economic Integration Directorate (presently 
Secretary-General), CARICOM Secretariat: Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 15th March, 2011. 
209 The themes covered in this and the following paragraph draw extensively from an Interview by the author of Mr 
Branford Isaacs, Adviser to the Secretary-General in the Implementation of the EPA at the CARI COM Secretariat. 
He also serves as Head of the EPA Implementation Unit and Trade in Goods Specialist in said Unit: Georgetown, 
Guyana, 16th September, 2011. Mr Isaacs was also the lead negotiator on Market Access, during EPA negotiations. 
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favourable than those extended to the goods of other countries.210 In other words, under the tem1s 
of the Trade in Goods provisions of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP Group 
of States, WTO-compatible EPAs were to be negotiated between the EU and ACP States to 
replace the trade arrangements set down in the Cotonou Agreement. 211 
A case in point, the provisions of the EPA dealing with Trade m Goods represent 
fundamental changes in the relationship between the CARIFORUM States and the EU and its 
Member States. While ACP States (including CARIFORUM States), from the establishment of 
the Lome I Convention in 1975, enjoyed duty free/quota free (DF/QF) access for the large 
majority of their exports to EU Member States without the obligation to grant tariff preferences 
to imports from EU Member States, the commitment in the Cotonou Agreement to establish 
WTO-compatible Free Trade Agreements required the setting up of a free trade area between 
CARIFORUM and the EU. This free trade area called for tariff liberalization by both the EU and 
CARIFORUM on substantially all trade in a reasonable period of time. To this end while the EU 
agreed to maintain its DF !QF access in favour of CARIFORUM States, CARIFORUM States 
agreed to apply a package of measures. 
The CARIFORUM-EU EPA, therefore, lays bare a fundamental break with the past, for 
the two sides (Arthur 2009 & 2010). In fact, the European Commission Green Paper published 
in 1996 that examined/assessed "relations between the European Union and the ACP countries 
on the eve of the twenty-first century .... [ came to the determination that]. ... the status quo would 
not do, change was needed" (Vahl 2011, 2-3). Indeed, the EPA cannot be considered in isolation 
210 Another difference in formalized trading relations today between Europe and the Caribbean is the new areas that 
make up the EPA, which hitherto were not considered. Trade in Services is certainly relevant in this regard, but so 
too are the areas falling under the TRI component of the Agreement. 
211 As Lodge (2008, 6) puts it, the EPA "is a GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Article XXIV-
consistent Free Trade Agreement and thereby represents a radical departure from the Lome/Cotonou paradigm of 
non-reciprocal market access." 
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from certain processes that provided important impetus for the negotiation of the Agreement in 
the first place. Of note, in this regard, are the so-called 'Banana Wars', an account of which is 
provided below.212 
The EU is amongst the world's largest importer of bananas. Until recently, banana 
exporting ACP states enjoyed a decades-old relationship in respect of the EU market for bananas, 
one where they supplied that market while enjoying market protection. Essentially, preferential 
treatment was extended to banana exporting ACP states over the so-called 'dollar' banana 
exporting' countries ostensibly of Central and South America. 
The 'Banana Wars'213 , as they came to be known, resulted from a challenge in the 1990s 
of the EU banana regime in the WTO by Central and South America countries with an 
established interest in the supply of bananas to the EU market. Although a drawn out battle 
ensued that pitted the 'dollar' banana countries, backed by the United States, against the EU, 
backed by the ACP, the EU would eventually lose the challenge in the WTO on more than one 
occasion in the years that followed. 
The fact is ACP states' access to the EU market, more specifically the value of these 
countries' access to the EU market, depended on the protective regime that EU had in place. The 
latter was based on a combination of quotas an~ high tariffs, which were at the center of the 
dispute. As a result of WTO rulings the regime would be modified at least once, from the 2000s 
onwards, which made ACP access to the EU market less certain. 
The regime the EU had in place had quotas for basically each of the banana exporting 
212 The themes covered in the balance of this sub-section draw extensively from an Interview by the author of Mr 
Nigel Durrant, Agricultural Trade Specialist, Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN) of the CARICOM Secretariat: 
Georgetown, Guyana, 2nd March, 2012. 
213 The 'Banana Wars', widely recognized as one of the longest international trade disputes, officially ended in 
November 2012 following an agreement reached between the EU and eleven Latin American countries at the WTO. 
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ACP states, in addition to the restrictive quotas that the EU had in place for the 'dollar banana' 
countries. The EU eventually put in place a single quota for banana exporting ACP states and 
limited the total amount that those countries could export to the EU, further to WTO rulings. This 
was an attempt by the EU to try and comply with those rulings. But this action did not go far 
enough for the 'dollar' banana country challengers, in the main because the EU still had very high 
tariffs on Central and South American bananas or what was also referred to as 'out of quota 
bananas'. In point of fact, the EU would allow a certain quantity of bananas from Central and 
South American countries, and anything over that threshold would be charged a prohibitive tariff. 
For Central and South American countries, the objective was to get the EU to sharply reduce the 
tariff. 
From the ACP's vantage point, as the 'Banana Wars' were being waged these countries 
were also mindful of the imminent expiration of the trade aspect of the CPA set for 2007. In other 
words, the 'Banana Wars' were not unfolding in isolation from 'other moving parts' in the 
machinery of the relationship between the ACP and the EU. The crux of the concern with respect 
to the expiration of the trade aspect of the CPA was that if the ACP did not have a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) in place with the EU by 2007, ACP bananas would no longer have duty free 
access to the EU market in any quantity at all. What is more, the EU would as a consequence of a 
pivotal WTO ruling against it set the overall quantity for ACP banana supplying states at 
approximately 776,000 tonnes. 
As a result, the EPA became necessary as a vehicle to ensure non-least developed ACP 
banana supplying states continued preferential access to the EU market (this is because least 
developed countries would be able to get full duty free and quota free access to the EU for their 
bananas regardless, in light of the EU's 'Everything but Arms' initiative). If the EPA was not 
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negotiated and signed by such ACP regions as CARIFORUM, the implication would be that 
bananas from these high cost-producing countries would be charged the same duties as the 'dollar 
bananas'; which would have put banana producers from such ACP countries out of business. In 
CARIFORUM, the banana exporting states are: Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname. 
As it turns out, the EPA would be negotiated and eventually signed by CARIFORUM. 
The initialing of the Agreement coincided with the deadline for expiration of the trade 
component of the CPA, i.e. 2007. By virtue of having 'inked the EPA', duty free and quota free 
access for CARIFORUM banana exporting states was secured in respect of the EU market. 
However, with respect to the saga of the 'Banana Wars', as a final settlement with 'dollar' banana 
countries the EU agreed in 2009 to a very steep reduction of the tariff from 176 EUR per tonne to 
114 EUR over seven years. With this agreement in place, the longstanding legal disputes at the 
WTO over bananas were ended; but the cut in the EU's banana tariff for Latin American 
countries-its so-called Most Favoured Nation or MFN tariff-would result in a marked fall in 
the preferential margin which ACP countries enjoy (European Commission 2010). Due to the 
tariff cut action and the difficulties that it was widely seen ACP banana exporting states like 
those in CARIFORUM would face as a result, the EU put in place Banana Accompanying 
Measures (BAM). The ACP banana exporting states to benefit from the BAM were "pre-
identified" by the European Commission, "on the basis of their volume of exports to the EU"; 
i.e. "[t]en countries [which] exported more than 10,000 tonnes on average over the past decade" 
(Ibid.' 5). 
The BAM, which has a total allocation of 190 million EUR for the ten countries over four 
years, got underway from early 2011 (Ibid., 5). The BAM essentially comprises funding to 
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support those ACP states concerned to transition out of the banana industry through 
diversification, in light of competitiveness pressures stemming from the new banana tariff 
environment. Alternatively, the funds can be used by those countries that see fit to keep their 
banana industry going and, as a result, require the funding to facilitate this. 
The Caribbean's elite technocrats were aware of the significant role of the 'Banana Wars' 
in providing impetus for the EPA's negotiation and, importantly, the negotiation's timeline for 
completion. On both counts, given the importance of bananas to the economic and social fabric 
of the CARIFORUM States concerned, the Region's elite technocrats had reason to press the 
case for the on-time launch of the EPA's and the efficacious conduct of negotiations 'with a clear 
finish line in sight'. 
However, bananas are not the only commodity to have had a bearing on EPA 
negotiations. Sugar is the other, though it was pivoted very differently in those negotiations. 
Sugar, like bananas, has had a storied role in EU-ACP relations. The relationship in the 
specific context of sugar was managed by the Sugar Protocol, an arrangement where each year 
the EU contracted a fixed quota of sugar from the Protocol signatory states of the ACP, and those 
amounts were allowed in to the EU market duty free. The EU, however, as part of the process of 
reforming its sugar regime took the decision in recent years to scrap the Sugar Protocol. That 
decision came during EPA negotiations, about a year before the CARIFORUM and the EU were 
to actually conclude their EPA. 
The Sugar Protocol itself was based on contractual arrangements, wherein a competitive 
system prevailed. There were fixed rules, in that if a given ACP sugar supplying state was unable 
to supply the set amount it risked losing its quota through reallocation of the amount that was not 
supplied to another ACP sugar supplying state. That system did not always work to the advantage 
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of CARIFORUM sugar supplying states', which for years had been on the losing end in terms of 
ability to meet quotas. Instructively, when the Sugar Protocol was jettisoned sugar industry 
insiders in the Region lamented this development. However, the view of sugar supplying 
CARIFORUM States was far from uniforrp on the Protocol's demise, as some went on record as 
saying they could no longer support a system in which their ability to supply the EU market was 
being eroded year after year because of some states' inability to meet their quota. Some states 
advocated for a free and open system for supplying sugar (i.e. no more restrictions on how much 
sugar could be exported to the EU from a given state, and by the same token there would not be 
a pricing guarantee linked to how much can be supplied), as opposed to a managed one. 
In terms of the difference in how the Sugar Protocol was pivoted during the EPA 
negotiations, consider that its removal did not represent an existential threat for those 
CARIFORUM States concerned, in large measure because sugar supplying states in the 
configuration214-Barbados, Belize, Guyana and Jamaica-were divided on the relevance of the 
Protocol to them, notwithstanding public statements to contrary. Secondly, the EU's move to 
terminate the Sugar Protocol came as EPA negotiations were already underway, and it would be 
written into the EPA that the Protocol would expire in 2010. The EU put in place-as an interim 
measure, with respect to the transition from the end of the sugar protocol-a market management 
mechanism which is meant to prevent a precipitous fall in prices. 
The change to the EU-ACP relationship highlighted above is especially striking when 
viewed against the background of the historical relationship between Europe and what came to 
be known as the ACP. It must be borne in mind that, "as a result of the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, some ACP states benefitted from structured cooperation with Europe. Two 
214 The Dominican Republic, which did not previously have access to the Sugar Protocol, is exporting sugar to the 
EU now. 
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Yaounde Conventions (1963-1974), centered on trade and development cooperation, grew from 
that early relationship. There was an evolution once again in the relationship between the two 
sides not too long thereafter. The Lome Conventions (1975-1999) are a case in point. The 
successively renegotiated Lome Conventions had long been the centerpiece of Caribbean and EU 
relations".215 Dating back to the 1970s, the Lome Conventions were ultimately replaced by the 
CPA, which was signed in 2000 and which hinges on trade, development and political pillars. 
The CPA exemplifies an evolution in the cooperation framework anchoring ACP-EU relations. 
Based on three broad areas of partnership (i.e. Development Cooperation, Trade,. and Political 
Dialogue), the CPA comprises a number of new elements in the re-tooled ACP-EU relationship. 
Simply put, "while being separate instruments, the EPA and CPA need to be read alongside each 
other. In other words, the EPA should be contextualized in the CPA".216 
Though presently being implemented by another entity, the negotiation of the EPA was 
led on behalf of the CARIFORUM region by an institution that has a storied history, the then 
CRNM. The following sub-section delves into this important institution. 
5.3.2 The CRNM: A Bureaucratic Actor-Leader in Caribbean Trade Diplomacy 
By the 1980s, an intensified form of globalization had taken hold of the world economy, a 
development not lost on Caribbean leaders. Whilst Caribbean States have had a longstanding 
relationship with the world economy, their experience with what became an increasingly 
prominent dimension of the emergent form of globalization-trade negotiations/agreements-
was quite limited. In its bid to adjust to and thus better mediate its insertion into the global 
215 Dr Anthony Peter Gonzales, Interim Director, IIR-UWI and former Senior Coordinator-WTO at the CRNM: 
Interview by author, Barbados, 22nd September, 2011. 
216 Mr Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission: Interview by author, 
Brussels, 22nd January, 20 I 0. 
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trading system so as to capitalize on development opportunities in the changing world order, the 
Region had to build its capacity 'from the ground up' to better engage in and manage external 
trade negotiations. 
As they were taking shape, Caribbean policy makers were mindful that the trade 
negotiations were unprecedented both in scope and complexity, hence likely to test the Region's 
negotiation capacity as never before. In the face of severe capacity constraints, the Region sought 
to advance a coordinated approach to the use of human and financial resources, which required 
the establishment of an organization dedicated to managing the negotiation process at the behest 
of Regional Governments. It is against this backdrop that the CRNM was born.217 
The Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM established the CRNM in 
1997,218 having already organized themselves to grapple in a more systematized fashion-
notably via the Prime Ministerial Sub-Committee (PMSC) on External Negotiations219-with 
pressures visited on the Region by a more frenetic agenda of trade negotiations. The CRNM220 
was billed as the principal regional intergovernmental organization tasked with managing the 
Region's external trade negotiations (regional states negotiate as one, though there are provisions 
217 The deployment of a 'team approach' that foregrounded coordination in external negotiations in the context of the 
CRNM was not the first time this approach had been used by the Region. Albeit more formalized in the context of 
the CRNM, the 'team approach' had been attempted in developing positions for negotiations with respect to the 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992, for example (Grant 2000). The 
experience of pooling regional expertise at such fora provided valuable lessons for the Region and in general was 
instructive, as policy makers began to conceive of the CRNM. Grant goes further, to suggest that the CRNM 
structure embraced some elements of supranationalism that have so alluded the Region, and otherwise been met with 
resistance, in the advance of regional integration. 
218 While the independent CARICOM Member States were in the forefront of efforts to establish the CRNM and 
comprise its membership, Cuba and the Dominican Republic were also invited to join. They formed part of the 
CRNM's membership, but the CRNM only represented their trade interests in certain negotiating theatres. 
219 This platform is an offshoot of an Interlocutory Group formed in the early 1990s, which was overseen by the 
Prime Minister of Jamaica; an operating dispensation which continues today with respect to the PMSC ori External 
Negotiations. A Working Group of Experts, its ranks of Officials drawn from member governments, played an 
integral role in backstopping the high-level process of advancing both a strategy and organizational basis for the 
Region's external trade negotiations (Grant 2000). 
220 The CRNM was headquartered in Jamaica, as its Prime Minister holds Prime Ministerial responsibility within 
CARICOM for External Negotiations. A CRNM sub-office was established in Barbados, whilst a presence was 
maintained in some other states. 
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for individual states to negotiate partial scope agreements with third countries). It was assigned 
the primary responsibility for developing and coordinating a cohesive, coherent regional trade 
policy, and by extension managing the Region's external trade negotiations-related resources and 
expertise.221 
As a testament to the stock placed by regional leaders in the Caribbean's trade 
negotiations undertaking under the aegis of the CRNM, they selected a prominent Caribbean 
statesman to be its founding leader, Sir Shridath Ramphal. Most notably he had served as 
Secretary General of the Commonwealth from 1975 to 1990. Another celebrated Caribbean 
statesman served as his deputy, Sir Alister Mcintyre. He served as Chief Technical Advisor. 
Amongst his career highlights previous to this appointment were as Secretary General of 
CARICOM and Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD. An eminent Jamaican diplomat, 
Ambassador Richard Bernal, would later replace Sir Alister and in December 2001 assume the 
top post of Director-General until his departure in June 2008. 
The CRNM's mandate has centered on the following: "[p ]roviding sound advice; 
[f]acilitating the generation of national positions; [ c ]oordinating the formulation of a cohesive 
negotiating strategy; leading negotiations where possible."222 The CRNM engaged in 
negotiations spanning the following theatres: multilateral (WTO); plurilateral (EPA); 
hemispheric (the now defunct Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)); and bilateral (i.e. "the 
negotiation of agreements between CARI COM and [third] countries like Canada, Costa Rica and 
the Dominican Republic").223 It was very stream-lined, with a staffing complement of 
technocrats that numbered, at its peak, just over a dozen; though it drew on expertise on an as-
221 Caribbean trade official: Interview by author, 12th July, 2010. 
222 Extract from http://cmm.org (About OTN_ General Information). 
223 Ibid. 
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needs basis from throughout the Region, by way of a pool of experts from states and regional 
organizations. 
The CRNM became a world renowned brand. It has been recognized as having within its 
ranks a cadre of top-notch, dedicated, highly trained, experienced and hard working 
professionals whose subject-area expertise (e.g. Intellectual Property, Trade in Services, 
Government Procurement and Competition Policy, and Agricultural Trade) had been sought after 
within and outside of the Region. Senior regional technocrats have underscored that the 
"impressive level of resources" invested in the CRNM over the years, both in respect of 
personnel and financially, by the Region (directly, or indirectly via donor agencies) was 
"indicative of the importance that its political directorate placed in retaining and exercising 
superior, world-class negotiating power".224 
Indeed the CRNM, and by extension the Region, had built up negotiating prowess, which 
was on display during EPA negotiations, which on the European side was led by the European 
Commission (principally, the Directorate General Trade with backstopping from other 
directorates, like the one responsible for development). This was the case principally because of 
the negotiating structure that CARIFORUM Ministers had agreed to for the grouping ahead of 
the launch of CARIFORUM-EU EPA negotiations in Kingston, Jamaica in April 2004,225 
following an all-ACP phase. A three tiered negotiating structure took shape as follows: 
Ministerial, Principal Negotiator and subject-specific technical experts. At the Ministerial level, 
CARIFORUM's Lead Ministerial Spokesperson was Dame Billie Miller, Barbados' Minister of 
224 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 18th May, 2012. 
225 On the occasion of the launch, both sides agreed on a plan and schedule that would guide the negotiations over 
the next three and a half years. The negotiations unfolded over four phases, with the last two by far being the most 
intense. Four negotiating groups were put in place: (i) Market Access (Goods); (ii) Services and Investment; (iii) 
Trade-related Issues (TRI); and (iv) Legal and Institutional Issues. 
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Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. The Ministerial Spokesperson was supported by a troika, 
comprised of Ministers from Belize, the Dominican Republic and Saint Lucia. The Director-
General of the CRNM served as Principal Negotiator, while also serving as Dean of the EPA 
College of Negotiators (which I will discuss later). This structure assured a significant level of 
organization and preparedness in the lead up to and during the negotiations, such that the 
CARIFORUM grouping was in a position to extract "negotiating/norm-based gains" from the 
EU side on a technical and political level.226 I~ all of this, the CRNM played a central role-with 
the backing of CARIFORUM States (namely, Ministries of Trade and diplomatic missions in 
Brussels) and regional integration secretariats-in the generation of technical analysis and 
negotiating positions, all the while working assiduously to effect the mandate given it to do 
precisely that by a governance structure and attendant socialization dynamics that I will take 
stock of shortly. 
Indeed, representatives of the EU side no less have credited the CRNM with playing an 
"instrumental" role in negotiating agreements like the EPA (see Yahl 2011, 2). In point of fact, 
the 'CRNM model' has been studied in other regions, with some developing country regions 
h . d h d . l . 227 avmg expresse t e eslfe to emu ate 1t. 
From its inception, until 2009, the CRNM stood at arm's-length from the CARICOM 
Secretariat. 228 Stemming from a decision taken at the Thirtieth Meeting of the Conference of 
HoG of CARICOM, convened in July 2009, and as previously indicated, the CRNM is now 
referred to as the OTN. This Heads decision came in the wake of their earlier decision in March 
2009 at the Twentieth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads to "incorporate the 
226 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 18th May, 2012. 
227 Ibid. 
228 This paragraph draws heavily on the description of the CRNM set out on http://cmm.org 
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Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) into the CARICOM Secretariat as a 
Specialised Department recognizing and providing for the special nature of its role and 
functions." The OTN "now has extended responsibility for the coordination, development, and 
execution of negotiating strategies for all Community external trade negotiations. "229 
However, save for the EPA's built-in agenda, the OTN is not responsible for EPA 
implementation. This task falls directly to CARIFORUM States which individually signed the 
Agreement; they have established national EPA Implementation Units or like entities to 
coordinate their respective implementation efforts. EPA National Coordinators are also in place, 
to aid in the aforementioned effort. The CARICOM Secretariat-based EPA Implementation 
Unit-which has also been referred to as the Regional EPA Implementation Unit, as it is housed 
in the CARIFORUM Directorate-also plays a supportive role. It facilitates in respect of the 
implementation of the Agreement. 
The Unit was set up by the Secretary General of CARICOM/CARIFORUM on 16 
February 2009, to facilitate the implementation of the EPA namely by assisting CARIFORUM 
States to honour their initial commitments relating to the implementation of EPA provisions.230 
The Unit is a response to capacity constraints that exist regionally and nationally to effect EPA 
implementation (both at the level of meeting commitments made under the EPA and taking 
advantage of opportunities for the regional private sector), a fact that was acknowledged during 
the negotiations, as evidenced in Article 8: 1 of the Agreement. The Unit delivers assistance, 
including in-country, to all signatory CARIFORUM States. In addition it executes some regional 
229 Ibid. 
23
° From 15th June 2011, the Director General of the CARIFORUM Directorate assumed supervisory responsibility 
for the Unit, which previously fell under the day-to-day management of the Trade and Economic Integration 
Directorate. The Unit is one of two in the CARIFORUM Directorate; the other being the Development Cooperation 
and Programming Unit. The EPA Implementation Unit's operation is supported, in part, by funds provided under a 
Grant Agreement between the CDB, as Administrator of the United Kingdom Government's Caribbean Aid for Trade 
and Regional Integration Trust Fund (CARTFund), and CARICOM. 
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functions as required by the EPA, such as partnering m the establishment of the Joint 
CARIFORUM-EU Institutions. 
To date, the following Joint Institutions-which oversee the implementation of the 
EPA-have already been established, and have begun to address operational aspects and issues 
arising out of implementation of the Agreement; those institutions are: the Joint CARIFORUM-
EU Council and the CARIFORUM-EU Trade and Development Committee. The CARIFORUM-
EU Parliamentary Committee is also in place, as is the Special Committee on Customs 
Cooperation and Trade Facilitation. The CARIFORUM-EU Consultative Committee-which is 
intended to formally include civil society actors in the implementation process-has not been 
established or convened as yet, due to unresolved differences between the two sides. 
The work of the Regional EPA Implementation Unit is guided by the Draft EPA 
Implementation Road Map. This document encapsulates the legislative and policy actions 
required, at the national and regional levels, and the timelines for accomplishment of each action 
in chronological order in which they are to be undertaken. The document also informs 
CARIFORUM States' implementation efforts. 
I want now to turn to a sociological analysis of the interregionalist institutional 
environment with respect to the Caribbean, so as to gain an appreciation of how associated 
processes engender the development of favourable norms stemming from interactions with third 
parties. 
5.3.3 The 'Caribbean Regional Platform': A Sociological Analysis of the Interregionalist 
Institutional Trade Governance Environment 
I. The Role/Identity Narrative Setting 
I begin by stating, institutions are generally social settings. They have social contexts, because 
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they are animated by socialization processes. To what end? Put simply, cooperation looms large 
in this regard mediated by persuasion. The CRNM, as noted previously now OTN, has had a 
social context vis-a-vis trade governance that has gone unexamined with respect to explanations 
of cooperation in Caribbean trade diplomacy. In the balance of this sub-section, I advance just 
such an analysis. 
As indicated earlier, the CRNM was tasked with managing the external trade negotiation 
process at the behest of Regional Governments. Over the years, it did precisely that. In so doing, 
it has played a critical role in the Region's interregionalist engagement. Its role has been 
infof!1Jed by the governance structure (and attendant processes/consultations) established for it 
by the HoG, which has provided for reporting to such bodies as the CARICOM COTED;231 the 
COTED has provided the CRNM with guidance and its negotiating mandate.232 Mechanisms like 
the College of Negotiators have also played a critical role, in so far as it facilitated the CRNM's 
provision of technical advice, as well as its coordination of negotiations.233 The CRNM's 
Director General has been responsible to Caribbean HoG, principally by way of the PMSC on 
External Negotiations. 
There are other relationships, too. These relationships exist in and are bounded by a 
governance structure. In the model developed here different types of elite technocrats inhabit this 
231 The CARIFORUM Council of Ministers has played this role, where the Dominican Republic has had to be 
catered for--0stensibly in the context of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA negotiations. A corresponding CARIFORUM 
dispensation at the level of Heads of Government was also devised, given that the Dominican Republic is not a 
CARICOM Member State and thus cannot participate in relevant Community organs. 
232 The CRNM's financial governance fell to a Finance Committee. It was comprised of representatives from some 
Member States, a CARICOM Secretariat representative and the CRNM Director General and Directors. 
233 As regards the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, the respective College provided a structured environment in and through 
which to advance technocratic/thematic synchronization of several trade issues that made up the Agreement that 
was, at the time, under negotiation. The EPA College comprised Lead and Alternate Lead Negotiators, and was led 
by the Dean of the College, i.e. the EPA Principal Negotiator, Ambassador Dr Richard Bernal. It was comprised of 
individuals with expertise in the various negotiating subjects and trade-related disciplines. Mandates approved by 
the CARIFORUM Heads of Government directed the College, which was supervised by Trade Ministers. 
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governance space, or structure. The illustration below sets out the governance structure. It should be 
seen as building on the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' grid (above), in that it further showcases the 
ability of categories of elite technocrats to effect and otherwise impact on the governance structure 
and attendant socialization dynamics buttressing the Caribbean' s external trade negotiations. 
Consultation regarding Caribbean External Trade Negotiations: 
Governance Structure. Socialization Dynamics 
COMPOSITE SOCIALIZATION OUTPUTS 
Purpose: ,COTID recommendations are reui8"118d. rwttter culdanm m external 
ne&diatim pmitimu Is no ll'Ollidlld. At Utis rta&n, recon1U1datims are 
suhnittedto Caribbean Heads ror approval. 
IJil'.OJJJir_t..a.ri.c..~tliW~hrt1ttYJ.d;.:.IJlA ~.lb.11" d Headl ti Cmernment 
•Purpose: Review.and approval of recommendatlonsOfthecoTiegeanCiTVii.i$-.-
•8ureaucrotic Actors Involved: PBA (at Ministerial level) 
- ---- - -- - -
•Purpos~:fociiltot~ th~CRNMs provision o/ttthnlcol adv/c~, as w~ll os Its coorcllnatlon o/nttJotlotlons. 
'Burroucratic Actors lnvofv,td; TBA On the execution of the Golleee·~ tethnic11I respon~ibilities), PBA 
_ ~~.:.si&llt r12sponsibi!ittlis) 
•·PiTfJ>1'l~a:Ji'iwn·e·d·by·cRNM-~()-d~1tb-e1~nnjh-ea·c1'rire-gidtratti'l:g~ubfe-e't;-s-oa'l-t()-d~·1Tf!llfp~rc:;p1n·ars­
and build consensus. 
•BtirtaiJtrotitAtton iihlo/VM:TBA, Q.BA 
•Purpose~Convened to arrive at natl Mal po:Sitions: on negotiation issues. 
•Bt1t'f'QUC:rotic Actors i11volved:TBA, Q.BA, ABA 
Source: Adapted from CRNM documents & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policymakers 
Pl'Oeou. connJlfalion 
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Government 
PMSC-EN - Prime 
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on !xtemal 
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forftade and 
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Wo:tking Group' 
NC - Ngli-ongl 
Consultations 
PSO ·Phased 
So<: iali%ation 
Outputs 
The Composite Socialization Inputs are central to the systematic formulation of and agreement 
amongst elite technocrats as to what identity problematique is most appropriate for a given 
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interregional scenario, and in turn form the basis for efforts to package and in turn project as 
Composite Socialization Outputs to the extra-regional third party that problematique in narrative 
form, to ultimately generate a socializing effect or interactionism: inducting the third party into 
the persuader's view of the problematique and the importance of establishing the norms that 
serve to accommodate the idiosyncratic lot of such states in the international system. In the case 
of the EU as the party being socialized, for instance, its internalization of a given problematique 
that is narrated on behalf of the Caribbean is likely to take hold due to the long association that 
Western European countries have had with (and therefore their insight into the Region), dating 
back to colonialism. 
The governance structure set out above, particularly through meeting/summit diplomacy, 
as relates to the formulation and sanction of regional negotiating positions in institutional 
settings is especially instructive in terms of the social interaction that it has generated with 
respect to PBA and TBA. Research findings reveal that these two elite technocrat groups play an 
especially prominent role in the previously identified institutional settings. 
What is more, through years of collaboration as members of common networks, they 
share the same ideological and world views. They have even maintained personal contacts, 
reinforcing camaraderie and shared perspectives on the lot of their respective states (in the case 
of elite technocrats hailing from states) and Member States (in the case of elite technocrats 
hailing from regional institutions) in international society. Many PBA and TBA, for instance, 
would have matriculated together. This is especially common amongst the 'baby boomer' 
generation, who upon graduating university would have operated in the same political and 
bureaucratic circles for decades. For their part, PBA and TBA in their 30's, 40's and 50's have for 
the most part come up the ranks of the public service together, influencing each others' views on 
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the trade-cum-development problematique of Caribbean States. In the process, these elite 
technocrats would have birthed a 'we-feeling' about these states (Deutsch 1957). In effect, what 
has emerged is a common role identity for these states. 
Like other states in the international system, Caribbean States took/take on a socialized 
role, a 'national image' of sorts (Holsti 1962). They play( ed) on, as some of these states also do in 
their intra-regional interactions, their underdog status. The literature on role theory/analysis, .as 
applied to foreign policy analysis, provides a useful theoretical framework and cognitive 
construct, in this regard. 
It highlights role conceptions (i.e. actor-based perceptions about their position relative to 
others, which can also be thought of as the belief system which "organiz[ es] perceptions into a 
meaningful guide for behavior" (Ibid., 245) in the international system, as well as role 
expectations (Holsti 1970). These are derived from state socialization in international society,234 
and not in the manner structural theories of international politics would have us think of state 
roles. 
Roles, then, can be applied to view state actors in social categories, in that in the 
enactment of a role there is a claim to identity (Aggestam 2006). This type of theory also brings 
into vie~ role impact, which, counter-intuitively, can be thought of and will be shown to be 
generally large for Caribbean States-in certain diplomatic scenarios-because of the 
negotiating savvy exercised in their regionalist engagements. 
II. The Role/Identity Narrative 
There is a tradition of Caribbean States being socialized as 'small and vulnerable', with a view to 
234 Holsti discusses policymakers' positions on certain "decisions" and "suitable actions" for their state and its 
function in the international system, in the context of role conceptions (1970/1987). 
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extracting gains from that narrative. Consider that the CARICOM Secretariat characterizes its 
Member States as being amongst "the smallest and most vulnerable countries in the world" 
(CARICOM Secretariat 2002; emphasis added). Caribbean leaders have repeatedly said as much, 
at a range of fora. For example, these oft-used terms routinely crop up in statements delivered by 
representatives of Caribbean States in such high-level fora as the General Debate of the United 
Nations General Assembly. Indeed, narratives around size and levels of development of states are 
well-worn, having long-informed these states' conceptions of shared identity, featuring as main 
themes in statements and documents. 
As previously indicated save for Belize, Guyana and Suriname, all Caribbean States are 
islands.235 They comprise one segment of the SIDS category. By any measure, SIDS are small. 
Arguably, they are the smallest of the world's small states; historically a catchall category.236 
Suffice to say, Caribbean States represent one extreme in an international hierarchy of states, on 
the basis of population and land mass alone. 
Caribbean States, respectively, fall well below the 'high water mark' with respect to a key 
statistical indicator for a 'small state', a population of 1.5 million people. The exception is 
Jamaica, with a population of just over 2.6 million.237 According to the CARICOM Secretariat, 
"ten CARI COM States would fit into any definition of 'micro states' with [respective] 
population[ s] of under 300,000" (ibid). Stunted geographic area is another consideration. In 
addition to the combined populations of the full members of the OECS-by far the smallest of 
235 Notwithstanding, these three continental states exhibit vulnerability and characteristics most commonly 
associated with island states; indeed they are represented along with their fellow CARICOM island states in many 
international coalitions and fora where islands have a major presence. This is the case with the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), for example; a grouping comprised of like-minded "small island and low-lying coastal 
countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their 
vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change" (see AOSIS site: 
http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/about.html). AOSIS has forty-two member states, not including observers. 
236 Thus, "smallness is [itself] a comparative concept" (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 6; my emphasis). 
237 US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2032.htm 
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the CARICOM states-"total[ing] less than 600,000,238 .... most have land areas only two or three 
times the size of Washington, D.C." (Erikson and Minson 2005, 166). 
In terms of the Caribbean States' ·narrative, theirs is an adversity-driven one-
developmental "challenges aris[ing] from factors beyond [their] control[,] including: 
· Remoteness and isolation; 
·Openness; 
· Susceptibility to natural disasters and environmental change; 
· Limited resource, production and export diversification; 
· Limited capacity; and, 
· Limited access to global capital markets" (ibid). 
A similar, but expanded, version of the above list has been drawn up, in which Caribbean States 
are said to be "challenged to overcome critical constraints relating to: 
· An undiversified range of economic resources; 
· Openness with a heavy reliance on external trade, foreign investment, technology, and overseas 
development assistance; 
· A narrow export base, mainly sugar, rice, bauxite, petroleum products, tourism and financial 
services and in some economies such as Trinidad and Tobago, a growing light manufacturing 
sector; 
· High dependency on trade taxes;239 
· High dependency on preferential trading arrangements in the US, European and Canadian 
markets; 
238 This figure excludes the grouping's two associate members. 
239 Bernal notes the disproportionately high dependence on "trade taxes as a percent of government revenue [in this 
regard] [t]rade taxes account for more than one-half of government revenue in St Lucia, Belize and the Bahamas" 
(2001, 3). 
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· Limited administrative and managerial resources; 
· Costly provision of socio-economic infrastructure and services; 
·High per unit transport costs; and, 
·Extreme vulnerability to natural disasters" (Housty 2005, 137-138) 
The CARICOM Secretariat underscores the vulnerability of its Member States in the particular 
context of the deleterious effects of trade openness, but also high export dependence240 
(CARICOM Secretariat 2002). A testament to CARICOM states' highly open economies is "[t]he 
average ratio of trade to GDP of about 80 percent in 2000" (Egoume-Bossogo and Mendis 2000, 
6). A number of these countries are reliant on primary product exports, which face adverse terms 
of trade (CARICOM Secretariat 2002). Some are outright monoeconomies, as regards 
commodity exports; "in extreme cases, one primary product export accounts for nearly all of 
exports, e.g., in 1991, bananas accounted for 92 percent of total exports in [the Commonwealth 
of] Dominica and 87 percent in St Lucia" (Bernal 2001, 3).241 In point of fact, "most CARICOM 
countries lack a diversified economic base, with the majority of countries dependent on primary 
products, tourism, and increasingly, financial services. Merchandise exports consist of primary 
products, such as sugar, bananas, and petroleum and natural gas in the case of Trinidad and 
Tobago. The narrow export base has been supported in the past by preferential trade agreements 
with North America and the EU" (Egoume-Bossogo and Mendis 2000, 6). 
What is more, these countries have over the last several years had to contend with the 
erosion of trade preferences, a mainstay of their economic and trading relationship with 
240 Similarly, such states face "high import content of production and consumption" (Bernal 2001, 6). 
241 Indeed, "[e]xport concentration is compounded by the dependence on one or two export markets, e.g. Britain 
absorbs 80 percent of [the Commonwealth of] Dominica's bananas and 90 percent of St Lucia's exports" (Bernal 
2001, 3). 
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respective metropoles. The potential losses, but also adjustment costs, for what are extremely 
small, vulnerable economies are daunting, in the light of the erosion of preference margins per 
Global North preferential tariffs242 (Milner et al 2009, 4). This is especially the case for those 
states that grapple with export concentration resulting from a narrow base of commodities, such 
as sugar and bananas (Ibid., 4 ). 
Historically these commodities have enjoyed high preference margins, but no more. 
Milner et al note that, "[g]iven the concentration of the current benefits of preferences, the actual 
erosion of preference margins due to national reforms (for example, reform of EU policies 
towards sugar and bananas) or prospective erosion associated with the multilateral tariff 
reductions proposed under the Doha Round of WTO negotiations will be concentrated on a 
relatively small number of developing and least developed countries. The developing countries 
experiencing or facing high losses are typically island economies, mostly in the 
Caribbean .... especially those dependent on sugar or banana exports to the EU" (Ibid., 4). 
What is incontestable is that as some of the smallest developing economies, Caribbean 
States "have structural and institutional characteristics, which affect the process of economic 
growth, constrain their ability to compete, increase their vulnerability to external events and limit 
their capacity for adjustment. These characteristics are sufficient to identify small economies as a 
distinct type of economy" (Bernal 2001, 1 ). 
Actually, Caribbean States comprise special cases within the small states category; 
242 In a few cases, the viability of some industries has been called into question. For example, St Kitts' centuries-old 
sugar industry-described by that countries' Prime Minister Dr the Hon Denzil Douglas as the "main part" of St 
Kitts' "economy"-was shut down in 2005 (Polcaro 2008, 42); in part because of uncertainty in terms of future 
shares of the European market. In this vein, Prime Minister Douglas points to "competition .... faced within the global 
economy" (ibid) as the cause of the closure of the industry. A statement by that countries' Sugar Industry 
Diversification Foundation is more forceful, contending that "St. Kitts & Nevis had the last sugar monoculture in the 
Eastern Caribbean until the government was forced by the WTO and the European Union to close the sugar industry. 
following the 2005 harvest" (Sugar Industry Diversification Foundation of St. Kitts & Nevis, http://www.sidf.org/). 
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notably because they are, for the most part, extremely small island states. As Dammen suggested 
three decades ago, "islands have a distinct character" ( 1980, 931 ): thus their problematique, 
conceivably, is even more acute. Even amongst the SIDS themselves, countries are tiered: 
"some of these are extremely small, and .... face as a result severe constraints in this regard" 
(Briguglio 1995). 
III. The Role/Identity Narrative Practice 
Research findings reveal that during EPA negotiations TBA, especially, consistently narrated the 
Caribbean in the terms set out_ above to EU negotiator counterparts. In a word, vulnerability 
exemplified that narrative or portrayal; this one particular representation having come to 
dominate these states' sense of person-hood. 243 This discursive construction, it would appear, has 
become naturalized; integrally a part of who they are.244 
In extra-regional trade negotiations, PBA and TBA have had a long record of securing 
differentiated treatment and norms for Caribbean States on account of the role/identity narratives 
of smallness and vulnerability. The EPA was no different. Indeed, S&DT is a central pillar of the 
Agreement, and it draws from Article 35.3 of the CPA which states that: 
[E]conomic and trade cooperation shall take account of the different needs and 
levels of development of the ACP countries and regions. In this context, the 
Parties reaffirm their attachment to ensuring special and differential treatment for 
all ACP countries and to maintaining special treatment for ACP LDCs and to 
taking due account of the vulnerability of small, landlocked and island countries. 
(European Commission 2005) 
243 Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009. 
244 As Hill and Wallace note, "[ e ]ffective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-
state's 'place in the world', its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are 
embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external 
and intemai developments reshape them" (1996, 8). 
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From the outset of the four phase EPA negotiation, regional PBA and TBA made known to their 
EU counterparts the centrality of S&DT to CARIFORUM's approach to the negotiation and the 
EPA itself. They were adamant that the principle of S&DT be given expression in the Agreement. 
On principle, the CARIFORUM side was concerned with disparities m the 
economic/developmental situations and capacities of the two parties.245 
Thus S&DT was a priority issue in.CARIFORUM's negotiating brief. It built on and was 
informed by gains made with respect to S&DT from the very earliest days of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with respect to Article XVIII treatment of developing 
country members. It also built on various milestones in the decades since then to strengthen 
S&DT, most recently through the Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) Work 
Programme/Working Group in the WTO's Doha Round of negotiations, in which Caribbean 
countries have been especially active.246 As contained in Paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, the objective of the Work Programme is to frame responses to reduce the trade-
related sources of vulnerability of small economies. Previous to that experience, the FTAA 
negotiations were important 'testing grounds' for Caribbean States in respect of this S&DT 
strategy, given that the forum made provision for the Consultative Group on Smaller Economies. 
To some extent, the bilateral FTAs pursued by the CARICOM bloc in the years leading up to 
EPA negotiations had also proved useful experiences in fashioning S&DT-related negotiating 
tacks. 
S&DT is a broad ranging issue, one which has assumed many forms. In this regard, a 
245 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 18th May, 2012. · 
246 S&DT has been an integral part of the GATT/WTO framework, exempting developing countries from certain 
trade rules/disciplines that otherwise developed members have to subscribe to. Building on this, developing 
countries such as those of the Caribbean have advocated transposition of like treatment in Agreements like the EPA 
which they have engaged developed countries in outside of the WTO framework. 
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CRNM brief on the issue notes that "the WTO Secretariat has identified 145 provisions spread 
across the various Multilateral Agreements. These have been classified according to the 
following six-fold typology: 
(i) provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities of developing country Members; 
(ii) provisions under which the interests of developing country would be safeguarded; 
(iii) flexibility of commitments, of action, and use of policy instruments; 
(iv) transitional time periods; 
(v) technical assistance; and 
(vi) provisions relating to least-developed country Members" (CRNM 2008, 1-2). 
The CRNM brief further notes that in relation to the identification of S&DT provisions, the 
aforementioned classification was applied to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. The end result is that 
S&DT is enshrined in the EPA. 
It is worth identifying, at this juncture, two important ways in which S&DT is reflected in 
the Agreement. The first is Article l(f) of the EPA, which states: 
Strengthening the existing relations between the Parties on the basis of solidarity 
and mutual interest. To this end, taking into account their respective levels of 
development and consistent with WTO obligations, the Agreement shall enhance 
commercial and economic relations, support a new trading dynamic between the 
Parties by means of the progressive, asymmetrical liberalisation of trade between 
them and reinforce, broaden and deepen cooperation in all areas relevant to trade 
and investment. 
(European Commission 2008, 7) 
Secondly and as previously intimated, S&DT provisions "infuse" ,the Agreement. 247 Of note, 
there is in place an overarching S&DT narrative as relates to development cooperation. The 
247 This paragraph draws heavily on the CRNM EPA Brief on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and Special and 
Differential Treatment Provisions in the EPA (2008). 
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chapter on development cooperation sets the scope and priorities for such cooperation, m 
addition to which every substantive chapter of the EPA has embedded in it subject-specific 
cooperation provisions. Broadly, these provisions "aim at facilitating implementation of 
commitments, improving CARIFORUM's ability to take advantage of the opportunities 
contained in the Agreement through increased competitiveness, improved export capabilities, 
fostering closer integration, building human, legal and institutional capacity and enhancing 
technological and research capabilities" (CRNM 2008, 2). 
What of the intra-regionalist dimension of the 'Caribbean Regional Platform'? As is 
revealed, it has actually problematized the cohesiveness of the Caribbean state narrative. Before 
examining how and why, the RLN is now examined with respect to the praxis of Caribbean 
interregionalism and a look at norms, in this regard. 
5.3.4 The Praxis of the RLN: Caribbean Jnterregionalism 
As set out earlier in the RLN framework, I contend that in Caribbean interregionalism PP looms 
large as, generally, do regional coherence and cohesion with respect to negotiations stemming 
from this sort of engagement. This contention is borne out upon closer inspection of the Region's 
approach to EPA negotiations. 
Consider that while, admittedly, some of the smaller so-called lesser developed countries 
in the CARICOM grouping were provided relatively more flexibility in respect of liberalization 
obligations, for instance, regional states in general were afforded flexibilities on account of the 
case of the narrative of shared vulnerability and differential treatment pitched by the then CRNM 
and others resonating with what turned out to be MP negotiating partners. In what follows, I 
delve into this latter point. 
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It is important, first, to set the stage by acknowledging the instrumental role that the elite 
technocrats at the level of TBA, essentially in intergovernmental institutions, ostensibly the 
CRNM, played in laying out how regional states ought to strategically position themselves in 
EPA negotiations. At various stages of regional consultation spanning NC, TWGs, CN, 
COTED/CCM, PMSC-EN and CARICOM/CARIFORUM HoGs, what was repeatedly 
emphasized was that it was incumbent upon states to 'sing from the same hymn sheet'.248 As one 
senior Caribbean policy maker put it, "[t]he Region had more to gain than lose in foregrounding 
pan-regional, albeit state-derived 'identity socialization"'.249 This reoccurring theme and the 
efforts of elite technocrats within the regional configuration to advance its cause can be deemed 
as a tactic to maximize the leveraging quotient to such a degree that it significantly added to 
rather than took away from regional coherence and cohesion, such that the norms that did take 
shape shored up negotiated outcomes that were in the interests of the group at large. 
But how, in practice, did the size and levels of development narrative articulated by the 
Caribbean during EPA negotiations work to its advantage? Simply put, that narrative helped 
'level the playing field'. This point is examined below. 
5. 3. 4.1 Case Example 1 - 'Leveling the Playing Field': Leveraging Development Finance 
The fruits of this narrative can be seen in respect of EPA implementation itself, for which 
significant funding has been secured by the CARIFORUM side. The case for this support was 
strenuously made by CARIFORUM negotiators during EPA negotiations.250 The merits of the 
248 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 18th May, 2012. 
249 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 18th May, 2012. 
250 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 18th May, 2012. 
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case were accepted by the EU side, so much so that language to that end appears in the 
Agreement. What follows is an excerpt from the preamble, which captures the understanding 
shared by both sides on the matter of support: 
A WARE that building capacities _and addressing supply constraints m 
CARlFORUM States is required to take full advantage of increased trading 
opportunities and maximise the benefits of trade reforms and REAFFIRMING the 
essential role that development assistance, including trade-related assistance, can 
play in supporting CARlFORUM States to implement and take advantage of this 
Agreement. 
European Commission (2008) 
While no financial commitments regarding EPA implementation were made by European 
Commission counterparts in a manner that tied such support to the EPA per se, it was generally 
accepted by both sides that at the very least the 10th EDF-which spans 2008-2013, the period 
immediately following the signing of the EPA-would have to be relied upon for such support. 
It was also accepted that bilateral Aid for Trade (AIT) from EU Member States would 
also have to feature, to complement EDF resources. The following excerpt from the Agreement 
attests to this: 
RECALLING that the European Union (EU) is committed to scaling up 
development aid, including aid for trade and to ensuring that a substantial share of 
the European Community's and EU Member States' commitments is devoted to 
ACP countries. 
European Commission (2008) 
Support for EPA implementation, then, primarily emanates from the EU-funded EDF viz-a-viz 
the CRlP and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), in addition to AIT contributions of EU 
Member States (CRNM/Caribbean Export 2009, 9). In point of fact, the 10th EDF makes €143 
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million available for Caribbean economic integration (supporting CARICOM's CSME, the 
OECS and the relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic), EPA implementation and 
the private sector. Some 9th EDF resources were also utilized to support aspects of EPA 
implementation. These funding envelopes to CARIFORUM are additional to EU funding 
arrangements in place for aiding in the adjustment of such Caribbean industries as sugar, banana, 
rum and rice (Ibid., 9). 
In point of fact building on recognition in the EPA itself that CARIFORUM States have 
capacity and supply constraints that must be addressed if they are to effectively "take full 
advantage of increased trading opportunities and maximize the benefits of trade reforms" with 
respect to the Agreement, a suite of initiatives financed under the 10th EDF are currently being 
put in place with the aim of lending support to CARIFORUM in the implementation of 
commitments under the EPA in several areas. These include: (i) Fiscal Reform and Adjustment; 
(ii) Statistics in the Dominican Republic; (iii) Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Programme; 
(iv) Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); (v) Services Sector; (vi) Rum Sector; and (vii) 
Institutional and Implementation Capacity. 
A three year (December 2012 to December 2015) €3.5 million EPA Standby Facility-a 
fund to be administered by the CDB, with support from National Authoring Officers (NAOs) in 
respective States-is also being established. It is intended to assist CARIFORUM States by 
helping to build institutional and productive capacity. 
The Regional Private Sector Development Programme (RPSDP), which the Caribbean 
Export Development Agency (Caribbean Export) manages, was the first initiative to be approved 
under the 10th EDF EU-CARIFORUM CRIP. The RPSDP officially began in March 2011 and 
has a five year implementation period with €28.3 million of the total amount provided under the 
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EDF. This is a several fold, unprecedented increase in EDF funds made available to Caribbean 
Export, so that it can lend much-needed, multi-faceted support (in the areas of competitiveness, 
market intelligence, trade promotion ~nd export development) to the regional private sector in its 
bid to breakthrough key external markets~ This RPSDP represents perhaps the single largest EU 
contribution of its kind to an ACP region, in the context of an EDF cycle. 
Through the aforementioned programming initiatives, the Region's public and private 
sectors-both of which have a stake in EPA implementation-are supported. 
The '10th EDF Programme of Support to CARIFORUM in the Implementation of the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA', briefly outlined above, is valued at €46.5 million. A Financing 
Agreement for that support was signed between the European Commission and CARIFORUM 
on 28 March 2012. The key milestones-including financial allocations and description of the 
respective sub-components-of this Programme of Support, at present, are presented in Table 3 
(on the following page). 
In keeping with the stated commitment to AIT in the Agreement, EU Member States were 
to have made additional resources available with respect to advancing the cause of EPA 
implementation. To date, however, only the United Kingdom and Germany have done so. The 
United Kingdom's programme of support through the CARTFund supported the EPA 
Implementation Unit within the CARIFORUM Directorate of the CARI COM Secretariat through 
its first phase of operations, up to December 2012. Launched as a £5 million Trust Fund, the UK 
Government-financed (and CDB-administered) CARTFund has also supported counterpart Units 
in a handful of CARIFORUM States. German Aff resources, more modest than the CARTFund, 
has been utilized for a variety of capacity building efforts directed at CARIFORUM states, to 
assist in advancing EPA implementation. 
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In taking stock of the development finance arrangements discussed above, which were secured in 
keeping with EPA negotiations, two points are worth noting. First while the resources secured 
represent a serious response on the part of the EU to the call from the CARIFORUM side to 
address supply side and other constraints they would face in penetrating the EU market, once 
market access was secured via the EPA, the adequacy of the quantum of resources has been 
openly questioned by the CARIFORUM side. Second, a 'bone of contention' during the 
negotiations for the EPA was the line taken by the EU, and ultimately settled upon, not to directly 
tie such support to the trade pact itself. So the EPA does not itself provide resources. 
Development assistance is provided under Cotonou. As such, the EDF is drawn on. 
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Be that as it may, the broader issue as the EPA was taking shape was how the so-called 
'development dimension' of the EPA was finding expression. More precisely, as the negotiations 
unfolded, that 'dimension' met with criticism on the CARIFORUM side for not going far enough. 
The EU side seemed content in its own interpretation, which in the early part of negotiations was 
seen as less ambitious. A term that itself was the subject of some criticism, the 'development 
dimension' refers in general to development finance but also to how CARIFORUM would be 
accommodated in the various facets of the Agreement, on account of its size and levels of 
development. 
That the CARIFORUM side was of one mind on the matter and the EU side another 
represented a defining divergence between the two sides, one that rested on whether the rhetoric 
of 'development' was being matched in negotiations with the practice of ingraining development 
in the Agreement. The backdrop was one of expectations as to the concerted 'marriage' of trade 
and development, and whether or not those expectations were being met in the view of the 
CARIFORUM side. Certainly, the EPA had been sold in these terms by the EU. In point of fact, 
at the outset of negotiations in Jamaica in April 2004, Commissioners Nielson and Lamy, who 
were at the time EC Commissioners for Development and Trade, respectively, underscored that 
the EPA is a "developmental mechanism, not simply a trade agreement" (Carrington 2006, 1). 
Speaking at a forum held during the period of Phase III of the EPA negotiations, the then 
Secretary General of CARIFORUM/CARICOM H.E. Edwin W. Carrington reminded EU 
representatives on hand "of one matter in these EPA negotiations which remains of outstanding 
concern to CARIFORUM ..... the Development Dimension" (Ibid., 2). In his address to the 5th 
Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF/ 51 Meeting forum held in September 2006-which had 
251 The RPTF came into being further to Paragraph 9 of the so-called CARIFORUM/EC Plan and Schedule for the 
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in attendance Ministers of CARIFORUM, Heads of European Commission Delegations in the 
Caribbean, NAOs of CARIFORUM and Members of the RPTF-Secretary General Carrington 
lamented that neither supply side constraints faced by the Region or the costs of adjustments 
with respect to the EPA were being addressed seriously in the negotiations (Ibid., 2). 
There would subsequently be a turnaround in negotiations, such that as the two sides 
moved into an advanced stage of talks supply side constraints and other costs of adjustments 
were dealt with seriously and meaningfully, on the insistence of the CARIFORUM side. The 
outline of 10th EDF Programming reviewed above attests to this. That programming and costing 
snapshot does not, in its entirety, necessarily reflect a 'meeting of minds'. 
A key takeaway, however, is that those development finance gains put to the test whether 
the rhetoric of development with respect to the EPA was just that, rhetoric; or whether there was 
tangible expression in reality. Where the CARIFORUM side may not have gotten all that it 
wanted with respect to the development finance component, and the interview data indicates that 
the CARIFORUM side wanted more, it secured important gains that are presently helping to 
advance the Region's ability to put the EPA to work in a manner consistent with its interests. 
What is not in dispute is that this development finance gain was a hard-fought one. The 
development finance secured reflects the determination and persistence of the CARIFORUM 
side. Moreover, empirical indicators show that these gains were an outcome of CARIFORUM's 
negotiating strategy that gave expression to its identity narrative. That this narrative had a 
bearing on how the Region was accommodated in the EPA and thus came to 'infuse' it is also 
EPA negotiations, and it served to bridge EPA negotiations and development cooperation (including the 'design of 
development strategies' and associated 'development finance cooperation' stemming there from). The mandate of the 
RPTF is set out as: "[T]ranslate needs for support, identified in the course of the negotiations, into operational ideas 
for trade-related and other development assistance, and to work out these ideas up to the level of pre-identification 
of fundable actions" (see Carrington 2006, 1). 
212 
evident in respect of trade liberalization gains, the theme of the next Case Example. 
5.3.4.2 Case Example 2- 'Leveling the Playing Field': Leveraging Trade Liberalization 
In terms of the new responsibilities that the EPA places on the CARIFORUM States to undertake 
market opening and rules-related commitments, these commitments span a cross-section of areas 
and are to be met over various periods (in respect of market liberalization by CARIFORUM 
States, it is to be phased in over 25 years (i.e. phased reductions over 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 
years))-with an outermost limit of 25 years in the case of the phased reduction of some tariffs. 
The process of liberalization started three years after the signature of the Agreement. The 
scheduling of CARIFORUM liberalization, then, spans from 2009 until 2033. 
The total amount of trade flows (imports and exports) which will be liberalized between 
the CARIFORUM and EU by the end of the transition period (2033) will be 92%. The actual 
value of 92% is significant, as-for the EU, at least-anything greater than 90% of trade flows is 
deemed to be the value required in order to satisfy the substantially all trade (SAT) criterion 
under the WTO's Article XXIV of GATT 1994. On this basis, a FTA is considered to be in 
compliance with the relevant WTO Article on Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs ). 
By all accounts, the 25 year liberalization period is "unheard of in trade agreements."252 
That this degree of treatment was secured for the Region "exceeded regional negotiators' 
expectations."253 This concession represents an important victory for the CARIFORUM side. 
Indeed, CARIFORUM tariff reductions are far less onerous than those of the EU. In Part II of the 
EPA, entitled Trade and Trade-related Matters, for example, the sub-section on Trade in Goods 
252 Mr Branford Isaacs, Trade in Goods Specialist, CARICOM Secretariat-based EPA Implementation Unit: 
Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 16th September, 2011. 
253 Mr Branford Isaacs, Trade in Goods Specialist, CARICOM Secretariat-based EPA Implementation Unit: 
Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 16th September, 2011. 
213 
takes account of the concept of S&DT. Enshrined in this aspect of the Agreement is a gradual 
opening of CARIFORUM states' domestic markets to EU goods. In addition, extensive 
safeguards are in place to protect CARIFORUM's sensitive sectors. Moreover, immediate DF/QF 
access to EU markets has been granted for CARIFORUM exports, with the exception of rice and 
sugar (rice was liberalized fully in 2010 and sugar in 2009). 
In respect of the final annexed schedules for CARIFORUM, then, they represent a 
liberalization schedule whereby "82.7% of the .... [groupings'] ... .imp011s would be liberalized 
within the first 15 years, and 92% of total CARIFORUM-EU trade would be liberalized within a 
25 year period."254 What is more, "l in 10 tariff lines were excluded from liberalization, 
including more than half the tariff universe dealing with agriculture and fisheries."255 
For CARIFORUM, a number of items (representing 13.l % of CARIFORUM imports 
from the EU) have been excluded from tariff liberalization altogether. What is more, 
CARIFORUM enjoyed a three year moratorium across the board from the point of signing the 
Agreement, with the exception of vehicles and some other goods. Instructively, "[ n ]early every 
significant revenue source was either placed in exclusions or given a phased reduction period of 
15 years or longer, allowing for these states to carry out their own internally agreed tax reforms, 
to replace potential revenue loss from the EPA."256 
Significant market access gains were also made by CARIFORUM, in respect of the EU 
market. Of note, in relation to exports by CARIFORUM under the Agreement, for a number of 
items, relaxed rules of origin qualifying conditions have been agreed, including those applicable 
to flour, biscuits and other bakery products, jams and jellies, chocolate confectionery, juices and 
254 Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009. 
255 Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009. 
256 Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009. 
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drinks, garments, of both knit and non-knit fabric, and air conditioning units, hence significantly 
enhancing market access into the EU. 
Negotiations, on the part of CARIFORUM, and the gains that the Region came by as a 
result were not easily won by any measure. Up until Phase III of those negotiations, the then 
CRNM is on record as reporting to the g3rd ACP Council of Ministers' Meeting in May 2006 that 
while the negotiations were on track, "seen from the perspective of the treatment of issues, in 
particular, those germane to Caribbean economic interests, the chasm in positions between 
CARIFORUM and the EC has never been wider. The following issues constitute areas where the 
current stage of the negotiations reflect major difficulties, namely, (a) approaches to tariff 
liberalization; (b) articulation of the regional integration dimension; ( c) scope and ambit of 
commitments in the fields of sustainable development and good governance; and ( d) funding the 
costs of EPA implementation and adjustment" (CRNM 2006). 
As far apart as· the two sides were, with respect to a variety of issues, at various points in 
the negotiations the gulf between them narrowed towards the end, in certain areas. Aiding in this 
process was, ultimately, "the bridging of differences in respect of commercial/trade and 
developmental trade-offs, but in a manner that was sensitive to 'leveling the playing field' for the 
CARIFORUM side, on account of its trade and development problematique".257 
Further, as a safeguard, the CARIFORUM side took the approach at the 'eleventh hour' 
that a review clause be included in the EPA. This position was adopted by the CARIFORUM 
side principally at the insistence of Guyana. The EU side agreed to incorporate the clause, which 
provides for a five-yearly review of the EPA. This was another important concession ~xtended to 
257 Ambassador Henry Gill, fonner Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 18th May, 2012. 
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the CARIFORUM side, and a rare one at that relative to other trade accords. 
Considered in their entirety and viewed through the lens of the leveraging quotient, then, 
these negotiating and representational experiences of the CARIFORUM side outlined above tell 
an instructive story of the bargaining tactics utilized by a smaller region seated at the negotiating 
table with a much larger one. Importantly, the account highlights gains for the CARIFORUM 
side; gains which go a long way in 'leveling the playing field' in respect of this precedent-setting 
partnership. 
The Region's elite technocrats recognized that with respect to the negotiated outcome or 
agreement, what is critical is the best argument as it has the potential to "put the pieces. in place" 
for third party negotiators to reconsider their beliefs and preferences at the negotiating table.258 
As such, what matters is the ability to persuade other parties to change their thinking and 
internalize regional norms. What is of help, in terms of the ability of the third party to soak up 
the norm, is the frequency and intensity of the negotiation-based interactions. This is where the 
Region's power rests and how it is able to mitigate, to a large extent, traditional notions of the 
power of large states. Thus the three hypothesis articulated earlier in the context of the RLN 
framework remain intact, against the backdrop of the empirical case. 
The discussion below highlights important norms secured in the context of the EPA. It 
serves to round off the preceding analysis of gains for the CARIFORUM side. I then transition 
into a discussion of intra-regionalism. 
5.3.5 Norms Generated as. a Result of Caribbean Interregionalism, in Connection with Issue 
Areas under Study: 'Cui Bono'? 
Recalling the discussion of norms in the introduction to this study, I had made the point that there 
258 Ambassador Herny Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 18th May, 2012. 
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are two types of norms. Norms can have a "regulative" effect. They also have a "constitutive" 
effect. 
Both norm types permeate the CARIFORUM-EU interregional relationship a la the EPA, 
pertaining to notions of the different developmental circumstances and regional identity of the 
Caribbean as compared to the EU. With respect to the "regulative" kind, I highlight here one 
norm of particular consequence that the EPA encapsulates: 
[Reaffirm] the essential role that development assistance, including trade-
related assistance, can play in supporting CARIFORUM States to 
implement and take advantage of this Agreement. 
(European Commission 2008, 6) 
Norm I: 'IMPORTANCE' OF AID FOR TRADE: Adoption of the notion that the 
CAR/FORUM grouping's implementation, including it moving to secure market penetration 
with respect to the EU market, is for all intents and purposes contingent-to a large extent-
on the EU extending the relevant/necessary resources (financial and otherwise, such as 
technical assistance). 
This norm sets out expectations or standards of proper actor behaviour, with reference to a 
particular identity narrative, in this case that of the EU partner. However, norms with a 
"constitutive" effect are also present. Consider the following: 
[Recall] that the European Union (EU) is committed to scaling up 
development aid, including aid for trade and to ensuring that a substantial 
share of the European Community's and EU Member States' commitments 
is devoted to ACP countries. 
(European Commission 2008, 6) 
Norm II: 'RESPONSIBILITY' FOR PROVISION OF AID FOR TRADE: Adoption of the 
notion that the responsibility falls squarely on the EU and its states to provide the 
relevant/necessary resources to the CAR/FORUM grouping. 
Aware that building capacities and addressing supply constraints in 
CARIFORUM States is required to take full advantage of increased 
trading opportunities and maximise the benefits of trade reforms. 
(European Commission 2008, 6) 
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Norm III: 'RECOGNITION' OF AND 'COMMITMENT' TO ADDRESSING 
DEVELOPMENTAL ENCUMBRANCES: Adoption of the notion that there are certain 
developmental idiosyncrasies with respect to CAR/FORUM States that need to be addressed, 
in particular by drawing on EU resources, in order for that configuration to maximize the 
extent to which it leverages the EPA in the implementation phase. 
Both of the aforementioned norms have rule-like qualities. The first references the EU and the 
second the Caribbean in defining respective actor's identity, but also actor's actions are specified 
in such a way that a given identity is recognizable to all concerned. 
Norms of this nature did not appear by accident. Caribbean elite technocrats confirmed 
that these norms found expression because of how they framed/narrated the Region during 
negotiations. Empirical findings reveal that the Caribbean's elite technocrats engaged their 
European counterparts in EPA negotiations with a view to generating not only intersubjective 
knowledge on the Caribbean, but that they did so in order to make the best argument. Thus social 
learning was not an end in itself. Rather, it was a means to an end, i.e.: arriving at a shared 
understanding (or norms) in respect of differential treatment to be extended by the EU to 
CARIFORUM, based on the latter's strength in making the best argument. 
Importantly, the best argument emanated from intense preparatory meetings and other 
consultative processes amongst the Caribbean's elite technocrats in the lead up to actual 
negotiations. These processes allowed for negotiating positions to be tested and vetted before 
they were taken forth to the negotiating table. Taken together and recalling the RLN-NPI, NPA 
and NPAS are reflected in these various steps. 
Data gathered reveals that the EU long held the view that although the Caribbean for the 
most part constitutes small, vulnerable islands with a unique development problematique, with 
the exception of Haiti, they do not fit United Nations standards of being LDCs. The EU held 
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firm, at the outset of negotiations, to the view that the type and volume of support and 
differential treatment to be provided to CARIFORUM to assist the Region in effecting and 
adjusting to the EPA should be commensurate with their middle income status. This would mean 
reduced types of support, lower levels of support as well as more modest differential treatment. 
CARIFORUM negotiators aggressively made the case that it was unfair to apply standard 
measures of development, such as GDP indicators, to the CARIFORUM States, as their 
vulnerability manifests itself in other ways; for example: susceptibility to climactic events (such 
as hurricanes and climate change more generally), or being more prone to the effects of 
exogenous economic shocks, given the trade dependency of these economies on the global 
economy. These events and phenomena were framed as being exigent, with respect to Caribbean 
States. Moreover, these arguments won the day, as reflected in the fact that norms like those 
featured above were secured, and as such this empirical case serves to hold up the three 
hypotheses set out earlier with regard to the RLN framework. 
Recalling the RLN, in this context, it turns out PP did in fact loom large with respect to 
the Caribbean side of the negotiating table, set against MP negotiating partners. The leveraging 
quotient is pivoted, then, toward policy-based convergence in plying regionness. In this regard, 
elite technocrats at the level of regional institutions, the evidence reveals, exercised an especially 
pronounced role. 
5.4 Socialization Processes: Elite Technocrats and Caribbean Intra-regionalism 
5.4.1 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 
In contrast to the Caribbean's interregionalist narrative, regional states leverage difference 
amongst themselves in respect of the intra-regional dimension of their relationship, so as to 
extract gains in that setting. Nowhere is this differentiation more sanctified than in the Revised 
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Treaty (CARICOM Secretariat 2001). In Article 4 of the Revised Treaty, Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and More Developed Countries (MDCs) are specified. 
In the Preamble to the Revised Treaty, it is acknowledged that "some Member States, 
particularly the LDCs, are entering the CSME at a disadvantage by reason of the size, structure 
and vulnerability of their economies." The LDCs are characterized, in the first instance, in 
Article 1 as "disadvantaged countries" and are seen as perhaps requiring "special support 
measures of a transitional or temporary nature." Regarding the latter, several reasons are 
enumerated in Article 1 which also sets out "disadvantaged regions" and "disadvantaged 
sectors." The case of "disadvantaged countries", "disadvantaged regions" and "disadvantaged 
sectors" is laid out in great detail in Part Two of Chapter Seven, whilst Part Three of the same 
chapter sets out the "Special Regime for Less Developed Countries." It is further recognized in 
the Revised Treaty that the persistence of disadvantage, however it may arise, may have an 
adverse impact on economic and social cohesion in the Community. Against this backdrop, the 
Community commits to establishing measures, programmes and mechanisms to respond 
accordingly to this economic imbalance. Instructively, Article 158, which appears in Part Two of 
Chapter Seven, references the establishment of the Development Fund, which the balance of this 
sub-section focuses attention on. 
5.4.2 The CDF in Perspective, against tlie backdrop oftlie OECS 
Article 158 notes that the establishment of "a Development Fund [is linked to] the purpose of 
providing financial or technical assistance to disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors." First 
off, this Treaty language explicitly acknowledges that social and economic disparities exist 
among CARICOM Member States. Importantly, the "received wisdom in the Community is that 
220 
unless disparities emanating from physical size, economic structure and the like are mitigated the 
full participation of disadvantaged countries in the CSME will be hamstrung, if not forfeited 
outright. Indeed, regional economic development could be severely compromised."259 
Secondly, the CDF is an institutional response to the imperative to address longstanding 
concerns with respect to intra-regional disparities which may result from the implementation of 
the CSME, and which certain States in particular have taken up the cause of on the wings of their 
own case of being less developed. To this end, "the CDF focuses on disbursing concessionary 
loans and grants, according preference to small to medium size projects of a short 
implementation period."260 Presently, with the exception of The Bahamas and Haiti, the 
independent Member States of CARI COM are Members of the CDF. Eligibility for financial and 
technical assistance support from the Fund extends to all Members of the CDF. However, during 
the period of the first contribution cycle access to resources has been limited to the designated 
disadvantaged countries - the LDCs (OECS and Belize) and Guyana (as a Highly Indebted Poor 
Country). 261 
With regards to its history, the CDF began operations in August 2009. Its two primary 
objectives are: "(i) mitigating polarization and promoting economic convergence; and, (ii) 
compensating for the negative impact and dislocation resulting from the intra-CARICOM 
integration process. These objectives are pursued through: (a) addressing defined structural 
diversification and infrastructural development needs; (b) facilitating regional investment 
promotion and mobilization; ( c) assisting business development and enterprise competitiveness; 
259 Sir Edwin W. Carrington, former Secretary General, CARICOM Secretariat: Interview by author, Georgetown, 
Guyana, 17th November, 2011 and 29th March, 2012. 
260 Ambassador Lome T. McDonnough, Chief Executive Officer, CDF: Interview by author, Hastings, Barbados 
22nd April, 2010 (in the margins of the Conference on the CAR/FORUM-EU EPA One Year On: Regional 
Integration and Sustainable Development). 
261 Ambassador Lome T. McDonnough, Chief Executive Officer, CDF: Interview by author, Hastings, Barbados 
22nd April, 2010. 
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and ( d) assisting in the alleviation of the social and economic impacts of natural disasters. "262 
To this end, in terms of capitalization of the Fund, it is a requirement that all Member 
States contribute. A formula to facilitate such contributions has been agreed by the CARICOM 
Heads of Government. At present, the CDF is capitalized at around US$90 million. Originally, 
the CDF was tasked with raising US$130 million, including through contributions from 
international development partners. 
While all CDF Members are eligible for financial and technical assistance-related support 
from the Fund, it is the OECS that stands to benefit the most from the CDF (by far making up the 
bulk of LDCs ). Indeed, during the first contribution cycle along with Belize and Guyana the 
OECS had access to resources from the Fund. Instructively respect to the grouping of states that 
by far has the largest 'piece of the CDF pie', it is the OECS. Of all the states that stand to benefit 
from the 'pie', the OECS has been most conspicuous in laying claim. 
The OECS's claim to difference from other States in the CARICOM grouping is a strong, 
fiercely guarded one and is steeped in a tightly knit sub-regional integration process all its 
own.
263 Lewis (2002) provides a recent scholarly engagement with this theme, the thrust of 
which was previously reviewed. 
The OECS's integration effort is an ambitious one, and though often compared to the EU 
because the OECS has stopped short of the depths of the EU's own integration maneuvering it is 
generally considered EU-lite. Lewis (2002) recounts how a proposal tabled in the late 1980s to 
'merge' the countries of the OECS (many of which had only just gained independence in the 
262 Ambassador Lome T. McDonnough, Chief Executive Officer, CDF: Interview by author, Hastings, Barbados 
22nd April, 2010. 
263 In the Region's external trade negotiations, too, the sub-region has from time-to-time called for and gotten special 
carve outs or caveats with respect to the degree of liberalization that they grant. 
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preceding decade) into a 'single state' did not sit well with some in the grouping.264 Her detailed 
account of this period notes how countries in the Leeward Islands were the first to reject the 
initiative, and how subsequently, following a few years of debate, the initiative for political 
unification would be let go by the Windward Islands. 
To be fair, this sub-region has embarked on a depth of integration unparalleled in the rest 
of the Region, if not the Hemisphere. 265 In addition to many areas of functional cooperation-for 
instance, in pharmaceutical procurement (via a unit housed in the OECS Secretariat), the Eastern 
Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority and the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority-
the sub-region also pools resources. Some Member states, for example, until recently had a joint 
High Commission in Ottawa, and have in place a joint technical and diplomatic mission in 
Geneva and Brussels, respectively. 
To date, though, perhaps the single greatest achievement of this groupmg of states 
regarding their integration journey was the establishment in 1983 of the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank. It is the Monetary Authority for Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, the Commonwealth 
of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent & the Grenadines. 
In place, therefore, is an Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Central Monetary 
Authority decides on the Union's monetary policy. In addition to the maintenance of a common 
pool of foreign exchange reserves, the Bank issues a single common currency, the Eastern 
Caribbean dollar. Most recently, the sub-region has advanced the cause of integration still further, 
by way of the Economic Union 'project'. 
264 Indeed William Demas, a Caribbean statesman, observed in the mid- l 980s that true independence for the 
countries of the Caribbean Region could only come as a result of a political union involving the former West Indies 
Federation members and Guyana, and that the impetus for this should be the countries of the OECS (Demas 1986, 
cited in Lewis 2002, 1-2). 
265 The themes covered in this paragraph draw extensively from an Interview by the author of Mr Ricardo James, 
Charge d'Affaires, Permanent Delegation of the OECS to the UNOG and other International Organisations in 
Geneva: Georgetown, Guyana, 15th July, 2012. 
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The OECS Economic Union commenced operations on 21 January 2011, coming on the 
heels of the seminal signing on 18 June 2010 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. Entering into 
force on 21 January 2011, the Revised Treaty of Basseterre has the effect of establishing a single 
economic space amongst the sub-region's independent Member States. Factors of production are 
to move unfettered in this space, including persons. The free movement of OECS nationals 
within this economic space took effect from 1 August 2011. However, the record with respect to 
giving effect to the Economic Union has been mixed. 
Given the pace, scale and degree of OECS integration from the very earliest days, 
following the creation of the grouping in 1981, the sub-region has generally been seen as an 
exemplar of integration for the rest of the Region. Instructively, the OECS's 'we-feeling' tends to 
trump that of the wider-Region. 
5.4.3 The Praxis of the RLN: Caribbean Intra-regionalism 
However, the OECS is but one example of a subset of regional states claiming difference in the 
narrative of the intra-regional undertaking. Guyana, as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), 
is also different. Most prominently, it is a continental country. So, too, are Belize and Suriname. 
Given where and how they are ·geographically positioned raises a whole host of issues, 
predominantly around how integrated they can be in the regional project given transportation 
challenges, etc. There are stark contrasts, too, in relation to natural resource endowments and 
economic activity. The continental countries tend to be resource rich, though agrarian in 
orientation. Among the larger of the regional island states Trinidad and Tobago, on the other 
hand, as previously noted, is a highly industrialized, energy-rich country. Similarly, Barbados-
though a smaller island state-is highly services dependent. Other regional states are variously 
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inserted into the disparate narrative sketched here. 
Against this backdrop, a coherent narrative with respect to the intra-regional dimension 
of the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' is elusive. In terms of the identity narrative of Caribbean 
States, the representation of subjectivized State-sameness is disrupted. National interests rise 
above all other considerations, and this is perhaps where QBA and ABA 'show their hand' most 
conspicuously in so far as in respective national settings domestic interest groups need to be 
catered to by the state. Business support organizations and business elites advocate positions 
which resonate with segments of national private sector constituencies, and they are not always 
supportive of or conducive to regional coherence or cohesiveness in myriad policy areas that 
'strike a chord' in the regionalism narrative.266 The same holds true for such social partners as 
organized labour. 267 
It is worth bearing in mind that the work of liberal inter-governmentalists is especially 
useful in showcasing how national interests are often tangled up in and, effectively, beholden to 
domestic interest groups, with the result that certain initiatives to deepen integration become the 
'sacrificial lambs' so to speak at the altar of national autonomy. 
Regarding state personas that can be brought to bear regarding intra-regionalism in the 
present context, drawing from the RLN framework set out in Chapter Four, they can be thought 
of as PP, MP and LP; each of which is maneuvering in a manner that draws attention to 
difference and that subscribes to policy-based dissonance. In this regard, the principal 
protagonists are state institution-based elite technocrats: PBA taking the lead in showcasing 
difference in platforms facilitating regional dialogue/consultation at the level of the political 
266 Mr Joel Richards, Trade Consultant, Barbados Private Sector Trade Team: Interview by author, St John's, Antigua 
and Barbuda, 26th October, 2011; and, Mr Carlos Wharton, Senior Trade Policy Adviser, Caribbean Export 
Development Agency: Interview by author, Bridgetown, Barbados, 2nd April, 2012. 
267 Former senior member Caribbean Congress of Labour: Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 5th July, 2012. 
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directorate, whilst TBA spearhead efforts at the level of NC, TWGs, CN and COTED/CCM 
preparatory meetings. These state-based institutions include Ministries of Trade, Finance, 
Planning, etc. 
A centerpiece of this 'destabilized regional state narrative' is the CDF and the amount of 
resources that can be secured to the extent that the narrative of state vulnerability that is laid 
claim to is relatively more acute. However, these sorts of tactics should in no way be seen as 
implying that the material incentives at play somehow make for a 'logic of consequences' 
prevailing over a 'logic of appropriateness'. Quite the contrary, while a 'we-ness' may be 
disrupted for state-centric gains in the short-term, regional integration is not sacrificed on the 
altar of such state tactics. The long term gains to be had from projecting 'we-ness' to third parties 
is never far from mind, and the pursuit of state-related aims are not pursued with a view to 
jeopardizing the regional narrative. 
That said, negotiating tactics of state actors in the intra-regional dimension of the 
'Caribbean Regional Platform' are sophisticated, well prepared and "surgically exercised" by 
highly trained and seasoned technicians principally based in Ministries of Foreign Trade through 
regular interaction, in order to highlight "difference" and secure "differential gains".268 In 
difference they see this status as working to great effect to extract gains (i.e. financial (stemming 
from the disbursement of concessionary CDF loans and grants), technical assistance-related, etc.) 
intra-regionally, be it through CDP-related bodies (of note the CDF Board) or CARICOM 
organs, like the COTED. 
While socialization processes obtain (not unlike those in the interregionalist dimension of 
the 'Caribbean Regional Platform') in which relevant elite technocrats are implicated, a narrative 
of difference is more pervasive. State identities and interests are reflexively defined/refined, 
268 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011. 
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informed by markedly divergent identity-derived policy preferences. 
Contestation, then, plays a key role in shaping the context and outcome of intra-
regionalist interaction such that state socialization in the interregionalist institutional 
environment (set out in the previous sub-section) is essentially 'put on its head' and what is a 
regional narrative, for that scenario, is supplanted by a state-based one in the present scenario. 
The influence of push factors looms large, in this regard. 
The illustration below sets out the push factors with respect to identity dissonance arising 
in the interaction of CARI COM States, in the particular context of their intra-regional relations. 
It should be seen as building on the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' grid (above), in that it further 
showcases the ability of categories of elite technocrats to effect and otherwise impact on 
attendant socialization dynamics buttressing the Caribbean's intra-regional relations. 
Caribbean Intra-regionalist Socialization Dynamics 
Source: Author & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policymakers. 
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The approach outlined above can be deemed a tactic to maximize the leveraging quotient to such 
a degree that it significantly adds to tailored state-based socialization and accommodation in 
terms of intraregional treatment, thus having the opposite effect in terms of regional coherence 
and cohesion, such that the norms that do take shape shore up negotiated outcomes that are in the 
interests of the state in particular. 
Interviews with top state level and intergovernmental bureaucrats suggest, however, that 
while domestic political economy imperatives loom large in shaping state preferences in intra-
regional relations such that the national narrative trumps the regional one this dimension is not 
the overriding factor in the inter-state bargaining process. After all, the process itself is mainly 
shaped by PBA and TBA. For them, their interest in the inter-state bargaining process is not of a 
short-term nature, per se, in the sense of allowing any one domestic political economy 
imperative to stand in the way of regional integration. 
This point bears itself out, for example, in the context of an especially thorny issue that 
presently is commanding the spotlight in intra-regional relations: Jamaica's widening trade 
deficit with CARICOM, and Trinidad and Tobago in particular. That country has run a trade 
deficit with the rest of the region for many years, and particularly so with Trinidad and Tobago; 
but the matter has come to a head as of late, as the gap has widened. 
Table 4, below, depicts the trend in the trade deficit relationship between Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago over a decade, up until the most recent year for which data can be sourced. 
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Source: Regional Statistics Programme, CARICOM Secretariat 
Tables 5 and 6, in the Annex, provide a more complete picture regarding the regional narrative 
and the trade deficit as relates to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, respectively. 
It is worth noting that the matter of the trade deficit in relation to Trinidad and Tobago is 
not unique to Jamaica: the twin-island Republic exports considerably more to other CARICOM 
Member States than they do to it. Barbados is also on record as registering its concerns, which 
were recently only inflamed on account of a trade spat widely reported in the regional media: a 
Barbadian conglomerate-Banks Holdings Limited-disclosed that its well known milk 
products and juices wer~ barred from the Trinidadian market on account of a long-festering 
dispute involving labeling. 
That there has been rising tension in relations between Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica 
is especially significant, given their status as two of the founding member countries of 
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CARICOM. Rising tension is on account of the trade deficit and other commercial (namely, 
energy) issues, with some Jamaican politicians and business leaders contending that Jamaica is 
not benefiting from membership in CARICOM and should therefore exit the regional integration 
project. However these views· have been dismissed by others; by Jamaica's Prime Minister, no 
less, who has repeatedly reaffirmed that country's commitment to the regional integration project 
(an affirmation echoed by the current CARICOM Secretary General Irwin LaRocque). 
Instructively, ahead of a summit of regional HoG held in July 2012 Barbados' ambassador to 
Trinidad and Tobago is said to have warned against "emotional statements" that could have an 
adverse effect on resolving disputes among Community partners. Reportedly, he warned against 
"misplaced hostility" towards Trinidad and Tobago. 
What this sentiment is indicative of is that as important as domestic corporate interests 
are to PBA and TBA and as responsive as they, in tum, must be to them, as a rule policy makers 
and technocrats are loath to become mired in what at times can become a caustic narrative of 
national economic interests that overshadows the 'bigger picture' of regional integration. A case 
in point is that the dispute over the trade deficit did not find expression in the Communique of a 
summit of regional HoG held in July 2012, at the height of the most recent flare up of tensions 
over the state of the trade deficit. The regional media, though critical that HoG had remained 
mum on the matter in the official summit statement, asserted that "[t]h~ silence of the 
communique on the contentious trade disputes could be viewed as a plus for political maturity in 
downplaying areas of disagreement and highlighting, instead, intended structured cooperation to 
deal with implications for the region of the prevailing global economic crisis" (Singh 2012). It 
was also reported that in the lead up to the summit, Barbados' Prime Minister expressed the view 
that he was attending the summit not "to fight with anybody" but that he would make Barbados' 
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concerns known. This sentiment also suggests that PBA are committed to cooperative (rather 
than competitive) bargaining, intra-regionally, which also has the effect of trumping the potential 
of identity cleavages that could end up posing an existential threat to integration taking hold. 
In as much as identity dissonance is at play intra-regionally in order to strategically 
pursue interests and policy preferences, the reflex of PBA is to not let that narrative get out of 
hand in terms of a zero-sum dynamic (i.e. maximizing respective preferences at any cost) taking 
hold. There is an unwritten rule, then, as to how far to push identity dissonance in the trading of 
concessions, even as it relates to shifting of the bottom-line. 
The upshot is that while important in the grand scheme of things, domestic political 
economy imperatives generally tend to inform rather than be deciding factors in inter-state 
bargaining processes. As such, liberal inter-governmentalism has limited explanatory appeal for 
our purposes. PBA and TBA are more invested in building up an image of their respective states 
in the service of how they are socialized intra-regionally in the long-term, such that they continue 
to benefit from policy, programme and financial assistance measures developed in response to 
their developmental problematique, in order to enable accommodation on a sustained basis. 
Thus, while the leveraging quotient is given practical effect by respective bargaining processes 
exerted to influence given regional consultative processes/machinery, it is informed by the 
overarching aim of norm formation: the most effective means of enabling accommodation in the 
long-term. 
The Revised Treaty, then, sets out one important norm-differentiated treatment within 
the Region, for which there is accommodation of 'institutionalli by way of the CDF. S&DT is 
accorded to LDCs with respect to the Treaty on account of their differences in levels of 
development and economic structures. S&DT provisions are intended to ensure more equity 
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prevails in respect of the obligations and commitments among parties to the Treaty, with due 
consideration to their levels of development. What we have to be cognizant of is that in the lead 
up to and in terms of advancing the cause of this Treaty-based accommodation, in CARICOM 
fora LDCs in particular had consistently underscored that because they are disadvantaged 
countries they had been significantly worse off during periods of great challenge for the 
Community absent any accommodation. 269 They presented an even more acute picture of the 
constraints of, say, each of the OECS micro-states, underscored on a scale that brings into relief 
the idiosyncrasies of a "micro of a micro-state."270 Thus the three hypothesis articulated earlier in 
the context of the RLN framework remain intact, against the backdrop of the empirical case. 
5.4.4 Norms Generated as a Result of Caribbean Intra-regionalism, in Connection with 
Issue Areas under Study: 'Cui Bono'? 
The Revised Treaty has many instances where both norms with a "regulative" and "constitutive" 
effect are referenced with respect to notions of the different developmental circumstances and 
identities of sub-sets of Caribbean States and their intraregional relationships. An instructive set 
of three interrelated norms with "regulative" effect that the Treaty encapsulates are: 
Acknowledging further that some Member States, particularly the Less 
Developed Countries, are entering the CSME at a disadvantage by reason 
of the size, structure and vulnerability of their economies; 
Believing further that the persistence of disadvantage, however arising, 
may impact adversely on the economic and social cohesion in the 
Community; 
Conscious further that disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors will 
require a transitional period to facilitate adjustment to competition in the 
CSME ..... 
CARICOM Secretariat (2001, 2-3) 
269 Sir Edwin W. Carrington, former Secretary General, CARICOM Secretariat: Interview by author, Georgetown, 
Guyana, 17th November, 2011 and 29th March, 2012. 
270 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011. 
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Norm I: 'RECOGNITION OF DISADVANTAGE OF SOME CSME STATES OVER 
, OTHERS AND THE NEED TO MITIGATE SAME': Adoption of the notion that there is a 
prevalence of disadvantage amongst segments of CSME states relative to others, the 
deleterious effects of which affect the parties concerned and threaten the Community at large. 
Further, carve outs in respect of obligations applicable to one set of states, i.e. the more 
disadvantaged ones, is an important remedial action. 
These norms set the stage for a pivotal norm with a "constitutive" effect, which is reflected in the 
Treaty as follows: 
Committed to establish effective measures, programmes and mechanisms 
to assist disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors of the Community. 
CARICOM Secretariat (2001, 3) 
Norm II: 'COMMITMENT TO REMEDIAL ACTION': Adoption of the notion that regarding 
the disadvantaged CSME states, protocols are to be established and associated policy-based 
mechanisms pursued in respect of mitigating the disadvantage experienced. 
The first three norms elaborate the expectations or standards of proper actor behaviour, invoking 
sub-set State identity narratives, whilst the fo~rth norm has a rule-like effect that on the one hand 
defines an actor's identity and on the other specifies actors' actions in such a way that a given 
identity is recognizable to others. 
Recalling the RLN, the empirical case shows that NPI, NPA and NPAS loom large 
regarding the establishment of the aforementioned norms. However the tendency is for the 
leveraging quotient to pivot toward policy-based dissonance, given the manner in which regional 
states ply regionness. 
5.5 The Functional Application of Regionness: Effects, Dynamics and Demonstrating 
Causal Relationships 
The chapter has been taken up with an examination of the Caribbean regionalism socialization 
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practices which find express10n among parties m in-group as well as out-group scenarios, 
namely social learning and persuasion. Social learning has a very specific meaning in the study, 
i.e.: socializers (the previously identified Caribbean epistemic communities and/or groups of 
states) imparting intersubjective or background knowledge on a group of states, i.e. socializees. 
What is more on the basis of the deployment of social learning, it was determined socializers 
engage in persuasion, with a view to advancing the 'best argument'. Data gathered revealed that 
routinized, sustained institutionalized network interactions involving nodes of Caribbean 
epistemic communities under study-more so at the levels of PBA and TBA social structures, 
respectively-served a strategic purpose: influencing the institutional preferences of socializees 
to the benefit of the socializers. 
In examining socialization processes that underpin Caribbean interregionalism and intra-
regionalism, and the role of elite technocrats as social agents therein, the study finds that identity 
and its evocation loom large. That it interrogates, in the context of the 'Caribbean Regional 
Platform', the hand of elite technocrats in socializing states and their 'regional identity 
(formation)' is a departure from the work of scholars like Wendt (1999) who also reify identity, 
but in framing the 'corporate identity' of the state they end up doing so as if it were an exogenous 
construct. Therefore while Wendt's constructivist scholarship informs the insights that find 
expression in this and the previous chapter, it only does so to a certain degree. 
With respect to the Caribbean's elite technocrats, the intention in the case of my analysis 
of the negotiation and (to some extent) implementation of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA was to 
lend insight into how PBA and TBA were most responsible for formulating a 'we-ness' (set 
against the ideational backdrop of region formation), in terms of how the Caribbean region was 
narrated and assigned a shared identity. Theirs was a pivotal role regarding knowledge 
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production concerning the Region. 
Of note, they drew in part on Commonwealth Secretariat and Commonwealth Secretariat-
informed literature on small states (referenced in Chapter 3). Importantly, I wanted to illustrate 
their role in presenting the Region as comprised of states with a shared developmental 
problematique, one that warranted-in the specific context of the EPA-differential treatment (as 
a norm) being extended to these states as a whole with a view to 'leveling the playing field' for 
them. I illustrated that dependable expectations had to be effected in respect of preferential 
treatment (norms) afforded CARIFORUM by the EU, in light of developmental idiosyncrasies 
associated most acutely with size, which the EU became seized of. 
By the same token, the CDF case illustrated how difference was sought within the group. 
Likewise, norms holding up that difference were sought. The emergence of Article 158 that 
formed the basis for the establishment of the CDF in the first place is a manifestation of the 
acceptance by all States of norms for differential treatment of the LDCs. However, there are 
numerous other instances where there were norm-based attempts to account for this 'difference': 
Measures to promote industrial development under Article 164 of the Revised Treaty is one 
important instance. 
Further, it was found that socialization practices are of consequence in the in-group 
scenario because they enable interpersonal trust to be established, preserved and form the basis 
for collective interaction going forward with respect to actors in that group and their ability to 
successfully achieve collective end-results, in as cohesive a manner as possible, with out-groups. 
There is another set of implications associated with epistemic community-based 
interactions that we must now tum our attention to. As already intimated, what is apparent from 
the study is that like-minded PBA and TBA play a dominant role in narrating the Region, 
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assigning meaning to it and mainstreaming a certain kind of thinking with respect to Caribbean 
States and their problematique. Importantly, the Region has been narrated on their terms (the 
same can be said of the norms that are devised to sanctify agreements). 
Empirical findings indicated that quotidian official network ties m relation to the 
regionalism policy making machinery could be pivoted in two ways by practitioners. If the 
Caribbean region engaged with a third party like the EU ('interregionalism'), the implication 
would be the production of a uniform regionalism narrative type. Wherein States within the 
Caribbean region engaged one another, instructively over access to a resource base such as the 
CDF ('intra-regionalism'), they were more prone to deploy a differentiated regionalism narrative 
type. 
This narrative type oscillation was first conceptually illustrated by way of the RLN. In 
either case the elite technocrats concerned felt that there was more to be gained in terms of 
negotiated outcomes/desired ends, by deploying the respective regionalism narrative type in 
response to a particular type of regional engagement. The effect was that regionness was most 
apparent with respect to the Caribbean during interregional encounters, though it receded during 
intra-regional ones. Of note, Caribbean States were keen to cement understandings with respect 
to treatment afforded them in either the interregional or intra-regional pathway, and therefore 
they moved to secure norms that have either a "regulative" or "constitutive" effect. 
Of note with respect to EPA interregionalism, it was determined that consistent with the 
compelling image associated with this study's title the Caribbean was able to Punch Above its 
Weight, in so far as during a period of unprecedented trade negotiations under cover of the EPA it 
was able to control its regionalism narrative. Moreover, PBA and TBA were able to make 
headway in 'leveling the playing field'. 
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Its regionness, so to speak, was evident in that the Caribbean was firmly in control of and 
able to make its ideational narrative resonate, for the most part, with as formidable a negotiating 
power as the EU. This narrative resonated with the EU, as evidenced by the concessions it 
extended and the norms which were concretized/entrenched in the Agreement. 
That the Caribbean epistemic communities under study in this dissertation accomplished 
this feat has been largely neglected in scholarly work. In point of fact, they ensured the 
persistence of a particular type of episteme about the Region in the lead up to and during EPA 
negotiations, utilizing the behaviours I have studied in this dissertation. Admittedly, they drew in 
part on the ideational referents of small states developed in the work of scholars and practitioners 
associated with the world renowned Commonwealth Secretariat research agenda on small states 
(referenced in Chapter 3). 
Secondly, in applying the constructivist concept that state socialization is a matter of 
course and is norm-driven as a framing for the empirical case of the Caribbean's approach to 
negotiating the EPA, it was determined that the 'logic of appropriateness' punctuated those 
negotiations such that the EU's logic of (negotiating) action was influenced by the need to do 
what is right. This finding forms a core element of the story of the best argument leveled by the 
Caribbean side in its efforts to strategically and pragmatically persuade the other party regarding 
concessions, such that tangible end-results came its way as a result. In this way, the Caribbean 
was also able to Punch Above its Weight. This is a key part of the story I tell. 
The outcome of EPA negotiations would have been far different, had the Caribbean side 
not been the protagonist that it was in doggedly narrating the ideational framing of the Region. 
What the study has accomplished, in part, is to document the role of ideational, non-material 
factors in shaping what the Caribbean is and the actor-based behaviours that arise to hold up and 
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diffuse that meaning for tangible benefit. 
The Caribbean, therefore, is not simply there. My empirical study shows that it is 
constructed. Key members of the Caribbean epistemic community studied exerted influence to 
this end. Importantly, this cognitive regional space is constructed to a significant degree by 
interactions of its protagonists with counterpart actors. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Elite technocrats serve as 'gate-keepers', with regard to the formulation and animation (i.e. 
communicative practice) of identity and interest-driven normative regimes. They have a 
profound understanding of the ideations of the Caribbean, and have come to recognize that more 
than ever before imaging and symbolism (precisely put, place branding) have fast become 
indispensable conceptual tools through which states can better make sense of and manage 
interactions in an unrelentingly complex world. PBA and TBA wield considerable influence and 
are embedded to a significant degree in Caribbean interregionalism and intra-regionalism. QBA 
and ABA also have roles to play, albeit less pronounced. 
Arguably these norm entrepreneurs operate within complex policy-making processes, at 
times seemingly representing contending narratives of the Region; their strategic policy 
choices/targets shaping perspectives on and practices as regards regional coherence differently. It 
is my contention that clusters of norm entrepreneurs are compelled, through diplomatic and other 
channels, to portray states differently from a discourse analytical point of view, depending on 
whether interregionalism or intra-regionalism objectives are being pursued. The 
(auto)biographical narrative which anchors state identity springs from state institutions (Steele 
2007, 905), but also region-specific intergovernmental organizations. As a region, the Caribbean 
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thus has an (auto )biographical narrative all its own, which gives meaning to state mandated 
interaction interregionally and intra-regionally. This circumstance, it can be surmised, influences 
how they come to view the wider world; and, importantly, how they want the world to view 
them. 
A former trade minister from a regional state perhaps put it best when he said of the 
Caribbean its "vulnerability is very real, not least in respect of small size" (Savarin 2005). These 
states are able to secure benefits and exercise agency in a manner that conventional theory is 
incapable of grasping. This is not so for constructivism, the theoretical backstop for this study. 
What has been instructive for our purposes is constructivism's "epistemological claim that 
meaning, and hence knowledge, is socially constructed", but also its "ontological claim that the 
social world is constructed" (Guzzini 2005, 498). Crucial, in all of this, has been the chapter's 
homage to constructivism's overriding tenet: "[the] reflexive relationship between the social 
construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality (ibid, 499).271 Especially 
relevant with respect to interregionalism, regionness with respect to the Caribbean took form 
during EPA negotiations in a manner that redounded to the benefit of the Region. 
What we should be seized of and call attention to, then, is the power of ideas/norms 
(namely, their moral persuasiveness), not the power of states in the realist sense. As a testament 
to the recognition of the power of the negotiation process, the Caribbean Region organized its 
best and brightest minds-by way of the CRNM-in its external trade negotiating effort. 
Enviable negotiating skill has been brought to bear, too, in the Caribbean intra-regional narrative, 
albeit for different reasons. Importantly, negotiations-regardless of the interregional or intra-
regional backdrop--enable an intensity and consistency of interaction, which is crucial to the 
271 As Guzzini notes in reference to constructivism's emphasis on reflexivity, "[it centers] on how the social 
construction of knowledge can itself affect the construction of social reality and vice versa" (2005, 499). 
239 
advance of social learning and the crystallization of norms. 
When considered in conjunction with strategic inventiveness-the kernel of the RLN 
model-the foregoing analysis reveals that 'Lilliputian' states, like those of the Caribbean, 
exhibit capacity for more agency than they are often given credit. At the very least, it prompts a 
re-think of how to problematize these states in world politics. Thus the empirical cases in the 
foregoing reveal that the RLN depicts 'what is', with respect to regional behavior/outcomes. 
Upon reflection, it would appear that when faced with adversity, PCS strive to 
outmaneuver counterparts, not blindly submit to them. The anthropomorphised 
(auto )biographical narrative (i.e. the construction of a social reality), then, informs behavioural 
cooperation, facilitating agency built on securing differential treatment for these states in order to 
accommodate particularity, associated with size and levels of development. This tactic is 
emblematic of strategic inventiveness (a term coined in the present study). Opportunism, then, is 
a more apt characterization of their regional/international affairs approach, than is submission. 
These states look to 'level the playing field'. 
However, the Caribbean has flexed its 'ideational' regionness at a juncture when Global 
North regions like the EU have invested considerably in soft power, such that increased space 
can be secured and their standing boosted in global politics as normative powers. Instructively, 
the EU has utilized its EPA with the Caribbean to leverage normative power to achieve its own 
ends. This approach has important implications for the socially constructed nature of the concept 
of the Caribbean 'region' and policy implications therein for the Caribbean region delimited for 
the purpose of the EPA, which the next and final chapter of the study delves into. 
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PART IV 
THE RISE OF EUROPEAN NORMATIVE POWER: 
COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA 
Chapter VI 
Global Actor, Normative Power, Region-Constructor: 
Making Sense of the EU's Global Governance Approach, in relation to its 
CARIFORUM EPA Engagement 
6.1 Introduction 
While NPE has hitherto been the subject of much attention in both the academic and policy 
communities, consideration of how the CARIFORUM-EU EPA forms a part of this strategy has 
gone virtually unstudied; thus, the Agreement's broad intent, through an EU prism, remains 
poorly understood. This chapter furthers such an understanding, at its outset reviewing the NPE 
thesis, then developing a hybrid normative-role approach and on this basis advancing the 
proposition that EU-centric· interregionalism anchors the EU's actorness. That such 
interregionalism positions NPE at the center of a 'hub-and-spokes' relationship with world 
regions-especially those in the Global South-is underscored. From the vantage point of the 
EU's interregionalist EPA engagement with CARIFORUM, I examine how the cause of a 
distinctive European, normative approach to global governance is advanced. Such region-pivoted 
North-South relations, I argue, reinforce the EU's understanding of the identity-based 
delimitation of other world regions. In policy terms, the EU's putative commitment to nurturing a 
regionalist project in the context of the wider Caribbean is also emblematic of a purposive effort 
on its part to champion, transpose and solidify its values-through actorness-onto this regional 
configuration, an effort which I demonstrate can present difficulties for the spoke region. 
It should be pointed out from the outset that the NPE thesis is best understood against the 
backdrop of the civilian power thesis. The civilian power thesis in the study of 
European/international affairs has cast a long shadow in academic and policy circles, longer still 
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if one traces its roots not to the work of Francois Duchene but E.H. Carr who proffered analysis 
to this end in the early part of the last century. In the decades since the 1970s, there have been 
two developments of note that have contributed to a resurgence of interest in the civilian power 
thesis (and its intellectual legacy), albeit in new 'wineskins'. One can be located in the academic· 
world, the other in the policy world. In respect of the former, the so-called constructivist turn in 
the social sciences, notably European/international studies, has led the way in theoretical 
innovations that have heralded the application of a 'normative lens' to the study of the EU. In 
respect of the policy world, there have been tectonic shifts in world politics (which have enabled 
the EU to assert itself as never before) and with respect to the entity that is now known as the 
EU, which have forced practitioners to pay close attention to the EU's apparent 'normative 
muscle'. 
This chapter considers the EU's normative predilection by examining the nexus between 
EU-styled global governance, the EU as a global actor-cum-region-constructor and the EU as a 
norm purveyor of consequence. As its backdrop, the chapter adopts a very narrow episodic focus 
as relates to the EU-i.e. the post-Maastricht period (1993 onwards) comprising the last twenty 
years wherein there has been an EU proper (i.e. the Treaty on European Union was signed in 
1992), and is cognizant of the period since the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007 onwards), 
one result of which has been a more coherent foreign policy stance on the part of the bloc. In 
terms of ontologically situating the nature of the EU, as I have already explained (see 
Introductory chapter) it is understood in the present study to pivot less on notions of political 
community than on conceptions of it as finding expression by way of the European Commission. 
This explanation is an important one, for our purposes, as NPE itself finds expression via the 
European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Moreover, what is European in theory 
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and practice is less a function of geographic notions of borders, which in and of themselves are 
problematic, but rather a project spearheaded by a supra-national institution-the European 
Commission. In recent times, it has been tasked by certain forces with devising, embedding and 
projecting a particular way of thinking regarding perceived values/model of modernity, as 
reflected in EU standards/norms and associated agendas, which if adopted by others will 
ultimately uphold a civilizational discourse in the service of European zone security imperatives. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. As a first step, it frames the EU against a global 
governance narrative. Secondly, it reviews key themes and literature with respect to NPE, 
showcasing a hybrid framework called the normative-role approach along the way. The next 
section first examines the role of EU interregionalism in holding up EU actorness. It then 
ascertains how a distinctive European approach to global governance is advanced via 
interregionalism, while discerning how this brand of global governance nurtures a norm-cum-
ideational regionalist project in the context of the wider Caribbean. In this regard I draw on 
empirical analysis with respect to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, particularly to point to how the 
Caribbean has been defined in EU terms and how as a spoke region it is has been negatively 
affected by one important dimension of the Agreement. The final section engages with the Joint 
Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy, which along with the EPA is framed as part of the larger 
puzzle board of the exercise of NPE in the Caribbean. The Joint Strategy is linked to the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA, and the implications thereto examined. A capstone section follows, 
serving to instantiate the kernel of the chapter's argument and demonstrate causal relationships. 
The chapter is rounded off with a brief concluding section. 
6.2 Global Governance and Europe 
Regions have brought an added complexity to the global governance landscape. On the one hand, 
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they have expanded and diversified its ranks. On the other hand, and more importantly, in cases 
where regions are imbued with actorness given assertive intergovernmental, institutional arms 
regional actors have more of a voice in policy areas on the global governance plane. 
As a result, regions hav~ a bearing on the decision-making dimensions and calculus of 
global governance policy processes, given that they have been inserted into and increasingly are 
exercising more of a role in various policy arenas.272 With respect to this latter point, especially, 
this stems, in large measure, from some of these configurations increasingly exhibiting actorness 
in international affairs. In evolutionary terms, this is indicative of state-like qualities adorning 
regions, at the level of form and/unction. 
Regional actorness, .· as a theme, has had considerable resonance in interregionalism 
research. In many respects, it has occupied a central place in the research agenda. Scholarly 
interest in this thematic referent has been driven primarily by research into the EU experience 
with integration, which has unfolded in such a way that the regional configuration has become 
ever more coherent in devising, articulating and projecting policy. As such, much of the 
contemporary research has had a geographic bias, where the narrative of the EU having assumed 
the status of an actor in world politics-one that seemingly has received wide acceptance by 
. 1 . . . 1 ffi . 1 1 273 more convent1ona actors m mternat10na a airs- ooms arge. 
This preoccupation with Europe can perhaps be attributed, in large part, to what Hettne 
and Soderbaum describe as interregional cooperation over the last decade having "become an 
272 Grinspun, for instance, underscores how NAFTA sanctioned economic integration-a core pillar of North 
American regionalism--cements sweeping transformations with respect to Mexico and Canada's economic and 
social structures (1993, 14). He is careful to note that, "the main impact ofNAFTA at the nation-state level will be to 
carve out a stronger role for transnational capital and consolidate this neoconservative agenda of structural reforms 
by engraving the changes in an international treaty" (Ibid., 17). 
273 The narrative of the EU as a global actor likely has wide appeal especially amongst scholars who have recently 
made the case that a European executive order is emerging (see Trondal 2010). For influential work on Europe as 
exhibiting 'regional actorness', see Bretherton and Vogler (1999). 
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increasingly important component of the EU's foreign policy relations [with other world 
regions]" (2005, 544). 
If not directly engaging with the EU, in taking account of interregionalism in select 
chunks of the world, the scholarship relates those experiences back to Europe and to the 
European Commission as the formalized, institutional nerve center of the integration process. 
Europe as region-with the European Commission at its helm-is often presented not only as a 
global actor in world politics, 274 but as the center of gravity, no less, of a number of interregional 
arrangements spanning a swath of world regions.275 
6.3 NPE and the Study of the EU in World Politics 
In a seminal article published a decade ago, Manners (2002) argued that Europe has established 
itself as a key player in world politics because of its ability to exercise power in a manner that 
influences global opinions, values and norms; a notion that is not altogether new, by Manners' 
own admission. Put differently and as already noted in Chapter One, Manners has characterized 
the concept of NPE as the "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" 
(2002, 239). More precisely, Manners points to the EU's power as resting in an ability to "define" 
what passes for normal in the context of global politics. 
274 Some scholars are more guarded in their pronouncements in this vein. For instance, Krotz (2009, 556) readily 
admits that contemporary international and European affairs have served as catalysts for "European high politics 
actorhood", as never before. By the same token, as he describes it, impediments to Europe emerging as a high 
politics actor remain (Ibid., 556). Krotz's assessment of Europe as an actor on the world stage-in such high profile 
areas as foreign policy, security and defence--in the years ahead, concedes that Europe will come into its own as an 
actor; but with the caveat that "a fully grown high-politics actor 'Europe' remains a longer-term project rather than 
something that will emerge in the imminent future ...... autonomous actorhood [in this vein historically] the weakest 
and least developed" (Ibid., 556-557). 
275 See, for example, a cross-section of chapter contributions in Hanggi et al (2006); also see the 2005 special issue 
of the Journal of European Integration on the theme of the 'EU as a Global Actor and the Role oflnterregionalism', 
subsequently published as an edited volume-Soderbaum and Langenhove (2007). 
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In his 2002 article, Manners discusses the EU's normative power against the backdrop of 
earlier concepts of and debates surrounding military power (which Hedley Bull276 was a leading 
proponent of) and civilian power277 (which Fran9ois Duchene was a leading proponent of) which 
have had significant influence over the study of Europe in international affairs over the last three 
decades.278 He goes further, contending that recent developments in international affairs warrant 
a reappraisal of traditional focus on either military power or civilian power (without dismissing 
that research agenda out of hand), to instead take into consideration the place of normative power 
in world politics (Manners 2002, 236). While juxtaposing NPE on civilian power and normative 
power, Manners is wary of what he characterizes as the latter two power references' penchant to 
treat with Europe like it was a state or to ascribe state-like qualities on it. Manners explicitly 
points to normative power as shifting traditional analysis on the EU's institutions or policies, per 
se, to cognitive processes-which he refers to as having "both substantive and symbolic 
components" (Ibid., 239). 
Elements of Manners' analysis are not that far removed from and owe an intellectual debt 
to social constructivist contributions to EU studies (see Chapter Two), where there has been 
276 Hedley Bull characterized Duchene's conceptualization of Europe in normative terms as a "contradiction in 
terms." For Bull (1982) that Europe could operate as civilian power was contingent on traditional military power 
that made this possible in the first place. 
277 Civilian power is a reference to Europe's economic prowess (but also its emphasis and reliance on multilateral 
diplomatic cooperation in the realm of 'low-politics' and the prominence of supranational institutions therein to 
achieve objectives on the international stage), as compared to its significantly more limited 'armed force'. A civilian 
power, then, turns to non-military means to achieve certain ends. Duchene saw the then the European Community as 
having within its grasp the ability to exercise influence on the world stage through "essentially civilian forms of 
power" (Duchene 1973, 19). Hfs concept of 'idee force' looms large in this context. The conduit for the exertion of 
this type of power is a supranational institutional structure. For Duchene, by projecting itself as a civilian power 
Europe was projecting its own "model" bent on ensuring "stability and security." The achievement of both, as 
indicated earlier, rested on economic as well as political means (1972; 1973). This thesis of Europe's role in 
international affairs is a very influential one. 
278 More recently, the concept of ethical power Europe has been devised and studied by some scholars (see 
Aggestam 2008). The concept is utilized, primarily, to study instances of usage of hard power or force by the EU 
and the ethical dilemmas that this raises in relation to the EU's stated commitment to a peace project, and by 
extension its obligation to uphold certain values. 
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particular emphasis on ideas, values, norms, discourse and interests.279 He suggests as much, 
when he refers to normative power as having an "ideational nature" (Ibid., 239). Indeed, there is 
a link with other literature. Two come to mind. 
Role theory is one. Decades ago, Holsti was at the ·center of theoretical innovations 
around the study of national images and what he recognized even then as "students of 
international politics [taking] a growing interest in psycho-attitudinal approaches to the study of 
the international system" ( 1962, 244 ). The study of soft power is the other scholarly area. As a 
concept, soft power in contemporary international studies is associated with Joseph Nye280 (see 
Bound to Lead (l 990) ). Nye characterizes soft power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the 
outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment" (2008, 94). 
Instructively, Nye notes that "[a] country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, 
and policies" (Ibid., 94 ). Of note, the term soft power has come into use in the context of the EU, 
which increasingly is being viewed as a global actor that thrives on the exercise of normative 
prowess. 
Strictly speaking, Manners likely would not accept the co-mingling of these 
concepts/approaches. As already stated, Manners has a very specific view of the EU in world 
politics. While analyzing the EU in ideational terms, his framing is not actor-centric, per se, 
though he does see the EU as a post-Westphalian actor of sorts. Rather, the EU's international 
identity is conceived of as stemming from common values and ideologies closely associated with 
the Union and its evolution over the last fifty years. His reference to how the EU is perceived can 
279 In Keohane's (1988) now much-cited reference to an emerging reflective approach in IR some twenty-five years 
ago, he underscored the importance of cultural practices, norms and values in the articulation of interests by states 
and in the behavior of states themselves in this approach. 
280 However while the 'soft power'/'hard power' dichotomy was coined by Nye, the study of states' efforts at what has 
come to be known as public diplomacy or image projection has a long lineage. E.H. Carr, a doyen of IR, noted the 
importance of 'power over opinion'. 
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be seen as third parties looking in to the EU, rather than the EU looking out. In contrast, 
contemporary scholars like Elgstrom and Smith (2006), who build on the tradition of role theory 
a la Holsti, showcase the EU's global actomess. 
I propose a middle road, one that combines insights from both the role theory scholarly 
agenda and NPE scholarly agenda. Admittedly Manners' attempt to de-emphasize the role of 
European institutions in the projection of normative power has some appeal, in so far as it 
reflects what he confesses is his not wanting to be straight jacketed by Westphalian conventions. 
However, on balance his is a problematic stance and at times inconsistent, given that references 
to "the EU as a normative power [with] an ontological quality to it" (Manners 2002, 252) leads 
one to believe that the EU-qua-actor is his ontological unit of analysis. Ultimately, it is those 
very institutions that he wishes to remove from the picture that are the well-spring not only of 
European norms, but identity narratives. What is more, institutions have 'stabilizing properties'; 
"[i]nstitutions generate their stabilizing properties once actors consistently adopt a particular role 
conception and modify their behavior accordfog to each other's role, behaviors and expectations" 
(Barnett 1993, 275). Importantly and according to constructivist tenets, an actor's identity is 
influenced by the institutional structures within which the actor is embedded; and by the same 
token those very same institutions are in place because of the actors who populate them. 
Thus normative power, it is the view of the present study, must be framed against 
institutions and seen through them, as they are formed because of them. The EU's ideational 
impact, in fact its ideational role-driven identity, does not just magically appear. This ideational 
narrative can be traced back to EU institutions, which are invested in the projection of power. In 
the first half of the next section, I provide further insights into this middle road approach, a 
normative-role approach. 
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Due to the fact that theorizing must as accurately as possible reflect the real world, this 
hybrid approach is especially instructive. Consider that in a Speech to the Bucerius/Die Zeit 
Summer School, Die Zeit Foundation in 2005 entitled 'The European Union as a Global Actor', 
Member of the European Commission responsible for Enlargement-Mr Olli Rehn-expressed 
the following view: 
I strongly believe that the EU's creation of a rules-based framework that is 
respected worldwide niakes Europe a global actor ... The idea at the heart of the 
European project is a simple one: create institutions and rules within which 
countries can conduct their business-both political and economic-and other 
countries will seek to do the same. The EU's most effective method of exerting 
soft power is by persuading countries to integrate themselves into legal 
frameworks and economic relationships with the Union. 
(Rehn 2005, 2) 
By most measures, the EU has defied expectations in emerging as a global actor, challenging 
conceptions of it as a regional actor with limited policy range. Haas (1961 ), for instance, had left 
out foreign and security policy from his middle-range theory of European integration, neo-
functionalism. 281 This grand model of European integration notwithstanding, Bretherton and 
Vogler (2005) are amongst a growing tide of scholars who have examined and showcased the 
emergence of the EU as a global actor in world politics. 
The newly-established EEAS282 and debate, associated with this pan-European diplomatic 
corps, of a coherent EU foreign policy that is taking form has only raised the profile still further 
of a Union with a global reach spanning a policy range that includes the domain of 'high politics'. 
That the advance of a CFSP, which first came to light in the Maastricht Treaty as a 'second pillar' 
281 Scholars like Deutsch (1957) took a more nuanced stance in the examination of a cooperation/military narrative, 
developing concept of'security community': a region spanning many nations, where members' positive identification 
and interaction would foster an environment supportive of peaceful relations, or at least expectations to that end. 
282 The EEAS "was one of the principal foreign policy innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon, intended to bring greater 
coherence and impact to the EU's international relations" (Hemra et al 2012, vi). 
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in the common European architecture, is on the cards is all the more remarkable, given that 
treaties dating back to the 1950s for the EU's predecessor organizations did not treat with these 
areas. 
6.4 The EU Approach to Global Governance: EU Interregionalism, EU Actorness and 
the CARIFORUM-EU EPA 
6.4.1 EU Global Governance: A Sui Generis Approach? 
The European Commission functionary cited above makes a compelling case for how the EU 
positions itself as a global actor, and importantly how it exerts soft power: "persuading countries 
to integrate themselves into legal frameworks and economic relationships with the Union." The 
statement is revealing in respect of the EU's approach to global governance, too, as it goes to the 
heart of ideas of a European order. A European Commission White Paper on European 
Governance ((COM(2001) 428 final)) provides insights into the Union's interest in the 
transposition of EU norms internationally. 
However, the aforementioned statement also resonates with the EU's sense of identity, in 
large measure framed politically-precisely because of its cultural and linguistic heterogeneity. 
Thus various EU Treaties describe the Union as being founded "on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law." Indeed, at 
the Copenhagen European Summit in 1973, the Heads of State/Government of the nine Member 
States of the enlarged European Community at the time affirmed their determination to introduce 
the concept of European identity283 into their common foreign relations (Declaration on 
283 European identity in this sense has nothing to do with a European cosmopolitan identity, in so far as the latter 
hinges on a cultural self-transformation; the European identity construct found in the Declaration on European 
Identity is a product of official institutions (Beck and Grande 2007). 
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European Identity 1973). Instructively, the statement notes: 
·The Nine have the political will to succeed in the construction of a united Europe. 
On the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome setting up . the European 
Communities and of subsequent decisions, they have created a common market, 
based on a customs union, and have established institutions, common policies and 
machinery for co-operation. All these are an essential part of the European 
Identity ..... The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic 
construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose 
progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other 
countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will 
strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely 
European foreign policy. 
(Declaration on European Identity 1973, 2 and 4; my emphasis) 
The Davignon Report, though set out fully three years earlier than the Declaration on European 
Identity, was an effort on the part of Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the then 
European Communities to usher progress with respect to political unification through 
cooperation in foreign policy matters. The Report cited instructions by the Heads of 
State/Government a year earlier "to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of 
political unification, within the context of enlargement" of the European Communities. In respect 
of instructions by the Heads of State/Government, instructively the Report went on to note: 
They stated that "the European Communities remain the original nucleus from 
which European unity has been developed and intensified". And they expressed 
their determination to pave "the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its 
responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution 
commensurate with its traditions and its mission". 
(Davignon Report 1970, 2; my emphasis) 
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Even more striking was the Report's reference to the following: 
The Heads of State or Government affirmed their "common conviction that a 
Europe composed of States which, in spite of their different national 
characteristics, are united in their essential interests, assured of its internal 
cohesion, true to its friendly relations with outside countries, conscious of the role 
it has to play in ·promoting the relaxation of international tension and the 
rapprochement among all peoples, and first and foremost among those of the 
entire European continent, is indispensable if a mainspring of development, 
progress and culture, world equilibrium and peace is to be preserved .... The 
Ministers therefore felt that foreign policy concertation should be the object of the 
first practical endeavours to demonstrate to all that Europe has a political 
vocation." 
(Davignon Report 1970, 2 and 3) 
That we see ideational referents to Europe and its role that date back several decades in the 
aforementioned documents would suggest that NPE, per se, is not new. As I had intimated 
earlier, E.H. Carr and other scholars writing decades ago touched on ideas widely associated with 
NPE today. Indeed, Professor Andre Sapir has argued that "from a conceptual perspective, NPE 
is not new. From a descriptive view point, it is; for the reason that the EU is evolving in a trend 
which suggests that a global Europe is rising. Tremendous strides have been taken in the 
economic, political, cultural and intellectual realms; this European project can benefit other 
states not formally part of the Union. The projection of this project is informing the EU's 
interaction with others, forming critical elements of a distinctly European vision for global 
governance. What is more, that the European project is reaching a critical mass within the Union, 
there is tremendous scope for its export beyond the Union. By the same token, in so far as NPE 
projects the European project it serves a defensive end, a countervail against the United States' 
designs for a global governance order and for that matter a rising China. There is also an 
offensive dimension, in this regard. The EU wants to advance the cause of its norms for 
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commercial and business ends, too. Innovation and competitiveness are now central to 
. ·1· . 1 d ,,284 c1v1 izahona a vance. 
The various statements referenced above are telling of a Europe entity's 'foreign policy' 
intentions, especially the declaration that in respect of the vision for Europe's responsibilities in 
and contribution to the world they must correspond in degree to its traditions and its mission 
which includes preserving a sense of progress and culture. In these key documents the EU's 
global role expectations were garnished with a normative sense of purpose, and as such are in 
keeping with the normative-role approach. Practitioners, it would appear, have been leading the 
charge in transforming the narrative on the possibilities of a re-envisioned Europe in 
international affairs. Theoreticians would soon follow, as the 1970s unfolded, in adopting and 
extoling this narrative; chief amongst them was Duchene. 
In the realm of the CFSP, the EEAS has positioned the EU to 'speak with one voice' as 
never before. Article 13a Amendments To The Treaty on European Union And To The Treaty 
Establishing The European Community attest to this. The EU's interregionalist pivot is an 
integral part of this narrative. However, how the EU has come to deal with enlargement is also 
instructive; in that it reinforces cohesion around a norm-laden stance/voice projected to third 
parties. 285 The so-called Copenhagen criteria286 captures this dimension quite well. It notes that: 
Membership criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved 
• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities; 
• the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
284 Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic, 16th January, 2010. 
285 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also lends insight, in this regard, in so far as it sets 
out core EU values; in the very first chapeau of its Preamble it frames the notion of "ever closer union" on the basis 
of "common values". It goes on to set out other values, underscoring the "individual [as being] at the heart of the 
Union's activities" (Charter ofFundamental Rights of the EU 2000). 
286 See http ://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession _process/ criteria/index_ en.htm 
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with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; 
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic & monetary union, and importantly adoption of the 
acquis communautaire based on expanded administrative structures to do so. 
(European Council 1993) 
What of the EU's dealings with states or groupings of states farther afield? Again, the 
Declaration on European Identity is instructive. In reference to the then Member States, as 
previously noted, the Declaration said those States "propose progressively to undertake the 
definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that 
in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely 
European foreign policy." Two themes come into view. 
First, allowance was made for engaging "groups of countries". A more recent 
Commission communication is especially notable, in this regard. It records the following: 
The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new member 
states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing 
social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU must act to promote the 
regional and subregional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for 
political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social 
divisions in our shared environment. 
(European Commission 2003, 3; my emphasis) 
Second, the act of engaging third parties would 'strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to 
the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy.' 
Both these propositions resonate as much today as they did thirty-plus years ago. In sum, 
interregionalism holds up EU actorness. 
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I had previously linked interregionalism to EU actorness, suggesting that it props up the 
latter. I address this contention in detail now. 
That this notion pervades practitioners' thinking is becoming increasingly apparent, in 
light of the trend of a sharp increase in pronouncements to this end. In a European Parliament 
Committee on Foreign Affairs Resolution/Report on the 'EU as a Global Actor: Its Role in 
Multilateral Organisations (2010/2298(INI))' issued 29 April 2011, it was noted that the Lisbon 
Treaty by "introducing" the EU's a legal personality: 
.... entrusts [the EU] with a wider range of competences in its external 
action, provides, notably by the creation of the post of a Vice-President of 
the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (VP/HR) and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), the Union with an opportunity for a clearer and stronger single 
voice in the world, as well as encouraging all types of mutually beneficial 
cooperation with relevant international and regional organisations and 
groups of states, and whereas it enables the Union to organise itself in 
such a way as to be able to become an effective global player .... 
(European Parliament 2011, 5; my emphasis) 
The same document went on to say that the European Parliament (which has a 'strengthened 
role'/'new powers', as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon or Lisbon Treaty) "[t]akes the view that, as 
a general rule and in the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, in cases of exclusive competences the EU 
should be the pre-eminent actor with full membership of the given multilateral organisation 
while its Member States may also - but need not necessarily - be present as members, but 
usually without an independent role" (European Parliament 2011, 5). 
The Lisbon Treaty refers to the EU as an actor on the international stage empowered with 
a voice, and as such is an instantiation of the EU as global actor approach. Instructively in the 
Treaty, the EU is referred to as having the "competence" to define and implement a common 
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foreign and security policy, a competence which includes the "progressive framing of a common 
defence policy." In respect of external action, "the role of the EU is further enunciated in the 
Treaty such the EU can be a player on multiple stages and assert itself as never before in 
international affairs".287 
I want now to return to a statement by Manners that I have cited before: for him the 
concept of NPE is the "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" (2002, 
239). The statement has a dual meaning. In as much as it references, as I have discussed, norm 
projection and the role of that exertion of norms in changing up the 'normal' viz-a-viz norms, its 
second meaning is just as important: the differencia specifica of the EU. Importantly, that the EU 
is a region operating in an international space conventionally seen as the domain of states in and 
of itself disrupts notions of what is 'normal' in international relations (Manners 2002). What is 
more, the EU cannot be neatly folded into the set of actors conventionally labeled international 
organizations, because both in form (institutions) and goals (vision) the EU stands apart in 
continually shifting the 'limits of the po~sible'. Thus at the level international organizations, too, 
the EU forces a re-think of what is 'normal'. 
Further still, in projecting itself and framing itself as a cohesive region, the EU as Dr Luk 
Van Langenhove argues "wants to interact with others like it; meaning regions that exude 
regionness. The EU wants to identify with other regions. Where there is a dearth of others like it, 
the EU wants to create those like entities. This helps establish normalcy for it as an actor. Where 
the EU finds an environment that is not populated with like entities, it seeks to create them so as 
hold up a reality consistent with its form; the push towards regional EPAs fits with this agenda. 
The reverse is also true, in that by projecting itself as a region it wants to change up what is 
287 Mr Esmond Reid, Minister Counsellor, Jamaican Mission to the European Union and Jamaican Embassy: 
Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010. 
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considered normal in the actor-centric international system. "288 
At this juncture, I contend that interregionalism is also a key vehicle/medium or platform 
that not only buttresses but projects NPE or spread/extend EU norms globally, what the EU 
ultimately aspires toward in the international sphere in order to shape a global governance model 
with regional overtones. Various European bodies have said as much, with references to the EU 
being positioned to be "able to assert its interests and values on the international scene" 
(European Parliament 2011). The EU has "honed its experience, in this regard, in the accession 
process with respect to EU enlargement. "289 
The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, respectively, brought large chunks of Eastern 
and Southern Europe into the EU fold. 290 In and of itself, enlargement is a linchpin of ensuring 
compliance with a common body of norms, constitutionalized as a body of law no less. 291 This 
acquis communautaire is the ultimate, most ideal way for the EU to shore up its norms and 
through its interregionalist approach to global governance. 
However, it is not practicable for enlargement to continue at the pace it has in recent 
years. There are several hurdles to this. Two that immediately come to mind is the appetite (or 
lack thereof) within the European polity for continued enlargement. There is also the question of 
the boundeness of Europe, in so far as a European zone is concerned. 
If it is that the EU is taken up with projecting its norms, surely enlargement cannot be the 
288 Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic, 17th January, 2010. 
289 Official, European Commission Directorate General for Enlargement: Interview by author, Brussels, 4th 
February, 2010. 
290 In May 2004, ten states joined the EU (i.e., Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) in the way of the so-called 'big bang' enlargement. This fifth accession 
brought in the largest number of states, and it was followed in January 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
291 The acquis communautaire "is, in effect, the continual codification of Community/European values, which form 
an important element in the NPE projection narrative, in so far as the areas being dealt with by the acquis are finding 
expression in EU external action around the EPA, for instance, but also the CPA": Mr Morgan Githinji, Expert, 
Market Access, ACP Secretariat: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010. 
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only tool at its disposal, given the limitations therein. It can be surmised that other platforms are 
required, to continue NPE. EU pivoted interregionalism with third states or non-member states 
who in the main will likely not become formal members is a hallmark of this strategy. 
The EU has a strong interest in continuously engaging a pool of states so that on the basis 
of that engagement those states are positioned to partake of, have a stake in and in tum reproduce 
the EU global governance order. The end result is that the EU-influenced international 
system/order becomes self sustaining, built on self reinforcing agents (i.e. regions) and structure 
(i.e. the international system) that relate to each other intersubjectively with norms being the 
bridge: this approach is sui generis to the EU. 292 Empirical evidence supports this claim. We 
need look no further than the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, though this influence narrative is more 
apparent in the European neighbourhood policy (ENP), as is evidenced in European Commission 
statements as follows: 
The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement 
with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for 
all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines 
between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to 
participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic 
and cultural co-operation .... The method proposed is, together with partner 
countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfilment will bring them closer to 
the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated in jointly agreed Action 
Plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and 
reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in 
the EU's Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information 
society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-
to-people contacts .... .The European Neighbourhood Policy will reinforce existing 
forms of regional and subregional cooperation and provide a framework for their 
further development. 
(Commission for the European Communities 2004, 3 and 4) 
292 This narrative is reminiscent of constructivism, which is widely recognized for bridging structure and agency. 
259 
In point of fact, after enlargement the next testing ground for the transposition of EU norms are 
the EU's immediate neighbours, via the ENP. As some scholars have noted, "[e]arly ENP 
pronouncements in particular made conscious references to the Copenhagen criteria and the 
acquis communautaire as appropriate guidelines for the ENP countries" (Magen 2007, 3 79). As 
previously intimated, Agreements entered into via the EU's interregionalist pivot, like the EPA 
(but also Association Agreements with non-ACP states, e.g. in Latin America), are a third tier of 
the EU strategy of norm projection. It is perhaps opportune to note here that, "in as much as a 
link can be made between NPE and EPA that link was not always there. When talk of the EPA 
began, that instrument was framed strictly in terms of facilitating WTO compatibility in EU 
trading relations with the ACP regions."293 There is "no doubt, too, that the EPAs were seen, at 
their 'conceptual outset' as an instrument to surmount the long simmering 'banana battle'-which 
came to a head in the mid-1990s when banana preferences were deemed indefensible in the 
WTO context-in which both the CARIFORUM States and by extension the EU were involved 
in, pitted against other, primarily Latin American, WTO members. "294 
However, "in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and contemplation of the 
inclusion of parts of Eastern and Southern Europe into the EU via enlargement prompted 
strategic thinking on the extension of application of elements of the acquis communautaire 
beyond the shores of Europe. As the 2000s drew nearer, the conceptualization of the EPAs as 
being more than just about sorting out WTO compatibility took hold in hallways of the European 
Commission."295 This sentiment about the acquis communautaire is shared by legal scholars296 
293 Mr Walter Kennes, Head of the Sector for Regional Integration, Directorate-General for Development, European 
Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
294 Mr San Bilal, Head of Economic Governance Programme, European Centre for Development Policy 
Management: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
295 Mr Walter Kennes, Head of the Sector for Regional Integration, Directorate-General for Development, European 
Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
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and given practical expression in the Lisbon Treaty. 297 Instructively, the European Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barroso quipped, "it is often said that the EU's comparative advantage lies 
in its normative power or the power of its values" (Barroso 2009). 
Indeed, these various methods of docking with Europe in a fashion that facilitates the 
transposition of norms supports (and fits very nicely with) the aforementioned contention of an 
EU functionary, which bears repeating here: "[t]he EU's most effective method of exerting soft 
power is by persuading countries to integrate themselves into legal frameworks and economic 
relationships with the Union" (Rehn op cit). The framing of the EPA along these lines merits 
further study, as the EU's engagement in this regard is emblematic of a distinctive 
interregionalist European, normative approach to global governance. Many in the Caribbean's 
PBA and TBA have made this observation, as my field research has revealed.298 
As is revealed in the next section, EU values are transposed through the EPA. This is 
emblematic of the regionalization norm, and is "a tactic that obtains with regards to the EPAs 
that the EU has pursued with the other ACP regions, too"299. Moreover, the Agreement serves to 
reinforce the EU's understanding of the identity-based delimitation of the Caribbean. As we shall 
also see, this 'prevailing' view of the regional configuration has visited complexities that go to 
296 For Magen, "the phrase 'acquis communautaire' contains two commonly undifferentiated yet strongly distinct 
personalities, which in turn serve two very different purposes: an inward-looking, 'internal order' personality that 
represents the inherited patrimony of the community and acts to preserve the sui generis genetic code of European 
integration; and a second, 'transformative engagement' (or 'governance export') personality, whose purpose is the 
outward projection of EU norms and the advancement of its interests abroad" (2007, 361-362). 
297 Article 21 of Title V, Chapter I of the Lisbon Treaty reads as follows: "The Union's action on the international 
scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world ... ". 
298 For example, in an interview I conducted with Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM in Port 
of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 18th May, 2012 he argued "given how the EU is positioning itself in the world it is 
always trying to influence norms, and platforms like the EPA represent important means through which it attempts to 
exercise that influence." A similar view was expressed by Ambassador Colin Murdoch, Antigua and Barbuda's 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade (who also serves as an OECS Commissioner on behalf of that country 
and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Caribbean Export Development Agency) in an interview I 
conducted with him in Georgetown, Guyana on 25th May, 2012. 
299 Mr Morgan Githinji, Expert, Market Access, ACP Secretariat: Interview by author, Brussels, 2 lst January, 2010. 
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the heart of how these states treat with each other. 
6.4.2 EU Global Governance: The Role of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA 
In respect of the aforementioned research trajectory, my empirical analysis focuses on one EU 
policy-type norm: r.egionalization.300 In so far as for Manners (2002) a norm is not only a 
commonly accepted standard but a standard that is dubbed normal, my interest lies in exploring 
what the EU supports as normal in respect of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA'sform and/unction. 
I. The Export of the Regionalization Norm: The EPA in Form 
At this juncture, let us turn our attention once more to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. It bears 
repeating here that the EPA can be traced back to the CPA (see Chapter Five). Indeed, elements 
of the preamble of the EPA are framed in the context of the CPA. What is even more instructive 
is that Article 2 of the EPA on Principles says of the Agreement, it "is based on the Fundamental 
Principles as well as the Essential and Fundamental Elements of the Cotonou Agreement, as set 
out in Articles 2 and 9, respectively, of the Cotonou Agreement" (European Commission 2008; 
my emphasis). It goes on to note that the EPA "shall build on the provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement and the previous ACP-EC Partnership Agreements in the area of regional cooperation 
and integration .... [and that] .... [t]he Parties agree that the Cotonou Agreement and this 
Agreement shall be implemented in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner" (ibid; 
my emphasis). 
300 This is not a norm that Manners identifies in his classificatory schema that lists nine EU norms, nor is it one that 
gamers much explicit focus in the literature. He flags five core norms: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights; four minor norms are also noted: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable 
development and good governance. The regionalization norm can, however, be seen as a supportive norm, in so far 
as the other norms that are typically identified in the literature find expression in a regionalization backdrop. What is 
more, regionalization as a concept looms large in "declaratory" language in respect of EU communications on 
external action (Manners 2002, 248). What is more, regionalization is fundamental to EU identity. 
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In respect of Article 2 of the second revision of the CPA there are four headings related to 
fundamental principles, the last of which is germane here. It is partly captioned as 
"regionalization." This portion of the Article reads as follows: 
[C]ooperation arrangements and priorities shall vary according to a partner's level 
of development, its needs, its performance and its long-term development 
strategy. Particular emphasis shall be placed on the regional dimension. 
(European Commission 2005; my emphasis) 
Article 4 of the EPA touches on Regional integration, and it reads in part: "[t]he Parties 
recognise that regional integration is an integral element of their partnership and a powerful 
instrument to achieve the objectives of this Agreement" (European Commission 2005). the 
Agreement further notes, "[t]he Parties recognise and reaffirm the importance of regional 
integration among the CARIFORUM States as a mechanism for enabling these States to achieve 
greater economic opportunities, and enhanced political stability and to foster their effective 
integration into the world economy" (European Commission 2005).301 
Herein resides the nub of what has turned out to be a bone of contention on multiple 
levels: The ideal definition/configuration of the Caribbean region, for purposes of the EPA. As I 
have already pointed out, the signatory states to the EPA are the fifteen CARIFORUM States; 
i.e. the independent CARICOM Member States and the Dominican Republic. In point of fact the 
agglomeration of these states into a regional configuration, as one of six ACP regions which the 
301 
"There are some who hold the view that the regional dimension of the EU's EPA project across the ACP actually 
split the ACP in a way that the trans-regional grouping is not likely to recover from": Mr Morgan Githinji, Expert, 
Market Access, ACP Secretariat: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010. Senior technicians maintained 
"the ACP Group has played and continues to play a critically important role, and while it must evolve to suit the 
times we cannot contemplate a diminished role for the Group. However, that there is no mention of the ACP in the 
Lisbon Treaty is a worrying sign. What is more, the budgetization of the EDF and other processes in train, like the 
Joint EU-Africa Strategy and the Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy, though important, take away from the ACP": H.E. 
Shirley Skerritt-Andrew, Ambassador, Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States (ECS) to the Kingdom of Belgium 
and Missions to the European Union: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010. 
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EU tasked itself to work with to secure one of six EPAs, has posed a special challenge. To 
understand why, we must trace CARIFORUM's origins.302 
CARIFORUM was created two decades ago. The configuration and the thinking on it 
have come a long way, in the intervening period. CARIFORUM was formally established in the 
early 1990s, when its Rules of Procedure were approved by Ministers of CARIFORUM States 
and signed in November 1992.303 This came on the heels of the accession of the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti to existing ACP-EU Agreements and the need to coordinate the use of funds 
for regional development cooperation, derived from these agreements, to promote regional 
integration amongst states involved. In other words, CARIFORUM was originally created as a 
consultation and coordinating space for the implementation of the resources aimed at promoting 
regional cooperation under the Lome IV Convention. 
For close to a decade of its existence, CARIFORUM was anchored institutionally by a 
Secretariat. It existed parallel to the CARICOM Secretariat. The CARIFORUM Secretariat was 
later merged into the CARI COM Secretariat, following a revision of the CARIFORUM Rules of 
Procedure, at the outset of the last decade. With a view to continuing in the servicing of the 
CARIFORUM function, a CARIFORUM Directorate was created within the CARICOM 
Secretariat. If we are to look to the genesis of CARIFORUM, the Secretary-General of 
CARICOM has been the Secretary-General of CARIFORUM. That dispensation has remained, 
following the merger. The CARIFORUM Directorate falls under the Secretary-General of 
302 The themes covered in the following paragraph draw extensively from an Interview by the author of Mr Ivan 
Ogando Lora, Director-General, CARIFORUM Directorate, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, 
Georgetown, Guyana, 22nd June, 2011. 
303 While established in the early 1990s, "CARIFORUM was conceived of in the late 1980s, when the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti joined the Lome Agreement. In CARIFORUM, the European Commission was able to 
accommodate the Dominican Republic and Haiti in respect of development cooperation relations. CARIFORUM, as 
the name indicates, was really more of a forum to facilitate exchange on the EDF CRIP and cooperation issues 
broadly conceived," Mr Ben Nupnau, Economic and Trade Affairs Manager, Economic Partnership Agreements 
Unit, Directorate-General for Trade: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
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CARIFORUM, though its day-to-day operations are managed by a Director-General who 
oversees its two Units, one of which is engaged in Development Cooperation/Programming and 
the other facilitates EPA Implementation. Mandates for the Directorate come from the 
CARIFORUM Ministerial Council. 
In recent times, there has been a discemable change in tenor regarding how the role and 
responsibilities of CARIFORUM are viewed. There have been calls to strengthen and breathe 
new life into the role and responsibilities of CARIFORUM. The case for expanding the scope of 
CARIFORUM has been thrust into the spotlight by the shifting CARIFORUM/EU relational 
narrative, for so long pivoted by a development cooperation dynamic, to one that is increasingly 
animated by an implementation narrative regarding the EPA, as well as geo-political 
considerations. 
In sum, CARIFORUM was conceived of and established as a configuration with a very 
specific purpose in mind.304 With the advent of the preliminary exchange of views between the 
Caribbean and EU sides with respect to the latter's desire to pursue an EPA with the region, 
however, it became clear that there was an emerging sense amongst some that the existing 
CARIFORUM configuration should be utilized as the spatial dimension of the region for 
purposes of the negotiation of that Agreement. 
As one European Commission staffer put it, "the EU wanted to facilitate regional 
integration by way of the EPA, but CARI COM as an integration grouping was deemed as being 
too parochial. "305 The staffer further noted, "it was always felt that a larger regional 
configuration would fit the bill, in that it would be big enough to be viable. From the vantage 
304 Mr Luis Omar Fernandez Aybar, Ambassador-Executive Secretary of the National Trade Negotiations 
Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dominican Republic: Interview by author, Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic, 12th June, 2012. 
305 Mr Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission: Interview by author, 
Brussels, 22nd January, 20 I 0. 
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point of states in such a larger configuration likely being able to identify with each other-as 
they are all part of the Caribbean space-and in terms of the greater economic/trade benefit to be 
had from a larger grouping collectively utilizing the EPA, it was felt that CARIFORUM would 
be suitable. "306 
Admittedly, views on the matter were mixed, with the Caribbean side for the most part 
expressing reservations. A senior Caribbean elite technocrat has said, "my view that the inclusion 
of the Dominican Republic in a Caribbean configuration to negotiate the EPA was not 
necessarily wrongheaded goes against the grain. "307 By the same token, the technocrat noted 
"the problem is how the Dominican Republic was accommodated in the Caribbean configuration 
that would come to negotiate the EPA." I will return to consider this latter point shortly. 
Suffice to say, there was some debate early on during efforts to organize the two sides to 
negotiate the EPA for the Dominican Republic to "go it alone," and for their part the independent 
states of CARICOM would sign on to negotiating an EPA.308 This was generally welcomed in 
the Caribbean side, considering many on this side were protagonists of this view. 309 There were 
some in the Dominican Republic who, for various reasons, were not necessarily opposed to this 
view.310 
The EU was "not seized of idea of a separate deal for the Dominican Republic, which that 
country had asked for. "311 The idea of a separate deal for the Dominican Republic never really 
took hold as it did not find favour with the EU side, given that this notion went against the EU's 
306 Mr Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission: Interview by author, 
Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
307 Ambassador Ellsworth John, St Vincent and the Grenadines' emissary to CARI COM and Head of the Regional 
Integration and Diaspora Unit in the Office of the Prime Minister: Interview by author, in Georgetown, Guyana on 
25th May, 2012. 
308 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011. 
309 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011. 
310 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011. 
311 Mr Remco Vahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, 
European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 20 I 0. 
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regionalization norm; not just in the context of the Caribbean but if it were to have entertained 
the idea much less pursued it there would have been implications for the other ACP regions, in 
particular some in Africa that are much less cohesive.312 
The EU did not necessarily force the 'Caribbean's hand' with respect to an acceptance, on 
their part, of the CARIFORUM configuration. However, "it was evident that the EU wanted the 
Dominican Republic in the CARIFORUM configuration."313 As one regional technocrat put it, 
"the EU was the match-maker".314 There was "more of a take it or leave it mentality on the EU's 
part. The Caribbean was not necessarily opposed to the EU's regionalization norm, given its long 
history of pursuing regional integration. But it was recognized even then that the Dominican 
Republic's inclusion could pose manifold challenges. That the CARICOM states were at that 
time pursuing a bilateral trade agreement with the Dominican Republic, and thus on paper this 
could be interpreted as meaning CARICOM states were committed to integration with that 
country, it was a stretch to imagine that this sort of initiative gave license for the Dominican 
Republic to be let into the Caribbean fold to negotiate an EPA. 
On the face of it, an outsider not au fait with the delicate diplomatic dance between 
CARICOM states and the Dominican Republic might have thought that a bilateral trade 
agreement in process between them should have set the stage for a deeper regional interaction 
courtesy of the EPA. But such an interpretation would have been oblivious to some of the very 
serious tensions, which have played out over the years at a very high level where three 
applications of the Dominican Republic for CARI COM membership have at best received tepid 
312 Mr Remco Yahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, 
European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
313 Sir Edwin W. Carrington, former Secretary General, CARICOM Secretariat: Interview by author, Georgetown, 
Guyana, 17th November, 2011 and 29th March, 2012. 
314 Mr Esmond Reid, Minister Counsellor, Jamaican Mission to the European Union and Jamaican Embassy: 
Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010. 
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and at worst no response from CARICOM."315 
As an elite technocrat put it, "the inclusion of the Dominican Republic into the Caribbean 
configuration to negotiate the EPA seemed logical to the EU."316 As an EU official said, "with 
the emergence of the CPA and the recognition that springing from it would be regional EPAs, in 
terms of the Caribbean EPA it was obvious to the EU side that the Dominican Republic would be 
part of that configuration. For the EU, the Dominican Republic is a part of one geographic space; 
its inclusion in the Caribbean configuration to negotiate the EPA made a lot of sense. This is not 
to say that CARIFORUM was an instrument of convenience; we recognized that regional 
integration can take many forms, including incipient forms. Considering the Dominican Republic 
falls outside of CARI COM, we imagined that the EPA would facilitate deepened integration with 
respect to the Dominican Republic and CARICOM; which at the time was already receiving a 
boost from the negotiation of the CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA."317 (This rationale 
would resonate somewhat with technocrats in the Dominican Republic who were originally 
averse to pairing their country with CARICOM to negotiate the EPA, but it was by no means the 
deciding factor with respect to their change of heart.318) 
315 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 201 l. 
316 Ambassador Errol L. Humphrey, Head of the EPA Implementation Unit in the Foreign Trade Division of 
Barbados' Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and former Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM EPA College 
of Lead and Alternate Lead Negotiators (he also served as Ambassador of Barbados to Belgium and the EU): 
Interview by author, Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010 in the margins of the European Commission-UWI 
Conference on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA One Year On: Regional Integration and Sustainable Development. 
317 Mr Ben Nupnau, Trade and Economic Affairs Manager, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate-
General for Trade: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 20 I 0. 
318 The "game changer" regarding Dominican elite technocrats for the most part coming on board with the idea of 
joining with CARICOM to negotiate the EPA was that country's experience negotiating the Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement or DR-CAFTA (Mr Manuel Rodriguez, Economic Studies Coordinator, 
Directorate of Foreign Trade and Commercial Treaties Administration, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 
Dominican Republic: Interview by author, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 12th June, 2012). Originally the 
Agreement was envisioned to encompass five Central American nations on the one hand and the United States on 
the other. Negotiations began in early 2003, and the Agreement was signed in 2004. After negotiations had begun 
with the original grouping of countries, the Dominican Republic was docked on. The announcement that the 
Dominican Republic would join negotiations came in late 2003. Actual Negotiations between that country and the 
United States got underway in early 2004, concluding by March of that year. The Agreement entered into force in 
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Ultimately, the "EU vision is to support regional markets that tend to approximate what it 
sees as geographical spaces."319 An elite technocrat makes the point that "the Caribbean is seen 
as a subsystem and the governments of this Community are desirous to protect the identity of the 
subsystem as a recognizable collectivity making decisions within an autonomously determined 
juridical and political framework."320 (I have touched intermittently on this theme throughout the 
study) In this vein, taking the similarities of CARICOM Members into consideration, a regional 
statesman has proclaimed, "these countries [are] more than neighbours. The purpose of the 
grouping is more than fraternal" (Seaga 2005, 128). 
This is a widely held view, across the Region, couched in conceptions of solidarity, 
derived from a sense of shared heritage (and interests) and belonging/community: i.e. 'cognitive 
regionalism' (Hurrell 1995, 352) that are not necessarily tangible but nonetheless vital to (and, 
indeed, can be seen as the lifeblood or connective gel) giving the Caribbean region and 
regionalism expression.321 Professor Lewis further notes, "as it relates to the EPA, the EU's view 
of the Caribbean's regional construct won out. The independent CARI COM states, for the most 
the Dominican Republic in 2007. However, both during negotiations and following their conclusion the Agreement 
was controversial in the Dominican Republic, primarily because of the extent of concessions that country had to 
give and the outcry that resulted from domestic interest groups and society at large. For the Dominican side, the 
negotiations were "tough" (ibid). The view has been expressed that "with the negotiating experience of the 
Dominican Republic with respect to the United States fresh in the minds of Dominican technocrats and policy 
makers, suddenly going it alone in negotiating with another Global North partner-the EU in the case of the EPA-
was far from appealing. These players were minded that CARICOM would likely not be ambitious in negotiations 
for the EPA, an outlook that at the time resonated with some Dominican officials who with the experience of DR-
CAFTA negotiations under their belt were inclined to play it safe. What is more, it is fair to say that some 
Dominican officials derived comfort in the knowledge that in a scenario of a paired negotiation with CARI COM the 
Dominican Republic would likely improve its odds of negotiating a more favourable Agreement" (ibid). 
319 Mr Karl Falkenberg, Director General for the Environment, Directorate General for the Environment, European 
Commission (formerly Deputy Director General for Trade-European Commission and EU Chief Negotiator for 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA): Interview by author, Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010. 
320 Professor Vaughan Lewis, Emeritus Professor, University of the West Indies and former Prime Minister of Saint 
Lucia and former Director-General, OECS Secretariat: Interview by author, Castries, Saint Lucia, 5th February, 
2010. 
321 As Cantori and Spiegel contend, states comprising a region must "have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, 
social and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states 
external to the system" (1970, 6). 
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part, conceded to the Dominican Republic being grouped with them to negotiate the EPA; this 
was the price they had to pay, if you will, with respect to taking on board the EU's 
regionalization norm. In CARICOM's estimation, that norm was not an anathema, per se, as it 
was felt could shore up these states' lot in a rapidly changing global market place."322 
Thus the EU's normative 'muscle' shone through in respect of the EPA in form. Its 
regionalization norm constructed the Caribbean region. 
II. The Export of the Regionalization Norm: The EPA in Function 
What of the deployment of the regionalization norm and its function in the EPA? By this I mean, 
do various elements of the EPA impact on policy space behind the borders? The short answer is 
yes, it does. On the face of it, this is not sui generis to the EPA. That the EPA touches on behind 
the border issues is part of a growing trend in trade relations, which has especially been playing 
out in the multilateral trading system. The trading system at this level "is faced with new and 
growing demands to extend the liberalization of international commerce and the purview of its 
rules in new areas hitherto considered only of domestic concern" (Sauve and Zampetti 2000, 83). 
One element of the EPA that is unique, though, is Article 23 8 on the Regional Preference. 
EU negotiators were the progenitors of the article. It is emblematic of the exercise or the function 
of the regionalization norm in the EPA, and it has turned out to be meddlesome and especially 
contentious. Article 238(1) & (2) reads as follows: 
322 Ibid., 6. 
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall oblige a Party to extend to the other Party 
of this Agreement any more favourable treatment which is applied within each 
of the Parties as part of its respective regional integration process. 
2. Any more favourable treatment and advantage that may be granted under 
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this Agreement by any Signatory CARIFORUM State to the EC Party shall 
also be enjoyed by each Signatory CARIFORUM State. 
(European Commission 2008) 
To fully appreciate the legal and trade woes that the language contained in these two sub-Articles 
antagonizes for CARIFORUM states, we need to first take stock of how differently positioned 
countries in the CARIFORUM configuration are in relation to the touchstone regional integration 
schema, the CSME. 
Of the fifteen signatory CARIFORUM States to the EPA, at least two fall outside of the 
CSME and one hangs on its fringes. In respect of the two that are clearly not party to the CSME, 
they are The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. The Bahamas is a CARICOM Member 
State, but has decided to opt out of the CSME. The Dominican Republic is not a CARICOM 
Member State, period. However, a CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA has been pursued, 
which has been mired in difficulties and has a built-in agenda in the areas oflntellectual Property 
Rights and Services that both sides have been slow to effect. For its part, Haiti enjoys a special if 
at times ambiguous dispensation, in respect of its involvement in the CSME. Suffice to say, it 
hovers at the margins and for all intents and practical purposes can be considered removed from 
the integration schema in certain respects. 
Herein resides the nub of what has turned out to be a bone of contention on multiple 
levels: Article 238 says, in a nutshell, that whatever treatment (principally with regards to 
market access (in Goods and Services), but also investment) one CARIFORUM state extends to 
an EU state that CARIFORUM state should provide no less favourable treatment to all 
271 
CAR/FOR UM states. 323 That some CAR/FOR UM States fall outside of the CSME regional 
integration schema presents several difficulties/complexities. 324 
Ultimately, the CARIFORUM-EU EPA was also pursued by the EU "in an effort to 
develop intra-regional trade and associated rules."325 The fact is, CARIFORUM's intra-regional 
dimensions reflect a patchwork of integration scenarios, 326 which as I have indicated present 
difficulties/complexities327, principally because CARIFORUM is not a customs union. 
Let us now explore the scenarios that present difficulties/complexities, and why they do. 
Scenario 1 
If any one CSME Member State extends certain treatment to an EU state under the 
aegis of the EPA's Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable 
treatment to all other CARIFORUM States:- Complexity: The benefit may not be 
one that the CSME Member State concerned would have been willing to concede 
to the Dominican Republic in the context of the CARI COM-Dominican Republic 
FT A. What is more, The Bahamas and Haiti are not signatory states to the 
CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA. Furthermore, "the Agreement between 
CARICOM and the Dominican Republic is based on reciprocity with the five 
CARICOM MDCs and non-reciprocity with the LDCs until the year 2005. It 
provides for the asymmetrical application of the reciprocity principle as 
323 The logic of the Regional Preference article does not apply in the case where a CAR/COM State extends certain 
treatment to another CAR/COM State, in so far as there is no obligation on the part of the state in question to provide 
no less favourable treatment to either the Dominican Republic or the EU . 
.324 The EPA's Regional Preference mimics a provision that operates in the EU internal market context. 
325 Mr Remco Yahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, 
European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 20 I 0. 
326 Mr Gregory Downes, Brussels Representative, CRNM: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 20 I 0. 
327 What is more, deep differences between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic with respect to the EPA were 
only recently though not completely resolved. The differences had centered on the CARIFORUM governance issue, 
particularly as it relates to EPA implementation. Challenges experienced in the CARICOM-DR relationship (which 
extend to the realm of the CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA, including its built-in agenda) have also been a 
matter of great concern across CARIFORUM states, and have "resulted in the slow pace of programming of 
Regional Indicative Programme resources as well as the processing of projects and the disbursement of funds 
necessary for EPA implementation" (McClean 2011, 23). Of note, after a seven-year hiatus the Fourth Meeting of 
the Joint Council established under the CARICOM-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement which convened in 
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 31 May 2012, ended much the same way as it did in 2005 - deadlocked. In 
respect of the EPA implementation dimension of things, the CARIFORUM Council of Ministers met in Belize in 
April 2011 and took a number of decisions intended bring resolution to a number of the long standing differences 
with respect to the existing CARIFORUM governance structure, and among those decisions was for "[t]he current 
position of Assistant Secretary-General of CARIFORUM should be designated as Director-General and the 
Director-General should also assume the position of CARIFORUM EPA Coordinator, in addition to his/her 
responsibility for the CARIFORUM Directorate" (Ibid., 23). 
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CARICOM LDCs are not required to reciprocate treatment."328 In the context of 
the EPA, variable geometry is applied in the treatment of groups of states. Of 
note, CARI COM LDCs have not undertaken the degree of liberalization that other 
CARIFORUM States have, namely the Dominican Republic. There is an added 
wrinkle in the context of Scenario 1: there is a law, as at the time of writing, in the 
Dominican Republic (Law 173) which has been a longstanding impediment for 
CARICOM exporters seeking to penetrate the Dominican Republic market. 
Negative Outcome: for CSME Member State(s). 
Scenario 2 
If The Bahamas extends certain treatment to an EU state under the aegis of the 
EPA's Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable treatment to all 
other CARIFORUM States:- Complexity: for The Bahamas, as this could raise 
trade uncertainties given that it is not a CSME Member. Positive Outcome: for 
CSME. 
Scenario 3 
If any one CSME Member State extends certain treatment to an EU state under the 
aegis of the EPA's Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable 
treatment to all other CARIFORUM States:- Complexity: Though The Bahamas 
is an anomaly with respect to the CSME, because of the EPA's Regional 
Preference The Bahamas would be conferred benefits in the face of a situation 
where that country ordinarily would not have enjoyed a benefit given that it falls 
outside of the CSME construct. Negative Outcome: for CSME and CSME states. 
Scenario 4 
If Haiti extends certain treatment to an EU state under the aegis of the EPA's 
Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable treatment to all 
CARIFORUM States:- Scenario 2 would be repeated, but there is a legal grey 
area in terms of the degree of replication of the effect, given Haiti's ambiguous 
association with the CSME. 
Scenario 5 
If any one CSME Member State extends certain treatment to an EU state under the 
aegis of the EPA's Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable 
treatment to all other CARIFORUM States:- Scenario 3 would be repeated, but 
there is a legal grey area in terms of the degree of replication of the effect, given 
Haiti's ambiguous association with the CSME. 
Against this backdrop, Article 233 on the Definition of the Parties and fulfillment of obligations 
serves to magnify the complexities in Article 238. Instructively at various points, Article 233 
328 Sourced from http://crnm.org/index.php?view=article&catid=44 %3 Abilaterals&id=54 %3 Acaricom-domin ican-
repub lic&option=com content&Itemid=79 
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invokes ambiguous responsibilities in respect of the Party vs. Parties. 
The Regional Preference Clause raises a number of fundamental policy issues for 
CARIFORUM States which are not concentrically positioned in respect of the CSME. These 
issues arise on account of what I have already pointed to, how the CARIFORUM States are 
inserted, or not, into the CSME project. 
The fact is for the most part the CSME process, pivoted by the Revised Treaty, and the 
CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA are the two principal Agreements that structure the 
trading-cum-integration relationship within CARIFORUM. The illustration below highlights the 
schema described here. 
CSME Trade Hub-cum-CARIFORUM-centric Trade Schema 
-
-Cq-i>~ ' .. co4t'.a ,1. 
~~ 
4 
Source: Author. 
The CPA, at Article 3 5 .2, states that "economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional 
integration initiatives of ACP States, bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument 
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for the integration of ACP States into the world economy" (European Commission 2005). In 
light of the above analysis of the 'export' of the EU's regionalization norm to the Caribbean, 
though, it is an open question as to whether the most appropriate approach was pursued with 
respect to the EPA's presentform and function. 
As to the EU's expressed desire to apply the CARIFORUM configuration in the EPA 
context, a refrain from Neumann is instructive: "[R]egions are invented by political actors as a 
political programme, they are not simply waiting to be discovered" (2001, 58; my emphasis). 
This latter point in considered further, against the backdrop of the Joint Caribbean-EU 
Partnership Strategy. 
6.5 The Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy: The Link to the CARIFORUM-EU 
EPAandNPE 
In keeping with the "EU's focus on regional approaches to political dialogue, joint partnership 
strategies have been developed or are in the process of being negotiated to take bi-regional 
partnerships forward."329 At the Fourth CARIFORUM-EU Summit held in Madrid, Spain in 
2010, the proposal for the formulation, adoption and implementation of a Joint Caribbean-EU 
Partnership Strategy was endorsed. The Caribbean and EU sides subsequently engaged in 
negotiations for a new Joint Strategy, further to one that crystallized in 2006. 
On 19 November 2012, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of the EU formally adopted 
the new Joint Strategy. The Twentieth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of CARIFORUM, 
convened in the Dominican Republic on 29-30 November 2012, formally endorsed the Joint 
Strategy. CARIFORUM States had agreed to the final version of the Joint Strategy in October 
329 H.E. Shirley Skerritt-Andrew, Ambassador, Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States (ECS) to the Kingdom of 
Belgium and Missions to the European Union: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010. 
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2012. As at the time of writing, the launch of the Joint Strategy was expected to take place in the 
first quarter of 2013. 
With respect to the previous Caribbean-EU Strategy, "the 2006 Caribbean-EU Strategy, 
the Caribbean was not a protagonist, per se. "330 This time around with the new Joint Strategy, the 
Caribbean is actively involved. The five agreed areas of action of the Joint Strategy are: 
• The promotion of regional integration and cooperation for sustainable development; 
• Responses to climate change and natural disasters; 
• Support to Haiti; 
• Cooperation on crime and security; 
• Joint action in bi-regional and multi-lateral fora and on global issues. 
Like the EPA, the Joint Strategy does not make specific provision for financial support. Absent 
no financing provisions, similar to the EPA, financing for the implementation of the Joint 
Strategy would have to be provided through the Cotonou Mechanisms for Development 
Cooperation. 
The need for a new Joint Strategy has been described by the EU side as having come 
about because of new "developments and challenges" and a more complex international 
system-including the Lisbon Treaty which "has amended the way in which the EU and its 
institutions will interact with third countries and regions"-which have required another basis for 
interaction outside of the traditional relationship facilitated by the CPA (Council of the European 
Union 2010, 2). 
A senior diplomat has said of a k_ey Joint Strategy document, "a component of the text 
reflects an important pillar of the relationship envisioned for the Caribbean and the EU, namely 
'[t]he partnership is facilitated by the fact that for the EU, the Caribbean States are in general 
330 Mr Ben Nupnau, Trade and Economic Affairs Manager, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate-
General for Trade: Interview by a.uthor, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
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stable democracies governed by the rule of law and is of strategic geographic importance as the 
main gateway to the Americas.' "331 This statement is instructive, indeed. 
The so-called 'enhanced bi-regional relationship' that is to emanate from the Joint 
Strategy has been described by the EU side as providing for an articulation of "common 
interests" (Ibid., 2). What is more, the Joint Strategy forms the basis for political dialogue on the 
future of CARIFORUM-EU relations. 
The Joint Strategy does reveal a "pattern of regionalisation in the EU's external relations, 
complementing what has already been achieved with respect to regionalisation imperatives 
relating to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA."332 From the outset of the development of themes for the 
Joint Strategy, 'regional integration' was identified ~y the EU side as being one such area. Since 
then, the EPA has been repeatedly and explicitly referenced in this context. Instructively, one of 
the findings of a report that emanated from an outreach consultancy commissioned in 2011 to 
engage relevant stakeholders from the Caribbean side and source their input into the further 
development of the Joint Strategy stated that in terms of the Regional Co-operation & Integration 
component of the Joint Strategy stakeholders: 
[C]alled for the bi-regional dialogue to emphasise that the Caribbean must drive 
the integration process - commitments with third parties, particularly agreements 
with the EU under EPA, should not dictate the pace and speed of integration in the 
region ...... numerous participants [interviewees] reflected on the experience with 
EPA, where targets and timeframes agreed to bi-regionally were "dictating the 
pace of integration within the region". 
(Houliston 2011, 11 and 30) 
Thus, NPE overtones are found in the EPA. Indeed, the processes that the EPA is connected to 
331 Brussels-based diplomat: Interview by author, 21st September, 2011. 
332 H.E. Shirley Skerritt-Andrew, Ambassador, Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States (ECS) to the Kingdom of 
Belgium and Missions to the European Union: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010. 
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further implicate it in an NPE narrative: the CPA is top on the list, given that the EPA takes into 
account the overall principles and objectives of the CPA.333 In fact, the EPA explicitly makes this 
link to the political context of the CPA. Some have said, "there is no denying that the EPA 
.reflects, to some extent, an EU altruism, but that the EU has certain defined 
economic/commercial ends in mind in having pursued the EPA with CARIFORUM in particular, 
and in important ways those commercial dimensions are weaved into projecting EU values. The 
regional approach to the EPAs was, frankly, more manageable for the EU and allowed for some 
level of tailoring of values to suit certain clusters of states. "334 Evidently, an EU actorness is at 
play. 
As the head of the EPA Implementation Unit in the Foreign Trade Division of Barbados' 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and former Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM EPA 
College of Lead and Alternate Lead Negotiators, Ambassador Errol L. Humphrey,335 
underscores, "the EU has a global vision that it is projecting. It does so through many platforms, 
and the EPA is one of them. The EPA is, in part, a way for the EU to get the Caribbean to partake 
in this vision. To see the EPA strictly through the lens of it being a trade and development 
agreement is to not see the forest for the trees. Consider that the CPA, which is the context for 
the EPA, has a political dimension, one of three pillars to that Agreement, which the Lome 
Agreements that came before did not have. "336 
333 Indeed, Article 2 of the EPA in respect of Principles notes that "[t]his Agreement is based on the Fundamental 
Principles as well as the Essential and Fundamental Elements of the Cotonou Agreement, as set out in Articles 2 and 
9, respectively, of the Cotonou Agreement." Article 2 goes on to state that "[t]he Parties agree that the Cotonou 
Agreement and this Agreement shall be implemented in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner." 
334 Mr Rem co Yahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, 
European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010. 
335 He was also a long serving Ambassador ofBarbados to Belgium and the EU. 
336 Interview by author, Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010 in the margins of the European Commission-UWI 
Conference on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA One Year On: Regional Integration and Sustainable Development. 
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This is a view shared by other elite technocrats. The Assistant Secretary-General of 
Foreign and Community Relations at the CARICOM Secretariat, Ambassador Colin Granderson, 
notes that "the EU's approach to negotiating agreements with many parts of the developing 
world, and the Caribbean is no exception, draws on a certain vision of its place in the world and 
(at times) imposition of its norms-which find ultimate expression in its acquis 
communautaire-on that part of the world. The transposition of these norms is not 
unproblematic. "337 
In how it conveys its motives, though, the EU is careful to build an edifice of rhetoric that 
lends itself to narratives of legitimacy and altruism, cloaked in notions of partnership. Here we 
come full circle to the Joint Strategy, as it and its stated political dimension are tied into this 
narrative. As Barbados' Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, H.E. Maxine McClean, 
states, "[a]lthough the scope of the Joint Strategy is broader than that of the EPA, there are some 
complementarities and even similarities or possible overlap in some areas" (2011, 25). 
Indeed for some, "NPE ties into the EU reclaiming influence in the Global South 
following diminished influence in the wake of decolonization and new possibilities for the EU to 
insert certain ways of thinking in respect of aspects of post-Cold War global governance in a 
manner that can uphold and project European civilizational discourse, thereby invoking defensive 
and offensive imperatives to better mitigate a host of present and prospective security challenges 
to the European zone. "338 
The normative-role approach provides a theoretical backdrop for this sort of viewpoint 
regarding the EPA and the EU's NPE agenda, and how it pivots itself accordingly. 
337 Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 29th June, 2012. 
338 H.E. Dr Patrick I. Gomes, Ambassador of Guyana to Belgium and the European Union: Interview by author, 
Brussels, 22nd January, 20 I 0. 
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6.6 The Functional Application of Actorness: Effects, Dynamics and Demonstrating 
Causal Relationships 
As I did with respect to the first dimension of this study, I want now to draw attention to causal 
relationships in respect of the second dimension which sought to discern the hands of the EU as a 
would-be region constructor and in the projection of NPE, utilizing what has been described 
elsewhere rather simplistically as just a trade and development agreement-the CARIFO RUM-
EU EPA. I want, first, to take up where I left off earlier in the chapter in noting that elements of 
Manners' (2002) analysis are not that far removed from and owe an intellectual debt to 
constructivist contributions to EU studies. 
Building on this argument, like constructivists, my starting position is that interests must 
be seen as being mutually constituted by way of interactions amongst actors. Further, the EPA 
can be viewed as a devise that brought together, for a time at least, the negotiating institutions of 
the Caribbean and the EU. With this in mind, the chapter developed the following arguments: in 
the lead up to EPA negotiations, EU agents in the European Commission exerted considerable 
influence amongst Caribbean States with respect to shaping their interest in the construction of 
the Caribbean as CARIFORUM. According to empirical findings that the CARIFORUM 
grouping ultimately became the configuration of choice was not so much a validation of EU 
region construction designs on the part of Caribbean States as it was a convenience for them, 
and one which they made work to their advantage during negotiations for the accord. The fact is, 
the addition of negotiators from the Dominican Republic into the Caribbean side made for a 
stronger negotiating team on that side. Afterall, the Dominican Republic had gained robust 
experience negotiating a variety of trade pads especially with large developed countries, namely 
the United States in the context ofDR-CAFTA. 
However, the account of dynamics and implications of some socialization practices by 
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EU agents directed at the Caribbean region, as I have just described them, speak only to one part 
of a two part story developed in the chapter. The second argument put forward deals directly with 
the notion of actorness a la the post-Maastricht EU-by way of the European Commission-and 
its interregional engagement with the Caribbean. As with interregional interactions involving the 
European Commission in general, it was found that the EPA (which is caught up in the highly 
political Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy) is a mechanism for the EU to transfer 
elements of the legal and institutional norms a la the acquis communautaire to the Caribbean. 
This manoeuvre forms part of a wider, persistent global governance strategy targeting a 
significant chunk of the Global South, as evidenced by the EU's push to engage in EPAs with the 
other five ACP regions. Consider that together the ACP Group comprises a 79-member bloc. 
The significance of this normative manoeuvre by the EU in its interactions with regions 
like the Caribbean cannot be overstated, since ideas matter in framing global governance 
agendas that are far from impartial. In this regard, whose ideas find expression as the defining 
ideas of any number of global governance imperatives can mean the difference in the extent of 
success and the degree to which groups of states fall short in respect of desired foreign policy 
ends, set against a zero-sum global governance environment. 
In light of this sort of analysis, an important take away is that grafting of EU norms to 
developing country regions can come with its fair share of problems, in light of a complex set of 
interdependencies. The case of the one norm analyzed in the latter part of the chapter is evidence 
of this, in so far as it has visited complexities on a many-tiered integration schema involving the 
CARIFORUM States that are not easily tackled. 
6. 7 Conclusion 
The chapter is firmly situated as a contribution to the debate on NPE. It serves to extend the 
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boundaries of this debate, delving as it does into previously unexplored areas. Not typically 
studied in this manner, the foregoing NPE-styled analysis lends new insight as regards the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA. By extension it widens the geographic and conceptual scope of NPE 
studies· in a manner that warrants greater attention from NPE scholars. What is more, it pushes 
the intellectual envelope in respect of scholarship on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, which to date 
has centered on theoretical and policy issues in a rather conventional manner (see, for instance, 
Stevens et al 2009). Its domaine reserve has been questions that mainstream political economists 
are content on addressing: tariff issues, non-tariff barriers, new areas that the Agreement is taken 
up with, such as Services, and the prospects therein for a transformative effect on the productive 
and developmental potential of the Region. 
Of course, this sort of analysis is important in its own right. However, the focus of such 
analysis is on the Agreement's fa9ade. The Agreement has deeper meaning, both for how the 
Caribbean Region engaged with itself and with external actors like the EU. In this vein, I have 
formulated new kinds of empirical, theoretical and normative questions to examine the behavior 
of actors who attempt to construct the Caribbean for various purposes. That the Caribbean has 
not attracted the attention of constructivist scholars, small wonder then that this sort of analysis 
has been hitherto elusive. 
Drawing on the work of IR constructivist scholars, Chapter Five sought to frame the EPA 
as a mirror-like devise that at once allows the Region to construct itself and establish an 
ideational framework thereto. The concept of regionness captures many of the elements therein, 
which I sought to explore. In as much as the study has been taken up with socialization processes 
wherein Caribbean agents are the protagonists, it has also been interested in how the Caribbean 
as a cognitive space is also the subject of a construction exercise by region constructors like the 
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EU. In an effort to understand what has motivated the EU in this regard, the study has examined 
its actorness in the particular context of the present chapter. The period under study presented an 
opportunity to study the EU in post-Maastricht terms, a la actorness. However, the negotiation of 
the EPA drew to a close on the cusp of the advent of the Lisbon Treaty. The era since then and 
because of that Treaty has seen EU actorness come into its own as never before, given the 
establishment of the EEAS with responsibility for coordinating European foreign policy and with 
a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at its helm. 
In sum, this chapter has sought to lend causal support to the arguments set out in the 
study, against the backdrop of empirical evidence that finds certain epistemic communities 
across both the Caribbean and Europe seek to socialize the Caribbean. The present chapter, in 
particular, reveals empirical insights of a global governance agenda at work in respect of the 
EU's interregional interaction with CARIFORUM on the shoulders of the EPA. It is neatly 
captured by the term actorness, the dynamics of which have found expression via NPE. Field 
research which facilitated my interaction with members of both Caribbean and EU epistemic 
communities under examination revealed that to frame the EPA in purely trade and development 
terms is, thus, analytically myopic. Something else was at work during EPA negotiations: an 
effort to transpose NPE. 
By the same token NPE tends to be treated with rather uncritically in some scholarship. 
The EU's normative agenda is presented and typically accepted at face value as innocuous, a 
'force for good in world politics'. In analyzing elements of the regionalization norm, the chapter 
determined that norm transposition of that nature makes even more slippery a regional 
integration environment at the level of CARIFORUM which is still trying to find its footing. 
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PARTV 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter VII 
Concluding Remarks 
and Possible Future Directions for Research 
This dissertation has examined, as its primary topic of study, the social context of Caribbean 
(inter)regionalism: socialization of regional states by way of role-playing in relation to their 
identity problematique, in support of persuasion directed at securing norms to accommodate their 
idiosyncratic identity. The study has sought to locate the role, therein, of what I term elite 
technocrats in constructing a Caribbean actor and keeping it on-message against the backdrop of 
international structures and through narrations or the exercise of the 'speech act'/language 
production (that conjure 'images, inflect metaphors and frame social and interactional realities of 
the subject), such that a Caribbeaness is normalized in the international social environment. 
Constructivism is an important referent, in this regard, in so far as that framework 
emphasizes the significance of so-called 'social facts' which are assigned intersubjective 
meanings (Searle 1995). What is more 'argumentative talk'-informed performative negotiations 
and related institutional practices, which hold up state identity, I demonstrate, play a cruci~l role 
in contouring norm-based social practices and realities. 
There has been a paucity of scholarly work on these themes in relation to understanding 
the diplomatic praxis _of Caribbean regionalism, wherein regional bureaucratic actors play a 
pivotal and too often overlooked role in steering the Region's diplomatic course. 
In providing one of the first theoretical and empirical analysis of the social typification/ 
signification of the Caribbean in an (inter)regionalist context, the dissertation makes an original 
contribution to an understanding of the production of the seljhood of states on and through what 
I term the 'Caribbean Regional Platform'. Theorizing small, marginal world regions like the 
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Caribbean as 'social constructs' thus provides conceptual purchase. The study contributes to an 
understanding of the role of social practices and discourse in generating state-cum-regional 
meanings as essential elements of norm-hinged Caribbean diplomacy. Thus it contributes to 
regionalist literature, the latter owing an intellectual debt to critical geopolitics and the NRA of 
Hettne and Soderbaum that draws attention to regional identity and the (de )construction of 
regions.339 Put simply the dissertation attempts to carve out a heuristic space for a better 
understanding of the role of very small state regions in the international system, one that 
provides grounds for optimism about their lot in that system. In doing so, it contributes to 
bridging the disciplinary boundaries of interregionalism, regionalism and island studies. 
A core concern of and key take away /insight from the present study is that the size of the 
state is not so much the determinant of power (in the realist sense, i.e. material power) as is the 
best argument in a negotiated process: a central aim of the dissertation is to highlight this and, by 
extension, the power of ideas. Shared ideas, perceptions and norm-produced understandings tend. 
to animate interactions amongst actors, big and small, in the international system. 
Instructively the study challenges predominant interpretations of power, and in the 
process contributes to a cross-section of scholarly fields most especially IR. What we should be 
seized of and call attention to, it has been argued both theoretically and empirically, is the power 
of ideas/norms (namely, their moral persuasiveness) and the process of social 
learning/socialization in this regard, not the material power of states, per se, which makes for a 
highly problematic theoretical and conceptual framework. With respect to the world's smallest 
state regions, like the Caribbean, seen in this light they are able to punch above their weight in 
international affairs; defying expectations and 'leveling the playing field'. Thus, overcoming 
339 As Paasi (2001) contends in the exercise of social practice and discourse, regions 'become'. 
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limitations of acutely small size is possible in the international system and an appreciation of 
how this can be achieved is sharpened by the deployment of a constructivist framework. 
The Region's elite technocrats are· aware of this from a practitioner's vantage point, 
principally because they at the forefront of and have perfected its praxis. There is, however, less 
of an appreciation amongst theoreticians of the theoretical applications much less the theoretical 
underpinnings therein. Thus an appreciation for insights that can be gained from psychosocial 
abstraction of the Caribbean state's diplomatic behavior tend to be lost on them, and most tend, 
by default, to frame Caribbean diplomacy in instrumental terms. At best, theoreticians pay lip 
service to the application of ideational frameworks to the study of Caribbean diplomacy. At 
worse, they ignore them. Where the Region has been studied, parsimonious rationalist theories 
find favour, with predictable result. 
In addition, there are some other noteworthy findings stemming from the study's first 
research dimension that I wish to flag at this juncture. While the states of the Caribbean Region 
face ineluctable, manifold challenges regarding negotiating trade agreements by virtue of their 
'smallness', there is something to be said about their size and shared identity working to their 
advantage in the following respects: 
(i) Their regional trade governance architecture is not weighed down by an 
overly large epistemic community to consult and agree on matters, and so 
negotiating positions/strategies can be regularly ventilated and arrived at 
efficaciously based on identifiable trade interests and priorities. Moreover 
and in light of the foregoing, strategic agility has come to characterize the 
Region's negotiating posture; 
(ii) Ideas circulate not only regularly but expansively amongst the tight-knit 
pool of elite technocrats, permeating a collective consciousness that 
informs first principles and associated ideational framings as well as 
norms that the Region is invested in mainstreaming in given negotiations 
discourse whenever it ventures to negotiate trade agreements. Importantly, 
through its strong trade governance architecture the Region is able to 
rigorously and deliberatively formulate/galvanize negotiating 
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positions/strategies from the ground up at the level of TBA all the way to 
PBA, for eventual sign-off; and 
(iii) Issue-based advocacy is that much easier, especially in situations where 
first principles and ideas with respect to regional identity-based 
understandings are widely accepted in the group. Indeed, issue-based 
advocacy around the Region's identity problematique is a strategy that the 
Caribbean honed through its experience negotiating the EPA, and is one 
that it has put to use (drawing on the lessons of and insights from EPA 
negotiations) in CARICOM-Canada Trade and Development Agreement 
negotiations which CARICOM HoG and their Canadian counterpart 
agreed to launch in August 2007. Consider that in these negotiations340 the 
Caribbean has been very strong in advocating a Chapter on Development 
Cooperation and the modalities for the implementation of same. 
CARICOM has called for a clear commitment on the part of Canada 
regarding meaningful subject-specific development commitments in the 
various chapters of the Agreement, which go beyond the traditional notion 
of S&DT, whilst providing asymmetrical obligations in favour of 
CARICOM, in addition to specific support linked to a package of 
resources/development assistance. Failing a Chapter on Development 
Cooperation, CARICOM has made the case that treatment of development 
in the Agreement should be secured, for instance, through legally binding 
Development Cooperation instruments and be informed by and feature 
appropriate linkages with the provisions of the Agreement. 
The second and related claim that the dissertation has examined and which has remained intact 
after having been subjected to analysis is that the EU is a global actor-cum-normative power that 
through interregionalist actions like the CARIFORUM-EU EPA has been promoting its vision of 
the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 'official' Caribbean region-building project, 
with the result that there are ideational and policy-type implications for the Caribbean. These 
efforts are not unrelated to the NPE agenda. An emergent normative power, the EU is 
increasingly relying on the norm-based exercise of actomess to achieve its own ends, which are 
deemed to be not altogether unproblematic. On the face of it, the EPA is billed by the EU as a 
340 At the time of writing, the Fourth Round of Negotiations had been held in Barbados from 17-20 July 2012. It 
provided an opportunity for the two sides to continue textual negotiations which commenced in the Third Round. 
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trade and development agreement. My findings suggest that the EPA is about much more than its 
stated trade and development dimensions; and so to narrowly study it and frame it in these terms 
has limited explanatory value. 
That the EPA goes well beyond this purview in intent and result suggests that the EPA 
cannot be viewed, or for that matter studied, in isolation from questions about the EU's role in 
the world and links to the NPE project, suggesting further that the other ACP regions that have as 
yet to sign-off on their respective EPA's should do so advisedly. As for the CARIFORUM 
Region, it needs to tread carefully as it proceeds to implement its EPA. Moreover, there is cause 
for research that further draws out the NPE-EPA linkage and the implications thereto. 
At this juncture, I want to briefly recall a caveat I had raised at the outset of the study. 
The case has been made in the study that Caribbean regionalism and associated interregionalist 
engagement with the EU, along the lines examined, is conceived of as a formal 
intergovernmental/state-led, top-down process. The fact is such an approach suits the study's 
purpose, and relatedly it has lent itself, especially, to advancing the first of the two scholarly 
interventions at the heart of the dissertation. In this regard, the study draws from constructivist 
research agendas in interregionalism, regionalism and critical geopolitics scholarship, 
respectively, and the tradition of metaphorical analysis and abstraction of islands in island 
studies, with reference to the tradition of small state analysis in IR. The study is one (and not the 
only) way in which to analyze Caribbean (inter)regionalist engagements. I do not purport that the 
approach herein is 'one-size-fits-all'. 
Regional integration could be studied in any number of competing ways, each informed 
by distinct approaches to and paradigms regarding the inscription of actors, their roles, 
associated processes (endogenous and exogenous) and outcomes with respect to regional 
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cooperation/coordination. For instance, the conventional hegemony scholarship could be a useful 
stepping stone. That it tends, however, to be tethered to rationalist/materialist approaches could 
be problematic for some. Classical theories like neo-functionalism may not fare better, given 
such frameworks' predisposition to European regionalism. Liberal inter-governmentalism, a 
framework that has arrived on the scholarly scene only recently, may also prove useful, though 
its predilection for domestic political economy imperatives is contestable in certain scenarios. 
Where informal, non-state regional societal interactions/actors, or for that matter 
economic/commercial cooperation, are the intended subjects of analysis, accounting in 
theoretical and analytical terms for inter-state cooperation may not in fact be a suitable approach 
for the analyst. He may be better served drawing on bottom-up regionalization paradigms, along 
with applicable metatheoretical approaches. In so far as the present study recognizes the crucial 
and marked role of PBA and TBA in the Caribbean Regional Platform with respect to socializing 
states of/in (depending on these elite technocrats' institutional vantage points) the 'Caribbean 
Region', the examination of (inter)regionalism in the theoretical and empirical terms prominent 
in the foregoing is deemed most appropriate. 
Similarly in identifying the links that it does between the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the 
EU's role in the world, the study determines that a juxtaposition of this interregionalist 
engagement on the NPE agenda is analytically most fitting. The strength of the evidence 
notwithstanding, some analysts may not be convinced by the findings of such an approach. The 
fact is, the study presents one (and not the only) way in which to analyze the CAR/FORUM-EU 
EPA, and it does so in so far as it determines that the NP E agenda permeates a spectrum of EU 
initiatives with third parties. 
With this in mind, the dissertation's theoretical engagement (particularly in the context of, 
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though not limited to, Chapters One, Two, Three and Four) and empirical analysis and the 
attendant applications thereto (particularly in the context of, though not limited to, Chapters Five 
and Six) suggest that there is substantial scope for further research of the Caribbean from an 
ideational vantage point. This extends to its relations with the EU, too, dealt with more frontally 
in Chapter Six. The dissertation should, therefore, also be seen as a general call for theoretical 
pluralism in the empirical study of the Caribbean in international studies, wherein it is framed as 
a relational act/device. 341 
The recent emergence of ideational social theories and methodologies and their 
instantiation in IR provide a powerful tool to accurately showcase very small states' realities and 
their agency, which have typically been hidden from view in conventional theorizing or 
dismissed outright. By the same token scholarly forays into the study of Europe's interregional, 
norm-based designs for/in the Caribbean are also not discernable, yet like the ideational study of 
Caribbean diplomacy its study reveals important insights related to discourse, social interaction, 
identity and norms and the role of Agreements like the EPA in propagating the EU's norms in 
another region. This dissertation has attempted to begin to patch these gaping holes in the 
literature, offering glimpses into scholarly frontiers that beckon. 
The dissertation is a long overdue contribution to theorizing and a reappraisal of the 
Caribbean in world politics, by drawing on influential alternative theoretical framings that have 
enjoyed wide application in IR and some related sub-fields, but that have remained elusive in the 
study of the Region. Although reflectivist and postcolonial approaches have recently attempted 
to establish a beachhead with regard to the critical study of various aspects of the Caribbean 
341 In that, not unlike self-other depictions, states in a regional grouping may also define their commonality, their 
'we-feelings' in juxtaposition to an external 'other' (Hurrell 1995, 335). Instructively, as one of Katzenstein's key 
findings in Small States in World Markets (1985) suggests in the European context, "[p]erceived vulnerability 
generated an ideology of social partnership that had acted like a glue for the corporatist politics of the small 
European states" (Katzenstein 2003, 11 ). 
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political economy, hitherto social constructivism, SIT and Habermas' social theory have not 
found their way, in any concerted manner, into the study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism. Their 
analytical deployment in the present study reveals not only that they can make a substantive 
contribution to the study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism, but also the place of very sinall states 
in the international order which historically have been largely overlooked. 
The fact is, where there has been long-standing and sustained engagement with such 
alternative theoretical framings in IR, comparatively-speaking their application in the study of 
Caribbean international affairs has barely scratched the surface. Unfortunately, where 
constructivism and related debates pitting it against a slew of other perspectives, for instance, 
have generally traveled to sub-field and area studies, its penetration of Caribbean regional studies 
is not readily apparent. This is an apparently anomalous state of affairs, when viewed against 
constructivism's wide appeal in such sub-fields as European regional and international/security 
studies. What is more, a range of global and intra-state developments (notably in security and 
political economy areas) that have come to pass since the end of the Cold War and that arguably 
have deeply affected the Caribbean region present no shortage of areas for analyses in this vein; 
Caribbean (inter)regionalism being one of them. 
The framework outlined in the present study provides a more compelling theory-driven 
and policy-relevant schema with which to conceptualize the Caribbean's (inter)regionalist 
engagement, compared to the insights of rationalist perspectives on Caribbean international 
affairs. Such a research vector should appeal to theorists and practitioners alike, and merits 
further exploration. 
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ANNEX 
Table 2 
Interregionalism Involving the Caribbean* 
Interregional Initiative 
CARIFORUM-EU 
Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) 
Joint CARIFORUM-EU 
Council (per Article 227) 
Note: This bi-regional, 
ostensibly trade relationship 
has been accounted for here. 
The same has not been done 
for other CARJCOM bilateral 
free trade agreements, e.g. 
between CARICOM and 
several Latin American 
countries (and soon Canada), 
as they are purely trade 
pacts; not having the same 
breadth and historical 
resonance as the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
Year Established/ 
Frequency and Type of 
Summits 
2008/Meetings of the Joint 
CARIFORUM-EU Council -
the highest institution 
overseeing the 
implementation process - are 
convened at intervals that are 
not to exceed two years. It 
meets at Ministerial level, 
while other Committees that 
form part of the EPA 
implementation architecture 
meet at the level of Officials. 
CARIFORUM-EU Political 201 O/biennial, Ministerial 
Areas a/Cooperation Type of 
Interregional 
Relationship 
The Agreement, at large. Bi-regional 
Of the five* institutions set out in the Agreement and that are tasked with 
responsibilities meant to ensure that the objectives of the CARIFORUM-EU 
EPA are met, the Joint Council is the highest such institution. It is described 
as having the responsibility to supervise implementation, in addition to 
taking decisions concerning said Agreement. 
* As outlined in Part V of the Agreement on '[nstitutional Provisions', the 
other bodies are the: CARIFORUM-EU Trade and Development Committee 
(Article 230), CARIFORUM-EU Parliamentary Committee (Article 231 ), 
CARIFORUM-EU Consultative Committee (Article 232) 
For some, the four institutions comprise 'the soul of the Agreement'. 
The fifth Committee, tasked with dealing with Customs and Trade 
Facilitation matters, is the most recently established one. 
Served as a preparatory meeting for· the EU-Latin America and the Bi-regional 
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Dialogue* (superseded by level 
CAR/FORUM-EU High-
Level Meeting held in the 
margins of the Community of 
Latin American and the 
Caribbean States (CELAC)-
EU Summit) 
* It is in keeping with the 
Lima Declaration of 2008, 
which agreed on the 
establishment of mechanisms 
required for a structured, 
comprehensive political 
dialogue. 
Caribbean Summit (but also the EU-CARIFORUM Summit, on its margins) 
that followed, in May 2010.342 
The Dialogue allowed for an exchange of views on a range of Western 
hemispheric issues, including increasingly closer ties/cooperation between 
Caribbean and Latin American countries by way of the Rio Group, the Latin 
American and Caribbean Integration Development Process, the Union of 
South American Nations (formerly the South American Community of 
Nations), and the Latin American Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA). The 
Caribbean side highlighted regional food security, energy and climate 
change/natural disaster concerns; in addition to security matters affecting 
the Region, e.g. drug trafficking and small arms trade. In line with the 
Dialogue's broad aim of promoting partnership and common values of 
respect for democracy, the rule of law and for human rights, the EU side 
raised issues related to human rights; namely initiatives underway regarding 
the moratorium on the death penalty and the International Criminal Court 
(see European Union 2010). These issues were subsequently taken up 
within the framework of the EU-CARIFORUM Summit, convened at the 
margins of the VI EU-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit of Heads of 
State and Government in 20 I 0. 
The Dialogue was intended to strengthen relations between the two regions, 
which have a long lineage dating back to the colonial past. The 
intensification of relations was also envisioned by the provisions of Article 
8 of the Cotonou Agreement. The Dialogue emerged against the backdrop 
of changing post-Cold War geopolitical realities, including partnerships, not 
least being increased membership in the EU and deepening integration, e.g. 
as a result of of the Lisbon Treaty. This Treaty, in particular, has been a 
catalyst for a strategic re-think on both sides of the Atlantic as to how each 
region should engage the other; for example, because of the changing face 
of development cooperation envisioned by the Treaty. 
In concert with Caribbean representatives, the European Commission 
devised a 'Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy', which feeds into this new Dialogue 
platform and was discussed at the EU-CARIFORUM Summit. Preparatory 
meetings for the Joint Strategy were held, including a seminar in Barbados 
in March 2010. This Joint Strategy follows an earlier strategy, authored 
ostensibly by the European Commission, in 2006. 
342 Ms Carlene Knight, Trade and Regional Integration Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean: Interview by author, 
Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010. 
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European Union-Latin 1999/biennial, Heads of State Dialogue on political, economic and cultural strategic partnerships across Relations between a 
America and Caribbean and Government the regions. Typically, mini-summits are organized on the margins, to regional 
Summit enable EU representatives to meet bilaterally with Latin American and organization and a 
(superseded by Caribbean countries and sub-region representatives. regional grouping 
CARIFORUM-EU High-
Level Meeting held in the 
margins of the CELAC-EU 
Summit; first meeting to be 
held in January 2013) 
African, Caribbean and 1975/0fficials, Ministerial Development and political dialogue, with a Secretariat playing a role in Transregional 
Pacific Group of States and Heads of State and coordination on strategic issues. 
(ACP) Government level 
- Frequency of meetings 
varies, with officials, 
ministers meeting fairly 
regularly; and Heads less so. 
UK/Caribbean Forum 1998/biennial, Ministerial Development and political dialogue, in addition to topical discussions; e.g., Quasi-interregional 
level on climate change, security, etc. relations 
CARI COM-Mexico 2010/ biennial, Heads of Political dialogue and cooperation in a variety of areas, spanning foreign Quasi-interregional 
Summit State and Government level and trade policy. It builds on longstanding ties between the Region and relations 
Mexico, with the latter establishing a Joint Commission with CARJCOM. 
CARICOM-Cuba Summit 2002/triennial, Heads of CARICOM-Cuba relations and cooperation Quasi-interregional 
State and Government level relations 
In 1993 an Agreement establishing the CARICOM-Cuba Joint Commission 
was signed. Under the ambit of the Joint Commission, cooperation is 
pursued in an array of areas - such as, the economic, social, cultural and 
technological spheres. 
CARICOM and Cuba concluded a Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement, in July 2000; subsequently signing an Agreement on Cultural 
Cooperation in 2005. 
China-Caribbean Economic 2005/ biennial, Heads of 
and Trade Cooperation State and Government level 
Forum 
CARICOM-Japan 
Consultations 
1993 (the formal 
establishment of CARICOM-
Japan relations )/biennial, 
Officials level 
Inaugural CARICOM-Japan 
Ministerial Meeting in 2000; 
second Meeting in 2010 
CARI COM-Brazil Summit 20 I 0/ triennial, Heads of 
State and Government 
(This arrangement is distinct 
from the dispensation set up 
to advance CARJCOM-
Mercosur (i.e. Common 
Market of the South) 
relations. Technical activities 
between the two 
organizations are envisioned 
and a meeting of the two in 
2010 advanced this, in 
keeping with the Joint 
CARJCOM-Mercosur 
Declaration adopted in 
Salvador de Bahia, Brazil in 
Economic and trade dialogue, to facilitate economic and trade cooperation. Quasi-interregional 
relations 
Wide-ranging cooperation arrangements, inclusive of Quasi-interregional 
development/technical assistance (e.g. in tourism, environmental protection, relations 
energy, and other areas, per the New Framework for CARICOM-Japan 
Cooperation for the Twenty-First Century, with technical assistance for 
projects funded under the Japan-CARICOM Friendship and Cooperation 
Fund). At the Fourteenth Consultations-the most recent-held in April 
2010, dialogue on bilateral cooperation spanned both regional and global 
issues (e.g. post-earthquake assistance to Haiti, the global financial crisis, 
the special treatment/position of Small Vulnerable Economies, etc.); in this 
vein, laying the groundwork for the Second CARICOM-Japan Ministerial 
Meeting in late 2010. In addition to taking stock of the last decade of the 
technical cooperation relationship between CARICOM and Japan, since the 
signing of the New Framework for CARICOM-Japan Cooperation 
Agreement, a revised Framework was considered (CARICOM Secretariat 
2010a). 
Amongst the issues under discussion: trade, integration and climate change. Quasi-interregional 
relations CARICOM-Brazil Technical Cooperation Agreement, which addresses 
sixteen areas of cooperation, including the key areas of agriculture, health, 
tourism and transportation (Skerrit 2010). 
Several bilateral Technical Cooperation Agreements were also signed 
between respective CARICOM Member States and Brazil. 343 Namely, 
"more than 40 bilateral agreements addressing areas of collaboration 
including health, education, culture, agricultural development, energy, 
tourism and civil defense .... [were] among the Summit's outputs" 
(CARICOM Secretariat 2010b). 
In addition, regional Secretariats, namely CARICOM and the OECS, also 
signed separate Memorandum of Understanding with the Rio Branco 
Institute of the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, regarding mutual 
cooperation on the training of diplomats. 
Both parties cited concerns that "the current international financial 
343 Ms Celia del Bubba, Attache, Embassy of the Federative Republic of Brazil to Saint Lucia: Interview by author, Rodney Bay, Saint Lucia, 30th April, 20 I 0. 
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2008 (see Declaration of 
Brasilia 2010)). 
Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean 
States (CALC) 
(Established as a 'unified 
forum' or overarching 
platform, that will effectively 
subsume the Summit of Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
on Integration and 
Development {CALC) and the 
Rio Group-i. e. the 
Permanent Mechanism for 
Consultation and Political 
Coordination-which was 
created in 1986) 
2010/ Annual, Heads of State 
and Government 
structures do not correspond to the unique needs of highly indebted small 
countries with middle income, like those of CARICOM"; and, in this 
respect, President Lula da Silva committed to articulate these concerns and 
related issues at the June 2010 meeting of the Group of 20, i.e. G-20 (see 
Declaration of Brasilia 2010). 
The inaugural Summit was described as having built on several bilateral and 
multilateral encounters between the two sides, including the Sixteenth lnter-
Sessional Meeting of CARI COM Heads of Government in 2005 - at which 
time President Lula da Silva engaged the gathering (see Declaration of 
Brasilia 2010). 
An important current in the dialogue enabled by this platform is Brazil's bid 
for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which 
CARICOM States have generally been supportive of. 
Established at the Rio Group-CARICOM Unity Summit, held in Mexico Transregional 
(on the occasion of the twenty-third Rio Group summit and the second 
CALC). Instructively, the Unity Summit Declaration highlights, "the 
necessity of having our own regional space that consolidates and projects 
the Latin American and Caribbean identity based on shared principles and 
values; and on the ideals of unity and democracy of our peoples" (see Latin 
American and Caribbean Unity Summit Declaration 2010). 
The CALC was formally launched in 2011, in Venezuela (with Chile being 
mooted as the country to host the following summit) - its signatory 
countries including all those in the Western hemisphere, save for the United 
States and Canada. The mainstay of this sort of summitry and diplomatic 
processes that result will be political dialogue and integration issues, 
broadly conceived. The host country described as the main objective of the 
2010 Summit in Mexico to have been consolidating unity in the region, with 
the creation of a platform that is different from the Washington-based OAS. 
The CALC builds on the inaugural Summit of Latin America and the 
Caribbean on Integration and Development, held in Brazil in 2008, under 
the theme 'Cooperation in Integration for Sustainable Development in light 
of climate change and the global crises in finance, food and energy'. Under 
discussion were, for example, the financial, energy and food crises and 
climate change, juxtaposed against integration and development from a 
Latin American and Caribbean perspective. The objectives of that Summit 
were described as strengthening regional integration, and instituting a 
commitment for joint action in the promotion of sustainable development of 
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CARICOM participation in 2000/Annual, Heads of State 
the Inter-Secretariat Co- and Government 
operation in the Greater 
Caribbean initiative of the 
Association of Caribbean 
States Secretariat 
the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean (Skerrit 2010). 
In the context of intensifying cross-regional dialogue, strengthening 
cooperation between regional and sub-regional secretariats was one of the 
areas identified. 
This initiative builds on the spirit of cooperation in the Special Agreement Variation on 
between ACS and CARICOM, signed in 1997. Under the Agreement, relations between 
CARICOM was recognized as a Founding Observer. Indeed, that two regional 
Agreement recognized that the ACS could also enter into special organizations, in 
arrangements with CARICOM and Latin American and Caribbean addition to relations 
Economic System, amongst others in the wider Caribbean, such the Central between two 
American Integration System and the Central American Economic regional groups 
Integration System. To advance the Agreement, the ACS and CARICOM 
Secretariats were charged with holding consultations on a regular basis. 
The Secretary Generals of CARICOM, ACS and Latin American and 
Caribbean Economic System have also met in recent years under a separate 
dispensation, with a view to advancing cooperation amongst their 
secretariats. 
The Inter-Secretariat Co-operation in the Greater Caribbean initiative 
convened an inaugural meeting in 2000, in accordance with the mandate 
handed down from the Second Summit of Heads of State and Government 
of ACS. These meetings have seen the participation not only of CARI COM 
and Latin American and Caribbean Economic System, but also Central 
American Integration System, Central American Economic Integration 
System, the Andean Community of Nations, OECS, amongst others. 
Themes have been wide-ranging, concerning issues of shared concern. The 
ACS is described as a body facilitating consultation, co-operation and 
concerted action, in the context of its Member States; its areas of focus 
being trade, transport, sustainable tourism and natural disasters. However, it 
also overseas an active work programme regarding the Caribbean Sea 
Initiative. Broadly speaking, the ACS is also envisioned as promoting 
regionalism amongst the wider Caribbean, conceived as the Caribbean 
Basin. 
* This is understood to refer to interregional arrangements in which either CARICOM institutionally and/or CARICOM Member States, at large, are engaged. 
Thus, ALBA and PetroCaribe (which leverages concessionary financing regarding Caribbean countries' purchases of oil, juxtaposed against the broad aim of 
integration through energy cooperation)-ostensibly underwritten by Venezuelan largesse-cum-geopolitical ambitions-is not included here, as not all 
CARI COM Member States are involved. Regarding ALBA, only the Commonwealth of Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda and St Vincent and the Grenadines have 
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joined, in 2008 and 2009 (for both the latter two), respectively.344 In respect of PetroCaribe, all CARI COM Member States are signatories, save for Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago. For similar reasons, also not included are the following sub/cross-regional configurations: (i) the OECS; (ii) the Trinidad and Tobago-
Eastern Caribbean states integration initiative (involving Grenada, Saint Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines; (iii) Central American Integration System (by 
virtue of Belize joining in 2000; although like Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Panama, it is not a part of the deeper integration process being pursued by 
the Central America Four: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua); and (iv) the Union of South American Nations (formerly the South American 
Community of Nations), which brings together the countries of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the Andean Community of Nations and two 
CARICOM States, Guyana and Suriname. 
• The Commonwealth and .Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (or the International Organization of the Francophonie) groupings are also not 
included, as there is only partial representation of Caribbean countries in each. 
There have also been recent efforts to deepen CARICOM-Australia relations, not reflected in the above matrix. The outlines of these relations have been 
sketched, but the nature of the relationship is still in its infancy, and not fully elaborated. The focus of Australia's development partnership with CARI COM is on: 
"Combatting the negative effects of Climate Change and reducing the risks posed by natural disasters; building regional economic resilience and supporting 
regional economic integration; and strengthening people-to-people linkages through volunteer programs, scholarships and fellowships and other exchanges" 
(CARICOM Secretariat 2010c). Since 2007, Australia has sought to more concertedly engage the Caribbean; most recently reiterating its commitment to 
enhancing its ties with CARI COM by way of an address-the first of its kind-to the Thirteenth Meeting of CARICO M's COFCOR, in May 2010, by Australia's 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon Stephen Smith (Ibid). A much-cited marker for this new relationship was "the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
[underscoring the establishment of a new relationship] between CARI COM and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in Port-of-Spain in November 2009 in the 
margins of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Trinidad and Tobago. This meeting of CARI COM Heads of Government with Australia's Prime 
Minister was the first of its kind. It was followed by the formal accreditation of Australia's High Commissioner to Trinidad and Tobago on 30 April 20 I 0 as 
Australia's first Plenipotentiary Representative to CARICOM" (Ibid). Moreover, "the areas of collaboration provided for under the [aforementioned] 
Memorandum of Understanding [and that are seen as] vital to the development ofCARICOM rang[e]. ... from climate change and emergency management, to 
regional integration and trade facilitation, diplomacy, renewable energy, food security and agricultural cooperation, sports, youth, culture, education and human 
rights" (CARI COM Secretariat 201 Od). 
344 Mr Jose Antonio Melendez Adrian, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to Saint Lucia: Interview by author, Castries, 
St Lucia, 29th April, 2010. 
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